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1chAPteR 1 - IntRodUctIon
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
This chapter consists of four sections. The first section describes the position of this study in relation to relevant theories in the field of 
conflict studies, including studies on ethno-religious conflict in Indonesia 
and on avoidance of intergroup contact in Western countries. The second 
section sheds light on how avoidance of intergroup contact is related 
to latent conflict, ethno-religious identification and majority-minority 
relations. Section three provides a description of the research sites in the 
Indonesian cities of Yogyakarta and Ambon, including a historical view of 
the political, economic and socio-cultural developments in both places. The 
fourth and final section of this chapter presents several research questions, 
both descriptive and explanatory, which guided research and analysis. The 
main question we attempt to answer in this dissertation is to what extent 
ethno-religious identification affects avoidance of intergroup contact 
between Muslims and Christians in Ambon and Yogyakarta, taking into 
account several individual and intermediate determinants.
1.1 Position of the thesis
Communal violence between ethno-religious groups has been a common 
occurrence in certain regions of Indonesia, particularly in the period 
between 1990 and 2003. Fourteen provinces were affected by these kinds 
of violent conflicts, resulting in the deaths of more than ten thousand 
people (Varshney et al., 2004:26). Communal violence between religious 
groups (Islam and Christianity) claimed the largest percentage of victims 
at 57%, while violence stemming from conflicts between ethnic groups 
was responsible for 30% of the deaths. The remaining 13% of deaths are 
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attributed to violence against people of Chinese descent. Western and 
Indonesian scholars have conducted several studies to analyze why and 
how an increase in communal violence took place after the economic crisis 
and political reforms of 1998. Bertrand (2004:7-9) uses an institutional 
historical approach to theorize that inter-communal violence is a specific 
characteristic of transitional periods.1 Similarly, Van Klinken (2007) relates 
violence in Indonesia to the power relations between political elites.2 Other 
research on conflict in the Northern Moluccas by Wilson (2008:195) 
demonstrates that macro-structural forces and changes in those structures 
play a role in conflict. These studies emphasize that local elites attempt 
to make use of ethno-religious identities in order to realize their political 
claims, and to acquire political positions and access to resources. 
However, most studies on conflict in Indonesia do not make the link 
between the contextual and individual processes of interaction between 
members of ethno-religious groups who are involved in communal violence 
(Gismar, 2000:44-50). Despite many studies on conflict, empirical studies 
of the way that conflict unfolds at the individual level remain scarce (Adam, 
2010a:43). More broadly, there is a disjuncture in the literature between 
those studies of conflict that pay most attention to the political, economic 
and social bases for ethno-religious conflicts, and those that focus more on 
prejudice, discrimination and attitudes (Green and Seher, 2003:510). The 
former approach is apparent in the studies by Brubaker and Laitin (1998) 
and Williams (1994). The latter approach can be found in the research 
of Fiske (1998) and Krysan (2000). This study is an effort to bridge this 
disjuncture in conflict studies by investigating conflictual relationships 
between groups at the level of the individual. This research addresses to 
1 In the period of transition to democracy, state institutions were weakened when the 
processes of contesting and allocating power between groups were more publicly 
observable than previously. This encouraged ethno-religious groups to renegotiate 
the structure of the state’s institutions because of the unfair distribution of power and 
resources during the New Order regime (1966 - 1998).
2 Van Klinken argues that democratization and decentralization has weakened the national 
government, encouraging local elites to mobilize ethno-religious groups in bids for 
regional control. 
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what extent processes of ethno-religious identification among individuals 
relate to, and affect, their support of exclusionary attitudes towards members 
of other ethno-religious groups. 
This study, however, does not focus on the enactment of communal 
violence. Referring to Deutsch’s (1973:14) typology of conflict, this study 
focuses on latent conflict, which he describes as an unconscious form 
of conflict, because it is not directly observable in individual and group 
behaviours. Based on Merton’s concept of latent dysfunction (1968:117), 
latent conflict can be viewed as the unintended and unrecognized 
consequences of individual and group behaviours that lead to social 
disintegration. Latent conflict may transform into communal violence if at 
least one of the following conditions is met: there is a mass mobilization 
undertaken by elites; one group is stereotyped through the framing processes 
of the media; and structural opportunity develops. Communal violence, in 
turn, is likely lead to latent conflict because it is grounds for the cultivation 
of hostility and hatred (De Jonge and Nooteboom, 2006:472). This study 
focuses on the avoidance of intergroup contact between different ethno-
religious groups, utilizing cognitive and emotional mapping of differences 
between ethno-religious groups, and the extent to which members of 
certain ethno-religious group allow interactions with members of other 
ethno-religious groups (Sterkens, 2009:6). The implication of intergroup 
contact avoidance is the absence of social interaction between groups, 
either formally or informally, which in turn tends to feed into communal 
violence and conflict (Varshney, 2002:9).  
Research on intergroup contact avoidance by ethno-religious groups 
is a major topic of social scientific research, covering many and various 
aspects of the phenomenon, as will be described further in section 1.2. 
Previous research in this field can be divided into three major topics. The 
first topic is research on social avoidance, which has been investigated by 
Bogardus (1925a), Coenders et al. (2007), Semyonov et al. (2007) and 
Schuman et al. (1997). They emphasize that intergroup contact avoidance 
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is generally associated with ethnocentrism and out-group hostility. The 
second topic is represented by studies conducted by Clark (1992), Walter 
(1986), Postlewaite and Silverman (2004), Waterman and Kosmin (1988) 
and Sanders (2002). Their studies focus on how support for residential 
segregation is related to ethnic, religious and racial identification. The 
third topic, researched by Sean and Murdock (1998), Iceland and Wilkes 
(2006), Tolsma et al. (2008) and Shimahara (1983), pays attention to how 
support for residential segregation, opposition to inter-ethnic marriage and 
segregated social interaction are related to the relationship between the 
majority and the minority.
In contrast to those studies, this research employs a theory of ethnic 
group conflict that guides the research methods and analysis applied to 
data on contact avoidance at the individual level. Consequently, this 
study emphasizes the importance of ethno-religious identity in relation 
to exclusionary reactions. In combining both quantitative and qualitative 
methods with triangulation analyses, findings from surveys are enriched 
by findings from in-depth interviews, providing more fully comprehensive 
data. Another significant distinction between this research and previous 
studies on contact avoidance is that this study investigates religious 
groups in Indonesia, while most studies on social avoidance focus on 
racial or ethnic groups in Western countries. In this thesis, I also argue that 
prejudicial and discriminatory attitudes can also be found in relationships 
between religious groups. Finally, while previous studies have focused 
on either attitudes to avoid out-group members, or on preferences to live 
in residential segregation, this study focuses on both of these practices, 
classifying them as intergroup contact avoidance.
Intergroup contact avoidance is considered to be a dimension of 
ethnic exclusionism (Scheepers et al., 2002:18). This attitude is related to 
the social construction of boundaries through identification with ethno-
religious groups across four domains: economic, political, social and 
cultural. Group identification is a process by which individuals are bound 
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to their groups and become aware of their group identity (Billig, 1976:322). 
It is a process dependent on a historical context that exists at a definite 
time. This particular form of identification takes place in every society 
that is characterized by competition for material resources, power, and 
status (Coser, 1956:8).3 In this study, I use the term ethno-religious group 
to emphasize both ethnic and religious identity, since both identities are 
often intermingled in Indonesia.4 This study is supported by evidence from 
fieldwork in the region of Yogyakarta in Central Java, and in the city of 
Ambon in the Moluccas. 
Research Issue1.2 
Exclusionary attitudes include various ethno-religious group attitudes, 
from prejudice (Jones, 1972; Pettigrew and Meertens, 1995; Coendors 
et al., 2001; cf. Coenders et al., 2007: 217-244) to the rejection of equal 
treatment (Schuman et al., 1997) and discriminatory attitudes towards out-
group members (Coenders et al., 2007: 217-244). Referring to Bogardus 
(1925a), contact avoidance is sociologically rooted in social distance. The 
concept refers to the grades and degrees of understanding and intimacy that 
are characterized in personal and social relations (Park, 1923 cf. Bogardus, 
1925a; Wark and Galliher, 2007:389). Following Bogardus, this study 
defines avoidance of intergroup contact as the individual attitudes leading 
to the avoidance of religious out-group members as friends, classmates, 
board mates, neighbours and elected officials, as well as to an individual’s 
preference to live in a separate area inhabited by people from the same 
religion.5 
3 However, the actual competition analysed in this study is on the contextual level, where 
power struggles between ethno-religious groups take place in the political field, and 
are influenced by social structure and agency. In addition, the kinds of resources that I 
refer to in this study include economic, social, cultural and symbolic resources (Harker, 
1990:13).
4 For example, Adenay-Risakotta (2005) dissertation describes that the identity of both 
Muslim and Christian groups in Northern Moluccas are still deeply based in connections 
to the land and rooted in local traditions (2004:349).
5 Board mates in this study refers to dormitory friends.
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Intergroup contact avoidance as latent conflict1.2.1 
Exclusionary reactions have several dimensions, namely prejudice, anti-
locution (gossip), contact avoidance, discrimination and physical attacks 
(Allport, 1958:15). Prejudice, for instance, can be described as a pattern of 
hostility directed against an entire group or against its individual members 
(Ackerman and Jahoda, 1950:4).6 Contact avoidance, the exclusionary 
reaction focused on in this study, refers to how Bogardus calculates social 
distance, incorporating individual attitudes that support the avoidance of 
engaging with out-group members as spouses, close friends, neighbours, 
colleagues and fellow citizens (Bogardus, 1925b cf. Wark and Galliher, 
2007; Hagendoorn, 1995:203). Nevertheless, contact avoidance has many 
links with other exclusionary reactions. Prejudice can develop as contact 
avoidance if it is driven by ethnocentrism, which is a combination of 
favourable attitudes toward in-group members and unfavourable attitudes 
toward out-group members (Adorno et al., 1950; Sumner, 1906/1959 cf. 
Coenders and Scheepers, 2003:313-343).7 Also, ethnocentrism that contains 
prejudice can lead to contact avoidance (Coenders and Scheepers, ibid.).8 
Another factor related to contact avoidance is intergroup hostility, which can 
be stimulated by competition over scarce resources and by conflicts over 
values. Here, contact avoidance can be viewed as latent conflict because it 
is essentially rooted in prejudice, ethnocentrism and intergroup hostility, 
representing a dysfunctional aspect of the social structure. Most studies 
consider prejudice to be the result of intra-group processes that displace 
aggression from powerful, frustrated groups onto a powerless minority 
(Freud, 1930:114-115, Stroebe and Insko, 1989:3-37). 
6 Prejudice is a product of situations, particularly historical and political situations; it does 
not solely present in individuals (Schermerhorn, 1970:6). 
7 Prejudice is also commonly associated with a view that one’s own group is the centre of 
everything, and all other groups are assessed with reference to it (Sumner 1906:27). 
8 Prejudice may lead to hostility if prejudice is mainly based on stereotypes towards out-
groups members (Eagly and Diekman, 2005:19). Ethnocentrism tends to create and 
preserve prejudice against out-group members (Cunningham et al., 2004:1333).
7chAPteR 1 - IntRodUctIon
Contact avoidance can be observed in daily interactions. Semyonov 
et al., (2007:439) describes how individuals prefer to live in racially or 
ethnically homogenous environments because they want to avoid sharing 
residential space and interacting with out-group members in daily life. 
In his study, contact avoidance is rooted in ethnocentrism, which entails 
a combination of favourable attitudes toward in-group members and 
unfavourable attitudes toward out-group members. Similarly, Krysan 
and Farley’s (2002:941) work on the relationship between residential 
segregation and ethnocentrism explains that an individual’s motivation to 
live in residential segregation is to avoid out-group members, because they 
would experience prejudice and discrimination by the dominant group in 
an unsegregated area. Another study by Bobo and Zubrinsky (1996:903) 
says that ethnocentrism and intergroup hostility explains the preference to 
live in residential segregation. A study by Patchen et al. (1977: 55-75) on 
racial avoidance among students of a public school in Indianapolis (USA) 
describes how social avoidance is related to personal characteristics that 
consist of personal aggressiveness, individual racial attitudes and the racial 
attitudes of peers and family members. 
Avoidance of intergroup contact may turn out to be an option to prevent 
the manifestation of violent conflict. Jacobson’s research (1977:1012) 
into contact avoidance between black, white and Latino students in the 
United States shows that contact avoidance can function as a peaceful way 
of avoiding the implementation of policies of racial assimilation. Another 
study by Tabory (1993: 148) on contact avoidance between Jewish groups 
in Israel points out that avoidance works as an exit option or as a way 
to reduce hostility by cutting social interaction. Other studies point out, 
however, that contact avoidance also has the potential to incite communal 
violence (Deutsch and Coleman, 2000:143). Although the practices and 
attitudes of contact avoidance are not always in conflict (and sometimes 
function as an aspect of social cohesion), we look at intergroup contact 
avoidance as a dysfunction. Referring to Merton (1968:117), we argue that 
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contact avoidance has unrecognized and unintended consequences that can 
disturb social order.
 
   Intergroup contact avoidance and ethno-religious    1.2.2 
identification
Ethno-religious identification refers to an individual’s processes of social 
categorization, identification and contra-identification with certain groups, 
as well as how they situate themselves in the comparison between groups. On 
one hand, ethno-religious identification can be perceived as an individual’s 
need to conserve their values and to search for complete knowledge (Allport, 
1954:13-18). On the other hand, it refers to how individuals recognize their 
reference group and externalize their knowledge of inter-group relations 
(Berger, 1967:3-28; Durkheim, 1993:90-99). 
Some theoretical propositions mention that in most cases ethno-
religious identification is likely to induce some exclusionary attitudes. 
Weber (1978:342 cf. Vertigans, 2007:304) claims that certain ethno-religious 
groups employ their identities in an exclusionary manner to maintain 
and enhance their position in intergroup relations. Group identities are 
employed to exclude out-group members when the degree of identification 
with a group, or salience of social identity, is very high; both in-group 
and out-group compete intensively in the same field, and also compete 
when the dimensions of intergroup comparison are related to differences in 
intergroup status, and when out-group statuses are shaped by the particular 
comparative judgment (Turner,1999:6-34).
Here, I will summarize several arguments about how ethno-religious 
identification leads to contact avoidance at the individual level. First, 
individuals who possess strong religious identification tend to support 
exclusionary reactions because the extrinsic values of their religious 
convictions may contribute to creating intergroup bias (Allport, 1966:456).9 
In addition, some religious practices and doctrines of particularism are 
9 This view is criticized by Harek (1987:6), who points out that some religious values are 
also intrinsically capable of creating prejudice against out-groups.
9chAPteR 1 - IntRodUctIon
related to prejudicial attitudes towards minority groups (Scheepers et al., 
2002a:242-265). Finally, Sanford (1969:220) argues that the acceptance of 
religion as an expression of submission to parental authority is a condition 
favourable to ethnocentrism, which in turn leads to contact avoidance.10 
In terms of ethno-religious identification being related to both social 
avoidance and residential segregation, Tabory’s study on the relationship 
between religious and non-religious Jews in Israel shows that religious 
identification leads to social avoidance and support for residential 
segregation (1993:160). He explains that ethno-religious groups live in 
closed communities to prevent their lifestyles from being impinged upon. 
Other research by Waterman and Kosmin (1988:79) on the residential 
patterns of Jews in London explains that the motivation to live in residential 
segregation is to maintain ethno-religious values and to live separately from 
the general population. 
Contact avoidance and support for residential segregation also takes 
place in countries where ethno-religious identification is not very significant. 
Residential segregation is often associated with social separation, which is 
defined as non-participation in a social institution resulting from individual 
voluntary choices (Barry, 1998 cf. Postlewaite and Silverman, 2005:2). 
Clark’s study on the behaviour of racial groups in the United States explains 
that racial avoidance plays an important role in the making of neighbourhoods 
(1992:451-466). Avoidance behaviour between racial groups can strengthen 
the already existing residential segregation. A study by Walter (1986:131-
146) on Irish residential segregation points out that residential clustering 
of Irish-born people in Luton (England) is a product of a distinctive ethnic 
background (1986:144). Another study by Sanders (2002:328) shows that 
segregation can be explained by a group member’s self-identification and 
the out-group acknowledgement of intergroup distinction. These conditions 
10 The need to maintain a positive distinction between the in-group and the out-group may 
lead to attitudes that are in favour of the in-group and against the out-group. Prejudiced, 
intergroup conflict and stereotyping arises from the struggle to maintain positive social 
identity (Wolfe and Spencer, 1996:177). 
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tend to lead to limited interactions, ignorance about other group members, 
rising levels of prejudice and negative stereotypes against the out-group.11 
Based on these studies, I find that group identification, including ethno-
religious identification, is likely to lead to contact avoidance or support for 
residential segregation. This study, therefore, focuses on the avoidance of 
intergroup contact in relation to ethno-religious identification. 
Intergroup contact avoidance and group size 1.2.3 
Actual competition and conflict is often related to relative group size.12 We 
define majority or minority groups from the quantity of their members or 
followers that can be differentiated along ethnic or religious lines (Robertson, 
2000:177). The positions of majority and minority groups in competition 
are related to differences in power and status. Power refers to social power, 
defined here as “the degree of control that one group has over its own fate 
and that of out-groups” (Jones 1972 cf. Sachdev and Bourhis, 1991:3), 
while status is defined as the relative positions of groups across valued 
dimensions of comparison (Tajfel and Turner, 1986:19). Differential access 
to power between ethnic groups is the most important determinant of ethnic 
discrimination and stratification13 (Barth and Noel, 1972:345; Marger 1985; 
Schermerhorn, 1970 cf. Sachdev and Bourhis, 1991:2). In contrast, status 
distinction between groups is considered to be an implication of different 
levels of power in a stratified society.14 However, in this study, I focus only 
on group size (between majority and minority) because we can use more 
11 Racial and territorial segregation are not necessarily fundamental elements of ethnic 
boundaries, yet they are  important when one or both of these elements of social 
organization play a role in the reconstruction of ethnic identity.
12 Competition is defined as a continuous and impersonal struggle between individuals 
or groups who are not necessarily in contact and communication. Meanwhile, conflict 
is competition that is personal and intermittent, between those who are in contact and 
communication (Park and Burgess, 1921:574-575 cf. Olzak, 1992:29).
13 Ethnocentrism, intergroup competition and differential power between groups serve as a 
basis for the prediction of ethnic stratification (Noel, 1968:157).
14 The creation of groups arises from the exercise of power through differentiation, 
stratification and constraint. Power contributes to the potential for conflict both as a 
field for ethnocentrism and as a basis for visible differences between groups (Mack, 
1965:395).
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empirical methods of measuring and identifying these categories based in 
quantitative observations, methods which are less applicable to assessing 
observations of power and status differences.
Minority groups are likely to avoid contact with majority groups 
due to being discriminated against by the majority. A study of Willmore 
(1997:1) points out that discrimination often leads to exclusionary 
reactions. If majority members discriminate against minority members, 
the discrimination will be internalized and institutionalized by the majority 
group. As a consequence, exclusionary reactions become inevitable. 
Another explanation is that differences in power and status between groups 
correspond with objective positions in fields of competition through 
which dominant groups control subordinated groups. The field is an arena 
of struggle, where both groups compete for the distribution of resources 
(Bourdieu, 1991:14). Power depends on the ownership of resources and 
influences objective positions (status). In this field, the dominant groups 
or the higher-status groups support discriminatory behaviour to exclude 
the subordinated groups or the lower-status groups (Bonacich, 1972; 
Cummings, 1980 cf. Semyonov et al., 2002:416). Here, contact avoidance 
and support for residential segregation can be viewed as a strategy to 
exclude the minority or the subordinated groups from competition and 
access to resources. 
The following studies explain contact avoidance, the support of 
residential segregation and opposition to interethnic marriage between 
majority and minority groups. The work of Sean and Murdock (1998:489) 
on contact avoidance between the white majority and non-white minorities 
in American suburbs shows that the minority groups are concentrated in 
the more affordable suburban areas. Meanwhile, the white majority that 
has access to more resources tends to live in urban areas. Iceland and 
Wilkes (2006:268) describe how differences in socio-economic status leads 
to support for residential segregation in the United States, although the 
support for residential segregation is stronger among Asian and Hispanic 
12
InteRgRoUP contAct AVoIdAnce In IndoneSIA
groups than among Anglo-American groups. Semyonov et al. (2007:448) 
also describe how support for residential segregation among Europeans 
tends to be more salient in countries where competition in the labour and 
housing markets are more intense.15
Another study by Tolsma et al. (2008:215-230) analyses ethnic 
competition and opposition to interethnic marriages in the Netherlands. 
They find that religious affiliation is a strong predictor for opposition to 
ethnically mixed marriages, more specifically to marriages of native Dutch 
people with Moroccans, Turks, or Surinamese (2008:227). Moreover, a 
deteriorating socio-economic status increases opposition to interethnic 
marriage. Competition between ethnic groups can develop into exclusionary 
attitudes and turn into opposition to heterogamous marriages. If ethnic 
competition results in antagonistic attitudes, economic competition and 
increases in the size of minority groups can lead to opposition to interethnic 
marriage. Another study by Shimahara (1983:109-130) explains that 
avoidance of interaction among students in high school is caused by 
racially-based residential segregation (1983:130). Differences in race are 
likely lead to the creation of neighbourhoods that are separated from the 
white majority with the racial status stratification being a stronger factor 
than class stratification. 
1.2.4 Research setting
This research focuses on contact avoidance between ethno-religious groups 
in the cities of Yogyakarta in Java and Ambon in the Moluccas. Many ethno-
religious groups inhabit both Ambon and Yogyakarta because the cities are 
centres of provincial government, education and economic activity. Previous 
research shows that Yogyakarta has always been a relatively harmonious 
15 The relationship between group size and support for residential segregation also came to 
the attention of Pooley (1977:378-380). He explains that the socio-economic structure 
of migrant communities, their cultural cohesion and their experiences with urban life 
affects residential segregation between Irish, Scottish and Welsh inhabitants of Liverpool 
in England. 
13
chAPteR 1 - IntRodUctIon
and peaceful city (Selosoemardjan, 1962:211-212; Sumartana et al., 
1999:241). For example, at the beginning of the political reforms in 1998, 
demonstrations in Yogyakarta by students and community groups were 
peaceful, in contrast to demonstrations in many other cities in Indonesia. It 
also appears that Yogyakarta has low levels of contact avoidance between 
ethno-religious groups. However, fundamentalist and radical Islamic 
groups have recently become active in the city, which sooner or later might 
influence the existing situation (Fox, 2004:16-17; Umam, 2006:9-15). 
Ambon stands in sharp contrast to Yogyakarta. Communal violence and 
religious segregation between Muslim and Christian communities has been 
the order of the day since the colonial period (Chauvel, 1990:1-23; Yanuarti 
et al., 2005:82-85). Although contact avoidance is relatively strong in 
Ambon, there are nevertheless still spaces where both communities interact, 
such as at some markets and particular schools, and in public offices. 
1.2.4.1 Yogyakarta
In this study, Yogyakarta refers to greater Yogyakarta, which consists of 
the city of Yogyakarta and the adjacent regencies of Sleman and Bantul.16 
Yogyakarta is located in the southern part of Central Java between Merapi 
volcano and the Indian Ocean. 
16 Greater Yogyakarta is not an official administrative entity, but people usually mean this 
bigger area when they speak about Yogyakarta.
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Map 1.1 Yogyakarta Special Region17
    
The city of Yogyakarta was originally the capital of the principality 
(vorstenland) with the same name that together with the principality of 
Surakarta was created by the Dutch in 1755 out of the remainder of the 
Mataram kingdom. Since Indonesia became independent, it is the provincial 
capital of the Yogyakarta Special Region (Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta, 
DIY). Yogyakarta was also the capital of the Indonesian Republic between 
1945 and 1949. Since that time, the ruling sultan combines his traditional 
position with that of the provincial governor. The present provincial 
governor is Sultan Hamengkubuwono X, a direct descendent of the first 
Sultan of Yogyakarta. During British colonial rule (1812-1816), part of the 
original principality was given to a son of the second wife of the first sultan, 
and that region is still headed by his descendants who bear the title paku 
alam (Selosoemardjan, 1962:12-14). Nowadays, Paku Alam IX occupies 
the position of vice-governor. Traditionally, the sultan is highly esteemed 
17 Source: http://petapembelajaran.blogspot.nl/2012/01/provinsi-di-indonesia-bagian-2.
html (accessed 23 September 2014).
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by the people of Yogyakarta. He is widely accredited for the absence of 
violence in the area after the Dutch recognized Indonesian independence in 
1949. Although progressive intellectual groups in Yogyakarta have recently 
criticized as undemocratic the appointment of these traditional leaders as 
governor and vice-governor as undemocratic, these complaints have not 
undermined the authority of the sultan. Despite the fact that the sultan’s 
position has become politicized, he still knows how to bring together the 
different populations in the region and how to protect the region’s minority 
groups. 
In 2010, greater Yogyakarta had 2,393,240 inhabitants: 388,627 in 
Yogyakarta proper, 1,093,110 in Sleman and 911,503 in Bantul (BPS DIY, 
2011:181). 90.72% of them were Muslims, while Protestants and Catholics 
made up respectively 3.23% and 5.75%. Hindus and Buddhists consisted 
of 0.17% and 0.10%. Compared with data from 1980, the percentage of 
Muslims has decreased slightly, dropping 2.54% (BPS DIY, 1981:48). In 
the same period, the percentage of Protestants and Catholics has increased 
slightly by 1.32% and 1.22% respectively (see table 1.1). Despite the fact 
that Christians are a minority in Yogyakarta, in terms of national religious 
demographics, they constituted the second largest local Christian community 
in Indonesia in 2010. Unfortunately, the religion of students in the city who 
originated from outside greater Yogyakarta is not included in the census, as 
those students are registered in their home areas. This implies that between 
one half to two-thirds of the total number of students (246,703) in Yogyakarta 
may not be included in the statistics above (Syamsuddin et al., 2004:3). 
The religious composition of the population in greater Yogyakarta differs 
slightly from the religious composition at the provincial and national level. 
At the provincial level, the 2010 census recorded 91.95% of the provincial 
population as Muslim, 2.73% as Protestants, 4.79% as Catholics, 0.15% as 
Hindus and 0.10% as Buddhists. At the national level, the population was 
composed of 87.18% Muslims, 6.96% Protestants, 2.91% Catholics, 1.69% 
Hindus and 0.72% Buddhists (BPS DIY, 2011:181).
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Table 1.1 Religious composition of greater Yogyakarta 1980 – 2010
Sources: BPS DIY, 1981:48; 2001:184; 2011:181.
Yogyakarta has an even greater variety of ethnic groups. The first 
official census of 1930 shows that the population of the city (143,909) 
consisted of 88.38% Indonesians, 6.30% Chinese, 3.88% Europeans and 
0.11% Other Asians (Department van Landbouw, Nijverheid en Handel, 
1931a:24). No information on the ethnic composition of the native 
population at the provincial level was included, but without a doubt, the 
greater part of Yogyakarta’s population consisted of Javanese. Subsequent 
censuses conducted between the nation’s independence and the year 2000 
did not include ethnic categories. Only since the turn of the last century 
was the ethnic identity of inhabitants included in the census again. In 
2010, the Javanese made up the majority (96.54%) of Yogyakarta, while 
the remaining population consisted of a great number of minorities that 
even when added together did not exceed more than 3.50% (see table 1.2). 
The ‘main’ ethnic minorities in the urban conglomerate were Sundanese, 
Malay, Chinese, Batak, Madurese, Minangkabau, Dayak, Papua, Balinese, 
as well as people from Nusa Tenggara Timur (Eastern Sunda Islands) and 
Lampung. Almost all the main ethnic groups of Indonesia are present in 
Yogyakarta, although their percentages differ substantially from the ethnic 
profile at the national level.18
18 In 2010, the seven biggest ethnic groups in Indonesia were the Javanese (40.22%), the 
Sundanese (15.5%), the Bataknese (3.58%), the tribes of Sulawesi (3.22%), the Madurese 
(3.03%), the Betawi (2.88%) and the Minangkabau (2.73%) (BPS, 2011a).
Religion
year
1980 2000 2010
 
Number % Number % Number %
Muslim 1,590,614 93.26 1,911,493 90.64 2,171,173 90.72
Protestant 32,670 1.91 66,450 3.15 77,223 3.23
Catholic 77,211 4.53 122,552 5.81 137,571 5.75
Hindu 2,299 0.13 4,333 0.20 4,061 0.17
Buddhist 1,940 0.11 3,951 0.19 2,419 0.10
1,705,540 100.00 2,108,896 100.00 2,393,240 100.00
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Table 1.2 Ethnic composition of Yogyakarta Special Region in 2010
   Sources: BPS, 2011b: 34
Since independence, Yogyakarta has attracted a continuous stream 
of migrants. Between 1980 and 1990, the positive net yearly migration in 
the special region of Yogyakarta doubled from 25,923 people to 40,963 
people (BPS, 2011c).19 In 2005, the positive net migration reached 102,149 
people. These numbers are in absolute terms higher than in other provinces 
of Java with the exception of West Java, as can be seen in table 1.3. In 
2010, almost one third of the greater Yogyakarta population consisted of 
people born elsewhere: 44.07% in Yogyakarta city, 34.39% in Sleman 
and 21.67% in Bantul (BPS, 2011a).20 Similar to the profile of the city’s 
religious demography, the ethnic diversity of Yogyakarta’s population is 
likely not fully represented by these numbers, as students who came from 
outside Yogyakarta were not counted in the census.
19 www.bps.go.id/tab_sub/view.php?tabel=1&daftar=1&id_subyek=12&notab=9 
(accessed 22 October 2014). Census data from 1980 demonstrates that the majority of 
the migrants came from Central Java (48.5%) and Eastern Java (15%). Others were from 
Sumatra (11.3%), Bali and Nusa Tenggara (2.3%), Kalimantan (2.4%), Sulawesi (1.6%) 
and Moluccas and Papua (1.5%) (Nagib, 1986: 43).
20 Sensus penduduk 2010, Retrieved from http://sp2010.bps.go.id (accessed 22 October 
2014)
No. 2010
Ethnic group Number %
 
1. Javanese 3,331,355 96.54
2. Sundanese 23,572 0.68
3. Malay 15,430 0.45
4. Chinese 11,545 0.33
5. Batak 9,858 0.29
6. Madurese 5,289 0.15
7. Minangkabau 5,152 0.15
8. East Nusa Tenggara 4,238 0.12
9. Dayak 3,790 0.11
10. Other south Sumatra 3,629 0.11
11. Papua 3,567 0.10
12. Balinese 3,495 0.10
13. Others 29,924 0.87
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Table 1.3 Net migration in Java 1980-2005
 
 
Source: BPS, 2011c.
The political situation
The present-day city of Yogyakarta is the administrative, political, 
economic and educational centre of the special region, with the same status 
as a province. All provincial branches of national governmental institutions 
are based in the city. Since independence, the sultan and paku alam hold 
the positions of governor and vice-governor, respectively. Until 2008, the 
occupation of these gubernatorial positions had never been under discussion. 
In that year, the national government proposed that these positions were no 
longer to be automatically granted to the ruling sultan and paku alam. This 
proposal was, however, not well received by the population of Yogyakarta 
at large. Only a few intellectuals from the University of Gadjah Mada 
(Universitas Gadjah Mada, UGM) and the Islamic University Student 
Association (Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam, HMI), supported the idea that 
the governor and vice-governor should be democratically elected. All 
religious organizations in the region, including Muhammadiyah, Nahdlatul 
Ulama (NU) and the Indonesian Communion of Churches (Persekutuan 
Gereja Indonesia, PGI) rejected this idea, because elections would separate 
the ruling sultan from the people of Yogyakarta. After four years of debate 
in the national parliament, the national government eventually enforced a 
law that strengthened the existing situation.21 
As a part of the political decentralization that took place after President 
Soeharto stepped down in May 1998, since 1999 governors have shared their 
21 See Law no. 13/2012 on the status of Yogyakarta Special Region, Chapter 18 verse 1.
No. Provinces Net migration 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 
 
1. Yogyakarta Special Region 25,923 9,878 40,963 54,305 67,056 102,149 
2. Central Java -724,541 -436,059 -774,941 -380,474 -663,290 -334,589 
3. East Java -367,380 -170,446 -318,741 27,837 -343,071 -94,111 
4. Jakarta 384,037 285,264 -160,348 -228,503 -148,141 -159,411 
5. West Java 83,519 210,386 854.869 668,836 465,268 287,839 
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power with a provincial parliament consisting of elected representatives of 
political parties. During the Soeharto regime, there were only three political 
parties: Golkar, the political machine of the regime (Partai Golongan Karya, 
Golkar), the Unity Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, 
PPP) and the Indonesian Democratic Party (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia, 
PDI). From these parties, only Golkar and PPP still exist, and both now have 
to compete with many new political parties, including religion-based and 
nationalist parties which have been founded since political reform started. 
The most important new political parties represented in the provincial 
parliament are the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (Partai 
Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan, PDI-P), which replaced the former PDI; 
the Democratic Party (Partai Demokrat, the party of incumbent President 
SB Yudhoyono); the National Mandate Party (Partai Amanah Nasional, 
PAN); the Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS); 
and the National Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, PKB). 
Golkar and Partai Demokrat are nationalist-oriented parties, whereas the 
PDI-P is a nationalist-oriented populist party; that is to say, the latter is a 
nationalist party that explicitly aims to reach lower socio-economic groups 
with popular measures. The PDI-P promised for instance to allow pedicabs 
(becaks) to operate all over Jakarta, and campaigned for the distribution of 
land to landless people (Suryadinata, 2002:93). PKS, PAN and PKB are 
progressive Muslim parties. In the 2009 election in greater Yogyakarta, the 
PDI-P won 25% of the total number of parliamentary seats, while Partai 
Demokrat and PAN got 17% and 15%. Golkar and PKS got 12% each, 
and PPP and PKB 6% each. The remaining seats went to other, smaller 
parties (BPS DIY, 2012:48). The progressive Muslim parties have many 
supporters among pious Muslims. 
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The economic situation
Once predominantly a centre for agricultural distribution, over the years 
Yogyakarta has developed a fairly diversified economic centre. Although 
the city has no big factories, there are a huge number of small and medium-
scale enterprises. Most of them operate in the trade, services and tourist 
sectors. In 2010, 31.86% of the city’s population worked in the trade 
sector, 9.40% in manufacturing, 9.19% in hotels and restaurants, 7.31% 
in education, 4.49% in transportation, 3.34% in construction and 32.80% 
in other small sectors combined (BPS 2011a). Only in rural parts of the 
regencies surrounding the city, Sleman and Bantul, is agriculture still 
important. In the same year, the minimum wage in Yogyakarta was IDR 
750,490 per month (BPS, 2010:26). The cost of living in Yogyakarta is 
considerably cheaper than in other Indonesian cities (Tambunan, 2006:4).22 
Although the standard of living has improved over the years, poverty 
and unemployment  are high. In 2010, 13% of the population of greater 
Yogyakarta lived under the poverty line, with a monthly income per capita 
of IDR 224,258, and 10% of the working age population was unemployed 
(BPS 2011a). 
In almost all economic sectors, a variety of ethnic groups are 
represented – although some sectors are dominated by members of one 
or two ethnic groups. The restaurant sector, for example, is dominated by 
Javanese, Minangkabau and Chinese. Security jobs are typically occupied 
by Javanese and people from East Nusa Tenggara. The food industry (in 
particular milk and bakeries), inter-regional transportation, cell-phones 
and computer shops are often owned by Chinese (Susanto, 2008:140). 
Street trade and home industries, such as furniture and batik production, 
are dominated by the Javanese (Brata, 2008:9). Since 2000, an increasing 
number of business activities have been established for Muslims only, such 
22 Based on a survey on cost of living implemented by Bank Indonesia and Universitas 
Pembangunan Nasional (UPN), the National Development University, Veteran, quoted 
in Radar Yogyakarta (Radar Yogya, 26 September 2012).
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as Islamic fashion, Islamic banking, halal foodstores and restaurants. Quite 
a few real estate businessmen try to attract Muslim customers only, and 
as in other cities in Indonesia, businesses that use religious symbols are 
booming in greater Yogyakarta. 
The socio-cultural situation
Yogyakarta started to become an educational centre during the revolutionary 
period. In 1948, the first state university, Universitas Gadjah Mada (UGM), 
was founded on the premises of the palace (kraton) of the sultan. In 1958, it 
moved to its present location in Sleman. Nowadays, there are ten state and 
120 private higher educational institutes in greater Yogyakarta. In 2009, 
246,793 students studied in greater Yogyakarta; 74,707 at state and 172,086 
at private higher educational institutes (BPS DIY, 2011:129,159). About 
one fifth of them (53,275 persons) studied in Yogyakarta City, the rest in 
Sleman and Bantul (BPS Kota Yogyakarta, 2011:48). A large number of 
students are member of religious student organizations, such as the Islamic 
University Students Association (Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam, HMI) or 
the Catholic Union of University Students of the Republic of Indonesia 
(Perhimpunan Mahasiswa Katolik Republik Indonesia, PMKRI). Students, 
especially those coming from other regions, are sometimes also member 
of ethnic student organizations, such as the Organization of Aceh Students 
in Yogyakarta (Taman Pelajar Aceh Yogyakarta, TPA) and the Papua 
Association of School and University Students (Ikatan Keluarga Pelajar 
dan Mahasiswa Papua, IKPM Papua). In 1998, fundamentalist-oriented 
Muslim students founded the Indonesian Muslim Students Action Union 
(Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia, KAMMI). This organization 
has been influencing relations between students of different religions, 
although it is officially forbidden by the University council to operate on 
campus. 
In recent years, ethnic and religious identities have become more salient 
among the student population. Before 1999, students from different ethno-
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religious groups maintained tolerant relations with each other (Sumartana 
et al., 2009:241). Recently, however, students from different ethnic and 
religious groups have tended to avoid each other, which is not always that 
easy, as many of them take courses together and live together in private 
dormitories. As a matter of fact, many regional governments outside Java 
provide dormitories in Yogyakarta for students from their areas, although 
not enough to house all the students hailing from these regions (Mas’oed 
et al., 2001:126). Some regional dormitories have become so exclusive 
that people from other ethnic groups are afraid to visit them. According to 
Zudianto (2008:82), dorms have become places of people from one culture, 
instead of places of cultural interaction between ethnic groups. The wish to 
live among ‘equals’ is most prominent among fundamentalist Muslims and 
Chinese. Fundamentalist Muslim students prefer to live together in separate 
houses or dormitories to preserve their religious beliefs and traditions, while 
Chinese students prefer to do the same primarily for reasons of security. 
The lifestyles of both groups also differ drastically from other groups. For 
example, the fundamentalist Muslim students dress themselves according 
to the prescriptions of their religion and mix their Indonesian with Arabic 
terms in daily life. The Chinese students typically dress in Western style 
and use the common dialect of people living in Jakarta.
1.2.4.2 The City of Ambon
The city of Ambon is located on the Leitimor Peninsula, in the southern 
part of Ambon Island. Ambon Island, together with the adjacent Lease 
Islands of Haruku, Saparua and Nusa Laut, is the centre of the Moluccan 
Archipelago, which is more commonly known as the Spice Islands. The 
city originates from a settlement that existed outside the walls of a fortress 
founded by the Portuguese in 1576, after they were expelled from Ternate. 
After a series of attacks between 1600 and 1605 by Dutch forces (assisted 
by Ternatese, Javanese soldiers and people from Hitu), the Portuguese 
had to surrender the fortress to their European rivals (Knaap, 1991:105-
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106; Ricklefs, 2008:27-30). The city of Ambon subsequently became the 
centre of the Dutch East Indies Company or the Verenigde Oost-Indische 
Compagnie (VOC). After the VOC made Batavia the capital of its activities 
in the Indonesian archipelago in 1618, Ambon became the administrative 
centre of the Moluccas.23 In 1866, Ambon became the seat of residence 
for Amboina, which consisted of the Central and Southeast Moluccas 
(from 1828 to 1949 it also included West Papua). During World War II, the 
city was bombed and occupied by the Japanese. After the recognition of 
Indonesian independence in 1949, the city became the provincial capital of 
the Moluccas. In 1999, the area was divided into two provinces: the North 
Moluccas with Ternate as the provincial capital, and the Moluccas proper, 
encompassing the central and southeastern part of the islands, with Ambon 
as the provincial capital.
Map 1.2 the Island of Ambon
Source: http://www.websitesrcg.com/ambon/maps.htm, accessed 29 
September, 2014
23 The Moluccas at that time consisted of Ternate, Tidore, Bacan Jailolo, Seram, Ambon 
and Lease, Buru, Banda, Kei and other islands in Southeast Moluccas.
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During the Portuguese period, people from Ambon and the 
neighbouring islands had settled outside the Portuguese fortress, which was 
called Nossa Senhora da Anunciada (Our Lady of the Annunciation). After 
the Dutch took over the fortress, which they called Victoria, the population 
of the settlement gradually increased. In 1694, about 50% of the 5,487 
inhabitants of the city consisted of people of Malay-Indonesian origin, 
mainly members of the Moluccan ethno-linguistic groups, while 25% of 
the inhabitants were Europeans and 15% were Chinese. Less than 5% of 
the Malay-Indonesians came from the island itself (Knaap, 1991:119). 
Due to the flourishing spice trade, the population grew steadily. In 1860, 
the city had 9,586 inhabitants: 81.30% Ambonese, 8.12% Europeans, 
6.73% of other “Indonesian” origins and 3.85% Chinese and other Asians 
(Leirissa, 2000:625). After Ambon had become the administrative centre 
of the residence of Amboina, the population increased further. In 1930, 
the population of the city had 17,078 inhabitants: 78.11% Indonesians, 
12% Europeans, 5.39% Chinese and 4.39% other Asians (Department 
van Landbouw, Nijverheid en Handel, 1931b:26-48). Between 1971 and 
2010, the population increased from 79,280 to 331,254, a growth of 318% 
(BPS Kota Ambon, 1984:19; BPS 2011a). During the religious violence 
that occurred between 1999 and 2004, between 108,000 to 129,000 
inhabitants, approximately half of the population, left the city temporarily 
or permanently (Tomagola, 2007:1).
The continuous increase in the number of inhabitants of the city of 
Ambon was mainly the result of migration, both from inside and outside 
the Moluccas. In particular, after independence, the number of migrants 
from other Indonesian islands increased drastically. One stream of migrants 
consisted of the great number of Indonesian soldiers and policemen that 
were sent to Ambon during the Old Order (the Soekarno regime), the New 
Order (the Soeharto regime) and in recent years to prevent tensions and to 
quell unrest in the area. Spontaneous migration from South and Southeast 
Sulawesi, beginning in the 1970s, also accounted for the increase in the 
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migrant population. Many people from Java also migrated to the Moluccas, 
although they mainly opted to settle in northern Seram and Buru Island 
through government-organized transmigration projects. Some of these 
Javanese transmigrants, however, later moved to the city of Ambon. 
Between 1971 and 1990, the proportion of migrants from outside the 
Moluccas residing in the city of Ambon increased from 5.20% to about 
30.00% of the population (ICG, 2002:1). From the beginning, the migrants 
in the city, mainly Buginese, Butonese and Makassarese (commonly 
called BBM), have dominated petty trade, the service sector (mainly small 
shops and restaurants), local transport (pedicabs and motorbike taxis) and, 
as labourers, building construction; Moluccans themselves dominated 
the wholesale business of agricultural products, the hotel and restaurant 
sector and the financial services. As we will see later, the continuous influx 
of migrants contributed heavily to the tensions and conflicts that have 
characterized the area in the last decade of the 20th century. In 1999, the pent-
up tension exploded into large scale violence when a Christian Ambonese 
attacked a Muslim migrant. The fighting escalated into a huge religious 
conflict that spread across the whole of the Moluccan archipelago between 
1999 and 2003.24 At least 4,840 people died, 1,907 of them in the city of 
Ambon (Varshney et al., 2004:30-34). During these years, many migrants 
left the city permanently or temporarily. In the years after the unrest, the 
number of migrants in Ambon soon reached pre-conflict levels again. In 
2010, migrants made up 34.05% of the city’s population, more than ever 
24 In 2011, Ambon again saw serious outbreaks of religious violence. The first incident 
erupted in September 2011, after a Muslim motorcycle driver died in a traffic accident 
in a Christian village. In riots following this accident, three people were killed and 
hundreds of houses were burned down. The second incident was in December 2011, 
after a Christian shuttle-bus driver was stabbed in a Muslim area. The troubles erupted 
only in the city and did not spread to rural areas, because many Muslims and Christians 
felt that these incidents were instigated by political elites. Apparently, military officers 
and political elites profited from the violence, which erupted before the 2011 mayoral 
election, and again before the 2013 gubernatorial election. For that reason, some people 
argue that these incidents were engineered to promote the idea that the governor-elect 
should be a figure with a military background. Others argue that the incidents cemented 
religious identifications among Muslims and Christians in order to influence the mayoral 
election (ICG, 2011:6-7). 
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before (BPS, 2011a). Many newly returned and new migrants found jobs in 
sectors that were previously dominated by Christian Moluccans. 
The migration process after independence led to changes in 
the religious composition of the population of the Moluccas, as most 
migrants came from provinces that were mainly inhabited by Muslims, 
such as Southeast Sulawesi and South Sulawesi. For centuries Islam and 
Christianity have been the main religions practiced in the Moluccas. In 
2010, the population of the province of the Moluccas (1,533,506) consisted 
of 50.61% Muslims, 41.40% Protestants and 7.90% Catholics. Muslims 
constituted the majority in the regencies of West Seram (Seram Barat) 
(60.31%), Central Moluccas (Maluku Tengah, including Central Seram, 
Banda, rural Ambon and the Lease Islands) (61.85%), East Seram (Seram 
Timur) (95.01%), Buru (84.85%), South Buru (Buru Selatan) (65.27) and 
in the city of Tual (74.91%). Protestants made up the majority in the city of 
Ambon (57.99%) and in the regencies of Aru (59.84%), West South East 
Moluccas (Maluku Tenggara Barat) (61.16%) and South West Moluccas 
(Maluku Barat Daya) (97.69%), while most Catholics lived in the regency 
of Southeast Moluccas (44.18%) (BPS, 2011a). On Ambon Island itself, 
most Muslims lived in the northern part of the Leihitu Peninsula, whereas 
most Protestants inhabited the southern part of the Leihitu Peninsula and 
the whole of the Leitimor Peninsula. 
Table 1.4 Religious composition of Ambon city in 1980, 2000 and 2010
Sources: BPS Provinsi Maluku, 2001; BPS 2011a; Sarluf and Umarella, 1983:14.
Religions Years 1980 2000 2010 
 
 Number % Number % Number % 
Muslim 85,405 41.12 48,997 26.22 128,417 38.77 
Protestant 114,383 55.07 131,936 70.59 192,105 57.99 
Catholic 6,846 3.30 5,769 3.09 7,943 2.40 
Hindu 356 0.17 121 3.06 435 0.13 
Buddhist 144 0.07 70 0.04 120 0.04 
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The religious composition of Ambon city differs from the religious 
composition of inhabitants at the provincial level. Of the 331,254 
inhabitants of Ambon city in 2010, 38.77% were Muslims and 60.39% 
Christians (57.99% Protestant plus 2.40% Catholic) (BPS 2011a). In 
comparison with the religious composition of the city in the 1980s, the 
percentage of Protestants increased by 2.92%, while the percentage of 
Muslims and Catholics decreased by 2.35% and 0.90% respectively (see 
table 1.5). Due to the flight of huge numbers of Muslim migrants after the 
1999-2004 conflict broke out, already in 2000 the number of Muslims had 
decreased drastically. However, by 2004, the number of Muslims living 
in the city had not only returned to previous levels, but began to exceed 
them. Between 1980 and 2010, the number of Muslims living in Ambon 
increased by 43,012 persons. In the same period, the number of Protestants 
increased by 77,722 persons. This figure is however misleading, as the 
greater part of the growth is the result of the inclusion of 25 Christian 
and four Muslim border kampongs (quarters) in the city of Ambon (BPS 
Kotamadya Ambon, 1984:13-15). This expansion of the city border to 
villages in Southern Leihitu and Leitimor Peninsula, which were mainly 
inhabited by Christians, was part of the national government’s response to 
the rapid population growth and ongoing urbanization of the wider region 
of the city of Ambon. 
The continuing process of migration to the Moluccas has led to a 
more varied ethnic population. Table 1.4 gives the ethnic composition of 
the population of the present province of Moluccas based on data from 
the 2010 census. The inhabitants of Ambon, Kei, Seram, Saparua, Aru 
and Yamdena are called the “children of the soil” (anak negeri) by the 
Moluccans themselves. Although they are recorded as distinct ethnic groups 
in the census, they are in fact closely related ethno-linguistic groups. The 
Javanese, Sundanese, Buginese, Butonese, Madurese and Minangkabau 
are members of ethnic groups from outside the Moluccas. In 2000, 83.47% 
of the provincial population consisted of anak negeri and 16.53% of the 
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population were migrants (Suryadinata et al., 2003: 28). In 2010, 75.00% 
of the provincial population were anak negeri and 25.00% were migrants, 
mainly from Sulawesi and Java. 
Table 1.5 Ethnic composition of the province of Moluccas in 2010
Source: BPS, 2011b: 34.
The political situation
Since independence, politics in the Moluccas has always been influenced by 
religion. Christian parties such as the Love to the Nation Democratic Party 
(Partai Demokrasi Kasih Bangsa, PDKB) and the Catholic Party (Partai 
Katolik) have always defended the interests of their Christian supporters, 
while the Islamic parties such as PPP, the Crescent and Star Party (Partai 
Bulan Bintang, PBB), PKB, and PAN, furthered the interests of their 
No. 2010 Ethnic groups Number % 
 
1. Moluccans 1,127,148 74.95 
2. Other ethnic groups from 
Sulawesi 247,266 16.44 
3. Javanese 79,340 5.28 
4. Nusa Tenggara Timur 8,624 0.57 
5. Makassarese 6,414 0.43 
6. Chinese 4,556 0.30 
7. Sundanese 4,457 0.30 
8. Papua 3,751 0.25 
9. Foreigners 3,300 0.22 
10. Minahasa 2,867 0.19 
11. Buginese 2,549 0.17 
12. Bataknese 1,775 0.12 
13. Balinese 1,616 0.11 
14. Other ethnic groups from 
Kalimantan 1,418 0.09 
15. Minangkabau 1,358 0.09 
16. Others 7,374 0.49 
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Muslim followers (Bertrand, 2002:66-69; Tomsa, 2009:4-6). In addition, 
secular political parties know that they must account for the interests of 
religious groups in order to please their followers and to attract voters. Both 
Golkar, PDI, PKP and PDI-P have taken into account the objectives of both 
Christian and Muslims. The political struggle aggravated along religious 
lines in Ambon after the violent conflict between 1999 and 2004. In the 
1999 election for a city parliament, which took place six months after the 
violence broke out, the PDI-P won 52.45% of the votes, Golkar 19.45%, 
PPP 17.00% and PDKB 3.47% (Ratnawati, 2005:15). The remaining 
votes were distributed among six other parties. At the time of the election, 
Christian Ambonese constituted the majority in the city (60%), as many 
Muslim migrants had already left the city. By voting en masse for the 
PDI-P, Christians succeeded in defeating the ruling party Golkar which 
was dominated by Muslims (van Klinken, 2001:20-22).
The political situation changed after the 2009 city parliament 
election. In this election, no political party received a clear majority of 
votes. Some parties, such as PDI, PKP, PBB, PDKB and the Catholic Party 
were excluded, because the number of votes they received was lower than 
the national electoral threshold. To receive seats in the city parliament, this 
national  threshold had to be met. PDI-P won the city parliament election 
again, but this time with only 20% of the votes. Golkar and Partai Demokrat 
got 19% and 11% of the votes respectively. PKS and PPP got 10% and 8% 
respectively, while a new nationalist party, the People’s Conscience Party 
(Partai Hati Nurani Rakyat, Hanura) got 8%, and a new Islamic party, the 
Reform Star Party (Partai Bintang Reformasi, PBR) got 6%. The remaining 
votes were distributed among the Great Indonesian Movement Party 
(Gerakan Indonesia Raya, Gerindra) (5%), the Democratic Nationhood 
Party (Partai Demokrasi Kebangsaan, PDK) (4%), PAN (4%) and PDS 
(4%) (BPS Kota Ambon, 2011:32). Nationalist parties which were popular 
among both Christians and Muslims were Golkar, Partai Demokrat, Hanura, 
Gerindra and PDK. Together, they got more votes than parties popular only 
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among Muslims (PKS, PPP, PBR and PAN) and parties popular only among 
Christians (PDI-P and PDS). 
To achieve a workable local government acceptable to both 
communities, one that would be able to overcome the tensions in the city, 
some parties with different religious orientations or religious followers 
formed temporary political coalitions. This strategy was used for the first 
time in the election campaigns for a governor in 2008 subsequently for a 
city mayor in 2011 (Pariela, 2007:107). To achieve their goals, parties or 
coalitions  nominated a pair of candidates, one Muslim and one Christian, 
for the position of governor and vice-governor as well as for the position of 
mayor and vice-mayor. In 2008 the gubernatorial elections were won by a 
coalition of PDI-P, Partai Demokrat, PDK, PKB and PBB, defeating PKS 
(which  collaborated with PAN), PPP (which allied with PDS, and Golkar 
which did not enter into a coalition. 
In the mayoral and and vice-mayoral elections in 2011, a Christian 
candidate became the mayor and a Muslim candidate became the vice-
mayor via the same strategy of coalition. The elected candidates were 
nominated by a coalition of Golkar, PPP, PBR, PDS and Gerindra. The 
defeated coalitions were Partai Demokrat (who collaborated with Hanura, 
PDK and PKPI), and PKS (who allied themselves with PAN and PBB). In 
this election, the PDI-P did not join a coalition. 
In the gubernational elections of 2013, a Muslim and Christian 
nominated by a coalition of Golkar, PKS, PPP and PAN were elected as 
governor and vice-governor. In this gubernatorial election, Hanura allied 
with Gerindra, PBB, PBR and PKB. PDI-P and Partai Demokrat proposed 
candidates without entering a coalition. 
Some parties also wanted to balance the number of Muslims and 
Christians working for the city administration, both with regard to the top 
officials and the lower echelons. In 2006, 84.07% of civil servants in the city 
administration were Protestants, while Muslims and Catholics comprised 
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14.48% and 1.30% respectively. These percentages do not reflect the city 
population; for example, Protestants comprised about 60% of the city’s 
population in the same year,  (Tomagola, 2007:27-28). No information on 
the religious affiliation of civil servants in 2011 can be found, but it is 
likely that Christians still comprised the majority. Of the top twenty-two 
city officials in 2012, only two were Muslims, and the rest were Christians. 
This question of accurate religious representation has extended to other 
areas; for example, allocation of the city budget for Muslim and Christian 
education is being sought. 
In contrast to religious representation, ethnic representation had never 
been a point of discussion.  75.86% of the civil servants in the city were 
Moluccans from Ambon and the Lease Islands, and 15.76% consisted of 
people from West Seram, Buru and Southeast Moluccas Islands (Tomagola, 
2007:27-28). 8.33% consisted of migrants from outside the province of the 
Moluccas (e.g. Sulawesi, North Moluccas and other islands). 
The economic situation
The tensions between Muslims and Christians have also influenced 
economic spheres. Many business premises, such as shops and markets, 
were destroyed in the course of the conflict between 1999 and 2004. Prior 
to the conflict, Christians bought goods from Muslim traders at Pasar 
Mardika. However, during the conflict period, both groups visited temporary, 
religiously segregated markets. Muslims went to markets located at the back 
of Ambon Plaza and Pasar Mardika, whereas Christians went to markets at 
Batu Meja, Batu Gadjah and Belakang Soya. As the harbour is located in the 
Muslim area, food supplies like fish and vegetables were easily available 
to Muslims. These commodities were very expensive at Christian markets, 
however, because Christian traders were forced to buy them in secret and 
had to pay soldiers to accompany them for protection (Adam, 2008b:6-7). 
During the troubles in 2002, there was only one market, Pasar Mardika, 
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where both groups were engaged in economic transactions, but this place 
was destroyed by intergroup violence in the same year. 
Many people lost their jobs in those turbulent years, and poverty 
increased. Muslims lost their jobs in areas numerically dominated by 
Christians, and Christians lost their jobs in areas numerically dominated 
by Muslims. Consequently, they became displaced in their own city and 
dependent on their savings, family support and on petty trade. 
Despite the fact that the unemployment level was still high, the 
economy of Ambon began to redevelop when stability increased from 2004 
onwards. Between 2003 and 2010, the monthly minimum wage increased 
from IDR 370,000 to IDR 840,000 (BI, 2004:271; 2010:174). The number 
of people living under the poverty line, identified by a monthly per capita 
income equal to or lower than IDR 305,245, decreased sharply from 29% in 
2001 to around 8% in 2010. The percentage of unemployment declined in 
the same period from 31% to 16% (Pariela, 2007:105; TNP2K, 2011:7,9). 
Unemployment levels among the local Ambonese remained high, however, 
since migrants from outside the Moluccas that re-opened businesses rarely 
recruited local people. Since 2004, business has been growing mainly in 
Muslim dominated areas (e.g. Pasar Mardika, Ambon Plaza, Batu Merah, 
Jalan Baru and Silale-Waihaong). The original inhabitants of Ambon have 
been left behind in this renewed economic development. Recent migrants 
dominate the market and restrict opportunities for Ambonese businessmen. 
People from other islands in the Moluccas have migrated to the city in 
search of better jobs because their traditional work in agriculture and 
fishing in their places of origin is no longer profitable. Another factor 
contributing to high unemployment levels is that both domestic and 
foreign investments have decreased due to security concerns. In the past 
a lot of Ambonese depended to a great extent on government jobs and 
small-scale government-initiated projects with limited work potential. As a 
result, many Ambonese now work in informal sectors or are unemployed. 
While there is economic division along ethnic lines, religious distinctions 
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no longer matter for choice of profession. Since the 1999-2004 conflicts, 
Christians now work in sectors that were previously dominated by 
Muslims, such as transportation (pedicabs and motorcycle taxi drivers) 
and shop keeping. Entrepreneurship has increased among the Christian 
Ambonese, and medium-sized business activities have grown in Christian 
areas. Likewise, Muslim Ambonese and migrants also work in sectors that 
used to be dominated by Christians, such as education and government. 
However, both Muslims and Christians tend to work within their own 
religiously segregated areas, except for people who work in hotels, shops 
and offices in the city centre and on the borders of Muslim and Christian 
neighbourhoods. Although religious segregation is clearly visible in terms 
of work location, there is more religious diversification within economic 
sectors than before. In 2010, 26% of the city’s inhabitants worked in the 
informal sector, 22% in trade, 12% in transportation and warehouses, 10% 
in the educational services sector, 7% in construction and 7% in agriculture 
and fishery (BPS, 2011a). Government jobs at the provincial level were 
shared equally between Muslims and Christians, while those at the city 
level were still dominated by Christian Ambonese. Religious segregation is 
still apparent in security industries, with the police force employing mostly 
Christians, and the military dominated by Muslims. 
The socio-cultural situation
Although there have been tensions in the Moluccas between Muslims and 
Christians since the middle of the 16th century, until the end of last of the 
century, members of both groups lived relatively harmoniously side by side 
in villages and neighbourhoods. After the period of conflict in the beginning 
of the 21st century, daily interaction became distorted and the tendency 
to avoid members of other religious groups became stronger (Pariela, 
2007:104; Yanuarti et al., 2005:82). In the city of Ambon, the conflicts led 
to the resettlement of a huge number of inhabitants. Increasingly, people 
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decided to live in quarters with people exclusively from their own religion.25 
Religiously segregated residential areas became the norm for the city, as was 
already common in the village structure for centuries (Chauvel, 1990:4-7). 
Muslims no longer wanted to stay in predominantly Christian areas, while 
Christians did not want to live in predominantly Muslim areas. Ambon 
city now consists of twenty urban villages and thirty rural villages. Only in 
two of these villages, Wayame and Suli Atas, do Muslims and Christians 
live together.26 Both residential segregation and contact avoidance have 
aggravated rivalry and competition between Muslims and Christians. 
Segregation between Muslims and Christians is not restricted to 
patterns of residence, or to the political and economic fields as described 
above. It is also visible in the field of education. Since the conflict, Muslims 
and Christians in the city try to avoid each other in educational institutions 
at the primary, secondary and tertiary levels. Most schools and universities 
have been religiously segregated since 2004. Primary and secondary school 
pupils go to Protestant, Catholic or Muslim schools within their ‘own’ 
religious area, with the exception of a few public schools that attract pupils 
from different religions. Most Muslim students study at Muslim universities 
and higher educational institutes located in Muslim areas, such as the State 
Islamic Institute (Institut Agama Islam Negeri, IAIN) and Darussalam 
University (Universitas Darussalam, Unidar). Christian students tend to 
study at Christian universities and higher educational institutes located in 
Christian areas such as the Indonesian Christian University in the Moluccas 
(Universitas Kristen Indonesia di Maluku, UKIM) or the Trinity Institute of 
Administrative Science (Sekolah Tinggi Ilmu Administrasi Trinitas, STIA). 
Only at Pattimura University (Universitas Pattimura, Unpatti) and the 
25 In 2008, 1,050,764 of the 1,200,000 inhabitants of the Moluccas lived in religiously 
segregated residential areas (Subair et al., 2008:186).
26 In several villages, such as Latta, Nania and Waiheru, inter-religious interactions still 
exist but the two groups live separately. This residential segregation led to personal 
differentiation of language. Before the conflict, the terms ‘bung’ and ‘usi’ were used for 
men and women regardless of religious identity. However, after the conflict, Muslim 
groups developed words such as abang (older man) and caca (older women) that 
indicated the referent’s religious affiliation.  
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State Polytechnic School of Ambon (Politeknik Negeri Ambon) are both 
religious groups more or less equally represented. 
In 2009, 33,980 students were registered in Ambon: 25,427 at the 
four state higher educational institutes and 8,553 at the five private higher 
educational institutes (BPS/Bappeda Provinsi Maluku, 2011:131-156). 
Many of these students participate in religious student organizations that 
were founded during the New Order, such as the Islamic University Students 
Association (Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam, HMI) and the Indonesian 
Christian Students Movement (Gerakan Mahasiswa Kristen Indonesia, 
GMKI). After the conflict ended in 2004, several ethnic student organizations 
were founded, such as the Students Association of Southeast Moluccas 
(Ikatan Mahasiswa Maluku Tenggara, Immimalra) and the Butonese 
Students Association (Ikatan Pelajar dan Mahasiswa Buton, IPMB). Most 
of these student organizations have connections with government officials 
and political parties. The student groups often use these contacts to defend 
their group interests, such as seeking to redress the imbalance of religious 
or ethnic representation within the university. In turn, government leaders 
and political parties use the students to further their own goals.
1.3 History of yogyakarta and Ambon
In both Ambon and Yogyakarta, religious identities are more salient than 
ethnic identities, and attitudes that encourage individuals to avoid contact 
with members of other religious groups have intensified over the years. To 
understand this development better, it is necessary to pay attention to the 
main political, economic, religious and socio-cultural changes that took 
place in the past, and how they strengthened the significance of ethnicity 
and religion in daily life. 
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1.3.1  Yogyakarta
Political changes
Before the Dutch arrived in the Indonesian archipelago, the kings 
(susuhunan) of Mataram had almost absolute power in their territory, 
stretching from Cirebon in West Java to Madura in East Java. After 1705, 
the Mataram Kingdom started to shrink and the main parts of its territory 
fell to the Dutch. Due to internal disputes and conflicts among the nobility, 
the Dutch had to intervene in the internal affairs of the kingdom several 
times. As compensation for this interference, the kings had to cede portions 
of their territories to the Dutch, such as Cirebon and Madura in 1705, 
and the North Coast of Java and Eastern Java in 1743 (Ricklefs, 1974:39; 
2008:105). In 1755, the remainder of the once powerful Mataram Kingdom 
was divided in the two principalities of Yogyakarta and Surakarta which were 
governed by the sultan and the susuhunan. Each new sultan in Yogyakarta 
or susuhunan in Surakarta entered into a contract with the Dutch. With 
every new signing of a contract, their authority was further restricted. In 
1785, for example, the Sultan of Yogyakarta had to accept the presence of a 
Dutch Resident and Dutch troops to inhabit the newly built fort Vredeburg 
located near the palace (Suhatno, 2006:1-2; Marinhandono, 2008:16-17). 
Between 1755 and 1940, nine contracts between the ruling sultans and the 
Dutch were signed in this principality. Through this process, the sultanate 
lost, for example, the right to appoint high officials, to have an army and to 
grant amnesty (Selosoemardjan, 1962:14-15; Kurniadi, 2009:194). And as 
mentioned earlier in the chapter, at the beginning of the 19th century, part 
of the principality was given over to another descendent of the Mataram 
dynasty, who took the title of paku alam.
After the proclamation of Indonesia’s independence by Soekarno 
and Hatta in August 1945, the Sultan and the Paku Alam immediately 
took the side of the new republic. Out of gratitude, President Soekarno 
granted Yogyakarta the status of a special territory, while the position of 
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governor and vice-governor were reserved for the sultan and the paku 
alam. Besides serving as a traditional ruler and the provincial governor, 
Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX also became minister of defence in several 
cabinets during the Soekarno regime (1945-1965) from 1950 until 1953. 
During the Soeharto regime (1965-1998), the sultan even functioned as 
coordinating minister of economic affairs between 1966 and 1967, and as 
vice-president between 1973 and 1978. After he passed away in 1989, his 
eldest son succeeded to the position of sultan and the national government 
appointed Paku Alam VIII as the Governor’s caretaker of Yogyakarta (he 
had previously held the title of vice-governor since 1945). After Paku Alam 
VIII died in 1998, Sultan Hamengkubuwono X, who later also became the 
provincial chairman of the political party Golkar, succeeded his father as 
governor, although the automatic conferral of this position shortly became 
discussion matter for debate in the provincial parliament and in national 
government circles. Under pressure from the people of Yogyakarta, this 
‘hereditary’ right was respected. Initially, the national government did not 
appoint Paku Alam IX, the son of Paku Alam VIII, as vice-governor of 
Yogyakarta because there was apparently no legal basis that stipulated this 
position. In 2003, however, the position of vice-governor was reactivated 
by the provincial parliament, and Paku Alam IX was appointed as Vice-
Governor of Yogyakarta. 
Since the Indonesian population was given the right to vote, secular 
parties have received the majority of votes in the national elections, as 
well as in the special region of Yogyakarta. In the first national election in 
1955, the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia, PKI) 
got 26% of the votes in the special region of Yogyakarta. The Indonesian 
Nationalist Party (Partai Nasional Indonesia, PNI) received 25%, and the 
Great Indonesia Movement (Gerakan Indonesia Raya, Gerinda) received 
14%. The Islamic parties, Masyumi and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), received 
19% and 15% respectively (Luthfi and Soetarto, 2009:236). PKI attracted 
voters mostly from the nominal Muslims referred to as abangan (as nominal 
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Muslim were called)), while PNI and Gerinda attracted voters mainly from 
both the abangan and the higher grades of civil servant (priyayi). Masyumi 
and NU were particularly popular among the pious Muslims (known as 
santri) (van Bruinessen, 2002:141-144). Christian parties such as Partai 
Katolik and the Indonesian Christian Party (Partai Kristen Indonesia, 
Parkindo) did not get many votes in Yogyakarta.
During the New Order period between 1971 and 1998, only three 
political parties were allowed to run: Golkar, the political machine of the 
regime; the National Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, 
PPP), a union of Islamic parties; and the Indonesian Democracy Party 
(Partai Demokrasi Indonesia, PDI), a union of Christian and nationalist 
parties. In all national elections held during the New Order, Golkar always 
received between 60% and 75% of the votes, numbers partially attributable 
to bribery and intimidation tactics (Suryadinata, 2002:32; Liddle and 
Mujani, 2007:834).
As described earlier in this chapter, after the process of political 
reform in 1998, several new political parties were founded. These parties 
were both nationalist (PDI-P and Partai Demokrat) and Islamic-based 
(PAN, PKS and PBB). In the 2004 local election in greater Yogyakarta, 
PDI-P won 32% of the votes, and PAN took 20%. Golkar and PKS received 
14% of the votes each, while PKB and Partai Demokrat won 11% and 7% 
respectively (BPS DIY, 2008:48). Christians from different ethnic groups 
and many abangan supported the PDI-P, while many santri voted for the 
Islamic parties (PPP, PAN, PKS and PBB). A great number of santri and 
abangan also voted for nationalist parties, particularly Partai Demokrat and 
Golkar (Baswedan, 2004:672-675; Barton, 2010:133-135). One-fifth of the 
voters consisted of young people between the ages of seventeen and twenty-
one. Several student organizations were affiliated with political parties and 
mobilized their followers to vote for alumni who had become candidates 
for parliament. For example, the Indonesian Muslim Students Action Union 
(KAMMI) affiliated with PKS, while the Islamic University Students 
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Association (HMI) sided with Golkar and Partai Demokrat (Machmudi, 
2006:6-7; van Bruinessen, 2002:142). The Indonesian Christian Students 
Movement (GMKI) and the Indonesian National Students Movement 
(Gerakan Mahasiswa Nasional Indonesia, GMNI) worked together with 
PDI-P.
In short, religious orientations have influenced politics after 
independence through confessional political parties. These religiously 
affiliated political parties stress religious issues and regularly use religious 
language and symbols to attract voters. However, the degree of their 
political influence has varied between periods. Before the New Order, pious 
Muslims voted for Masyumi and NU, nominal Muslims voted for PKI and 
PNI, while Christians often voted for Parkindo or Partai Katholik. During 
the New Order, the government eliminated religious orientations from 
politics by restricting nationalist and Islamic parties. Nevertheless, religious 
orientation continued to influence political preference to a certain extent, 
in particular with PPP, which received most votes from Muslims, and with 
PDI, which found relatively strong support among Christians. After the fall 
of the New Order in 1998, Muslim votes tended to go to confessional parties 
such as PPP, PAN, PKS and PKB. Many pious Muslims living in rural areas 
traditionally supported PPP and PKB, while those living in urban areas 
predominantly voted for PAN and PKS. However, the influence of religious 
orientation gradually declined, as witnessed in elections held in the period 
between 1999 and 2009, although it still exists.
Economic changes
Until the beginning of the 20th century, the city of Yogyakarta was a court 
city, a city based around the royal court of the sultan. The court dependent 
on revenue from taxes in kind and labour from the peasant population. 
Peasants had to pay two-fifths of the rice harvests twice a year to so-called 
apanage holders, i.e. members of the royal family and court officials, and 
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one-fifth of the harvest yield to village heads. Both apanage-holders and 
village heads were given these rights to extract revenues by the sultan. 
In turn, the apanage holders had to give two-fifths of their share to the 
sultan or paku alam (Wasino, 2005:32; Margana, 2007:97). During the 
British Interregnum (1811-1816), the Land Rent System was introduced to 
the greater part of Java, but not to Yogyakarta and Surakarta. This system 
forced the population to pay annual monetary taxes to district collectors 
instead of paying a variety of levies and duties (Carey, 1986:76-80). In 
1830 the Dutch introduced the Culture System, or Cultuurstelsel, in several 
regions of Java, forcing the population to cultivate products for export on 
one-fifth of their land. This system was not imposed in the principalities, 
but colonial interference in the agricultural system in Yogyakarta started 
about the same time, when lands given as prebends to apanage holders 
were leased to private entrepreneurs for the cultivation of crops such as 
coffee and indigo (Hugenholtz, 1986:142-143; Houben, 2002:66-67). The 
plantation holders obtained all the rights over these lands for a maximum 
period of 20 years (Selosoemardjan, 1962:33,262).27 Thus, in Yogyakarta, 
peasants did not enter into contracts with the plantation holders themselves 
as they did elsewhere (Suhartono, 1986: 178). Plantation holders consisted 
of Europeans and Indo-Europeans; Chinese and other foreign Asians were 
not allowed to lease land. In 1918, the apanage system was abolished, 
and peasants in Yogyakarta were granted ownership of their lands 
(Selosoemardjan, 1962:34). Instead of taxes in kind or in labour, they were 
obliged to pay a poll tax and a land tax, which amounted to 10% of the 
harvest yield (Stock quoted in White, 2004:4). 
As a result of the abolition of the apanage system, the cultivation of 
commercial products by peasants increased. Parallel with this development, 
Yogyakarta changed from being primarily a court city into a predominantly 
27 Although the apanage holders had leased out their prebends since 1830, the colonial 
government only legally allowed the leasing system in Yogyakarta and Surakarta 
as of 1857. The maximum duration of the lease was expanded to 30 years in 1918 
(Selosoemardjan, 1962:262-263). 
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commercial city. By 1920, it had become a relatively modern city with wide 
streets and Western-style buildings. On the border of the city, batik and other 
handicraft industries started to grow. In 1930, 163,397 people, about 9% of 
the population of the principality, worked in batik making, silversmithing 
and other home industries (Sitsen quoted in Haryono, 2009:104). The 
Javanese who owned and worked in these home industries and trades came 
mostly from villages inhabited by pious Muslims (Surjomiharjo, 2008:40). 
Among the owners of these kinds of business in Yogyakarta were also some 
Chinese. 
Indeed, in this period the economic activities undertaken by the 
Chinese had become more diversified. After the founding of the city of 
Yogyakarta, Chinese inhabitants worked as heads of gambling houses, 
artisans, painters and carpenters. At the end of 19th century, they also 
worked as moneylenders, business brokers, tax farmers and rice traders 
(Bosma, 2007:73-94; Susanto, 2008:28-29). In the 1930s, many Chinese 
residents began to open hotels and restaurants, as well as drugstores, 
pawnshops and home-industries, and started to produce various kinds of 
food, drinks, household equipment and furniture (Susanto, 2008:48-49). 
At that time, the Chinese also dominated batik manufacturing. In 1939, 
however, the Javanese started to dominate this home industry, after they 
founded the Union of Native Batik Companies (Persatuan Perusahaan 
Batik Bumiputera, PPBBP). During the Japanese occupation between 1942 
and 1945, Chinese businesses were stymied because the new administration 
only supported Javanese businesses and organized them under the Progress 
of Indonesian Economy (Kemajuan Ekonomi Indonesia, KEI) scheme 
(Kwartanada, 2005:6-14).
After the Japanese occupation, economic development deteriorated, 
and this trend continued during the independence struggle between 1945 
and 1949. When the Dutch recognized Indonesian independence in 1949, 
many people in Yogyakarta had lost their jobs and lived in poverty. The 
Indonesian government had little money to jumpstart the economy or 
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generate employment. Only batik production was subsidized by national 
government funds. Former aristocrat families ran batik and jewellery 
factories and profited from renting rooms to the increasing number of civil 
servants and migrants in the region. The Sultan himself tried to create 
employment opportunities by re-establishing the tobacco plantations, a sugar 
factory and a machine workshop that had been destroyed during the war. 
He also opened his palace to foreign tourists to increase provincial income 
(Dahles, 2001:62-64). Between 1955 and 1965, the national government 
launched several affirmative action programs for the development of native 
entrepreneurs, facilitating services for importing goods and providing 
access to low interest credit. Many small and medium-sized industries 
and cooperatives were established, but they did not develop well due to 
inefficiency and the interference of political interests (Selosoemardjan, 
1962:240).28
 During the New Order, tourism, manufacturing and the educational 
sector flourished. In the 1970s, Yogyakarta became the second top tourist 
destination in Indonesia after Bali, with the city’s historical monuments, 
including temples and palaces, attracting an increasing number of domestic 
and foreign tourists. Tourism also influenced the local economy by driving 
the manufacture of souvenirs, the construction of new hotels and the 
development of other tourist services. In the same period, home industries 
such as weaving, batik, drying tobacco, printing and the production of 
wooden furniture grew (Kano, 1981:357). Moreover, by 1971, Yogyakarta 
was home to 22.5% of the state and private higher educational institutes 
in Indonesia, which was even higher than the percentage of educational 
institutions in Jakarta (12.5%). Newly founded universities and higher 
educational institutes attracted students from all over Indonesia, and local 
inhabitants as well as migrants opened businesses catering to the student 
population such as dormitories, restaurants and photocopying shops. 
28 At the provincial level, the economy of Yogyakarta therefore was dependent on 
agriculture, mainly rice production. Peasants also cultivated sugar cane, maize, cassava, 
peanuts and soybeans (Selosoemardjan, 1962:240).
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Since 1980, the sectors of construction, transportation and finance in the 
region developed as well. In short, between 1969 and 1997, the economy 
of Yogyakarta grew, diversified and flourished. After the economic crisis 
in 1997, the manufacturing industries declined, but trade and services 
increased.29 Many labourers who worked in manufacturing industries lost 
their jobs and found new employment in the informal and service sectors 
(i.e. street trade and local transport)
Javanese, Chinese and migrant populations contributed in different 
ways to the economic development, and profited from it in varying degrees. 
Large-scale enterprises mostly belonged to the Chinese, while the Javanese 
and migrants from outside the region owned small and medium-sized 
enterprises. After 1965, the New Order regime gave more opportunities to 
Chinese-owned businesses. It gave the Chinese community a significant 
hand in the construction and transportation sectors. In the 1980s, the 
community expanded into businesses in computer assembly, food 
processing and medicine. The economic crisis at the end of the New Order 
did not prevent the Chinese from setting up and eventually dominating the 
information technology industry in the region. Tensions between Chinese 
and native entrepreneurs was avoided at the urging of the local government 
officials, who encouraged the Chinese community to help native-owned 
businesses. One impediment to the growth of Chinese-owned business is 
that since 1975, the government has prevented Chinese from owning land 
and opening businesses in and around the palace and Kota Gede (Susanto, 
2008:67-70).
The role of migrants in the regional economy increased after the 
economic crisis in 1997, when people from surrounding provinces came 
to work in some of the city’s informal sectors. In 2008, about 29% of the 
29 The 1997 Asian economic crisis, however, changed the economic structure at the 
provincial level, facilitating the replacement of agricultural and manufacturing industries 
with trade and service industries. Between 1969 and 2010, the contribution of agriculture 
decreased from 38.9% to 17.19%, and manufacturing fell 20.60% to 13.28%. However, 
trade industries increased from 12.80% to 20.79%, and service industries from 8.50% to 
17.04% (Hill and Mubyarto, 1978:30; Bank of Indonesia, 2011:11).
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street vendors in Yogyakarta and Sleman were migrants from Central Java 
(Brata, 2008:9). 
Religious changes
Islam was introduced to the Indonesian archipelago during the 12th and 13th 
centuries. In the 14th and 15th centuries, the religion spread gradually along 
the northern coast of Java. Muslim traders and Islamic preachers from the 
Middle East, Persia and coastal India played an important role in the spread 
of Islam (Geertz, 1968: 9-13; de Jonge, 1997: 94-95; Ricklefs, 2008: 3-8). 
From the 17th century on, Islam gained increasing followers in inland 
Java, particularly after the king of Mataram embraced Islam. Islamization 
occurred more rapidly in the last quarter of the 19th century, when contacts 
with the Arab world increased after the opening of the Suez Canal. 
According to Geertz (1960:5-6), Muslims in Java can be divided into 
two categories: santri, devout Muslims who adhere to Islamic traditions, 
and abangan, nominal Muslims who practice a syncretic religious tradition 
consisting of elements from Islam, Hinduism and traditional indigenous 
beliefs. Santri were originally found among traders in urban areas, and 
abangan mainly among peasants in rural areas (Ibid:5-6). In contemporary 
society, however, santri can be found at all social levels, although they still 
dominate in urban areas. Some authors have criticized Geertz’s depiction 
of the duality of Java’s Muslim population. According to De Jonge (1993), 
the Indonesian Islamic community from the beginning has shown much 
more differentiation than this.30 
At the beginning of the 20th century, two Muslim organizations 
were established that had a great influence on the religious and societal 
emancipation of the population of the Indonesian archipelago: Nahdlatul 
Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah. NU was very popular in the countryside. 
In Yogyakarta, the villages of Krapyak (Bantul) and Mlangi (Sleman) 
30 Islam is popular among the main ethnic groups in Indonesia, such as the Javanese, 
Sundanese, Madurese, Malay, Buginese and Makassarese. 
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remain traditional centres of NU-teachings. Both villages have several 
pesantren or Islamic boarding schools that attract many students every year, 
mainly from Central Java. Muhammadiyah, which tries to purify Islam of 
pre-Islamic influences and emphasizes prescribed ritual patterns, tends to 
flourish in urban areas (de Jonge, 1993:104). Muhammadiyah organizations 
supported Indonesian emancipation by founding hospitals, modern schools 
and orphanages (Fuad, 2002:133-135; van Bruinessen, 2004:5-11). In the 
course of time, in particular after independence, other Muslim organizations 
were founded, such as the Indonesian Islamic Preaching Council (Dewan 
Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia, DDII) and the Indonesian Association of 
Muslim Intellectuals (Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia, ICMI). DDII 
focuses on improving the level of dahwa (preaching) by opening study 
centres, publishing books and sending students to Islamic schools in Middle 
Eastern countries. ICMI organizes Muslim scholars to drive economic 
empowerment and lead community-based education programs. In the last 
decade, Islamic communities (Jama’ah) that are more fundamentalist in 
orientation and that are connected to a global network of Muslims have also 
flourished in urban areas (van Bruinessen, 2003:11-15). These organizations 
and congregations have a large number of followers among the student 
population in Yogyakarta.
Christianity was introduced in the Indonesian archipelago by the 
Europeans. Portuguese missionaries started to spread Catholicism in 
the Moluccas at the beginning of the 16th century. The Dutch abrogated 
the proselytizing efforts of the Portuguese after they replaced them and 
introduced Protestantism in the same area. In Java, however, the Dutch 
only allowed Protestant and Catholic missionaries to spread their faiths 
from the beginning of the 19th century, although there were already quite 
a number of converts in the big cities.31 Protestantism started to take hold 
31 In line with the policy of Napoleon during the French occupation, Governor-general 
Daendels helped the Catholic missionaries by appointing them to the position of civil 
servants. Nuns from the Netherlands arrived in Java in 1856, and priests arrived in 1862. 
The first bishop was appointed in Batavia in 1842 (Muskens and Vriens, 1972:64).
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in Central Java in the middle of the 19th century, and Catholicism at the 
end of the 19th century. In Yogyakarta and the surrounding environment, 
Protestantism was introduced in 1859, and Catholicism in 186532 (Vriens, 
1972:51; Aritonang and Steenbrink, 2008:674). The intensive training of 
indigenous ministers in Central Java was a crucial factor in the initial spread 
of Protestantism between 1860 and 1870.33 In the early 20th century, Jesuit 
missionaries who had already founded schools and churches in Muntilan 
also settled in Yogyakarta, and made the city a centre of their missionary 
activities in Java.34 Christian converts were primarily made among the more 
syncretic abangan, and among the Chinese
Unlike the case with Islam, Christianity spread more systematically 
through missionary orders and organizations. The colonial administration 
also allowed missionary organizations to start education and healthcare 
programs in local communities. In 1936, Protestant and Catholic missions 
controlled 35% of the village schools in Yogyakarta; most of their students 
in that year were nominal Muslims (Steenbrink, 2007:393). The schools and 
hospitals run by missionaries could not be matched by Islamic organizations 
in terms of numbers and quality, but nevertheless, such activities increased 
the amount of Christian converts (Noer, 1973:22-24). Between 1930 and 
1932, the number of Catholics grew from 10,000 to more than 30,000 (van 
Klinken, 1996:97). In the same period, the number of Protestants increased 
from 2,208 to 3,148 (Sumartana, 1991:105). From the beginning, the 
colonial government was not always pleased with missionary activity, as it 
caused friction with the Muslim population, and even stimulated Muslim 
fanatism (Hefner, 1993:99-100; Aritonang, 2004:84-85). 
32 However, this religion was introduced to Yogyakarta people through the court 
photographer, Kassian Cephas (Aritonang and Steenbrink, 2008:673).
33 For example, indigenous ministers such as Ibrahim Tunggul Wulung and Sadrach 
Surapranata in 1860-1870. Although Dutch missionaries tried to change local Christians 
into Dutch Christians, Tunggul Wulung resisted by educating his followers to become 
Javanese Christians. Meanwhile, Sadrach established the independent Christian 
communities in Bagelen (Aritonang and Steenbrink, 2008:673). 
34 In Yogyakarta, few Javanese converted to Christianity. The religion is popular among 
individuals from minority ethnic groups such as the Ambonese, Papuans, Timorese, 
Torajanese and Manadonese. 
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After independence, Indonesian  priests and ministers gradually 
replaced their European colleagues. Between 1945 and 1949, some of 
the Protestant churches established by the Dutch split along ethnic lines, 
resulting in for example the Council of Chinese Christian Churches in 
Indonesia (Dewan Gereja-Gereja Kristen Tionghoa, DGKT) and the 
Protestant Evangelical Church in Timor (Gereja Masehi Injili di Timor, 
GMIT) (Aritonang and Steenbrink, 2008:826-831). At the same time, 
Protestant missionaries from Germany and the United States of America 
introduced new denominations, such as the Indonesia Evangelical 
Communion (Persekutuan Injili Indonesia, PII) and the Union of Pentecostal 
Churches in Indonesia (Persekutuan Gereja Pentakosta di Indonesia, 
PGPI), (Ibid:867-868). In the early 1960s, the Catholic Church began to 
establish new dioceses and parishes in several cities in Indonesia. After the 
Indonesianization of Christian churches in the region, Indonesian churches 
continued to receive financial support from their fellow denominations in 
Europe and America from the 1960s on (Steenbrink, 2010:107-109). 
After the coup d’état in 1965, the anti-communist Soeharto regime 
forced the population to choose one of the five approved monotheistic 
religions: Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, Hinduism and Buddhism.35 
This led tens of thousands of abangan and Chinese inhabitants to convert 
to Christianity (Aritonang, 2004:412-414; Mujiburrahman, 2006:28-29). 
Among the abangan were many PKI members who tried to protect themselves 
through conversion, while many of the Chinese who were oriented towards 
the Chinese homeland opted to convert to Christianity for similar reasons. 
Converting to Islam was not a popular option among the Chinese, because 
several Muslim groups cooperated with the Indonesian military in killing 
huge numbers of PKI members in 1965 and 1966 (Hefner, 1993:113-114; 
Bertrand, 2004:74-75). In some rural areas many abangan also converted 
to Christianity because missionaries provided them with basic services that 
35 According to the resolution of the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Sementara (MPRS), 
the Provisional People’s Consultative Assembly, XVII/1966, every Indonesian citizen is 
obliged to embrace one of the religions recognized by the state.
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government failed to provide, such as education and healthcare (Willis, 
1977:159). As a result, on the national level, the total number of Christians 
in Indonesia increased from 2.80% in 1933, to 7.50% in 1971 (Ricklefs, 
1993:294). These conversions also led to an expansion of Christianity in 
Yogyakarta, although part of this increase is also attributable to the increase 
of Christian students from outside Yogyakarta, inter-religious marriage and 
natural growth. Between 1974 and 2010, the number of Protestants and 
Catholics in Yogyakarta increased from 81,342 to 114,794 people (see 
table 1.1). 
Cultural changes: a growing distance between Muslims and Christians 
During the colonial period, political conflicts often had ethno-religious 
dimensions. The most telling example in Java before 1900 is the Java 
War that took place between 1825 and 1830, disrupting the whole of 
society. Muslim Javanese considered this war to be a symbol of their 
resistance against the Christian Dutch (Carey, 1984: 1-3). After the war 
ended, prejudicial relationships between the Dutch Christians and Muslim 
Javanese remained. On the one side, Muslim Javanese referred to the Dutch 
as infidels to indicate their hatred (Noer, 1973:21). On the other side, the 
Dutch perceived Islam to be a religion used by the Javanese to instigate 
rebellion (Arifianto, 2009:77). The prejudicial relationship became stronger 
at the end of the 19th century due to the missionary activities of Dutch 
missionaries and Muslim preachers. The Dutch supported missionaries in 
encouraging the spread of Christianity, hoping that the Christian Javanese 
would support the Dutch colonial state and consider the Dutch as their 
brothers (Ibid.). Muslims leaders responded by consolidating their religious 
teachings and founding a number of modern religious organizations, such 
as Muhammadiyah (1912) and NU (1926). 
After independence, especially between 1950 and 1965, political 
conflicts between pious and nominal Muslims became more intense than 
those between Muslims and Christians. Political conflicts with religious 
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dimensions broke out in several provinces. The most visible conflict was 
the rebellion of armed groups that proclaimed the Indonesian Islamic State 
(Negara Islam Indonesia, NII) in the 1950s. In Yogyakarta, this rebellion 
found little or no support because Muslims in this region were strong 
supporters of the new Indonesian state proclaimed by Soekarno and Hatta. 
Another political conflict with religious dimensions in recent Indonesian 
history was the failed 1965 coup d’etat by a group of armed forces personnel 
who apparently conspired with leaders of the Indonesian Communist Party 
(PKI).
The Indonesian military used Muslim organizations to provide 
support for their anti-communist campaign in Java. As Yogyakarta was a 
stronghold of PKI, tensions between members of communist organizations 
and Muslim organizations frequently erupted in the city (Harnoko et al., 
1966:43-44). Many members of the PKI were imprisoned or executed 
by the Indonesian military in 1965-66, with the implicit and sometimes 
explicit support of Muslim organizations. In 1966, the national government 
dissolved the PKI and forced all ethno-religious groups to live in harmony 
by imposing security measures.
In the first half of the New Order period, the government made 
extensive efforts, not always in a peaceful manner, to suppress religious 
and ethnic antagonism and unrest. In Yogyakarta, the sultan himself was 
heavily involved in promoting tolerance among religious and ethnic 
minorities and majorities in Yogyakarta. As a result, people from different 
religions and ethnicities lived together peacefully and engaged in a number 
of strategies to facilitate contacts. Tensions between Christian missionaries 
and Muslim organizations in greater Yogyakarta were largely resolved. In 
short, religious differences were seldom problematic in daily life during 
those years. 
During the second half of the New Order period, however, the distance 
between Muslims and Christians gradually became wider. Between 1970 and 
1990, the government marginalized Muslim organizations and appointed to 
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government positions more Christians and nominal Muslims than pious 
Muslims. The old Islamic parties were banned, and the new founded Islamic 
party, PPP, was controlled by the government and restricted in its activities. 
Muslim organizations restricted themselves almost completely to religious 
affairs, and as a result, Muslim society underwent a process of Islamisation 
or santrinisasi (Hefner, 1987:551). The distance between Muslims and 
Christians grew and harmonious relations between them gradually eroded 
as modernist Islamic beliefs spread in the region. For example, in 1980, the 
Religious Scholars Council (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, MUI) issued a decree 
that prohibited Muslims from mixing their beliefs and practices with those 
of non-Muslims (Steenbrink, 1998:331). This decree discouraged Muslims 
from attending Christian ceremonies, including funerals (Mujiburrahman, 
2006:284). Islamisation also entered the university environment during 
this period. Several Islamic preaching institutes, called Lembaga Dakwah 
Kampus (LDK), were founded on campus in the 1980s. They organized 
common prayers and lectures on Islamic culture, and encouraged 
engagement with Islamic practices (Rahmat, 2003:23-24; Nashir, 2007 cf. 
Wahid et al., 2009:24). 
In the 1990s, processes of Islamisation made inroads into government 
institutions, as the New Order regime courted the santri (pious Muslim) 
population for political support. President Soeharto appointed more santri 
to parliament and cabinets, and used the ICMI to channel his political 
interests.36 The government also began to allow female Muslim students 
to wear veils in public schools (van Bruinessen, 2002:134-135; Bertrand, 
2004:83-84). Several Islamic preaching centres that spread modernist 
Islamic beliefs were founded in Yogyakarta, and the LDK became more 
popular among Muslim students in state universities. 
36 President Soeharto was prone to accommodating those who joined the Indonesian 
Muslim Scholar Association (ICMI). The DDII, ICMI and other Muslim organizations 
such as HMI supported the regime, while traditional Muslim and Christian organizations 
remained silent.
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Despite the  fact that  religious differences were becoming more 
apparent in Yogyakarta, efforts were made to maintain religious harmony 
through the establishment of religious-based NGOs and other groups. 
Organizations like Interfaith Dialogue or interfidei (Dialog Antar Iman, 
DIAN) and the Institute for Islamic and Social Studies (Lembaga Kajian 
Islam dan Sosial, LKiS) were created to address the state of inter-
religious relations.37 The potential of such initiatives was realized when 
religious violence broke out between Muslims and Christians in Surabaya, 
Tasikmalaya and Situbondo in 1996, violence which heightened tensions 
in Yogyakarta as well. Religious leaders in Yogyakarta immediately 
implemented a program of interfaith dialogue, including discussions on 
sensitive topics such as church burnings and missionary activities in Muslim 
communities. In 1997, as a follow up to the dialogue, they established the 
Forum of the Brotherhood of Faithful People (Forum Persaudaraan Umat 
Beriman, FPUB). 
In the last twenty years, Muslims have become more aware of their 
religious identity than ever before, and as a result, the distance between 
Muslims and Christians has become greater. After the political reforms 
in 1998, the Islamic Brotherhood Forum (Forum Ukhuwah lslamiyah, 
FUI) was founded by Muslims in Yogyakarta to coordinate local Islamic 
organizations. Apart from the coordination of preaching activities, the FUI 
also tried to prevent Muslim pupils from studying in Christian schools, 
and campaigned against pornography and drug use.38 Muslim organizations 
knew how to thwart the activities of Christian missionaries in abangan 
37 In 1992, on the initiative of some Christians, DIAN Interfidei, an institute for interfaith 
dialogue, was founded to create religious harmony and to develop an open and democratic 
society (Steenbrink, 1988:334, Mujiburrahman, 2006:284). Moreover, on the initiative 
of some Muslims, LKIS was established to develop tolerant and democratic Islamic ideas 
(Masóed, et al., 2001:131).
38 Aliansi Pemuda Islam (API) Yogyakarta or The Islamic Youth Alliance, Majelis 
Mujahiddin Indonesia (MMI), KAMMI, Gema Pembebasan and others supported the 
FUI demonstrations. They also supported the 2003 law on education, which provided 
students with courses according to their individual religious identifications (Subhan, 
2007:110-115).
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communities. For example, they founded mosques and Islamic boarding 
schools in areas close to where Christian missionaries worked. In state 
universities, new Muslim groups affiliated with international organizations 
such as Ikhwanul Muslimin, Hizbut Tahrir and Salafi groupings were popular 
among students, in part because these were facilitated and supported by 
the LDK. These groups sparked discussion of religious values and norms 
on campuses, and criticized the government for ignoring religious values 
(Sidqi, 2008:57). A large number of students joined these groups because the 
older Islamic student organizations (HMI, IMM and PMII) were perceived 
as only being concerned with seeking access to power (Machmudi, 
2006:112). In daily life, these students created distance between Christians 
and Muslims outside of their groups by wearing specific Muslim dress, 
living in exclusive houses and avoiding interaction. 
As well as a growing distance between Muslims and Christians, 
another effect in Yogyakarta of the political reforms was the founding in 
the year 2000 of some militant Muslim organizations.  These groups were 
the Jihad Force (Laskar Jihad) and the Indonesian Mujahiddin Assembly 
(Majelis Mujahiddin Indonesia, MMI). Unlike other Muslim organizations, 
these groups sent thousands of militants to fight against Christians in 
Ambon and Poso between 2000 and 2002. Also, both groups demanded the 
implementation of Islamic law in Indonesia (Hasan, 2002:145-146). After 
the religious conflict in both cities ended in 2002, the Laskar Jihad was 
dissolved by its leader, while the MMI still exists but is not very active. A 
militant group based in Jakarta, the Islam Defenders Front (Front Pembela 
Islam, FPI) opened a branch in Yogyakarta a few years after the decline 
of the Laskar Jihad and the MMI in Yogyakarta. This group is known for 
its anti-vice raids against bars, casinos and gambling businesses. In 2012, 
some members of Laskar Jihad even attacked the office of the Institute for 
Islamic and Social Studies (LKiS), which was conducting a discussion with 
an American liberal feminist. With actions like these, this group disturbs the 
harmonious relationship between Muslims and Christians in this region. 
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Christians also acknowledge the growth of some fundamentalist 
oriented groups, of charismatic denominations, which have operated in 
increasingly exclusive ways. These groups reportedly adopted the same 
techniques used by fundamentalist Muslims to promote their beliefs in 
urban areas (van Bruinessen, 2003:17-19). Although a charismatic Christian 
denomination had already founded a branch in Yogyakarta by 1980, its 
membership only increased (slowly) after the political reforms of 1998. 
In 2004, its church in Yogyakarta claimed to have around 2,500 members 
(Koning, 2011:26). Many Chinese professionals in particular converted 
to charismatic Christianity, as they feel threatened by the increase in 
numbers of fundamentalist Muslims. But with the growing popularity of 
charismatic Christianity, Muslims regularly force their churches to close, 
sometimes because of seemingly superficial reasons, such as the complaint 
that the services are too noisy (Koning and Dahles, 2009:14-27). Although 
the number of charismatic churches has increased, they are nevertheless 
relatively few in number and small in size compared with mainstream 
Christian denominations such as the Javanese Christian Church (Gereja 
Kristen Jawa, GKJ) and the Indonesian Christian Church (Gereja Kristen 
Indonesia, GKI). This explains why there have not been significant conflicts 
between Muslims and charismatic Christians in Yogyakarta.
Nowadays, some Christians feel obliged to display their religious 
identity in daily life, e.g. by wearing religious symbols or by praying in 
public, in response to growing Islamisation. In social media forums, they 
have expressed their critical opinions about violence conducted by Muslim 
militias. They seldom take resort to violence to defend their Christian 
identity. There are only occasional instances in which Christian groups are 
involved in violent Incidents in Yogyakarta – in 2007, for example when 
Christian students from Eastern Indonesia interfered in problems between 
local Christians and villagers.39
39 See “Mahasiswa Papua dan Warga Yogyakarta Bentrok.” Tempointeraktif, 9 June 2007, 
http://r.infoanda.com/?lh=BF1TBwAFUVMD (accessed on 22 October 2014).
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1.3.2  Ambon
Political changes
Upon the arrival of the Portuguese in the Indonesian archipelago, four 
sultanates competed for power in the Northern Moluccas: Ternate, 
Tidore, Bacan and Jailolo. Halmahera and the Western coast of Papua 
fell under Tidore’s influence, while Ambon and the adjacent islands in 
the Central Moluccas fell within Ternate’s sphere of influence. However, 
the interference in local affairs in Ambon was minimal. The negeri or 
village, the main political unit on the island, had a relatively high degree 
of autonomy. It was governed by a raja or village head who was assisted 
by the council of elders (saniri) and the heads of the clan (kepala soa). The 
villages in Ambon belonged either to the Wemale tribe or the Alune tribe. 
Villages belonging to the Wemale tribe entered into associations, called 
ulilima, while villages of the Alune tribe formed associations called ulisiwa 
(Cooley, 1962:13-18). The ulilima were associations of five villages; the 
ulisiwa were associations of nine villages. Villages in the northern part 
of Leihitu Peninsula on Ambon belonged to the ulilima, and villages in 
the southern part of the island belonged to the ulisiwa. In the southern 
Leitimor, all villages were part of the ulisiwa. 
When the Portuguese arrived in 1512, the Sultan of Ternate welcomed 
them as political allies, and agreed to an exclusive trading alliance with 
the Portuguese. The Portuguese helped the sultan to defeat his rivals in 
the archipelago, which gave Ternate the opportunity to extend its political 
influence to northern Sulawesi, the southern Philippines and the central 
Moluccas (Abdurrachman et al., 1973:58). However, in the middle of 16th 
century, hostilities between the Portuguese and Ternate broke out as the 
Portuguese behaved arrogantly and looked down on Muslims. In 1575, 
after four years of skirmishes, the Portuguese were forced to surrender 
their fortress in Ternate and relocate their operations to the city of Ambon 
(Nanulaitta 1966:18; Widjojo, 2007:13). 
55
chAPteR 1 - IntRodUctIon
After their arrival in the Moluccas, Portuguese ships often landed for 
replenishing in Hitu before continuing their journey to Banda or Ternate. 
In the beginning, the Portugese had good relationships with the Hituese, 
but for reasons similar to their later (and previously mentioned) expulsion 
from Ternate, in 1524 their ships were forced to land on the southeastern 
coast of Leihitu. The ulisiwa villagers on the southern coast welcomed the 
Portuguese as new trading partners and saw them as protectors in their 
already fierce rivalry with the Hituese. After the Portuguese introduced 
Catholicism in this area, conflicts between villages in the north and the 
south of Ambon developed into religious hostilities. Muslim ulilima villages 
under the kingdom of Tanah Hitu, which was founded in 1470, allied with 
Ternate, while Christian ulisiwa villages allied with the Portuguese. At the 
end of the 16th century, the Hituese, assisted by soldiers from Ternate, Java 
and Makassar, and later by Dutch troops, attacked the Portuguese and their 
Christian allies (Widjojo, 2007:11-12). 
After the Portuguese surrendered to the Dutch in 1605, Christian 
villages in Ambon and Lease came under control of the Dutch East India 
Company, known as the VOC (Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie), 
while Muslim villages stayed within the influence of Ternate through 
the installation of a governor in Hoamoal. In 1605 and 1607, the VOC 
entered into contracts with the Muslim rulers of Hitu, Banda and Ternate, 
stipulating that they had to sell their spices to the company at a fixed price. 
However, in 1620, the Governor of Ternate and the Muslim rulers of Banda 
and Hitu no longer felt obliged to honour this contract, because the market 
price of spices had increased (Widjojo, 2008:23-29). To enforce the trade 
monopoly, between 1621 and 1651 the VOC sent troops to conquer Banda, 
Hitu and Hoamoal (Bartels, 1978:115-123, Ricklefs, 1981:59-61). After 
the company had control over the area, it tried to monopolize both the trade 
and the production of spices.40 The Ambonese village heads were forced 
40 In 1621, almost the entire population of Banda was brutally killed by VOC troops. Of 
around 3,000 inhabitants, only 150 people were spared and moved to the Kei archipelago. 
Europeans, foreign Asians and their slaves were then assigned by the company to cultivate 
nutmeg and mace on Banda.
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to mobilize villagers for cultivating cloves on the island and for rowing 
the VOC-vessels of the hongi-tochten, military expeditions conducted to 
destroy cultivation of cloves outside Ambon (Cooley, 1962:83-90; van 
Fraassen, 1983:18; Chauvel, 1990:8).41
After the Dutch colonial state was established in 1800, the Netherland’s 
monopoly over spices, including the use of compulsory labour, continued. 
During the British Interregnum (1810-1816), however, the Resident in 
Ambon ended compulsory labour in clove production and rowing services. 
When, the Dutch re-established control in 1817 and wanted to reintroduce 
forced labour, a rebellion broke out in the Lease Islands (van Fraassen, 
1983:32-33). After the Dutch regained power on the islands in 1824, they 
reformed the insular colonial administration, including the nature of the 
relationship between the village heads and the villagers. The village head 
was considered to be a representative of the Dutch colonial state at the 
local level. His role became the enforcement of Dutch instructions, rather 
than facilitating the aspirations of his subjects. The Dutch depended on 
village heads to keep social order in Muslim villages especially, since there 
were no Dutch institutions such as churches and schools as there were in 
Christian villages. After the abolition of the spice monopoly in 1864, the 
village heads were assigned to collect taxes, arrange compulsory workers 
and enforce law and order (Chauvel, 1990:8).42 
During the Dutch colonial state’s rule, the distance between Muslim 
and Christian Ambonese became wider as result of issues of citizenship 
and recruitment of civil servants. The Dutch divided the Moluccans into 
villagers and citizens (burgers); citizens received certain privileges, such 
as exemption from compulsory labour. Villagers could obtain the status of 
citizen by entering into professional jobs that were useful for the Dutch, 
41 As compensation, village heads received 4% of the sales from their villages (Braithwaite 
and Dunn, 2010:148). Villagers were not allowed by the VOC to leave their villages, 
as they had to work for clove production and rowing services. The only opportunity for 
leaving was to work as soldiers for the company (van Fraassen, 1983:17-19).
42 In 1920 these compulsory services were replaced by tax payments to the government 
(Chauvel, 1990:11). 
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such as civil servant, soldier, carpenter and boatman. In the middle of 
19th century, the number of citizens in Christian villages was far greater 
than the number in Muslim villages in Ambon and the Lease Islands. In 
1868, 42% of Ambonese in the city of Ambon (19,116) and 25% of those 
in Saparua (11,436) were considered to be citizens (Leirissa,1995:4). The 
Dutch favoured Christian Ambonese because they did not trust the Muslim 
Ambonese. In their turn, Muslims were reluctant to work for the colonial 
government because of concerns about being converted to Protestantism.
The Dutch also needed soldiers and civil servants for other areas in 
the colony. A substantial part of this labour force was recruited in Ambon, 
mainly from among the Christian Ambonese. According to Sidel (1999:12), 
in 1930 or thereabouts, around 16%  of the Christian Ambonese lived in 
better circumstances outside their home island.43
Between 1920 and 1942, the rise of nationalist political parties 
promoting ideas of political and economic reform threatened the position 
of the colonial government and its accomplices, such as the village heads. 
Educated Ambonese returning from Java founded the Nationale Indische 
Party and the Association of Ambonese (Serikat Ambon). Both political 
parties opened branches in the villages and made an effort to reform village 
political structures. With the establishment of these new political parties, 
village heads were pressured into furthering the interest of their villagers 
instead of those of the Dutch (Chauvel, 1990:88-94). In those days, 
opposition against the village heads was stronger in Christian areas than in 
Muslim areas, because Protestant ministers, teachers and educated people 
followed the call for political reform and did not refrain from challenging 
the village power structures (Chauvel, 1990:99-100). In particular, the 
succession of village heads by family members often created tensions 
43 For reasons such as this, the Christian Ambonese identified themselves with the Dutch. In 
contrast, more Muslim Ambonese left the Moluccas for pilgrimage activities, trading, or 
shipping. Their interactions with their fellow Muslims created a strong Muslim identity 
and helped form the Indonesian identity during the period of colonization (Chauvel, 
1980: 53, Sidel, 2008:36-38).
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between villagers and village heads’ families Despite this pressure, the 
village heads, following government officials, still supported the colonial 
system (van Fraassen, 1983:36-37). And when the Dutch granted village 
heads the right to ban political parties in 1934, they were better able to 
secure their autonomous positions in their villages. 
When Indonesia declared independence in 1945, the Ambonese were 
divided along political and religious lines. People who benefitted from 
colonialization, such as the village heads, government officials and soldiers of 
the Royal Netherlands East Indies Army (Koninklijk Nederlandsch-Indisch 
Leger, KNIL), had supported the Dutch. In contrast, most of the Muslim 
villagers had apparently supported Indonesia’s independence (Chauvel, 
1990:211-214). Many Christian Ambonese however resisted the Indonesian 
state because they believed that the Javanese and the Muslims, who were 
considered inferior in Ambon, would dominate the new nation and usurp 
their privileges in government (Bertrand, 2002:62-63; Ricklefs, 2008:270). 
In contrast, most Muslim Ambonese considered that independence would 
pave their way to further emancipation in the archipelago. In 1949, the 
Dutch officially recognized the Republic of the United States of Indonesia 
(Republik Indonesia Serikat, RIS). The Moluccas became part of the East 
Indonesian State (Negara Indonesia Timur, NIT). In 1950, the RIS was 
dissolved and replaced by the Republic of Indonesia, a unitary state in which 
the Moluccas became a province, called Maluku. However, former KNIL 
troops stationed in Ambon rejected this unitary state, and fought for an 
independent Republic of the Southern Moluccas (Republik Maluku Selatan, 
RMS), which was proclaimed by former government officials of NIT in the 
city of Ambon (Bartels, 1978:11, Chauvel, 1990:355-358). To consolidate 
their positions, former KNIL troops attacked several villages with Muslim 
populations that had supported the integration with the Indonesian state. 
Even today, Muslim Ambonese have never forgotten these attacks, and 
remain deeply suspicious of the Christian Ambonese, whom they consider 
to be supporters of the RMS (Bohm, 2006:15-16; Azra, 2008:116). 
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Although the rebellion was defeated the same year by the Indonesian 
military, Christian Ambonese still succeeded in securing positions in 
administrative and educational institutions in the Moluccas because of their 
higher levels of education as well as other privileges they had received 
during the Dutch period. In the 1955 national election, the Indonesian 
Christian Party (Partai Kristen Indonesia, Parkindo) got 49.36% of the 
votes in the city of Ambon, defeating Masyumi, an Islamic political party, 
and the Indonesian Nationalist Party (Partai Nasional Indonesia, PNI), 
which got 24.10% and 7.89% of the votes respectively (van Klinken, 
2006:141). The appointment of representatives from political parties in the 
city parliament in 1957 was based on the local results of the 1955 national 
election. Christian Ambonese dominated the city parliament through 
Parkindo between 1957 and 1971.
During the six national elections between 1971 and 1997, Golkar 
dominated in Ambon as elsewhere in Indonesia, winning between 67% 
and 75% of the votes, while the rest of the votes were divided between 
PPP and PDI (Bertrand, 2002:63-64). During the New Order, the national 
government appointed all governors and city mayors; the positions were 
mostly taken by military officers. In the Moluccas, the position of governor 
was generally given to a (Javanese) Muslim, while the position of mayor 
of Ambon city went to a Christian Ambonese. However, ethno-religious 
divisions were not as salient during this period, because the government 
suppressed religious tensions. Only in the 1990s did religious divisions 
become an important issue. When President Soeharto started to use 
the Indonesian Muslim Intellectual Association (ICMI) to channel his 
political interests, the growing influence of ICMI in national politics also 
extended to local politics in the Moluccas. Christian Ambonese felt that 
their domination over local government was threatened (ICG, 2000:3). In 
1992, the national government appointed Akib Latuconsina, a chairperson 
of Moluccan branch of the ICMI, as governor. He was the first Muslim 
to occupy this position, and the first Ambonese governor in twenty-four 
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years, as most of the previous governors had been Javanese (van Klinken, 
2001:18). The new governor decided not to reappoint the mayor of Ambon, a 
Catholic Javanese, because 90% of the employees he hired were Protestants 
(Bertrand, 2002:69). 
The political reforms of 1998 created anxiety among Muslims and 
Christians. Both sides believed that the others would break the law (van 
Klinken, 2005:87; 2007:94). Six months before the national election in 
1999, communal violence erupted in the city. Both groups of believers made 
use of their religious symbols to justify their aggression against members 
of the religious out-group. People also clearly identified with their religions 
for reasons of safety (Sterkens and Hadiwitanto, 2009:58-59). The violence 
stopped temporarily during the election in June, but flared up again in the 
year 2000, due to the presence of militant Muslim groups like Laskar Jihad 
and Majelis Mujahidin. The incidents that took place were responsible for 
4,840 deaths in the Moluccas, including 1,907 deaths in Ambon (Varshney 
et al., 2004:30,34). In 2002, Muslim and Christian leaders signed a peace 
agreement but the communal violence did not come to a halt until 2004.
After the violent conflicts came to a halt, both groups hesitantly took 
steps to reconcile with members of other religions. Over time the capacity 
to distinguish between religious values and political interests increased. 
When violence erupted again in 2011, fewer Muslims and Christians 
supported it, considering it to be politically engineered violence. Although 
both sides now live in religiously segregated neighbourhoods, they seem 
to have realized that further communal fighting will only cause suffering. 
Both religious groups work together now in gubernatorial and mayoral 
elections. Christian candidates for governor or mayor will appoint Muslims 
as their candidates for vice-governor or vice-mayor, and vice versa. Another 
example of reconciliation is the establishment of organizations, often 
initiated by students from middle-class backgrounds, consisting of Muslim 
and Christian members campaigning for peace and mutual understanding. 
The most popular student-based organizations which directly or indirectly 
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contribute to mutual understanding are Kopi Badati, communities of 
photography and music groups.
Economic changes
Before the 16th century, on the islands of Ternate, Tidore, Bacan, Halmahera, 
Moti and Makian cloves were cultivated, while the Banda Islands in the 
Southern Moluccas produced nutmeg and mace. However, only Ternate 
and the Banda Islands served as centres of the spice trade. Between the 
13th and 15th centuries, it was mainly Javanese, Makassarese, Chinese and 
Arabic traders who bought spices in Ternate and Banda (Andaya, 1993:110-
112). They exchanged the spices for clothes, porcelain, metals and other 
commodities (van Fraassen, 1983:1-2). In those days, Ambon and the 
Lease Islands were peripheral areas compared to Ternate and Banda. After 
the founding of a Portuguese fort in Ternate 1523, Javanese, Makassarese, 
Arab and Chinese traders were forbidden by the Sultan to buy spices in the 
North Moluccas. He granted a trade monopoly to the Portuguese, as they 
supported him in dominating the North Moluccas, so that they were the 
only group allowed to purchase cloves in Ternate. In response, the people of 
Hitu in Ambon and of the Hoamoal Peninsula in Ceram started to cultivate 
cloves, which were sold to Asian traders. When the Portuguese moved to 
their new base in Ambon in 1575, they asked the Christian Ambonese to 
cultivate cloves in the Leitimor Peninsula and on the Lease Islands, but 
without much success (van Fraassen, 1983:6-9).
As mentioned earlier, at the beginning of the 17th century, the VOC 
monopolized the spice trade through contracts (including price agreements) 
with the Muslim rulers of Ternate, Banda and Hitu. The Moluccan inhabitants 
now had to sell their spices to the VOC, and to buy their commodities from 
the company. However, when the market prices increased and the contracts 
were not adjusted, producers tried to circumvent these agreements. The 
same happened when the VOC was unable to provide commodities, such 
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as textiles, porcelain and rice. When the Muslim rulers of Banda, Hitu and 
Hoamoal broke their contracts, it led to a series of wars with the VOC. 
After the VOC had defeated its enemy in the Moluccas in 1651, it increased 
its monopoly over the spice trade and extended its power into other areas 
of the Moluccan archipelago.44 Now, Ambon and the Lease Islands became 
more important for the spice trade than Ternate and Banda. All spices from 
the Moluccas were collected in Ambon before being shipped to Batavia. 
The VOC established a well-organized monopoly for the purchase and 
transportation of spices to Europe via Batavia (Reid, 1990:10-12). 
Beside the trade of spices, the production of spices in the Moluccas 
became monopolized as well. From 1651, the inhabitants of Ambon, Lease 
and the Banda islands were forced by the company to plant at least 10 
clove trees in their gardens, and to sell their harvest to the company for 
fixed prices. The inhabitants of the other islands were prohibited from 
cultivating spices. The VOC enforced this policy by hongi-tochten: punitive 
expeditions to villages that resisted the spice and production monopoly 
(Bartels, 1978:69; Chauvel, 1990:20-21). In those days, both Muslims and 
Christians were not allowed to leave their villages, except those who were 
assigned for VOC expeditions (Cooley, 1962:86-87; Chauvel, 1990:4-7). 
As mentioned earlier, they were forced to work in clove cultivation and 
rowing services. Villagers who cultivated cloves did not always receive 
payment as stipulated in the contracts, because many company officers 
and village heads were corrupt. This made the villagers suffer under the 
monopoly system. Corruption in the VOC, here and elsewhere, contributed 
to its dissolution at the end of 18th century.
After the VOC was dissolved in 1799, the spice monopoly was 
continued by the Dutch colonial state. However, in 1824, the monopoly was 
weakened by the London Agreement between the Dutch and the British that 
allowed spice production in the Northern Moluccas. With increased clove 
44 In 1652, the sultans in the Northern Moluccas signed new contracts with the VOC on 
clove eradication. As compensation for the loss of revenue, the sultans and their officers 
received annual payments.
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production in the archipelago and an undermining of the monopoly, prices 
decreased gradually (Leirissa, 1995:1). They decreased even more after 
the British started to cultivate cloves in their own colonies as well, such as 
in Zanzibar. In 1864, the Dutch put a formal end to the spice monopoly – 
which actually had disappeared already. As a result, the prices for spices 
fell sharply on the international market (Hospes, 1996:30-31). 
By the end of 19th century, Ambon had become an economic backwater. 
The Ambonese still cultivated spices, but in much smaller quantities than 
during the VOC period. The Dutch introduced some new commercial crops 
in Ambon, such as indigo and cocoa, which fetched higher prices than spice 
crops on the international market. However, the attempt to cultivate these 
crops failed and the greater part of the population in the countryside became 
heavily dependent on subsistence activities (Chauvel, 1990:14). 
In the early part of the 20th century, inter-island transportation 
services improved and seaports all over the Indonesian archipelago were 
modernized. Shipping between Makassar, Batavia and Surabaya to the city 
of Ambon with steamboats became more frequent. This stimulated traders 
from outside the Moluccas, such as Chinese, Buginese and Javanese, to 
come to Ambon to trade. They sold rice and manufactured goods and 
bought spices, copra and wood from the Moluccans (Asba, 2007:47-48). 
In this period, transportation between Ambon and other Moluccan islands 
also became easier. People from Christian villages all over the Moluccas 
came to the city for education, while people from Muslim villages came to 
become petty traders. Both migrants and Moluccans in Ambon city lived in 
ethnically and religiously segregated areas at that time.
After independence, Ambon remained the trading centre for 
commodities in the Moluccas, although the Chinese, Buginese, Javanese 
and other Indonesians replaced the Europeans as wholesale traders. 
Between 1970 and 1998, many Butonese, Buginese and Makasarese 
came to trade and to start transport service businesses. During the New 
Order, certain economic sectors in Ambon were linked to particular ethno-
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religious groups. Small and medium-sized businesses were dominated by 
the predominantly Muslim Butonese, Buginese and Makasarese groups. 
Large-scale businesses were controlled by the Chinese, who were mostly 
Christian. In villages surrounding the city, peasants, fishermen and petty 
traders were generally Muslim Ambonese, Muslim Butonese and Christian 
Ambonese. Positions in governmental and state educational institutions 
were mostly occupied by the Christian Ambonese. Regular salaried jobs 
in the private sector were usually shared among different ethno-religious 
groups (Bertrand 2002:73). At the end of the 1990s, problems arose when 
Muslim migrants started competing for jobs as civil servants and in the 
higher levels of government. The Christian Ambonese were pressured to 
leave positions that they traditionally held in education and government. 
Christian Ambonese felt that the Muslim migrants, who already dominated 
the private sector, threatened their political, cultural and economic existence 
(HRW, 1999:6). This political and economic rivalry is identified as one of 
the roots of the communal violence that occurred between 1999 and 2004. 
Religious changes
Similar to the spread of Islam in other parts of the Indonesian archipelago, 
Muslim traders and Islamic preachers were responsible for introducing 
Islam to the Moluccas. Islam reached the Spice Islands in the 13th century 
and became popular after the kings of Ternate, Tidore, Bacan and Jailolo 
converted to Islam around 1460 (Pires, 1944:212-214; Chauvel, 1990:16-
17). In the 16th century, Islam gained more followers in Ambon and the 
Lease Islands. People who lived in the ulilima villages of northern Leihitu 
converted to Islam, while people who lived in the ulisiwa villages of 
southern Leihitu and the Leitimor Peninsula retained their animistic beliefs 
(Aritonang and Steenbrink, 2008:32-35). There was a similar evolution on 
the Lease Islands: inhabitants of Hatuhaha in northern Haruku and of Iha in 
northern Saparua converted to Islam. The introduction of Islam to Hitu by 
Muslim traders exposed the Ambonese, who before the 16th century lived in 
isolation and were considered to be less civilized than people in the northern 
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Moluccas, to external influences (Chauvel, 1980:43-45). In the middle of 
the 16th century, Europeans – first the Portuguese who brought Catholicism, 
and later the Dutch who introduced Protestantism – challenged the spread 
of Islam. 
In the 17th century, Islam spread gradually from the northern to the 
southeastern regions of the Moluccas, although Islamic beliefs and practices 
were still mixed with traditional beliefs. During the VOC period, Muslims 
in the Moluccas were relatively isolated from the rest of the global Islamic 
community because they were prevented from leaving their villages, and 
because Asian spice traders were eventually banned from visiting the 
Moluccas in order to protect the VOC’s trade monopoly (Chauvel, 1980:53; 
Leirissa et al., 1982:246). At the beginning of the Dutch colonial state, 
influential Muslims from outside the Moluccas (e.g. Prince Diponegoro 
and Tengku Imam Bonjol) became political prisoners and were forced to 
live in Ambon. They hardly had any contact with the island population. 
Restrictions imposed by the Dutch made it impossible to teach Islamic 
religion systematically in the Moluccas. At the end of 19th century, advances 
in inter-island transportation allowed Muslims to go on pilgrimage and 
to study outside the Moluccas; while Islamic preachers from outside the 
Moluccas also arrived, introducing modernist Islamic beliefs – but overall, 
Islam in the region remained relatively isolated. In the 1930s, a branch of 
Muhammadiyah was set up in Ambon. However, most Muslim Ambonese 
rejected the new Islamic ideas promoted by this progressive organisation, 
as they felt their traditional beliefs were being attacked (Bartels, 2010: 
248-249). It wasn’t until after independence (particularly during the New 
Order), when migration increased in the 1980s and 1990s, that the pace of 
Islamisation in the Moluccas speeded up. Among the migrants were Islamic 
preachers who brought the Muslims of Ambon into contact with different 
interpretations of Islam. After several years, many of the younger Islamic 
preachers who adhered to modernist Islamic beliefs replaced religious 
leaders who had a more syncretic belief system.
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The Portuguese were the first to bring Catholicism to the Moluccas. 
They introduced it in the villages in southern Leihitu, and later in Leitimor 
Peninsula and the Lease Islands. By the middle of the 16th century, most 
native communities in southern Ambon and the adjacent islands of Haruku, 
Saparua and Nusa Laut had nominally converted to Catholicism.45 Between 
1575 and 1605, Catholicism was the main religion in the city of Ambon. 
However, when the Portuguese left in 1605, the indigenous Catholics had to 
convert to Protestantism, as the Dutch declared all Christian villages to be 
Protestant villages (Bartels, 2010:241). Between 1605 and 1800, Catholic 
missionaries were forbidden from spreading their faith in the Indonesian 
archipelago. Only from 1912 were Catholic missionaries allowed to 
undertake activities in Ambon again. However, Protestant clergy and 
government officials in the city prevented the establishment of a Catholic 
Church and school until 1925 (Steenbrink, 2007:221-226).
Initially, the VOC did not pay much attention to religious education 
and to the pastoral care of the Christian Ambonese (van Fraassen, 
1983:13-14). From 1605, the company sent religious ministers to serve 
only the Dutch. However, in 1633, ministers started to provide lessons 
on Protestantism in confessional schools to the Christian Ambonese, and 
trained a few of them to become religious teachers, sacristans and church 
guardians. In 1633 there were 32 schools with 1,200 pupils, rising to 54 
schools with 5,190 pupils by the year 1700 (Aritonang and Steenbrink, 
2008:105). Between 1625 and 1775, the VOC sent 41 Protestant ministers 
to Ambon, Lease, Ternate and Banda, where they served as both religious 
clergy and teachers (2008:103). During the British Interregnum (1810-
1816), the British Resident sent more missionaries to Ambon to work in 
churches and schools. This practice was continued by the Dutch colonial 
state (van Fraassen, 1983:35). From the beginning of the 19th century, Dutch 
45 Three villages of Ambon Island accepted Catholicism in 1538, and the prominent Spanish 
Jesuit father, Franciscus Xaverius, was part of missionary activities in Hatiwe, Tawiri, 
Nusaniwe, Killang, Ema, Halong and Soya in 1546. The Christian villages regarded 
these conversions as challenges to the power of Ternate; while Ternate perceived that 
these villages had switched their political loyalty to the Portuguese (Alhadar, 2001:13)
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missionaries, funded and controlled by the colonial government, managed 
the spread of Protestantism more systematically. For example, missionaries 
founded schools for local Protestant ministers to introduce Protestantism 
across the archipelago. The language used in churches and schools was 
Malay-Ambon, which gradually led to the loss of local languages in many 
Protestant villages (Chauvel, 1990:6-7). 
In the middle of the 19th century, all Protestant churches in the Moluccas 
merged into the State Church (Staatskerk) of the Moluccas.46 In 1935, these 
churches were united under the autonomous synod of the Protestant Church 
of the Moluccas (Gereja Protestant Maluku, GPM). This synod is now the 
biggest religious organization in the area, and its hierarchical structure is 
parallel with the structure of the provincial administration.47 As previously 
mentioned, Christian Moluccans succeeded in securing positions at all 
levels of the insular bureaucracy due to their higher levels of education and 
the privileges they had enjoyed under the Dutch. They also profited from 
this elevated station after independence, as many Christian Moluccans 
obtained prominent positions in education and politics. Although new 
Christian denominations, such as Pentecostal and charismatic churches, 
appeared in the city, the vast majority of Protestants are still affiliated with 
the GPM. New denominations attract younger generations in particular, 
mainly through their varied and modern liturgy. 
Cultural changes: traditional mechanisms for conflict resolution 
Traditional cultural relationships dating back to pre-colonial times are 
still relevant, even when villages do not share the same religion anymore. 
46 In 1814-1864, The Rotterdam Missionary Society (Rotterdamsche Zendelingen 
Genootschap) got authority to carry out missionary activities. The most famous minister 
was the so-called ‘Apostle of the Moluccas’, J.C. Kam. All missionary activities were 
controlled by the Committee of Affairs of the Protestant Churches in the Netherlands-
Indies (Commissie voor de Zaaken der Protestantsche Kerken in Nederlandsch Indië). 
47 In 2010, the GPM had 575,000 followers, spread over 27 branches and 725 churches 
(http://profilgereja.wordpress.com/2010/05/11/gereja-protestan-maluku/, accessed 29 
September 2014). 
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Among the traditional forms of inter-village relations, the pela – a form of 
alliance and cooperation between two or more villages – was the only one 
that was to a certain extent respected by the Dutch. Entering into new pela 
relationships was even permitted, but only under the supervision of the 
Resident. As a mutual mechanism for cooperation, three types of pela (lit. 
blood) can be distinguished: pela keras, pela tempat sirih and pela gandong. 
Pela keras (‘hard’ pela) is established when leaders from participating 
villages swear an oath to unite as brothers and to help each other. This 
strong bond is symbolized by the ritual of drinking blood together. Pela 
tempat sirih (‘soft’ pela) is based on friendship between villages. Pela 
gandong (‘kinship’ pela) is a form of brotherhood between two or more 
villages claiming common ancestry (Bartels, 1978; Adam, 2008a:228; 
Bartels, 2003:133-135; Sterkens and Hadiwitanto, 2009:67). 
These three kinds of pela are mechanisms that bind and create peaceful 
relationships between villages of either the same or different religions. In 
the past, pela consisted of rules, customs, prohibitions and punishments 
that had to be observed by the villagers involved. For example, marriage 
between men and women from the villages participating in pela gandong 
was strictly prohibited (Huwae, 1995:78-79). People in villages participating 
in a pela relationship were considered to be related by blood, and had to 
help each other at all times, during both war and peace. The villagers of 
participating villages were brothers and sisters, and although members of 
pela eventually had different religions, their relationship was based on a 
long history of trusted social interactions (Coolley, 1962:71). Thus, pela 
minimized the threat of aggression between Muslim and Christian villages, 
while it strengthened common interests and shared values between them 
(Lowry and Littlejohn, 2006:410-411). Besides pela, adat  (customary law) 
also minimized religious rivalries, since regional and cultural identification 
was stronger than religious identification (Bartels, 2010:246-247). Despite 
having many similarities, pela is distinguished from adat, as adat includes 
all traditional values and laws within a specific community (Sterkens and 
Hadiwitanto, 2009:69). 
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After independence, both government policies and the activities of 
preachers from outside the Moluccas contributed to the erosion of these 
traditional cultural bonds (Lowry and Littlejon, 2006:410-411). During 
the New Order era, the government imposed law No. 45/1979 on village 
government, changing traditional villages into administrative units that 
had to adhere the new national state ideology. Consequently, it discouraged 
local leaders from maintaining the adat system and the traditional local 
bonds between villages. At the same time, many preachers, who were 
among the wave of new migrants to the Moluccas, were members of 
global religious communities or denominations. They introduced Islamic 
beliefs that reduced the significance of local cultural bonds and customs. 
For example, in the 1980s, attendance of religious celebrations with people 
from different religious groups was prohibited. By the time of the recent 
conflicts (1999-2004), pela had already lost its meaning and had become 
an ineffective method for preventing violence (Pariela, 2007:104; Sterkens 
and Hadiwitanto, 2009:67). Another reason that pela was ineffective in 
preventing violence was that the bond only applies to participating villages 
(Iwamony, 2010:104-106).  
 After the conflict ended in 2004, decentralization became a spearhead 
of political reformation, with village heads and the regional government 
trying to reactivate pela to prevent further religious violence. This has 
seen little success to date, as migrants and younger generations showed 
little enthusiasm for the reestablishment of this traditional institution. Pela 
is understandably ineffective in preventing or resolving conflicts when 
migrants are involved: on the one hand, they are excluded from traditional 
cultural bonds, and on the other, they do not feel obliged to practice to these 
forms of solidarity (Iwamony, 2010:108-109). The younger generations of 
Moluccans that stick to modernist religious beliefs also question pela because 
it is a traditional cultural bond instead of a religious one. Nevertheless, 
the reactivation of pela has encouraged Christians and Muslims to attempt 
a spirit of mutual trust and cooperation that is central to pela practices. 
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For example, during the National Quran Recitation Festival (Musabaqah 
Tilawatil Quran, MTQ), in 2012, Christians were involved by providing 
accommodation to the participants of the festival. And during the national 
church choir festival, some Muslim schools participated and had their choir 
teams perform traditional Moluccan songs.
Furthermore, village heads and the regional government paid 
attention to activating the adat system; it had functioned well before it was 
undermined after independence (particularly during the New Order period). 
Traditional adat laws were explicitly brought back to people’s attention 
in 2002, when Moluccan village heads established a provincial cultural 
organization called The Assembly of Kings (Majelis Latupati) to promote 
peace between Muslims and Christians. It also initiated discussions on 
land rights and cultural relations. As a part of the peace building process, 
the assembly reactivated adat laws to restore villagers’ access to land and 
other resources. However, in reality, some village communities use the 
adat laws to support religious segregation, preventing displaced persons 
from reclaiming their property (Adam, 2010b: 401). Nowadays, almost all 
regencies, including the city of Ambon, have regulations that confirm the 
existence of the traditional negeri: villages with clear territorial borders 
determined by hereditary identity and with leaders whose authority to rule 
based on genealogy. Consequently, villages have a relatively higher degree 
of autonomy than before independence (Adam, 2010b:404-405). As in the 
past, indigenous clans own land collectively, and the land is allotted to 
clan members by the council of elders. In contrast, in villages inhabited by 
migrants, the so-called negeri administratif, land is owned individually. 
Economic and political changes in the Moluccas have also spurred 
changes in the educational system, characterized by a polarization between 
Muslims and Christians.  After the VOC arrived, Protestant churches 
developed confessional schools in many Christian villages. In 1860, 
these schools became state schools (volksscholen) providing pupils with 
a practical education (Chauvel, 1990:27). Consequently, these schools no 
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longer provided religious education. In 1874, the colonial government 
also established training schools for teachers, medical assistants and other 
professions. In line with the tenor of the Ethical Politics, at the beginning 
of the 20th century the Dutch also started to introduce modern education 
in the Moluccas. In 1920, primary schools (Hollands Inlandsche Schools, 
HIS) and secondary schools (Middelbaar Uitgebreid Lager Onderwijs, 
MULO) were founded in Ambon and the Lease Islands. After six years, 
these schools had 2,846 Christian pupils. The graduates of these schools 
filled the lower and middle ranks of the colonial bureaucracy. In 1920, 
the Dutch also established state schools in six Muslim villages on Ambon 
Island. However, by 1930, only one of these remained. Muslim children did 
not attend these state schools because their parents worried their children 
would lose their culture and religion by studying under the Dutch (Chauvel, 
1990:25-38). Unlike in other parts of Indonesia, there were only a few 
traditional Islamic schools (pesantren) in Ambon. In 1930, the literacy rate 
in Ambon reached 44.50%, while the Indonesian national average was only 
6.40% (Timmer, 1961:40).
After independence, more and more Muslim Ambonese attended 
education in government schools. And both Muslim and Christian students 
from the Moluccas continued their higher education in the city of Ambon. 
In 1962, the government founded Universitas Pattimura (Unpatti), the first 
public university in Ambon. When this University opened, the Christian 
lecturers and administrative staff clearly outnumbered the Muslim staff. So 
much so, that Muslim students felt discriminated against at the university. 
The larger proportion of Christian staff was a result of the higher educational 
level of Christians compared to Muslims at that time. In 1965, the biggest 
Protestant synod in the Moluccas, the Moluccas Protestant Church (Gereja 
Protestan Maluku, GPM), founded the Theological Seminary (Sekolah 
Tinggi Teologia, STT) of GPM; this developed into the Indonesian Christian 
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University in the Moluccas (Universitas Kristen Indonesia di Maluku, 
UKIM) in 1985.48
Only in 1980 did the State Islamic Institute (Institut Agama Islam 
Negeri, IAIN) Sultan 
 Alauddin Makassar open a branch in Ambon to accommodate Muslim 
students in state-run higher education. In 1997, this branch became the 
State Islamic Academy of Ambon (Sekolah Tinggi Agama Islam Ambon, 
STAIN), which developed into the State Islamic Institute (Institut Agama 
Islam Negeri, IAIN) Ambon in 2007.
The higher education institutes in Ambon are seriously affected by 
interreligious tensions. In 1992, when Muslims dominated the provincial 
government, the governor tried to fire the rector of Unpatti because he was 
accused of favouring Christian lecturers for promotions and scholarships. 
In the end, however, the governor’s effort did not succeed due to strong 
protests from university staff and students (Bertrand, 2002:63). Another 
controversy started when the governor appointed a Muslim Butonese as 
head of the local education office, and increased the number of Muslim 
teachers by hiring them from Sulawesi, since qualified Muslim teachers 
could not be found in the Moluccas.
During the violence between 1999 and 2004, higher educational 
institutes both contributed to and suffered from the conflict. Muslims 
burnt down buildings on the Unpatti and UKIM campuses because they 
represented the hegemony of Christianity; Christians burned down Islamic 
schools in the city. The Muslim groups set up defences centered in STAIN 
Ambon and the surrounding areas. After these violent clashes, pupils and 
students went to schools and higher educational institutions in religiously 
segregated neighbourhoods. As mentioned before, these days there are only 
48 UKIM was originally rooted in a Christian teacher training school called STOVIL 
(School tot Opleiding van Inlands Leraars) founded in 1885 by Dutch missionaries. After 
recognition of Indonesian independence in 1949, STOVIL changed into the Theology 
School of Maluku Protestant Church (Sekolah Teologia-GPM).
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a few schools and higher educational institutions where students of both 
religious groups are present. Unpatti and Polytechnic Ambon are the only 
institutes of higher education where both groups are represented.
Research Questions1.4 
The research questions for this study are divided into two categories: 
descriptive and explanatory. After the descriptive questions are addressed, 
explanatory questions are used to explore the proposed relations between 
variables. This study therefore presents descriptive and explanatory 
questions at the individual level, which are outlined below.
Descriptive questions at the individual level1.4.1 
One objective of this research is to study whether there is ethno-religious 
identification, and avoidance of intergroup contact, among Muslims and 
Christians in Yogyakarta and Ambon. Moreover, this objective also includes 
an investigation of the ways in which ethno-religious identification and 
intergroup contact avoidance are present in daily life. As shown above, 
these cities have different histories that might play a role in either group 
identification or intergroup contact avoidance. The descriptive questions on 
the individual level are:
To what extent is ethno-religious identification present among Muslims and 
Christians in Ambon and Yogyakarta? (Question 1a)
To what extent is avoidance of intergroup contact present among Muslims and 
Christians in Ambon and Yogyakarta? (Question 1b)
In which ways is ethno-religious identification among Muslims and Christians 
observable in their daily lives? (Question 1c)
In which ways is avoidance of intergroup contact among Muslims and 
Christians observable in their daily lives? (Question 1d)
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Explanatory questions at the individual level1.4.2 
The relation between intergroup contact avoidance and ethno-religious 
identification has been studied in the framework of so-called social identity 
theory (Tajfel, 1970). Social identity theory explains how reference to group 
membership can lead to prejudice, hostility and discriminatory behaviour 
against out-group members. Reference to group membership is sufficient 
to create favourable attitudes toward in-group members and prejudice 
and hostility toward out-group members. Therefore, we formulate our 
explanatory research question as follows:
To what extent is there a relationship between ethno-religious identification 
among Muslims and Christians in Ambon and Yogyakarta, and avoidance of 
intergroup contact? (Question 2a)
Ethnic group conflict theory explains that the stronger the actual 
competition between ethnic groups, and the stronger the perceived 
ethnic threat, the stronger will be social identification, which will induce 
exclusionary reactions (Gijsberts et al., 2004). Many studies provide 
evidence that these reactions affect certain groups more than others, as the 
level of actual competition might be different between groups. Referring 
to previous research by Coenders and Scheepers (2003), people with lower 
education levels support in-group favouritism more than those with higher 
education levels. Scheepers et al. (2002) mentions that ethnic exclusionism 
tends to be supported by individuals of majority groups from less educated 
levels, lower income brackets, manual workers and by those who are 
unemployed. In another study of social distance by Coenders et al. (2007), 
avoidance of social contact with immigrants strongly prevails amongst 
those with lower education levels, manual workers, the self-employed and 
people in rural areas. In this research, we include social characteristics 
such as gender, parents’ religion, the education level of parents, social 
class or household income, parents’ occupational status and the subject’s 
occupational status. The research question is: 
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To what extent is there a relationship between ethno-religious identification 
among Muslims and Christians in Ambon and Yogyakarta, and avoidance 
of intergroup contacts, considering other individual-level determinants such 
as gender, parents’ religion, household income, parents’ education, parents’ 
occupational status and parents’ occupation status? (Question 2b)
Based on relevant previous studies, the relationship between 
intergroup contact avoidance and ethno-religious identification is neither 
direct nor deterministic. This means that social identity theory alone cannot 
explain all practices of intergroup contact avoidance as dimensions of ethnic 
exclusionism. Studies of Duckit (2006), Bobo (1988), Schneider (2008), 
Schlueter and Scheepers (2010), Duriez and Roggen (1999), Doherty and 
Poole (1997), Iceland and Wilkes (2006), Coenders (2001), Tropp et al. 
(2006) and Sidanius and Pratto (1999) point out that many variables may 
relate to ethnic exclusionism and social identification. These variables are 
the salience of identity, perceived threats, intergroup contact, religiosity, 
individual memory of violence, perceived discrimination, nationalistic 
attitudes, distrust and social dominance orientation. Therefore, my research 
question is formulated as follows:
To what extent can we explain the relationship between ethno-religious 
identification among Muslims and Christians in Ambon and Yogyakarta, 
and avoidance of intergroup contacts, in relation to particular intermediate 
determinants such as salience of identity, perceived threats, intergroup contact, 
religiocentrism, attitudes toward religious plurality, interpretation of sacred 
writing, perceived discrimination, memory of violence, nationalistic attitudes, 
distrust and social dominance orientation? (Question 3)
76
InteRgRoUP contAct AVoIdAnce In IndoneSIA
77
chAPteR 2 - theoRetIcAl FRAmewoRk And ReSeARch model
 CHAPTER 2
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
AND RESEARCH MODEL
This chapter describes theories on intergroup contact avoidance, conceptual and research models, and hypotheses. The research 
models used are derived from theories on intergroup contact avoidance. 
Furthermore, we come up with a set of variables, namely intergroup contact 
avoidance, ethno-religious identification, individual determinants, perceived 
threat, salience of identity, intergroup contact, religiosity, perceived 
discrimination, individual memory of violence, nationalism, distrust, and 
social dominance orientation. Then, from the research model, we formulate 
a set of hypotheses, before going on to provide a brief description of the 
structure of the thesis. This chapter therefore consists of three sections: 
the first section describes the theoretical frameworks employed, the second 
section explains the formulation of the research model and the hypotheses, 
and the third section illustrates the structure of the thesis.
Theories on intergroup contact avoidance1.1 
In this research, intergroup contact avoidance between ethno-religious 
groups will be conceptually analyzed from the perspective of three 
main theoretical frameworks, namely realistic conflict theory, social 
identification theory, and ethnic group conflict theory.  Realistic conflict 
theory locates intergroup contact avoidance as part of the conflict between 
social groups due to competition over scarce resources and over values. 
It has developed from both sociological and psychological approaches 
to intergroup relations. Social identification theory attempts to explain 
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that ethno-religious identification either directly or indirectly influences 
intergroup contact avoidance. Ethnic group conflict theory adds a new 
aspect to realistic conflict theory and social identification theory, putting 
intergroup contact avoidance into a broader perspective and including the 
position of individuals in the social system.
In addition to these three main theories, this study also looks at 
other theories and standpoints, by considering factors such as salience 
of identity, actual intergroup contact, religiosity, individual memories of 
violence, perceived discrimination, nationalistic attitudes, distrust, and 
social dominance orientation. Overall, the aim is to incorporate all these 
theories into one overarching framework that will be rigorously tested. This 
study also evaluates the application of these theories, which have largely 
been developed in and for Western societies, in the analysis of societies in 
Southeast Asia. 
2.1.1 Realistic conflict theory
Realistic conflict theory explains that limited resources can lead to conflict 
between groups, resulting in an increase in prejudice and support for 
discrimination. This theory assumes that social conflict is rational; that 
is, conflict against out-groups aims to realize the real objective of an in-
group due to competition over scarce resources, power, and status (Coser, 
1956; Sherif, 1967; Le Vine and Campbell, 1972; Austin and Worchel, 
1979).1 The importance of intergroup competition as a determinant of the 
social conflict is also articulated by Sumner (1906), Davie (1929), Bernard 
(1957), Boulding (1962), and Newcomb (1960) (Levine and Campbell, 
1972:29). This theory has two dimensions of explanation drawn from 
both sociological and social psychological perspectives. In sociological 
1 Although the assumption of rationality is relevant to the groups themselves, it is extended 
to include the group members. If it is rational for the groups to compete, it must also be 
rational for the group members to do so. In many cases, this theory is viewed as an 
economic theory that considers people as selfish and always seeking to maximize their 
own rewards (Taylor and Moghaddam, 1987: 34; Bornstein 2003: 129).
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theory, the explanation is derived from Coser’s argument that conflict, 
like cooperation, has a social function. He refers to Simmel’s concept that 
social conflict can be perceived as a form of socialization. Coser (1956:35) 
states that the function of social conflict is to establish and maintain group 
identities and boundaries: the distinction between the in-group and the out-
group is constructed through social conflict. Conflict serves a social function, 
promoting the formation of social groups, defining and maintaining group 
boundaries, and strengthening social cohesion as well as social solidarity 
(Coser, 1956; cf. Mack, 1965).
Coser (1956:49) distinguishes between realistic and non-realistic 
conflicts. Realistic conflict refers to a conflict stemming from frustration 
related to specific demands and the estimated gains of the participants. This 
kind of conflict is often directed at the source of the frustration. Meanwhile, 
non-realistic conflict is a conflict arising from the need to release tension, and 
is not related to achieving specific results. Realistic conflict has functional 
alternatives for resolution. This means that the conflict can be put to an 
end when the participants find satisfying alternative ways to accomplish 
their objectives. Non-realistic conflict has functional alternatives only in 
the choice of rivals (1956:49). 
Like Coser, Blumer (1958) also proposes a point of view stressing 
the relationship between conflict and social identity formation. In the racial 
prejudice of dominant groups, three feelings are always present: feelings 
of superiority that the dominant group or race is intrinsically different 
from others, feelings about proprietary claims to certain privileges and 
advantages, and feelings of fear and suspicion that the subordinated race 
intends to usurp the prerogative of the dominant race (Blumer, 1958: 4; 
Coenders, 2001: 28). Therefore, racial prejudice strongly exists in the sense 
of a group’s position, rather than in feelings of in-group favouritism and out-
group hostility. The dominant group defines and redefines its identity, and 
the subordinate group’s identity, through interaction and communication. 
In short, racial prejudice is a defensive reaction to subordinate groups 
perceived to be challenging the sense of a group’s position.
80
InteRgRoUP contAct AVoIdAnce In IndoneSIA
Referring to Coser (1956:54), every social system has sources of 
realistic conflict, in that people compete over conflicting claims to scarce 
resources, status, and power. Coser’s concept of realistic conflict corresponds 
with Blumer’s ideas about prejudice and group position, although they use 
different terminology (Coenders 2001:29). Ethnic groups have contradictory 
claims over status, power, and scarce resources. Each group holds beliefs 
that they have the right to own these scarce resources, and holds judgments 
about the proper distribution of power and privilege. Increased in-group 
cohesion, solidarity, and feelings of superiority are supported by conflicts of 
interest between ethnic groups, as well as increased hostile and prejudicial 
attitudes towards out-group members. According to Blumer, challenges 
against the prerogative of the in-group can be considered a threat from the 
out-group. Nevertheless, realistic conflict between groups does not only 
relate to material resources, but is also associated with struggles for the 
existence of the in-group’s values (Allport, 1954 [1958]; Coser, 1956:4; 
Blalock, 1967). In a different way, Allport (1954) also argues that ideological 
conflict between religious groups may take place if the conflicting religious 
groups claim that their religion or beliefs are the only true religion.
The central hypothesis of realistic conflict theory is that “real conflict 
of group interests causes intergroup conflict” (Campbell, 1965:287). This 
theory is based on the rationale that human nature is selfishly oriented and 
attempts to maximize rewards (Gijsberts et al., 2004: 6). In comparison, 
realistic conflict theory in psychology, pioneered by Sheriff and associates 
(1966, 1969, 1979)and based in experimental research on the relationships 
between social groups, concludes that competition between social groups 
tends to create wider social distance, to increase in-group favouritism, 
solidarity, and group pride, and to create prejudice and disputes between 
social groups (Gijsberts et al., 2004:8).2 As a consequence, intergroup 
2 Galinsky (2002:91-92) explains the decisive role of groups in the creation of a competitive 
spirit. First, a group provides social support that justifies behaviours promoting self 
and group interest. Second, group membership decreases the ability of opponents to 
level accusations against the self. Third, the mere presence of a group on the other side 
activates a schema built of fear and distrust. 
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hostility and competition are considered realistic, instrumental in character, 
and motivated by rewards that are extrinsic to the intergroup situation. In 
summary, the conflicting interests that develop into social conflict through 
intergroup competition will create antagonistic intergroup relations, and 
strengthen identification, including the attachment to a positive image 
within the in-group (Tajfel and Turner, 1986:8).3
Levine and Campbell (1972:29-42) comprehensively explain the 
logic of realistic conflict theory. First, they theorize that real conflict of 
interest between groups will lead to intergroup conflict. Furthermore, real 
conflict of interest, intergroup conflict, and the presence of hostility may 
become a real threat to the in-group, as well as create perceptions of threat. 
Secondly, real threat will turn into hostility towards the sources of conflict, 
increasing in-group solidarity, awareness of one’s own in-group identity, 
and the tightness of group boundaries. Threat will also reduce defection 
from the group, intensifying the punishment and rejection of deviants 
within the group, and strengthening ethnocentrism. Finally, the weakest 
group in a local cluster is likely to be the most ethnocentric. 
In contrast to the approach of social psychology, sociological 
literature stresses socio-economic factors. For example, Blalock (1967:49) 
emphasizes economic and status factors as the major determinants of 
minority discrimination. Economic, political, and cultural competition can 
be identified as actual competition, related to a part or whole strata between 
ethno-religious groups (1967:74). Competition between groups can be 
either actual or perceived (Blalock, 1967:102).4 The recent development of 
realistic conflict theory includes perceived threat as an intermediate factor 
3 However, this proposition seems to undermine the rational and material basis of realistic 
conflict theory. When group conflict operates on a psychological level, it is far from 
rational due to the involvement of biased decision making (Monroe et al., 2000:433)
4 Actual competition can be seen in relation to differences in average standard of living, 
unemployment levels, discrimination policy in the recruitment of civil servants, and the 
growth of population caused by migration. Meanwhile, perceived competition is the 
personal evaluation of social conditions related to ethno-religious groups.
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between intergroup competition and group identification (or hostility).5 
Bobo (1988:95-96) differentiates between three motives of group conflict: 
perceptions of incompatible group interests, perceptions and evaluation 
of group standing, and perceived threat or challenges to group interests. 
According to Bobo (1988:97), perceived threat is a determinant factor 
in racial policy attitudes.6 Bobo and Hutchings (1996:955) explain that 
intergroup hostility does not rise simply from objective conditions or from 
negative feelings against an out-group. In their estimation, feelings of 
perceived competition and hostility derive from historically and collectively 
developed judgments of group position in the social order that in-group 
members feel they should rightfully occupy, rather than members of an 
out-group.
This theory argues that resource tension and the significance of a 
potentially competitive out-group can result in the perception of group 
competition for resources (Dovidio et al., 2005:488). Perceived competition 
is thought to be based on propositions of zero-sum belief. That is, the more 
the other group obtains, the less is available for one’s own group. This 
model is often referred to as an instrumental model of group conflict due to 
the rational and instrumental attitudes and behaviours toward the out-group 
competitors that are hypothesized to remove the source of competition by 
including out-group derogation, discrimination, and avoidance of the other 
group (2005:488). 
2.1.2 Social identity theory
Theories about sources of group conflict are contrasted with psychological 
5 The original realistic conflict theory has been expanded to include the perception of 
the conflict (Esses and Amstrong, 2002:701). The theory does not require that actual 
competition exists, because the perception of competition will lead to conflict and 
intergroup hostility.
6 Larsen et al. (2009:117) says that perceived threats produce prejudice and discrimination 
against minorities by majority groups. Competition between groups over limited 
resources and economic insecurities may create frustrations that result in aggression 
towards minority groups (2009:128).  
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theories that propose intergroup conflict as projective expressions of 
problems that are essentially intra-group or intra-individual in origin 
(Levine and Campbell, 1972:29). As mentioned by Tajfel and Turner 
(1986:7), this theory is different from much of the work in social psychology 
that emphasizes intra-individual or interpersonal psychological processes 
that create prejudiced attitudes or discriminatory behaviour. For example, 
experiments conducted by Billig and Tajfel (1973:27-52) point out that 
conflict is not necessarily always conflicts of interest between groups. Tajfel 
and Turner (1979[1986]) and Tajfel argue (1970:96-102) that competition 
between groups, or conflicts of interest, are not a necessary condition for 
discrimination, but are merely social categorizations.
Every society consists of social categories, defined as divisions of 
people that are based on nationality, race, class, religion, and occupation 
which stand in power and status relations to one another (Abram, 1990:13). 
Social categories do not exist in isolation, so they naturally lead to the 
creation of a distinctive social structure. This point of view from social 
psychology is in line with the sociological theories of structuralism from 
Weber (1930), Durkheim (1893 [1933]), Parsons (1951), and Merton (1957). 
The social identity approach in social psychology attempts to explain the 
representation of individuals in one’s group. Psychological processes 
create identity and behaviour, including group behaviour. These theories 
date back to Sumner (1906[1960]:27) who emphasizes the differentiation 
between the in-group, or “us,” and the out-group, or “others.” The former 
refers to peaceful relations, and the latter refers to war relations. Sumner 
considers ethnocentrism to be group behaviour. His theory is the basis for 
the further exploration of social identity in the literature of sociology and 
social psychology. 
The rise of social identity theory begins from critiques of realistic 
conflict theory, by saying that theories of identity should pay attention to 
the processes underlying the development of group identity, and to the 
subjective aspects of group membership (Tajfel and Turner, 1986:8). Social 
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identity theory attempts to explain attitudes and behaviour between social 
groups through psychological processes that emphasize the development and 
maintenance of a group’s identity, and the impact of group identification on 
behaviour between groups (Gijsberts et al., 2004:8). Differing from Barth’s 
idea that identification and collectivity are constructed through transaction 
and negotiation,7 Tajfel says that group membership  is sufficient in itself 
to generate identification with that group and to channel behaviour toward 
in-group favouritism and discrimination against an out-group (Jenkins, 
1996:7).8 
Based on experimental research, conflict of interest between groups 
is not sufficient or necessary to produce conflict and discrimination (Turner, 
1981).9 Therefore, the central assumption of this theory is that in-group 
bias is an omnipresent characteristic of intergroup relations.10 Tajfel and 
associates provide evidence that social categorization is sufficient to create 
intergroup discrimination and behaviour favouring the in-group.11 In terms 
7 Collective identity is never frozen, and is constantly in flux. Consequently, social 
boundaries are built through a combination of many varieties of elements and can always 
be contested. The membership in a collectivity is socially constructed and based on 
continuous social interactions that share certain features of similarity (Eisenstadt and 
Giesen, 1995:97).
8 Huddy (2001:131) questioned this proposition. Social identity theories regard social 
identity as an all or nothing phenomenon. When the group is salient, the group identity 
will be the main identity. When it is not salient, individual identity will be paramount.
9 Like Marxist theory, social identity theory holds that the basis of all human groups is 
found in members’ recognition of a common plight. Differing from Marxist theory, this 
theory considers the psychological processes that translate social categories into human 
groups, and the creation of a psychological reality from a social reality (Hogg 1988:16 
cf. Herring et al., 1999:365). 
10 Jelen’s study (1993:178-179) on religious group attitudes explains that ethno-religious 
group identification is one of the most important predictors of political attitudes among 
religious and political elites, as well as among the public masses. However, Rubin and 
Hewstone (2004:823-830) criticize social identity theory for overemphasizing in-group 
favouritism and underemphasizing out-group favouritism, and also for its inability to 
explain institutional discrimination.
11 Brewer (1999:442) says that in-group favouritism and identification do not directly 
correlate with discriminatory perception and behaviour against an out-group. He argues 
that the need to justify in-group values is related to forms of moral superiority, sensitivity 
to threat, social comparison processes, the anticipation of interdependence under 
conditions of distrust and power politics can bridge in-group identification to create 
hostility against an out-group.
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of in-group favouritism, Tajfel and Turner (1986:14) say that maximum 
difference (MD) is more essential than maximum in-group profit (MIP). 
According to this theory, individuals’ evaluation of self is a function 
of both personal and social identity (Herring et al., 1999). If personal 
identity depends on individual accomplishment, it is also a product 
of group membership. In order to maintain a positive self-evaluation, 
individuals make favourable references to the in-group, which they identify 
with, and unfavourable ascriptions to out-groups. This theory assumes 
that individuals categorize their world into them and us. Identification is 
a motivational need to create positive distinctions, which are fulfilled by 
social comparisons between groups. Comparisons between the in-group 
and out-groups are signified by perceptual overstatements favouring the 
in-group (Greene, 1999: 394). Therefore, social categorization will lead to 
this kind of perceptual contrast (Turner et al., 1987; cf. Greene, 1999:394). 
Social identification, social categorization, and social comparison will 
produce biased perceptions of the in-group towards out-groups.
As previously mentioned, social identity theory has four important 
concepts: social categorization, social identification, social comparison, 
and psychological group distinctiveness. (Tajfel, 1978a; Gijsberts et al., 
2004:9). Social categorization, as defined by Tajfel (1978b:61) “can be 
understood as the ordering of a social environment in terms of groupings of 
persons in a manner which make sense to the individual.” It is considered 
a system of orientation that helps to define the individual’s position 
in society.  The difference between the in-group and the out-group is 
created by social categorization, a cognitive instrument that systematizes 
the complexity of information a human organism receives from their 
environment. Social categorization takes place when information about 
social groups is organized so that the similarities and differences between 
categories are emphasized.12 Therefore, the difference between categories 
12 If the negative out-group orientation is not a strong element of group identity, social 
categorization may not be accountable for how someone relates to his or her reference 
group members. Therefore, culture may be one way that individuals find out the meaning 
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within the in-group is perceived as peripheral, while similarities between 
categories within the in-group become central. Out-groups are defined 
as groups with members who uniformly share values, conceptions, and 
feelings; meanwhile, the characters of the in-group are regarded as more 
diversified. 
Tajfel (1978a:63) says social identification is understood as part 
of an individual’s self-concept, which derives from knowledge of his or 
her membership in social groups, along with the value and emotional 
significance attached to that membership.13 Every individual obtains his or 
her image of self from his or her knowledge of membership in a social 
group that is attached to a sense of value and emotion in regards to that 
membership.14 Social identity can only be defined through the effect of 
social categorization that segments individuals’ social environment into in-
groups and out-groups. Social identity can be either positive or negative, 
depending on the evaluation by the social group that contributes to the 
formation of the social identity of individuals. This assumes that individuals 
strive to acquire or maintain a satisfying image or concept of self, or a 
positive social identity. 
Meanwhile, individuals perceive the features of their own in-group as 
having higher moral values via the social comparison process. This is rooted 
in Festinger’s (1954) hypothesis, which states: (i) “there exists, in the human 
organism, a drive to evaluate his opinions and his abilities; (ii) to the extent 
and value of the group, and may contribute to collective identity formation (Herring et 
al., 1999:379).  
13 A politicized collective identity occurs when individuals regard themselves as self-
conscious group members in the midst of a power struggle (Sears et al., 2003:421), so 
in-group favouritism is linked to collective self-esteem but not to personal self-esteem. 
Political mobilization makes ethnic identity stronger and more salient. Participation can 
be perceived as rational in that it is undertaken to obtain desired outcomes or as a means 
of reaching valued goals (Klandermans, 1984).
14 Image making is the redefinition of group boundaries, since the boundaries define 
collective identity (Pitchford, 2001:48). While boundary markers such as religion and 
language are subject to negative evaluation by the dominant groups, the out-group 
(subordinate) may influence the redefinition of their meaning and group identity in a 
more positive way (Taylor and Whittier, 1992 cf. Pitchford, 2001:48). 
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that objective, non-social means are not available, people evaluate their 
opinions and abilities by comparing them respectively with the opinions 
and abilities of others” (Tajfel, 1978:64). Social comparison happens when 
we make comparisons between others and ourselves. According to Turner 
(1978:236), to achieve positive social identity, comparisons between the 
in-group and the out-group must be perceived as differences that favour 
the in-group. Festinger suggests that the difference between individuals in 
an evaluative dimension of performance can be conceptualized as status 
difference (Turner, 1978:237). This social comparison paves the way for 
creating and maintaining distinctive psychological groups.
If social systems contain hierarchically structured social categories, 
individuals cognitively simplify and order their perceptions and experiences 
in order to understand their experiences and to behave accordingly. 
Individuals categorize others on the basis of their similarities and differences 
to the self, by which they perceive others as members of the same category 
as the self (in-group members), or as members of a different category (out-
group members) (Abram and Hogg, 1990:19). Furthermore, individuals 
identify with their in-group, with this social identification representing the 
extent to which the in-group is incorporated into the sense of self and, at 
the same time, the self is experienced as an integral part of the in-group 
(Brewer, 2001:111). Social identification does not produce group behavior 
because it only creates a positive image of the in-group. Both social 
categorization and social comparison however operate together to generate 
a specific form of group behavior involving intergroup differentiation and 
discrimination, in-group favouritism, stereotypical perception, conformity 
to group norms, and affective preference for the in-group over the out-
group (Abram and Hogg, 1990: 22). has Although they are both part of 
social identity formation, there are important differences between social 
categorization and social comparison. While social categorization leads 
to stereotypical perceptions of the in-group and out-group, and stresses 
intergroup differences, social comparison explains the selectivity of the 
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accentuation effect, and the magnitude of the exaggeration of intergroup 
difference and similarities (Abram and Hogg, 1990:22). 15  
Social identity theory answers questions about why people like their 
in-group, and dislike out-groups (Coenders, 2001:24). Social identity 
is part of an individual’s self-concept, which comes from the processes 
of social categorization and social comparison. The basic standpoint of 
the theory is that individuals struggle for a positive social identity, and 
determine the relative status and value of their in-group through social 
comparison with out-groups. Finally, individuals struggle for positive in-
group distinctiveness, and have positive attitudes toward their in-group and 
negative attitudes towards out-groups.
2.1.3 Ethnic group conflict theory
Social identity theory fails to address both the context and consequences of 
prejudice and discrimination, particularly in regards to group differences 
in power (Sidanius et al., 2004:846). According to realistic conflict theory, 
out-group rejection derives from intergroup conflict over real issues such 
as jobs, power, and economic benefits. Meanwhile, social identification 
theory shows that unfavourable attitudes towards an out-group flow from 
the social comparisons that maintains one’s self esteem, self-worth, and 
social identity (Insko et al., 1992:273-4). Ethnic group conflict theory 
comprehensively addresses aspects of intergroup contact avoidance. 
Referring to previous studies, avoidance of intergroup contact between 
ethno-religious groups is one dimension of ethnic exclusionism in the 
framework of ethnic group conflict theory. Upon further inspection, this 
theory appears to be a combination of realistic conflict theory and social 
15 Social self-identification occurs when someone falls into a relatively separate subsystem 
of self-conception, namely social identity, which comes from membership within social 
categories (Abram and Hogg, 1990: 22). Due to the fact that social self-identification 
is essentially social self-categorization, it is not difficult to generate a principle that 
determines the salience of social identity. Essentially, within any given social frame of 
reference, those social categories will become salient.
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identity theory (Scheepers et al., 2002:18), whereby both theories are 
complementing each other. Both theories emphasize realistic conflict and 
the social processes of identification of ethno-religious group members. 
Furthermore, both theories can be seen as “ethnic group conflict theory” or 
“ethnic competition theory,” which we will explain in detail below.  
Ethnic group conflict or competition theory has two basic assumptions. 
First, competition between social groups over scarce resources becomes 
the main catalyst of antagonistic intergroup behaviour. Sociological 
perspectives emphasize that such competition has always existed in 
every society (Coser, 1956). Psychological perspectives explain that 
competition between groups improves solidarity within the in-group and 
increases hostility between groups (Sherif and Sherif, 1969). The second 
assumption refers to social identity theory, in which individuals have a 
fundamental need to perceive their in-group as superior to out-groups. This 
pertains to favourable characteristics that they perceive among members 
of the in-group and apply to themselves through a mental process called 
social identification.16 Moreover, they estimate out-group characteristics 
negatively through the mechanism of social contra-identification. 
Experimental research conducted by Jetten et al. (2001 cf. Coenders 
et al., 2007:217-44) shows that threats to social identity can increase in-
group identification under competitive conditions, as explained by realistic 
conflict theory. The more that participants perceived discrimination against 
their group, the more that the meaning of group membership was primarily 
based on collective dissimilarity. Consequently, Coenders et al. emphasize 
that social identity theory can be complementary to propositions from 
realistic conflict theory. Both theories constitute ethnic group conflict 
theory. Furthermore, in respect to competition, Coenders et al. (2007:217-
44) provide an explanation that the competition takes place at a contextual 
16 Social identity theory was developed to analyze group behaviours when social comparison 
is cognitively salient. It is applicable to behaviours through which individuals pay 
attention to intra-group structure. Yuki (2003:177) explains that cognitions at both the 
intergroup and intra-group level may affect an individual’s group behaviours.
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and individual level that is both observable and measurable. The competition 
at the individual level often refers to the perceived threat of competition 
that mediates effects of social identity on different dimensions of ethnic 
exclusionism. 
A comprehensive argument for regarding the importance of 
perceived threats in mediating between intergroup competition and ethnic 
exclusionary attitudes is provided by Olzak (1992, cf. Scheepers et al., 
2002:30). Olzak (1992:35) says that whenever ethnic threats increase, 
whether it is due to macro or meso-social conditions, a majority group will 
react with exclusionary measures in response to the threat. In this sense, 
perceived threat enforces a mechanism of social identification, providing 
a theory of the dimensions of ethnic exclusionism under certain individual 
and contextual conditions.17 The theory contains this crucial proposition: 
“the stronger the actual competition between ethnic groups at an individual 
as well as a contextual level, and/or the stronger the perceived ethnic 
threat, the more the mechanisms of social (contra-) identification will 
be reinforced, inducing stronger nationalist attitudes and exclusionist 
reactions” (Coenders et al., 2007, Gijsberts et al. 2004:18).  Figure 1.1 
describes more completely the theoretical discussion on ethnic group 
conflict theory. This figure is an adaptation of the theoretical synthesis in 
Gijsberts et al. (2004:18)
17 Schneider (2008:54) differentiates the economic interpretation of ethnic competition 
theory from a cultural viewpoint, analysing the pattern of social relations between 
majority and minority groups involving conflict over values rather than conflict over 
material resources.
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Figure 2.1 Ethnic competition theory: theoretical-conceptual model
Source: Gijsberts et al. (2004: 19). 
The terms of ethnic exclusionism and narrow forms of nationalism 
are strongly rooted in ethnocentrism, and relate to social (ethno-religious) 
identification, intergroup competition, and power difference. Both can 
result in a set of perceptions, individual attitudes, and social practices that 
are characterized by in-group favouritism and out-group hostility. Ethno-
religious identification as derived from social identity theory seems to 
contribute directly to ethnic exclusionism based on prejudice and perceived 
ethnic threat (Allport and Kramer, 1946; Blalock, 1967; Hood et al., 1996 
cf. Capucao, 2009:6). Moreover, the social positions of individuals are 
rooted in actual competition. In reality, the level of competition varies 
between social categories of conflicting groups. The rationale behind this 
is that members of the dominant group who share a position with, or live 
near, members of the minority group tend to display more widespread 
participation in ethnic exclusionism (Scheepers et al., 2002: 19). 
In this theoretical framework, intergroup contact avoidance is an 
intentional social practice explained by ethno-religious identification at 
the individual level, intermediated by perceived ethnic threat; and actual 
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competition and power difference are at the contextual level, affecting 
intergroup contact avoidance either directly or indirectly through perceived 
threat. 
However, those main theories are complemented by other relevant 
theories on adaptation within the complexity of social realities. The relation 
between ethno-religious identification and intergroup contact avoidance is 
intermediated by salience identity, actual intergroup contact, religiosity, 
perceived discrimination, individual memories of violence, nationalistic 
attitudes, distrust, and social dominance orientation. Intergroup contact 
avoidance is viewed as a dimension of ethnic exclusionism closely related 
to the social structure (actual competition and history of intergroup relation) 
and to the individual (ethno-religious identification). As mentioned earlier, 
intergroup contact avoidance is also positioned as latent conflict. 
Other theories1.1.4 
If intergroup contact avoidance as a dimension of ethnic exclusionism is 
placed within the scope of wider social processes, it is undoubtedly true that 
the avoidance of intergroup contact is connected to an individuals’ identity 
formation as a member of a group. It is important to find out the position 
of theories of identity formation in the conceptual map of socio-scientific 
theories.18 The most important debate concerns why identity theory often 
fails to provide explanations as to why actors make certain utterances and 
why certain actions happen (Martin, 1995:5; Malasevic, 2006). Jenkins 
(1996:6) explains that identification and behaviour motivation seem to be 
connected. However, our system of classifications of the self and others are 
18 Wimmer (2008:985) explains the intellectual genealogy of defining ethnicity in terms of 
three traditional theoretical lines. The first conceives of ethnicity as a mode of drawing 
boundaries between individuals, towards the making of a social group. The second 
identifies ethnicity as the outcome of political and symbolic struggle. The third is an 
emerging institutionalist tradition in ethnic political studies. However, the central debate 
on identity formation processes is whether social boundaries are social constructions or 
primordial sentiments (Banks, 1996:179-184). 
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multidimensional and not likely to be consistent.19 Referring to Brubaker 
et al. (2004:31-36), Jenkins (1996:9) says that identity is an open-ended 
identification process. This means that it is possible for group membership 
and identity to have an influential role, yet without determining everything. 
This is due to that fact that individual behaviour is complex and influenced 
by worldviews, habits, and knowledge. The following description considers 
other theoretical propositions to explain intergroup contact avoidance. 
These explanations consider factors such as actual intergroup contact, 
religiosity, individual memories of violence and perceived discrimination 
to further investigate the relationship between ethno-religious identification 
and intergroup contact avoidance.
Salience of identity1.1.4.1 
The concept of salience of identity is linked to the classical debate over 
whether strong group identification is generally associated with unfavourable 
attitudes and hostility towards an out-group. Sumner (1906:27) and Adorno 
et al. (1950) explain that both of them are closely related either within 
the group or at the individual level. However, Allport (1954[1958]:40-41) 
argues that these characteristics may be not related. In line with Allport, 
Brewer (1979[1986]:100) says that the distinction between two conflicting 
groups can be minimized if both sides have some arenas for interaction and 
share a common physical or political environment. Research by Brewer 
and Campbell (1976:141-146) provides evidence that positive in-group 
favouritism is not related to social distance in relation to out-groups. Brewer 
and Miller (1996:48) say that the consequences of in-group favouritism 
may be manifest in the absence of hostility toward an out-group, if in-
19 Brewer (2001:117-119) divides identities into the following categories: person-based 
social identities refer to definitions of social identity that are set within an individual’s self-
conception. Relational social identities are those in which the self is classified in relation 
to others, deriving from interpersonal relationships. Group-based social identities refer 
to the perception of self as an integral part of a larger group. Collective identities involve 
shared representations of the group based on common interests and experiences.
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group identification does not depend on the presence of an out-group. This 
means that a favourable attitude towards the in-group and an unfavourable 
attitude towards out-groups is only one dimension of intergroup relations. 
This research introduces the question as to why group identification can be 
a source of out-group hostility or social distance. One answer is salience 
of identity.
Salience of identity refers to the salience of ethno-cultural group 
attachment. Duckitt (2006:154) defines it as “how aware individuals were 
of their ethnic categorization and identity and how important this ethnic 
differentiation was to them.” In other words, salience of identity is viewed 
as an individual’s acknowledgement, consciously and intentionally, that 
he identifies himself as member of a certain ethno-religious group, and 
understands all of the consequences stemming from that membership. This 
term can also be found in a study by Phinney and Rotheram (1987:13) 
stating that group identification may consist of many dimensions, such as 
ethnic awareness, ethnic self-identification, ethnic attitudes, and ethnic 
behaviours. The importance and meaning of ethnic identity will be more 
salient in certain situations. Of course, this salience of identity may come 
from both ethnic as well as religious memberships. Therefore, salience of 
identity can be a mediating factor in ethno-religious identification and in 
avoidance of intergroup contact.
Intergroup contact1.1.4.2  
Ethnic group competition theory is also complemented by intergroup 
contact theory. Ethnic group competition theory proposes out-group size as 
a proxy of actual competition. This theory assumes that a larger out-group 
size increases economic competition and cultural conflicts over norms 
and values. However, contact theory provides the explanation that a larger 
out-group size not only increases competition, but also increases contact 
opportunities. Larger out-group size may reduce negative attitudes against 
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an out-group (Schneider, 2008:54). Those who do not have any contact 
with out-groups will feel threatened culturally. However, a larger out-group 
size may increase the possibility for interaction with out-group members. 
Intergroup contact typically reduces prejudice against out–groups, as 
it turns out, based on a comprehensive meta-analysis of many previous 
studies (Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006:766). Consequently, intergroup contact 
may link relative out-group size to intergroup attitudes, which is a predictor 
of decreasing prejudice in relation to increasing out-group size (Wagner et 
al., 2006; Schlueter and Wagner, 2008; Schlueter and Scheepers, 2009). 
The research of Brown et al. (2007:701) points out that contact with 
members of an out-group is associated with favourable intergroup attitudes. 
This is in line with Allport’s hypothesis (1954[1958]) that contact with out-
group members can improve intergroup attitudes. However, according to 
that research, the intergroup contact will have stronger and more beneficial 
effects if contact is with someone who is identified to be typical of his 
or her in-group. Similar studies that were conducted by Eller and Abrams 
(2004), Hamilton and Bishop (1976), and Maras and Brown (1996) also 
provide evidence that contact has beneficial effects on intergroup attitudes. 
However, contact leads to negative attitudes when the conditions are 
sub-optimal (Gerard and Miller, 1975; Schofield, 1979 cf. Brown et al., 
2007:693). One method to induce favourable attitudes from intergroup 
contact is by preserving some categories as salient in contact situations 
(Hewstone and Brown, 1986:231). Therefore, the out-group members will 
be seen as typical of the in-group, and any change in attitude towards them 
will be related to the group as a whole. In this study, actual intergroup 
contact mediates between ethno-religious identification and intergroup 
contact avoidance.
Religiosity1.1.4.3 
In certain cases, there is some evidence to suggest that religions have 
contributed to interethnic violence in places like Russia, India, Nigeria, and 
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United Sates (“In God’s name,” 2007 cf. Inzlicht et al., 2009:285). Some 
religious beliefs may encourage tolerance, such as the doctrines of election 
and revelation (Allport, 1966:447). However, religious particularism may 
lead to prejudice when followers regard their religion as the only true 
religion (Eisinga et al., 1990:56; Scheepers et al., 2002). Referring to social 
identity theory, Sterkens and Anthony (2008:35) mention that religions 
have a tendency to produce religiocentrism, because religions establish 
their own identity. According to them, religiocentrism can be defined as the 
combination of favourable attitudes towards the in-group and unfavourable 
attitudes towards out-groups. However, religiocentrism is sometimes also 
associated with religiously based sentiments of exclusiveness – the belief 
that one should prefer members of one’s own religion above others (Ray and 
Doratis, 1971:170). Some believers hold to the absolute truth of their own 
religion in exclusion to the idea of there being any truth in other religions 
(Abu-Nimer, 2004:497). Religiocentrism tends to contribute to exclusion 
and to discrimination towards other religious groups while regarding one’s 
own religious group as superior.
In this study, the general term ‘religiosity’ refers to religiocentrism, 
attitudes towards religious plurality, and a literal interpretation of sacred 
writing. As mentioned above, religiocentrism is the combination of 
favourable attitudes toward the in-group and unfavourable attitudes 
toward out-groups. Religiocentric attitudes represent an evaluation by 
individuals regarding their own religion and other religions. Meanwhile, 
attitudes towards religious plurality indicate individuals’ interpretations 
of different religions as sources of truth and values (Anthony et al., 
2005:154-86). These attitudes entail inclusive monism, exclusive monism, 
commonality pluralism, differential pluralism, and relativistic pluralism. 
Finally, interpretation of sacred writing, i.e. the dynamics of intra-textual 
fundamentalism versus hermeneutic interpretation, refers respectively to a 
literal or contextual interpretation of Holy Scriptures. Research by Duriez 
et al. (1999) explains that exclusive truth claims (exclusive monism) and 
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literal interpretations in general (here specified as religious intra-textual 
fundamentalism) closely relate to discriminatory behaviour. Both believers 
and non-believers who have literal ways of thinking are associated with 
ethnocentrism (Hutsebaut, 2007:177). Therefore, religiocentrism, attitudes 
towards religious plurality, and the way believers interpret sacred writings 
are all part of the broad dimension of religiosity that mediates the relationship 
between ethno-religious identification and intergroup contact avoidance.
Individual memory of violence 1.1.4.4 
In analysing the relationship between social identification and ethnic 
exclusionism, experience of violence may play a pivotal role as an 
intermediary variable, as it often connected to the strengthening of social 
boundaries and solidarity within an in-group. Coser’s (1956) propositions 
on social conflict mention that high intensity and hard social conflict can 
reconfirm social boundaries between in-groups and out-groups, increase 
the social solidarity of an in-group and produce increased perceptions of 
difference within an in-group. A social identity in terms of who “we” are 
depends on who “they” are at moments of violent conflict (Connerton, 
1989; Tilly, 2002; Whiteley, 1988 cf. Novak and Rodseth, 2006:3). Several 
studies provide evidence that the experience of violence or the memory of 
violence can reconfirm social boundaries and intensify ethnic exclusionism. 
Both individual and collective memories of violence can be important, 
since the psychological consequences of intergroup violence can persist 
among victimized groups for generations after peace is restored (Cairns and 
Lewis, 1999; Wohl and Branscombe, 2005 cf. Sahdra and Ross, 2007:385). 
For example, studies by Novak and Rodseth (2006:17) on the trauma of 
collective violence, point out that memories of violence make people draw 
and redraw social boundaries. In addition, Waterston (2005:43) in his auto-
ethnographic writing, sheds light on how the memory of violence and its 
narrative can encourage people’s hatred as well as acts of destruction, 
ethnocentrism, and the worst kind of nationalism. 
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Other research by Doherty and Poole (1997) and Anderson and 
Shuttleworth (2003) explain how religious violence between Catholics 
and Protestants in Belfast, Northern Ireland in the 1970s caused residential 
segregation according to religious denomination. In this city, apparently 
ethno-religious violence and spatial segregation are strongly related over 
time and space (Doherty and Poole, 1997:533). This does not solely mean 
that ethno-religious violence has an impact on spatial segregation, but also 
that the latter facilitates ethno-religious attacks. However, Sahdra and Ross 
(2007:393) explain that differences in in-group identification are closely 
related to the accessibility of historical memories, including memories of 
violence. The lower and higher in-group identifiers do not differ significantly 
in remembering in-group victims. The higher identifiers recall less of the 
violence conducted by their own group. Group membership provides the 
materials for memory, and stimulates individuals in recalling particular 
events (Halbwachs, 1992:38). In this research, individual memories of 
violence intermediate the relationship between ethno-religious identification 
and intergroup contact avoidance. 
Perceived discrimination1.1.4.5 
The activation of social boundaries can encourage discrimination against 
other ethno-religious groups. Social boundaries are defined as “any 
contiguous zone of contrasting identity, rapid transition, or separation 
between internally connected clusters of populations and/or activity for 
which human participants create shared representation” (Tilly, 2005:134). 
Consequently, social boundaries include relations between individuals 
within one group (in-group), relations between individuals within the other 
group (out-group), relations between in-groups and out-groups, and shared 
representations that belong to both groups. Eisenstadt and Giessen (1995:98) 
also pay attention to how social boundaries and solidarity are constructed, 
maintained, contested, changed, and reconstructed. They explain that 
three ideal patterns can be used to identify collective identity: primordial 
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identities, civic identities, and transcendental patterns (religion). Collective 
identity is created through the social construction of social boundaries and 
solidarity. Both of them are constructed by the processes of differentiation 
between “us” and “the other” (Eisenstadt, 1995:97).20 
The formation of collective identity21 has consequences for the 
allocation and distribution of resources within a collectivity, as well as 
for access to those resources (Eisenstadt, 1995:99). Referring to Tilly 
(2005:134), social boundaries can change through four kinds of processes. 
They can change through formation, transformation, activation, and 
suppression. In practice, the formation and changing of social boundaries 
can lead to the activation of political identity, economic exploitation, 
social category discrimination, democratization, and communal violence. 
Sander (2002:348) also argues that the construction of social boundaries 
is marked by conflict due to competition and exploitation (or perceptions 
of competition and exploitation). Fox (2000:427) emphasizes that ethno-
religious identification contributes to discrimination against minority 
groups. Unfair daily treatment and discriminatory experiences result 
in perceived discrimination through an internalization process that is 
experienced by individuals. Conversely, a study from Iceland and Wilkes 
(2006:269) provides evidence that discrimination and racial residential 
preference play a pivotal role in determining residential patterns. Moreover, 
Rosenbaum (1992:468) demonstrates that ethnic preference for seclusion, 
and experience with external forces, including discrimination, imposes 
isolation on a group. Discrimination as well as perceived discrimination 
may tend to increase hostility toward out-groups and strengthen in-group 
20 This results from the social construction of social boundaries, creating the line of 
demarcation between insiders and outsiders. The meaning of boundaries is emphasized 
due to a collective identity that results from the social construction process, a collective 
identity that gives attention to the definition of difference between “us” and “them” (the 
“other”). 
21 Collective identity is rooted in classical sociological theories, such as Durkheim’s 
collective conscious, Marx’s class-consciousness, Weber’s verstehen, and Tonnies’s 
gemeinschaft. They describe the “we”-ness of a group, emphasizing the similarities or 
shared attributes of group members (Cerulo, 1997:386-387). 
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identification. Allport (1954:160) refers to this as extropunitive and 
intropunitive factors. In this study, perceived discrimination is added as an 
intermediate variable between ethno-religious identification and intergroup 
contact avoidance.
Nationalistic attitudes1.1.4.6 
A nationalistic attitude has two dimensions, namely patriotism and 
chauvinism (Coenders 2001:64). If the former refers to the degree of 
attachment to the national in-group or country, as well as the love for and 
pride in one’s own country, the latter refers to the view that one’s own 
country is unique and superior. Chauvinism, therefore, implies a downward 
comparison with other countries. This definition is strongly rooted in the 
writing of Adorno et al. (1950:107) in reference to the concepts of genuine 
patriotism and pseudo-patriotism. The former is an attitude that stands 
for love of one’s country. Meanwhile, the latter is a “blind attachment to 
certain national cultural values, uncritical conformity with the prevailing 
group ways, and the rejection of other nations as out-groups” (Ibid.) 
Kleinpenning and Hagendoorn (1993:21) explain that nationalism and 
patriotism are ordered on the continuum of rejecting out-groups. Another 
argument by Todosijevic (1998:18) explains that chauvinism and romantic 
nationalism (patriotism) correlate significantly with authoritarianism, 
particularly authoritarian aggressiveness values in the former Yugoslavia 
states. In addition, Latcheva (2010:209) provides evidence that chauvinism 
and nationalistic pride positively correlate with ethnic exclusionism and 
intolerance toward national minorities in Bulgaria. Coenders (2001:202) 
notes that the more restrictive the notions of the national in-group, the more 
strongly ethnic minorities are excluded.
On the other hand, ethno-religious identification also can relate to 
nationalistic attitudes. Most studies refer to Ernest Gellner’s (2006) seminal 
work that argues nationalism replaces religion with more powerful symbols 
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of national identity. Anderson (1991:19) also mentions that the increase in 
nationalism usually marks the decline of the influence of religion. Research 
by Lozides (2000:13) proves that religions in the Balkan Peninsula have no 
strong effect on ethno-nationalism, but that markers of ethnic identification 
such as language contribute to ethno-nationalism there. Rieffer (2003:237) 
offers a framework for understanding the role of religion in the origins 
of nationalism, and for considering how religious nationalism frequently 
leads to discrimination and violence. In this context, religions function as 
an instrument to unify different groups of people. Consequently, if religious 
identification has a relatively positive influence on ethno-nationalism, it 
will potentially lead to discrimination and violence. 
However, nationalism in the Indonesian context is different than 
nationalism in the Western and Eastern European contexts. Indonesia 
has more than 300 ethnic groups with their own languages and cultures. 
After the fall of the authoritarian regime in 1998, decentralization was 
implemented. Major ethnic groups in certain provinces such as Aceh, Riau, 
and Papua claimed that they were sons of the soil and should have privileges 
– political, economic, and socio-cultural privileges – in their provinces. We 
identify these claims as regiocentric attitudes or regiocentrism. In this study, 
chauvinism, patriotism, and regiocentrism represent nationalistic attitudes. 
Therefore, the stronger the ethno-religious identification, the more likely it 
is to find nationalistic attitudes (chauvinism, ethno-nationalism, and regio-
centrism), which increase intergroup contact avoidance between religious 
groups.
Distrust1.1.4.7 
Classical sociological theories argue that trust is a basic element of a 
society, since societies would disintegrate without it. Trust functions as a 
force of social integration as well as influencing the practical conduct of 
individuals (Simmel 1990:178, cf. Mollering 2001:405). Modern studies 
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on trust emphasize trust as mutual faithfulness, on which all relationships 
in society eventually depend, and see it as fundamental for the creation of 
social solidarity (Parsons, 1969:351; Tropp et al., 2006:771; Tam et al., 
2009:46). Trust can exist either in a social system as an inter-subjective 
force for binding society together, or within individuals as a psychological 
construct. In a pluralistic society, low levels of trust will likely lead to social 
disintegration, because there would not be enough social capital to bridge 
and bind all the various groups comprising the society. In that scenario, 
relationships between groups at the individual level are characterized by 
stereotyping, prejudice, and exclusionism. For example, the support of 
residential segregation is generally stimulated by lower intergroup trust. In 
short, high trust is likely to encourage harmonious intergroup relationships, 
while low trust tends to stimulate conflict between groups.
The research by Tropp et al. (2006:789) on trust and acceptance in 
intergroup interactions concludes that “group members may have different 
expectations for cross-group interactions, depending on the way in which 
their group membership is introduced in the contact situation.” In their 
research, respondents had less trust in and acceptance of out-groups that 
made reference to their group membership in cross group-interactions. 
Another study on trust by Tam et al. (2009:57) describes the Northern Ireland 
case: direct and extended intergroup contact with out-group members may 
eliminate distrust against out-groups. Another study on trust in Bosnia 
and Russia by Ward et al. (2007:33) shows that respondents who do not 
articulate ethnic pride, and who make friends with people from various 
ethnic backgrounds, tend to trust people of different national backgrounds. 
In this context, group identification is related to how people express trust or 
distrust against out-group members. Based on these three studies, it is clear 
that distrust and trust are related to group prejudice. However, distrust and 
trust are also related to group identification. In this study, we situate distrust 
as an intermediate variable in relation to ethno-religious identification and 
contact avoidance between ethno-religious groups.
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Social dominance orientation1.1.4.8 
Social dominance theory is a synthesis of authoritarian personality theory, 
Blumer’s group positions theory, Marxist and neoclassical elite theories, 
and social identity theory. This theory elaborates on social identity theory’s 
perspective that group conflicts tend to be minimized when both the superior 
and inferior groups recognize the legitimacy of status distinction (Sidanius 
and Pratto, 1999:19). The theory is based on the basic observation that all 
human societies are likely to be structured as systems of group-biased social 
hierarchies, which consist of a small number of dominant and hegemonic 
groups at the top, and a number of subordinate groups at the bottom. The 
dominant group owns a large share of the positive social value, or all of the 
material and symbolic things that people strive for, while the subordinated 
groups possesses a large share of the negative value, such as lack of power 
and social status (ibid., 1999:1-2). One of the theoretical assumptions is that 
“social systems are subject to the counterbalancing influence of hierarchy 
enhancing forces, producing and maintaining ever higher levels of group-
based social inequality, and hierarchy-attenuating forces, producing 
greater levels of group-biased social equality” (ibid., 38).
Social dominance theory states that group-based oppression is driven 
by systematic institutional and individual discrimination. Many social 
institutions (like schools, organized religion and marriage) and powerful 
individuals disproportionately allocate desired goods (prestige, wealth 
and power) to members of dominant groups, while directing undesirable 
things to the less powerful groups (Sidanius et al., 2004:843). Institutional 
discrimination is one of the major forces producing and reproducing 
systems of group-based hierarchy. Group discrimination is systematic 
due to how social ideologies work to coordinate the actions of individuals 
and institutions. The acceptance of ideologies that legitimize inequality, 
and of practices that produce inequality, is determined by people’s desires 
for group-based dominance, called social dominance orientation (ibid., 
848). Research based on this theory, carried out by Dru (2007:882) shows 
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that social dominance orientation relates to prejudice when competitive 
memberships are salient. Another study by Pratto et al. (2000:403) explains 
that the psychological capacity to receive and transmit social dominance 
is likely essential to how the culture and ideologies of dominance are 
maintained and combined with institutional arrangements to produce and 
reproduce a culture of dominance. Therefore, in this study, we situate social 
dominance orientation as an intermediate variable between ethno-religious 
identification and intergroup contact avoidance.
Research model1.1 
Based on previous research, and considering the research questions and the 
proposed theoretical frameworks for analysis, this study comes up with a 
research model that consists of ethno-religious identification, avoidance of 
intergroup contact, and individual and intermediate determinants.
The formulation of the research model1.1.1 
Based on the three main theoretical frameworks identified at the beginning 
of this chapter, and the additional theories discussed above, the basic 
concepts utilized in this research are as follows: avoidance of intergroup 
contact, ethno-religious identification, perceived threat, salience of 
identity, intergroup contact, religiosity, individual memory of violence, 
perceived discrimination, nationalistic attitude, distrust, social dominance 
orientation, and social position of individuals. Each concept is developed 
into variables that will be measured in this research as dependent, 
independent, intermediary, and control variables. The main dependent 
variable is intergroup contact avoidance and the main independent 
variable is ethno-religious identification. The control variables are the 
social positions of individuals that we label as individual determinants. 
Intermediary variables are salience of identity, perceived threat, intergroup 
contact, religiocentrism, attitudes toward religious plurality, interpretation 
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of sacred writing, individual memory of violence, nationalistic attitudes, 
perceived discrimination, distrust, and social dominance orientation 
(SDO). The following table gives a description of the conceptual definitions 
of each type of variable based on the theoretical framework.
Table 2.1 Conceptual definitions of variables
22 A set of beliefs and practices of individuals, particularly varieties of spirituality such as 
praying and church going, that supports a sort of faith (Geertz, 1968:1).
Variables Conceptual definitions
 
Avoidance of  intergroup 
contact 
The degree to which people avoid interactions with out-
group members, both intimate and official subjects in 
daily lives. 
Ethno-religious 
identification22
Ethno-religious awareness, self-identification, and 
behaviours that individuals derive from their 
membership of a religious or ethnic group, with attached 
values and emotions.
Individual determinants Social categories of individuals (i.e. gender and 
household income) that may influence them to avoid 
intergroup contact avoidance
Perceived threat Social perceptions of ethno-religious groups related to 
threats in the field of political, economic, and socio-
cultural competition.
Salience identity The extent to which individuals are aware of their ethnic 
categorizations and identity and how important these 
ethnic differentiations are to them.
Intergroup contact The degree of social interaction between members of 
different ethno-religious groups in public spaces.
Perceived discrimination Social perceptions of exclusion and discrimination of all 
members of the in-group that are internalized.
Individual memories of 
violence
Individual memories or experiences related to direct or 
indirect communal violence in the past.
Religiocentrism Combination of negative attitudes towards religious out-
groups and positive attitudes toward religious in-groups.
Attitudes toward religious 
plurality
Individuals’ interpretations of different religions as 
sources of truth and values. These attitudes entail 
feelings about religious monism, pluralism, and 
relativism.
Interpretation of sacred 
writing
The way believers interpret sacred writings, which can 
be distinguished into intratextual fundamentalism and 
hermeneutic interpretation.
Nationalistic attitude Attachment to one’s own nation or country based on 
critical understanding, and feelings of national 
superiority based on uncritical attachment to the group 
and country.
Distrust Mutual lack of the faithfulness on which all relations in 
society eventually depend, being fundamental for the 
creation of social solidarity.
Social dominance 
orientation
People’s desire to accept ideologies that legitimize 
inequality and practices that produce inequality within 
group-biased social hierarchies.
                                                       
22     A set of beliefs and practices of individuals, particularly varieties of spirituality such as praying and church 
going, that supports a sort of faith (Geertz, 1968:1).
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Following the ethnic group conflict theory and theoretical propositions 
from other theories, this study proposes a set of relations between ethno-
religious identification, avoidance of intergroup contact, and individual 
and intermediate determinants, as follows. According to social identity 
theory, ethno-religious identification is likely to have a positive influence 
on avoidance of intergroup contact because group membership is sufficient 
to generate discrimination against out-group members (Turner, 1981). 
Social categorization and comparison tend to induce exclusionary attitudes 
in intergroup relations (Brewer, 2001). Therefore, we come up with a 
proposition that ethno-religious identification tends to induce intergroup 
contact avoidance. Also, previous studies on social distance (Coenders and 
Scheepers, 2003; Tolsma et al., 2008) suggest that certain social positions 
allegedly affect avoidance of intergroup contact in a negative direction. 
The higher the social class is, the lower will be the intergroup contact 
avoidance. Consequently, individual determinants are proposed to have 
negative effects on avoidance of intergroup contact.
Several studies suggest that the following intermediate determinants 
are likely to have influences on contact avoidance. Ethnic group conflict 
theory says that perceived threat is the most important determinant of 
exclusionary attitudes toward out-group members. Referring to ethnic 
group conflict theory, we expect that ethno-religious identification will 
probably result in the avoidance of intergroup contact due to perceived 
threat. Moreover, studies on salience identity demonstrate that ethno-
religious identification does not directly tend to increase exclusionary 
behaviour toward ethno-religious out-group members. The meaning and 
importance of ethno-religious identity are more salient than the meaning 
and importance of ethno-religious identification (Phinney and Rotheram, 
1987). Therefore, we propose that the salience of identity will likely induce 
the avoidance of intergroup contact. In addition, according to intergroup 
contact theory, contact between groups tends to reduce prejudicial attitudes 
toward out-group members if intergroup contact has a stronger effect 
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on favourable attitudes towards the out-group (Pettigrew, 1998). Ethno-
religious identification therefore is expected to have a negative influence 
on the avoidance of intergroup contact via actual intergroup contact.
Research on religiosity provides the explanation that religiocentrism, 
attitudes toward religious plurality, and interpretation of sacred writing, are 
likely related to exclusionary attitudes toward religious out-group members 
(Anthony and Sterkens, 2005; Williamson, et al., 2010). We consequently 
propose that ethno-religious identification induces avoidance of intergroup 
contact via religiosity. Also, the activation of social boundaries is likely to 
increase discriminatory attitudes toward out-group members. Support of 
ethno-religious identification is expected to have positive influences on the 
avoidance of intergroup contact via perceived discrimination. Studies on 
experiences of violence provide evidence that memories and experiences of 
violence are likely related to residential segregation, avoidance, and conflict 
between religious groups (Doherty and Pooley, 1997). Consequently, 
we propose that ethno-religious identification likely affects avoidance of 
intergroup contact positively via individual memories of violence. 
Research on nationalistic attitudes points out that both romantic 
nationalism and chauvinism tend to increase ethnic exclusionary and 
intolerant attitudes toward ethnic minorities (Coenders, 2001; Latcheva, 
2010). So, we propose that ethno-religious identification appears to have a 
positive influence on the avoidance of intergroup contact via nationalistic 
attitudes. Studies on trust (Mollering, 2001; Tropp et al., 2006) suggest 
that trust is a basic element of society. Low levels of trust tend to reinforce 
social identity, which in turn will increase intergroup contact avoidance. 
Distrust therefore is expected to have a positive effect on intergroup contact 
avoidance. Finally, several literal sources on social dominance theory 
say that superior groups are likely to legitimize their domination over 
subordinated groups, while the subordinated groups are likely to support 
equality between groups (Sidanius and Pratto, 1999). Therefore, social 
dominance orientation is likely to mediate the relationship between group 
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identification and avoidance of intergroup contact. The relation of all these 
intervariables can be seen in detail in the following charts.  
Figure 2.2 Research model: the relations between variables
47
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In summary, the conceptual model shows that ethno-religious 
identification is proposed to induce avoidance of intergroup contact, 
even after controlling for several individual determinants (i.e. gender and 
household income). We expect that people from higher social statuses are 
less likely to avoid contact with the out-group. The relationship between 
ethno-religious identification and intergroup contact avoidance can be 
explained by the following intermediate determinants: perceived threat, 
salience of identity, religiocentrism, attitudes toward religious plurality, 
fundamentalism, individual memory of violence, perceived discrimination, 
nationalistic attitudes, distrust, and social dominance orientation (SDO)  – 
these are expected to have positive effects on intergroup contact avoidance, 
and moreover reduce the initial relationships between ethno-religious 
identification and intergroup contact avoidance. In contrast, actual 
intergroup contact is proposed to have a negative influence on avoidance 
of intergroup contact. 
2.2.2 Hypotheses
Based on research questions as mentioned earlier in chapter 1, the theoretical 
framework of intergroup contact avoidance (i.e. ethnic group conflict theory 
and other theoretical propositions), and based on the research model, this 
study proposes a set of preliminary hypotheses, as follows:
Among Christians and Muslims in Yogyakarta and Ambon, the 1. 
stronger people’s ethno-religious identification is, the higher will be 
the level of avoidance of intergroup contacts.
Among Christians and Muslims in Yogyakarta and Ambon, the 2. 
stronger people’s ethno-religious identification is, the higher will be 
the level of avoidance of intergroup contacts, even after controlling for 
other individual-level determinants (such as gender, parents’ religion, 
household income, parents’ education, occupational and occupation 
status).
110
InteRgRoUP contAct AVoIdAnce In IndoneSIA
Among Christians and Muslims in Yogyakarta and Ambon, the 3. 
relationship between ethno-religious identification and the avoidance 
of intergroup contact can be explained by particular intermediate 
determinants:
3a. Perceived threat 
3b. Salience of identity 
3c. Intergroup contact
3d. Religiocentrism
3e. Attitudes toward religious plurality
3f.  Interpretation of sacred writing
3g. Individual memories of violence
3h. Perceived discrimination 
3i.  Nationalistic attitudes
3j.  Distrust
3k. Social dominance orientation (SDO).
These hypotheses are rooted in previous theoretical insights, 
addressing the research questions, particularly the explanatory questions 
at individual level. Hypothesis 1 is intended to answer research question 
2a and test the relationship between ethno-religious identification and 
intergroup contact avoidance. Hypothesis 2 aims to respond to research 
question 2b, which examines the relationship between ethno-religious 
identification and intergroup contact avoidance while controlling individual 
level determinants. Hypotheses 3a, 3b, 3c, 3d, 3e, 3f, 3g, 3h, 3i, 3j and 
3k have the objective of answering research question 2c and testing the 
relationship between ethno-religious identification and intergroup contact 
avoidance by using intermediate variables. 
2.3 Structure of the thesis
This thesis consists of six chapters. Chapter 1 provided a description of the 
introduction of the study, consisting of the position of the thesis, research 
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issues, history of intergroup contact avoidance in Yogyakarta and Ambon, 
and the research questions. Chapter 2 explains the theoretical framework 
of intergroup contact avoidance and the formulation of the research 
model and the hypotheses of the thesis. Chapter 3 largely explores data 
collection and measurement techniques, including research approaches, 
data collection procedures, and the representativeness of the samples, 
measurements, and uni-variate analyses.  Chapter 4 employs bi-variate 
analyses to analyse the findings, including intergroup contact avoidance by 
ethno-religious identification, individual, and intermediate determinants. 
Chapter 5 primarily employs multivariate regression analyses covering and 
testing the theoretical model. Chapter 6 provides a description of crucial 
questions, empirical answers, innovation and progress, and new research 
issues. The results of interviews conducted will be described and analyzed 
in Chapters 4 and 5. l
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CHAPTER 3
DATA COLLECTION AND MEASUREMENTS
In this chapter, we shall present the data collection and the measurements used in the course of this study. The first section describes the data 
collection methods employed in the research. The second section describes 
the types of measurements used, illustrating how the survey questions and 
the description of the survey in general were derived from the conceptual 
and operational definitions of each variable. Also in this section, we present 
the results of the univariate analysis conducted on the answers to each 
question in the survey. The last section describes the development of the 
topic list and focuses on the qualitative aspects of this study. 
3.1 Data collection 
Referring to Van de Vijver and Leung (1997:1), this study can be classified 
as a cross-cultural comparative study, because it compares the behaviours 
and attitudes of two different ethno-religious groups in different research 
sites. To support this study, we use both qualitative and quantitative 
methods as approaches to gathering and analysing data. Most of the 
observed phenomena discussed here are quite complicated, and will be 
interpreted with comprehensive theoretical perspectives from religious 
studies, sociology, and anthropology. Triangulation, defined by Denzin 
(1978:291) as “the combination of methodologies in the study of the same 
phenomenon,” suggests that quantitative and qualitative approaches should 
be viewed as complementary. Webb et al., (1966), Jick (1979), and Olsen 
(2004), strongly advocate the use of triangulation. For example, Olsen (2004) 
argues that triangulation tends to support interdisciplinary research rather 
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than one strongly bounded discipline of sociology. Referring to Newman 
(1997:29), the combination of quantitative and qualitative approaches is 
more appropriate for this study as we are trying to describe the phenomenon 
of contact avoidance among ethno-religious groups in great detail, and to 
explain it in relation to a number of variables. 
3.1.1 Data collection procedures
The data collection methods employed in this study included surveys, 
interviews, literature studies, and observations. A survey was conducted 
among university students in both Ambon and Yogyakarta. There are 
several reasons why we chose students as our research population. Students 
in Indonesia are part of the middle class, generally having sufficient 
knowledge and experience to utter analytic statements and to determine 
their attitude consciously and logically. University student unions organize 
demonstrations, rallies, and training for activists against unpopular 
government policies. The fall of authoritarian regimes in 1966 and 1998 
were related to rising student movements. After 1998, the process of 
electing leaders of student unions often became a matter for political contest 
between religious or ethnic organizations. In conflict areas,  student unions 
are politicized groups but are not necessarily affiliated with groups that 
are allegedly responsible for violence, or with politicized ethno-religious 
organizations. Student groups have also been involved in conducting peace 
activities, promoting reconciliation between ethno-religious groups that 
have been involved in conflict (Sterkens, 2009:3). A description of our 
sample and sampling procedures for these surveys of student attitudes can 
be seen in section 3.1.2. 
Specifically, the qualitative approaches employed in this study were 
semi-structured interviews and literature studies. We describe our interview 
procedures in section 3.3.  Literature studies were carried out to search for 
information on the history of ethno-religious formation. Media sources were 
also used to provide information on contextual factors, such as political 
contestation and conflictual relationships between ethno-religious groups.
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3.1.2 Representativeness of sample
Surveys were conducted among students at the undergraduate level with 
a minimum of second year standing from six universities in Ambon and 
Yogyakarta. We chose students from the second year onwards because they 
have had sufficient time to engage in social interactions with classmates, 
board mates1 and neighbours from different ethno-religious groups. The 
surveys were carried out at the beginning of the academic year in September 
2011. 
The universities chosen were purposely selected by considering the 
representation of religions at each institution. The universities selected 
were University of Gadjah Mada, (Universitas Gadjah Mada, UGM), 
State Islamic University of Sunan Kalijaga (Universitas Islam Negeri, UIN 
Sunan Kalijaga), and Christian University of Duta Wacana (Universitas 
Kristen Duta Wacana, UKDW) in Yogyakarta; and University of Pattimura 
(Universitas Pattimura, Unpatti), State Islamic Institute of Ambon (Institut 
Agama Islam Negeri, IAIN Ambon), and Indonesian Christian University 
in Maluku (Universitas Kristen Indonesia Maluku, UKIM) in Ambon. The 
main reasons that we chose these six universities are that two (UKDW and 
UKIM) house a majority of Christian students, two (UIN Yogyakarta and 
UIN Ambon) house a majority of Muslim students, and the others (UGM 
and Unpatti) possess a heterogeneous population of students from various 
religious groups. UGM and Unpatti were also selected because of their 
roles as centres of education with secular orientations in their areas. Both 
UGM and Unpatti are also arenas of political contestation for religiously-
based student organizations. 
Pilot survey
Before conducting the surveys, we distributed a pilot questionnaire to test 
the validity and reliability of the measurements. In some cases, questions 
in the pilot survey were not used in the definitive stages of data gathering, 
1     ‘Board mates’ refer to dormitory friends.
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for instance, when the answers to the survey questions did not have a 
normal distribution or had a very skewed distribution, or when a question 
proved too difficult to understand or did not clearly relate to context of the 
interviews. 
The pilot survey was conducted in Yogyakarta and Ambon in May 
2011, using second-year students and above who were selected randomly 
from the undergraduate enrolment lists (with exception of the first year 
students) of the six chosen universities. The following steps were used in 
this systematic random sampling. First, we identified the number of students 
in each university, using the list of ordered student identification numbers. 
For example, Unpatti has 14,198 students distributed across eight faculties. 
Second, we decided on the number of respondents at both the university 
and faculty levels. The number of respondents taken from each university 
was fifty students, and the number of students taken from each faculty was 
proportional to the faculty’s percentage of all students at the university. For 
example, looking at Unpatti’s 50 respondents, the faculty of Agriculture has 
3 respondents (representing 6% of the sample of 50), because the faculty’s 
959 students represent 6.75% of the total university population. Third, we 
calculated the interval number by dividing the amount of undergraduate 
students with the number of respondents taken from each faculty. For 
instance, the interval number for the faculty of Agriculture is 160, which 
is the result obtained from dividing the population of 959 students by six 
respondents. Finally, from the list of ordered student identification numbers 
in every faculty, we then selected a random number between 1 and 160 
(for example, the 5th student)and selected every 160th student from the 
fifth student in the sequential list: for example, the 165th student, the 325th 
student, the 490th student, and so on. 
After the pilot survey was conducted, we evaluated the questionnaire 
based on the following criteria. First, we reviewed the descriptive statistics 
and correlations between questions. We eliminated questions that had 
no correlation with other questions of the same latent variable, or had 
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correlations that were too high. Second, we evaluated how respondents 
answered certain questions. Third, we added some minor information that 
was later included in survey questions. Therefore, we improved some of 
the survey questions based on our evaluation of the pilot survey.  
Definite survey
The definite survey was carried out in three universities in Ambon (Unpatti, 
IAIN Ambon, UKIM), and three universities in Yogyakarta (UGM, UIN 
Sunan Kalijaga, and UKDW) from September to December of 2011. The 
overall goal of the sampling procedure was to collect a random sample 
from students in their second and third years of the BA program, in order 
to present a generalization of the student population. In each university, 
250 students were selected by systematic random sampling. The following 
steps were carried out when conducting the survey in Ambon. First, we 
collected a list of students from every faculty to serve as the sampling 
frame.2 We then conducted a systematic random sampling based on the 
proportion of the student population in every faculty within the university. 
The interval number was found by dividing the population of each faculty 
with the number of respondents. An invitation was sent to respondents with 
the assistance of university staff or the student union in each faculty. After 
that, respondents were gathered in one place to fill out the questionnaires 
under the supervision of the researcher.3 
2 During religious violence in Ambon on the 15th of July 2011, the registration office 
of Unpatti was burnt down; and in communal violence on September 11th, 2011, the 
administration building of UKIM Ambon was destroyed. Consequently, the newest 
student enrolment lists for Unpatti and UKIM were destroyed. We used enrolment lists 
from the second semester of 2010 as a sample frame for these institutions.
3 This manner of inviting respondents was applicable in Unpatti (in the Agriculture, 
Technology, Education, and Economy faculties). However, at IAIN Ambon and some 
faculties in Unpatti (Law, Fisheries, Science, and Social Science) we used a different 
approach. Student executive boards identified respondents from a random list and 
distributed questionnaires. The next day, they collected the questionnaire from the 
respondents. In UKIM, university staff members distributed questionnaires to respondents, 
and respondents filled these out at home. After one week, these respondents submitted 
their questionnaire to the university staff.
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The survey procedure in Yogyakarta was similar to the procedure in 
Ambon.4 First, a list of the students attending the three universities was 
obtained in the form of a digital file.  The data in Yogyakarta was gathered 
at the university level, rather than at the faculty level as in Ambon. Second, 
we implemented random sampling directly by using a set of random 
numbers obtained by a computer program. Third, we sent invitation letters 
that were distributed by the department heads to the respondents, asking 
them to gather in particular places within their universities. Finally, the 
surveys were conducted in the classrooms referred to in the invitation. 
These procedures were applicable at both UGM and UIN Sunan Kalijaga. 
However, at UKDW, several research assistants visited respondents in their 
dormitories to distribute the questionnaires. The number of respondents 
and the response rate can be seen in more detail in Table 3.1.
The table shows the number of respondents per department and 
university, resulting in 1,500 respondents in total. Two hundred and fifty 
respondents were selected by systematic random sampling from each 
university. The proportion of respondents we took from each faculty was 
similar to the proportion of total faculty students within the total university 
student population.  For example, the proportion of total student population 
in the faculty of Agriculture at Unpatti is 7%, and the proportion of our 
respondents is 7%. This is a result of using stratified random sampling at 
the faculty level. In the case of UGM, UIN Yogyakarta, and UKDW, there 
is a slight difference between the proportions, because random sampling 
was done at the level of the population of the university as a whole.
The response rates to the survey are provided in table 3.1. The response 
rates at Unpatti (65.45%) and IAIN Ambon (64.43%) were relatively high, 
while the UKIM rate came in slightly below those rates (59.38%). The 
response rate at UIN (60.82%) was relatively high, with slightly lower rates 
at UGM (54.70%) and UKDW (51.97%). In short, the response rate of 
respondents in Yogyakarta was slightly lower than in Ambon.
4 Tri Subagya managed the survey distribution during his fieldwork in Yogyakarta from 
September to December 2011.
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Considering the random procedures we used, the relatively high 
response rates at the universities, and the match between the distribution of 
students in faculties and samples, we propose that this database provides us 
with the ability to generalize the student populations of these universities 
from this sample. 
During the period when the surveys were conducted, from September 
to December of 2011, there was a series of incidents of communal violence 
between Muslims and Christians in Ambon. A large-scale incident erupted 
in September, after a Muslim motorcycle driver was murdered in a 
Christian village. During the subsequent communal violence, three people 
died and hundreds of houses were set on fire. Another incident occurred 
in October 2011, but on a smaller scale. However a second large-scale 
incident erupted in December 2011, when a Christian mini-bus driver was 
murdered in a Muslim settlement. A number of terror-bombings occurred 
in both communities in the days following this incident, which led to 
public transport becoming religiously segregated. This recent violence may 
have affected the opinions of respondents in Ambon who answered the 
questionnaire.
Measurements 1.2 
In this study, we divided the variables into four categories: dependent, 
independent, individual determinants, and intermediate. The dependent 
variable is intergroup contact avoidance, and the crucial independent 
variable is ethno-religious identification. Individual determinants consist 
of gender, parents, religion, household income, parent’s education, 
occupation, and occupational status. Intermediate variables are salience of 
identity, perceived threat, intergroup contact, religiosity (religiocentrism, 
attitudes toward religious plurality, and interpretation of sacred writing), 
perceived discrimination, individual memory of violence, nationalistic 
attitudes, distrust, and social dominance orientation (SDO). All of these 
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variables have clear definitions containing specific indicators, which are 
operationalized in specific survey questions.
3.2.1 Avoidance of intergroup contact 
Intergroup contact avoidance is represented by social distance (Park, 
1923 cf. Bogardus, 1925a; Wark and Galliher, 2007) and the preference 
to remain residentially segregated (Clark, 1992; Tabory, 2007; Semyonov 
et al., 2007). The operational definition of intergroup contact avoidance, 
based on Bogardus (1925b) and Wark and Galliher’s (2007) work on social 
distance, is an individual’s intention to reject or avoid out-group members 
as spouses, close friends, classmates, board mates, neighbours, housemaids, 
civil servants, town mayors, and police, as well as an individual’s preference 
to live in residential segregation. Residential segregation is an individual’s 
preference to stay in housing inhabited by religious in-group members, 
rejecting religious out-group members as neighbours.
Contact avoidance
For the purposes of measurement, intergroup contact avoidance consists of 
two main indicators, namely social distance and a preference for residential 
segregation. The indicator of social distance builds on the measurements by 
Bogardus (1925b), Coenders et al., (2007), and Wark and Galliher (2007).. 
Coenders et al. emphasize the opposition to interethnic marriage in some 
European countries, and add the willingness to accept or avoid a boss from 
a migrant group in the social distance scale. Wark and Galliher place their 
emphasis on opposition to having contact with migrants as spouses, close 
friends, neighbours, colleagues, and fellow citizens. Since the root of these 
two inventories build on Bogardus’s concept of social distance, this study 
uses the questions developed by Bogardus as the main inventory. 
The first measurement is derived from Bogardus’s social distance 
scale. The original question is “According to my first reaction, I would 
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willingly admit members of each race to one or more of the classifications 
under which I have placed a cross.” Because this study measures social 
distance between Muslim and Christian students.5  the subject of social 
distance has been changed to adapt to the student environment, referencing 
board mates and classmates. We also added the category of housemaid 
in order to represent lower status individuals in society. In addition, this 
question measures social distance in the realm of politics, referring to 
civil servants, city mayors, and police officers, because the desire to avoid 
religious out-group members can extend to interactions with government 
officials. Therefore, we changed the question to :  “To what extent would 
you accept or avoid having a Christian (or Muslim) as your future spouse, 
close friend, board mate, classmate, neighbour, civil servant, city major, 
police officer, and housemaid?”
Table 3.2 Contact avoidance by Muslim and Christian respondents
   Likert scale 1-5 (from totally disagree to totally agree).
5 Although our independent variable is about ethno-religious identification, this research 
focuses on avoidance of intergroup contact between religious groups rather than between 
ethnic groups. This is because religious groups are considered to be of primary concern. 
It does not mean that there is no contact avoidance among ethnic groups in research sites. 
It is hard to account for conflict experience in Ambon without examining how religion 
played an important role in political mobilization. 
To what extent would 
you accept or avoid 
having a 
Christian/Muslim as 
your ....
RESPONDENTS
AMbON yOGyAKARTA TOTAL
Muslim 
(n=368)
Christian 
(n=351)
Muslim 
(n=474)
Christian 
(n=253)
Muslim 
(n=841)
Christian 
(n=604)
164/173. city/town mayor? M: 2.86
SD: 1.12
M: 2.28
SD:  .94
M:  2.93
SD: 1.20
M: 2.11
SD:  .68
M:  2.90
SD: 1.17
M: 2.21
SD:  .85
165/174. civil servant? M: 2.43
SD:  .87
M: 2.06
SD:  .69
M: 2.26
SD:  .81
M: 2.06
SD:  .66
M: 2.33
SD:  .84
M: 2.06
SD:  .68
166/175. police officer? M: 2.55
SD:  .97
M: 2.18
SD:  .79
M: 2.22
SD:  .77
M: 2.04
SD:  .54
M: 2.36
SD:  .88
M: 2.12
SD:  .70
167/176. neighbour? M:  2.61
SD: 1.00
M:2. 01
SD:  .68
M: 2.08
SD:  .67
M: 1.94
SD: .54
M: 2.31
SD:  .87
M: 1.98
SD:  .62
168/177. classmate? M: 2.43
SD:  .99
M: 1.87
SD:  .57
M: 2.00
SD:  .64
M: 1.91
SD:  .52
M: 2.19
SD:  .85
M: 1.89
SD:  .55
16 9/178. 
board/dorm/house mate?
M:  2.84
SD: 1.13
M:  2.03
SD:  .67
M: 2.16
SD:  .79
M: 1.94
SD:  .57
M:  2.46
SD: 1.01
M: 1.99
SD:  .63
170/179. 
houseboy/housemaid?
M:  3.51
SD: 1.15
M: 2.24
SD:  .89
M:  2.64
SD: 1.07
M: 2.01
SD:  .66
M:  3.02
SD: 1.18
M: 2.14
SD:  .81
171/180. close friend? M:  2.89
SD: 1.17
M: 2.00
SD:  .69
M: 2.27
SD:  .91
M: 1.94
SD:  .59
M:  2.54
SD: 1.08
M: 1.97
SD:  .65
172/181.  future spouse? M:  4.37
SD: 1.01
M:  3.35
SD: 1.39
M:  4.00
SD: 1.19
M:  3.54
SD: 1.27
M:  4.16
SD: 1.13
M:  3.43
SD: 1.35
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In our sample, Muslim respondents are more likely than Christian 
respondents to avoid contact with out-groups. The mean values of answers 
provided by Muslim respondents are higher in terms of contact avoidance, 
the lowest being 2.19 for the question pertaining to classmates, and the 
highest being 4.16 for the question pertaining to future spouses.  The 
answers of Christian respondents to those same questions were 1.89 and 
3.43. However, Muslim respondents in Ambon showed higher levels of 
contact avoidance than those in Yogyakarta. The mean value of Muslim 
respondents in Ambon to the questions about classmates and civil servants 
was 2.43, and 4.37 for the question about future spouses. Meanwhile, the 
mean value of answers given by Muslim respondents in Yogyakarta for the 
question about classmates was 2.00, and 4.00 for the question regarding 
future spouses. The answers from Christian respondents also have the 
same pattern: Christian respondents in Ambon displayed greater support 
for contact avoidance than those in Yogyakarta. 
From table 3.2 we can extract the order of contact avoidance on a 
scale from high to low in the answers from Muslim respondents: future 
spouse, housemaid, city mayor, board mate, close friend, police officer, 
civil servant, neighbour, classmate. For Christian respondents the order on 
a scale from high to low is: future spouse, city mayor, housemaid, police 
officer, civil servant, board mate, neighbour, close friend, and classmate.
Standard deviation measures to what extent the value deviates from 
the mean in reference to particular data. The standard deviation of contact 
avoidance for Muslim respondents for each item ranges from .84 to 1.18, 
while the the standard deviation for Christian respondents lies between .55 
and 1.35. As seen in Table 3.2, the variation in the answers from Muslim 
respondents in answering this question is relatively higher than the variation 
in the answers from Christian respondents. 
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Table 3.3 Barriers of contact
63.90% of respondents (both Muslim and Christian) believe there are major 
barriers in relations between Muslims and Christians, as demonstrated in 
Table 3.3.  
Support for residential segregation
The second measurement employed in this study explains the relationship 
between religious identification and the preference to live in segregated 
areas. This second indicator builds on the measurement developed by 
Tabory (2007). We have made changes and additions to one of the model 
questions, simplifying it to be more easily understood by Indonesian 
respondents. The first question [I prefer to live in neighbourhoods inhabited 
by person of similar religiosity level] has been adjusted to say, “I prefer 
to live in a neighbourhood inhabited by people of the same religion.” A 
negative statement has also been added to the first question, “I prefer to 
live in a neighbourhood inhabited by people of the different religion.” The 
third and fourth statements are “For the good of the city, people should 
reside in separate communities according to their religion,”and  “There 
should be separate neighbourhoods where Muslims and Christians can live 
separately.”
150. Do you believe there are 
major barriers between …?
RESPONDENTS
AMbON yOGyAKARTA TOTAL
Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent
No 191 25.50 308 41.10 499 33.30
Yes 526 70.10 432 57.60 958 63.90
Missing 33 4.40 10 1.30 43 2.90
Total 750 100.00 750 100.00 1500 100.00
151. If yes, what do you think 
is the primary barrier 
between them?
RESPONDENTS
AMbON yOGyAKARTA TOTAL
Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent
Religion 194 36.90 143 33.10 337 35.20
Attitude 159 30.20 149 34.50 308 32.20
Language 8 1.50 6 1.40 14 1.50
Values 86 16.30 103 23.80 189 19.70
Others 44 8.40 22 5.10 66 6.90
Missing 35 6.70 9 2.10 44 4.60
Total 526 100.00 432 100.00 958 100.00
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Table 3.4 Preference for residential segregation
Likert scale 1-5 (from totally disagree to totally agree)
Muslim respondents prefer to live in neighbourhoods inhabited 
by people of the same religion (M= 3.93), with Muslim respondents in 
Ambon scoring higher (M=4.28) than Muslim respondents in Yogyakarta 
(M=3.65). Christian respondents have a higher preference than Muslims 
for living in neighbourhoods inhabited by persons of different religions, 
scoring (M=3.33) to Muslim respondents’ (M=2.85). Muslim respondents 
(M=2.69) also show more support than Christians (M=2.22) for the idea 
that, for the good of the city, people should reside in separate communities 
according to their religion. Muslim respondents (M=2.68) also show a 
higher level of agreement than Christians (2.11) with the statement that 
there should be separate neighbourhoods for Muslims and Christians.
The standard deviation of answers from Muslim respondents lies 
between 1.02 and 1.16, while for Christian respondents it ranges from .92 
 RESPONDENTS 
AMBON YOGYAKARTA TOTAL 
Muslim 
(N=364) 
Christian 
(N=356) 
Muslim 
(N=475) 
Christian 
(N=254) 
Muslim 
(N=838) 
Christian 
(N=611) 
 
182. I prefer to live in a 
neighbourhood 
inhabited by persons 
of the same religion. 
M:  4.28 
SD: .92 
M:  3.55 
SD: 1.11 
M:  3.65 
SD: 1.08 
M:  2.93 
SD: .97 
M: 3.93 
SD: 1.06 
M: 3.29 
SD: 1.09 
183. I prefer to live in a 
neighbourhood 
inhabited by persons 
of different religion. 
M:  2.65 
SD: 1.10 
M:  3.26 
SD:   .96 
M: 3.01 
SD:  .93 
M: 3.42 
SD: .86 
M: 2.85 
SD: 1.02 
M: 3.33 
SD:  .92 
184. For the good of the 
city, people should 
reside in separate 
communities 
according to their 
religion. 
M:  3.05 
SD: 1.16 
M:  2.41 
SD: 1.05 
M: 2.42 
SD:  .95 
M: 1.97 
SD: .77 
M: 2.69 
SD: 1.09 
M: 2.22 
SD:  .97 
185. There should be 
separate 
neighbourhoods 
where Muslims and 
Christians can live 
separately. 
M:  3.02 
SD: 1.25 
M:  2.26 
SD: 1.06 
M:  2.43 
SD: 1.02 
M: 1.91 
SD:  .84 
M:  2.68 
SD: 1.16 
M: 2.11 
SD:  .99 
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to 1.09. The heterogeneity of the responses from Christians is lower than 
the heterogeneity of responses from Muslims.
3.2.2 Ethno-religious identification
Ethno-religious identification includes three primary dimensions reflected 
at the individual level: cognitive (knowledge), evaluation (value), and 
affective (emotion) (Tajfel, 1981; Gijsberts et al., 2004). The term refers 
both to religious identification and ethnic identification. Questions regarding 
these variables were taken from the models provided in Tuti’s (2007) 
and Handi’s (2008) questionnaires, which focus on ethnic and religious 
identification in Indonesian society. In addition, we added some questions 
from the European Social Survey (ESS 2008,) since these questions touch 
on conscious self-identification. 
3.2.2.1 Religious identification
According to Phinney and Rotheram’s concept of ethnic identity (1987), 
we define religious identification as an individual’s sense of belonging 
to a religious group and the part of an individual’s thinking, perceptions, 
feelings, and behaviours that relate to their religious group membership. 
Religious identification is a process in which individuals obtain their image 
of self from their knowledge of having membership of a religious group, 
including the value and emotional significance of the group (Tajfel, 1981; 
Gijsberts et al., 2004). Based on this definition, religious identification 
consists of religious self-definition, attendance at religious practices and 
ceremonies, friendship by religion, membership and participation in 
religious organizations, and political orientation.
Religious self-definition
Based on interpretations drawn from previous research, religious self-
definition is an individual subjective feeling, acknowledgement, and 
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recognition through verbal statements about an individual’s membership in 
a certain religious group that represents their religious identity. Therefore, 
the question of religious self-definition is “What religion do they consider 
themselves to belong to?” Religious self-definition will be measured by 
asking respondents whether they consider themselves to be Muslim, 
Christian, Catholic, Hindu, or Buddhist. As an historical record and in 
support of religious self-definition, this research also asks respondents 
whether they had a different religion during secondary school (about 12-17 
years), or if their parents practice a different religion to them. This question 
is necessary to find out the history of religious affiliation and religious 
socialization in respondents’ families, which is how individuals learned 
religious knowledge as children. 
Table 3.5 Religion 
In our sample, 56.90% of respondents consider themselves to be Muslim, 
36.70% consider themselves to be Christian, and 5.20% consider themselves 
to be Catholic. However, the composition of religious populations differs 
between Ambon and Yogyakarta. The majority of respondents in Yogyakarta 
consider themselves to be Muslim (64%), with almost all the remainder 
identifying as Christian (26.10%) or Catholic (7.90%); there were small 
numbers of Buddhists (0.80%) and Hindu (0.40%) . In Ambon, 49.70% of 
the respondents identified themselves as Muslim, 47.30% as Christian, and 
2.50% as Catholic; there were no Buddhists or Hindus. Most respondents 
21a. To what religion do 
you consider yourself to 
belong to? 
RESPONDENTS 
AMBON YOGYAKARTA TOTAL 
Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent 
 
Islam  373 49.70 480 64.00 853 56.90 
Catholic 19 2.50 59 7.90 78 5.20 
Christian/ Protestant 355 47.30 196 26.10 551 36.70 
Buddhist 0 .00 6 .80 6 .40 
Hindu 0 .00 3 .40 3 .20 
Others 0 .00 2 .30 2 .10 
Missing 3 .40 4 .50 7 .50 
Total 750 100.00 750 100.00 1500 100.00 
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(83.60%) answered that they did not practice a different religion in high 
schoolbut 29 respondents in Yogyakarta and 10 respondents in Ambon 
did.  Respondents reported that overall, their parents shared their religious 
identity.  
Religious practices
Religious practices refers to the degree to which individuals identify 
themselves as part of a certain religious group, as reflected in their 
participation in regular religious activities, like attending religious services, 
reading and reciting their Holy Scriptures, and praying. The more frequently 
respondents engage in religious practices, the higher his/her degree of 
religious identification. The measurement of religious practices can be 
divided into two categories: reading Holy Scriptures and attending religious 
services. Questions about religious practices refer to the measurement by 
Handi (2008). However, the first question in Handi’s model from [How 
often do you read in the Holy scriptures of your own tradition] has been 
changed to “How often do you read or recite the Holy Scripture (Bible or 
Koran)?” The second question has been changed from [How often do you 
go to normal religious services in mosque or church] to “How often do you 
go to religious services in mosques, churches, or other places of worship?’ 
The third question is “How often do you pray?”
Table 3.6 Praying
 
 
 
38. How often do you pray? 
RESPONDENTS 
AMBON YOGYAKARTA  TOTAL 
Muslim 
(n=355) 
 (%) 
Christian 
(n=367) 
(%) 
Muslim 
(n=463) 
 (%) 
Christian 
(n=254) (%) 
Muslim 
(n=815)  
(%)  
Christian 
(N=621) 
(%) 
 
Never .60   1.20 .20 .50 
Only on feast days or special 
holy days 
3.70 .50 1.50 1.60 2.50 1.00 
At least once a month 1.40 1.60 .70 2.00 1.00 1.80 
Once a week 1.70 1.60 2.00 2.80 1.80 2.10 
More than once a week 11.00 8.20 5.40 6.70 7.90 7.60 
Once a day 13.00 15.00 7.20 16.90 9.70 15.80 
Several times a day 68.70 73.00 83.30 68.90 76.90 71.30 
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More Muslim respondents answered that they pray more than once 
a day (76.90%) than Christian respondents (71.30%) are. In Ambon, the 
percentage of Christian respondents who pray several times is slightly higher 
than the percentage of Muslims who do. In Yogyakarta, the percentage of 
Muslim respondents who answered that they pray several times a day is 
higher than percentage of Christian respondents who do.
Table 3.7 Attendance at religious services
More Muslim respondents attend religious services several times a day 
(23.80%) than Christian respondents (7.60%). Some Muslim respondents 
attend religious services only on feast days (29.20%), while others attend 
religious services several times a day (23.80%). Some Christian respondents 
attend religious services once a week (38.00%), and others more than once 
a week (36.50%).
Table 3.8 Reading the Holy Scripture
 
 
39. How often do you go to 
religious services? 
RESPONDENTS 
AMBON YOGYAKARTA TOTAL 
Muslim 
(n=355) 
 (%) 
Christian 
(n=366) 
(%) 
Muslim 
(n=463) 
 (%) 
Christian 
(n=253) 
%%) 
Muslim 
(n=818) 
% 
Christian  
(n=619) 
(%) 
 
Never .30 .30 1.30 .80 .90 .50 
Only on feast days or special 
holy days 
40.00 12.30 21 8.70 29.20 10.80 
At least once a month 6.80 3.30 12.70 7.50 10.10 5.00 
Once a week 12.10 29.50 16 50.20 14.30 38.00 
More than once a week 9.90 40.20 19.40 31.20 15.30 36.50 
Once a day 5.40 2.50 7.10 .40 6.40 1.60 
Several times a day 25.60 12.00 22.50 1.20 23.80 7.60 
 
 
57. How often do you read 
or recite the Holy Scripture 
(Koran or Bible)? 
RESPONDENTS 
AMBON YOGYAKARTA TOTAL 
Muslim 
(n=358) 
 (%) 
Christian 
(n=340) 
(%) 
Muslim 
(n=470) 
 (%) 
Christian 
(n=248) 
(%) 
Muslim 
(n=828) 
(%)  
Christian  
(n = 588) 
(%) 
 
Never  1.80 1.10 3.60 0.60 2.60 
Only on feast days or special 
holy days 
5.60 4.10 7.90 11.70 6.90 7.30 
At least once a month 5.60 3.50 10.90 6.00 8.60 4.60 
Once a week 10.60 14.10 10.90 24.60 10.70 18.50 
More than once a week 20.10 27.60 20.40 23.40 20.30 25.90 
Once a day 24.90 22.90 25.50 22.60 25.20 22.80 
Several times a day 33.20 25.90 23.40 8.10 27.70 18.40 
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Table 3.8 shows that a larger percentage of Muslim respondents 
(27.70%) read Holy Scriptures once a day, while a larger percentage of 
Christian respondents (25.90%) read the Holy Scriptures more than once 
a week.
Friendship by religion
Friendship by religion refers to the number of an individual’s close 
friends in everyday life, from the same religionand from other religions. 
This represents the degree to which individuals identify with a religious 
group, and also serves as a means for people to distinguish themselves 
from other religious groups. This variable measures the number of close 
friends an individual has from both the religious in-group and out-groups. 
A high number of religious in-group friends and a low number of religious 
out-group friends indicates a high degree of religious identification. This 
measurement is derived from Handiwitanto’s questionnaire (2007) on 
friends of the same religion. The original question in the survey, “How 
many of your best friends consider themselves members of the same religion 
as you,” has been revised to ask “How many of your close friends are…
(Muslim, Christian, or Catholic)?” 
Table 3.9 Muslims as close friends
 
 
274. How many of your 
close friends are 
Muslims? 
RESPONDENTS 
AMBON YOGYAKARTA  TOTAL 
Muslim 
(n=366) 
(%) 
Christian 
(n=330) 
(%) 
Muslim 
(n=476) 
(%) 
Christian 
(n=253) 
(%) 
Muslim 
(n=842) 
(%) 
Christian 
(n=583 
(%) 
 
None .50 5.50 .60 2.40 .60 4.10 
Some 1.60 56.10 1.30 31.60 1.40 45.50 
Relatively many 14.20 33.90 12.60 49.80 13.30 40.80 
Almost all 22.10 1.50 63.20 14.60 45.40 7.20 
All 61.50 3.00 22.30 1.60 39.30 2.40 
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Table 3.10 Catholics as close friends
Table 3.11 Protestants as close friends
In our sample, a good number of Christian respondents have some 
Muslims (45.50%) as their close friends. More than half of Muslim 
respondents also have some Catholics (51.10%) and less than half of Muslim 
respondents have some Christians (49.30%) as their close friends. A larger 
percentage of Christian respondents in Yogyakarta claimed that “almost 
all” of their close friends were Muslim (49.80%). A larger percentage 
of Muslim respondents in Yogyakarta claimed that they have “relatively 
many” Catholics as close friends (58.50%).
Participation in religious ceremonies
This variable indicates an individual’s participation in religious rituals and 
ceremonies. It measures the frequency of attendance. The more frequently 
a respondent attends religious ceremonies, the higher his or her degree of 
religious identification. In measuring this variable, we modified one of the 
questions drawn from the Tuti questionnaire on ethnic attitudes in Indonesia 
 
 
275. How many of 
your close friends are 
Catholics? 
RESPONDENTS 
AMBON  YOGYAKARTA TOTAL 
Muslim 
(n=314) 
(%) 
Christian 
(n=325) 
(%) 
Muslim 
(n=435) 
(%) 
Christian 
(n=253) 
(%) 
Muslim 
(n=749) 
(%) 
Christian 
(n-578) 
(%) 
 
None 51.60 4.30 16.10 .40 31.00 2.60 
Some 36.60 57.80 61.60 28.10 51.10 44.80 
Relatively many 9.90 28.60 20.50 58.50 16.00 41.70 
Almost all 1.30 4.00 1.60 10.30 1.50 6.70 
All 0.60 5.20 0.20 2.80 .40 4.20 
 
 
 
276. How many of 
your close friends are 
Protestants? 
RESPONDENTS 
AMBON  YOGYAKARTA TOTAL 
Muslim 
(n=321) 
(%) 
Christian 
(n=337) 
(%) 
Muslim 
(n=430) 
(%) 
Christian 
(n=253) 
(%) 
Muslim 
(n=751) 
(%) 
Christian 
(n=590) 
(%) 
 
None 42.10 .60 17.00   27.70 .30 
Some 34.30 1.50 60.50 7.50 49.30 4.10 
Relatively many 19.60 17.80 19.30 46.20 19.40 30.00 
Almost all 2.80 41.50 3.00 35.20 2.90 38.80 
All 1.20 38.60 .20 11.00 .70 26.80 
 
134
InteRgRoUP contAct AVoIdAnce In IndoneSIA
(2007) (“Regarding the traditional ceremonies of your own ethnic group, 
could you indicate whether you have no knowledge about it or you know 
about the traditions but you do not perform it? Or whether your family 
still carries them out and you participate in the activities?”) so that the 
term “ethnic ceremony” is changed to “religious ceremonies in Islam and 
Christianity.” The question is also changed to read, “Could you indicate 
whether you participate or not in the religious ceremony/rituals in…. (types 
of religious ceremony)?” 
Table 3.12 Participation in religious ceremonies 
Likert scale 1-7 (from never to several times a day), Muslim 
respondents only answered questions about Islamic religious ceremonies 
(question 24 to 31) and Christian respondents only answered questions 
about Christian ceremonies (question 32 to 37). Both groups answered 
questions about marriage, funerals, and fasting.
 
 
Could you indicate 
whether you participate 
or not in the religious 
ceremony/rituals in… 
 
RESPONDENTS 
AMBON YOGYAKARTA TOTAL 
 
Muslim 
(n=353) 
 
Christian 
(n=343) 
 
Muslim 
(n=472) 
 
Christian 
(n=248) 
 
Muslim 
(n=827) 
 
Christian 
(n=591) 
 
Circumcision/Baptism M: 3.32 
SD:  .98 
M:  3.72 
SD:   .56 
M: 3.18 
SD:  .98 
M:  3.67 
SD: .73 
M: 3.24 
SD:  .98 
M: 3.70 
SD:  .64 
Marriage M: 3.23 
SD:  .93 
M: 3.45 
SD: .78 
M: 3.44 
SD:  .74 
M: 3.41 
SD:  .84 
M: 3.35 
SD:  .83 
M: 3.43 
SD:  .80 
Funeral M: 3.43 
SD:  .89 
M: 3.57 
SD:  .68 
M: 3.58 
SD:  .78 
M: 3.48 
SD:  .77 
M: 3.51 
SD:  .83 
M: 3.53 
SD: .72 
Fasting M: 3.87 
SD:  .51 
M: 2.78 
SD: 1.33 
M:  3.87 
SD: .53 
M:  2.85 
SD: 1.29 
M: 3.87 
SD:  .52 
M:  2.81 
SD: 1.31 
 Idul fitri /Christmas M: 3.88 
SD:  .49 
M: 3.80 
SD:  .45 
M: 3.89 
SD:  .49 
 
M: 3.79 
SD:  .56 
M: 3.89 
SD:  .49 
M: 3.80 
SD: .50 
 Idul adha/Easter M:3.88 
SD:  .50 
M: 3.79 
SD:  .47 
M: 3.88 
SD:  .48 
 
M: 3.80 
SD:  .55 
M: 3.88 
SD:  .49 
M: 3.80 
SD:  .51 
Maulud  Muhammad M:3.81 
SD:.60 
- M:3.67 
SD:.83 
- M:3.73 
SD:.74 
- 
 Isra mi’raj celebration  M:3.83 
SD:.56 
- M:3.68 
SD:.82 
- M:3.74 
SD:.73 
- 
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In this question, we distinguished between religious ceremonies for 
Muslim respondents and those for Christians. The religious ceremonies 
listed for Muslim respondents are fasting (Ramadan), Idul Fitri, Idul Adha, 
Isra Mi’raj, and Maulud. The religious ceremonies listed for Christian 
respondents are baptism, Christmas, and Easter. However, both Christian 
and Muslim respondents were asked to respond about ceremonies for 
marriage, funerals, and circumcision. A large percentage of both Muslim 
and Christian respondents attend almost all of the religious ceremonies 
listed. This is clearly demonstrated by the high mean values of attendance 
at a variety of religious ceremonies, from 3.24 (circumcision) to 3.89 (Idul 
Fitri) for Muslims, and from 2.81 (fasting) to 3.80 (Christmas) for Christians. 
Idul Fitri is the religious ceremony that the largest number of Muslims 
indicated that they attend, while Christmas is the religious ceremony that 
the largest number of Christians indicated that they participate in. The 
standard deviation for Muslim respondents is between .49 and .98, and the 
standard deviation for Christian respondents is between .50 and 1.31. There 
is more variety in the responses provided by Christian respondents than 
Muslim respondents.
Membership and participation in religious organizations
This measurement describes an individual’s affiliation to and participation 
in a certain school or community-based religious organization, representing 
the degree to which individuals identify themselves with a certain religious 
group, and distinguish themselves from other religious groups. We theorized 
that respondents who are members or affiliates of a religious organization 
would more intensely identify with their religion: the more frequently 
respondents participated in the activities of their religious organization(s), the 
higher their degree of religious identification. Questions about membership 
in religious organizations are drawn from Handi’s questionnaire (2007). In 
this study, we modified the first question [Please indicate if you belong to 
one of the organizations below] into two questions: “Are you a member or 
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a supporter of any religious organization?”, and “If yes, please specify the 
name of the organization (school based, community based, or other)?” We 
modified the second question [How often are you involved as a volunteer in 
mosque or church] to be more focused and clear: “On average, how often 
did you participate in the activities of your religious organization in the 
past year?” 
Table 3.13 Participation in religious organizations
In our sample, some respondents were members and participated in 
campus-based student organizations, such as the campus preaching institutes 
KAMMI, HMI, GMKI, and PMII. The percentage of Christian respondents 
who are active once a week or more than once a week (50.50%) is higher 
than the percentage of Muslim respondents (35.20%) who are. Muslim 
respondents in Yogyakarta are more active in religious organizations 
compared to Muslim respondents in Ambon, while Christian respondents 
in Ambon are more active in religious organizations compared to Christian 
respondents in Yogyakarta.
Political orientation
This measurement provides an explanation of an individual’s preference 
for a political party, representing their political and religious orientations. 
Geertz (1960) conducted work on Indonesian students’ affiliation to political 
 
254. On average, how 
often did you participate 
in the activities of your 
religious organization in 
the past year? 
RESPONDENTS 
AMBON YOGYAKARTA TOTAL 
Muslim 
(n=171)  
% 
Christian 
(n=192) 
% 
Muslim 
(n=175) 
 % 
Christian 
(n=217) % 
Muslim 
(n=346)  
% 
Christian 
(n=230) % 
 
Never 6.40 10.40 13.70 10.50 10.10 10.40 
Only on special days 49.10 32.20 39.40 36.80 44.20 33.00 
At least once a month 11.10 5.70 9.70 7.90 10.40 6.10 
Once a week 15.80 22.40 9.70 28.90 12.70 23.50 
More than once a week 17.50 29.20 27.40 15.80 22.50 27.00 
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parties and their religious orientations. He said that four political parties 
generally represented the categorizations of the religious orientations of 
Javanese people: the Communist Party (secular, common people), two 
Islamic parties (Nahdlatul Ulama and Masyumi), and the Nationalist Party 
(secular upper class group). In the post-New Order period, there are some 
Muslim groups based in political parties, such as the Welfare and Justice 
Party (PKS), the National Awakening Party (PKB), the National Mandate 
Party (PAN) and the Development Unity Party (PPP). The questions used to 
measure political party affiliations are: (i) “Did you vote in the last national 
election?” (ii) “If no, why did you not vote? (iii) If yes, which political party 
did you vote for in the last election?” (iv) “If you were not able to vote, 
which political party would you have voted for? After the pilot survey, the 
third and fourth questions were merged into one question, asking, “If you 
voted, which political party did you vote for in the last national election? If 
you did not, which would you have voted for?”
Survey results show that the majority of respondents voted in the 
2009 national election (64.50%). The main political parties respondents 
voted for were Demokrat (23.20%), PDIP (9.30%), Golkar (8.30%), PKS 
(5.70%), PKB (2.20%), PAN (2.10%), and Hanura (1.20%). These survey 
figures correspond fairly closely to the results of the actual election in 
2009, in which the votes were distributed Demokrat (20.85%), Golkar 
(14.45%), PDIP (14.03%), PKS (7.88%), PAN (6.01%), PPP (5.32%), PKB 
(4.94), Gerindra (4.46), and Hanura (3.77%).  The three biggest political 
parties, as well as Hanura, have a nationalist and secular orientation. Most 
respondents (43.00%) who participated in the national election in 2009 
voted for secular political parties instead of religiously based political 
parties. Only 10.00% of respondents voted for religiously based political 
parties. The most fundamentalist oriented political party, PKS, was more 
popular among respondents in Ambon (8.30%) than in Yogyakarta (3.20%). 
The most nationalist oriented political party, PDIP, was also more popular 
among respondents in Ambon (12.70%) than in Yogyakarta (6.00%). 
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3.2.2.2 Ethnic identification
Referring to Phinney and Rotherham’s concept of ethnic identity (1987), 
and being similar to religious identification, ethnic identification consists 
of five indicators: ethnic self-definition, language use, friends by ethnicity, 
participation in ethnic ceremonies, and membership and participation in 
ethnic organizations.
 
Ethnic self-definition
The question about ethnic self-definition refers to what ethnic group an 
individual considers himself or herself to belong toand was phrased: “To what 
ethnic group do you consider yourself to belong to?” The possible choices 
include the twelve biggest ethnic groups in the research sites according 
to census data. These are Javanese, Sundanese, Madurese, Minangkabau, 
Ambonese, Buginese, Makassarese, Butonese, Toraja, Minahasa, Chinese, 
and Bataknese. After the pilot survey, the Ambonese category was adjusted 
to ‘Ambonese (e.g. Seram, Kei, Ternate, etc.), please specify’ in order to 
reflect the various ethnic groups, such as Eastern Seram, Western Seram, 
Kei, Hitu, and Saparua, that fall under the term Ambonese.
Table 3.14 Ethnic group
14a. To which ethnic 
group do you consider 
yourself to belong to? 
RESPONDENTS 
AMBON YOGYAKARTA TOTAL 
Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent 
 
Javanese 21 2.80 436 58.10 457 30.50 
Sundanese 0 .00 38 5.10 38 2.50 
Madurese 0 .00 37 4.90 37 2.50 
Minangkabau 1 .10 16 2.10 17 1.10 
Ambonese (e.g. Seram, 
Kei, Ternate, etc.) 
581 77.50 8 1.10 589 39.30 
Buginese 6 .80 5 .70 11 .70 
Makassarese 1 .10 2 .30 3 .20 
Butonese 93 12.40 2 .30 95 6.30 
Toraja 10 1.30 10 1.30 20 1.30 
Minahasa 1 .10 4 .50 5 .30 
Chinese 2 .30 47 6.30 49 3.30 
Bataknese 0 .00 37 4.90 37 2.50 
Others, specify 14 1.90 90 12.001 104 6.90 
Missing 20 2.70 18 2.40 38 2.50 
Total 750 100.00 750 100.00 1500 100.00 
 
                                               
1 Consisting of 28 ethnic groups such as Papua, Alor, Bali, Betawi, Flores, Melayu, Sangir-Talaud, Poso, Sasak, 
Timor-Leste, the Philippines, Banjar, Mandailing, Pamona, Kaili, Gorontalo, Flores, Dayak, etc. 
6      Consisting of 28 ethnic groups such as Papua, Alor, Bali, Betawi, Flores, Melayu, Sangir-Talaud, Poso, 
Sasak, Timor-Leste, the Philippines, Banjar, Mandailing, Pamona, Kaili, Gorontalo, Flores, Dayak, etc.
6
139
chAPteR 3 - dAtA collectIon And meASURementS
This research also asks information about the ethnic identification 
of respondents’ parents. This information is necessary to find out whether 
respondents come from families that have one or more ethnic group 
affiliations. The history of ethnicity is part of the preliminary information 
on ethnic socialization in a family. The ethnic identification of respondents’ 
parents is measured by the question, “To which ethnic group do you consider 
your father to belong to?” and “To which ethnic group do you consider your 
mother to belong to?” 
In our sample, respondents identified themselves as Ambonese 
(39.30%), Javanese (30.50%), Butonese (6.30%), Chinese (3.30%), 
Sundanese (2.50%), Madurese (2.50%), Bataknese (2.50%), Minangkabau 
(1.10%), Toraja (1.30%), Buginese (0.70%) and Makassarese (0.20%). 
Most of the respondents in Yogyakarta consisted of Javanese (58.10%), 
Chinese (6.30%), Sundanese (5.10%), Madurese (4.90%), and Bataknese 
(4.90%). Respondents in Ambon mostly comprised Ambonese (77.50%) 
and Buton (12.40%). Fathers of the respondents were identified as 
Ambonese (38.70%), Javanese (31.00%), Butonese (6.70%), Chinese 
(3.70%), and Bataknese (2.50%). The ethnicity of respondents’ mothers 
was generally the same as that as the fathers. However, the profiles of the 
ethnic affiliation of respondents’ fathers differed across the two sites. In 
Ambon, respondent’s fathers were mainly identified as Ambonese (76.10%) 
and Buton (12.90%), while the fathers of most respondents in Yogyakarta 
were identified as Javanese (59.20%), Chinese (7.10%), Madurese (5.10%), 
Bataknese (5.10%), Sundanese (4.50%), and Minangkabau (2.00%). 
Language use
Language use refers to how individuals speak their local languages in 
different places, including at home, at family gatherings, at school, with 
friends, in their community residence, and in dealing with local government. 
In many places the use of local languages signals identification with 
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a certain ethnic group, and can be used to distinguish members of one 
group from members of other ethnic groups. Language use is comparable 
with participation in religious practices, representing the extent to which 
individuals identify themselves with a certain ethno-religious group. We 
presume that languages are used not only for communication, but also 
for the expression of identity – identity that depends on where, and with 
whom, people speak. In Indonesia, individuals usually speak more than 
one language. Local languages in many places are viewed as highly salient 
ethnic identifiers. 
There are two main inventories of questionnaires utilized in this 
research. The first is an inventory from the European Social Survey 
(2008/2009) which covers what languages Europeans speak most often at 
home. The second is Tuti’s questionnaire on language practices, from which 
we drew the question “What is the language you usually speak at home (big 
family gathering, work place, and social gathering)?” Since this research 
used students as respondents, “work place” was changed to “university,” 
and “social gathering” was changed to “a community of residence.” We also 
added two additional categories of “close friend” and “government office” 
to the question. The modified question is “What language do you usually 
speak ….(at home, in big family gatherings, in the university, with close 
friends, in your community of residence, and in dealing with government 
offices)?” After the pilot survey, this question was changed to “What is the 
language that you mainly speak?”
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Table 3.15a Language use
22. What is the language 
that you mainly speak at 
home? 
RESPONDENTS 
AMBON YOGYAKARTA TOTAL 
Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent 
 
Indonesian 319 42.50 254 33.90 573 38.20 
Your ethnic language 346 46.10 449 59.90 795 53.00 
Other language 30 4.00 11 1.50 41 2.70 
Missing 55 7.30 36 4.80 91 6.10 
Total 750 100.00 750 100.00 1500 100.00 
23. What is the language 
that you mainly speak in 
big family gatherings? 
RESPONDENTS 
AMBON YOGYAKARTA TOTAL 
Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent 
Indonesian 327 43.60 323 43.10 650 43.30 
Your ethnic language 316 42.10 383 51.10 699 46.60 
Other language 22 2.90 9 1.20 31 2.10 
Missing 85 11.30 35 4.70 120 8.00 
Total 750 100.00 750 100.00 1500 100.00 
24. What is the language 
that you mainly speak in 
the university? 
RESPONDENTS 
AMBON YOGYAKARTA TOTAL 
Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent 
Indonesian 561 74.80 617 82.30 1178 78.50 
Your ethnic language 95 12.70 62 8.30 157 10.50 
Other language 15 2.00 15 2.00 30 2.00 
Missing 79 10.50 56 7.50 135 9.00 
Total 750 100.00 750 100.00 1500 100.00 
25. What is the language 
that you mainly speak 
with close friends? 
RESPONDENTS 
AMBON YOGYAKARTA TOTAL 
Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent 
Indonesian 379 50.5 356 47.50 735 49.00 
Your ethnic language 233 31.1 298 39.70 531 35.40 
Other language 52 6.9 30 4.00 82 5.50 
Missing 86 11.5 66 8.80 152 10.10 
Total 750 100.0 750 100.00 1500 100.00 
26. What is the language 
that you mainly speak in 
your community of 
residence? 
RESPONDENTS 
AMBON YOGYAKARTA TOTAL 
Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent 
Indonesian 378 50.40 399 53.20 777 51.80 
Your ethnic language 253 33.70 292 38.90 545 36.30 
Other language 49 6.50 11 1.50 60 4.00 
Missing 70 9.30 48 6.40 118 7.90 
Total 750 100.00 750 100.00 1500 100.00 
27. What is the language 
that you mainly speak in 
dealing with government 
offices? 
RESPONDENTS 
AMBON YOGYAKARTA TOTAL 
Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent 
Indonesian 692 92.30 710 94.70 1402 93.50 
Your ethnic language 1 .10 11 1.50 12 .80 
Other language 3 .40 2 .30 5 .30 
Missing 54 7.20 27 3.60 81 5.40 
Total 750 100.00 750 100.00 1500 100.00 
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More than half of the respondents speak their local language at 
home (53.00%) rather than the national language (38.20%). Respondents 
in Yogyakarta speak local languages at home (59.90%) more than those 
in Ambon (46.10%). In general, respondents use both local language 
(46.60%) and the national language (43.30%) when they speak at big family 
gatherings. Most respondents speak the national language at university 
(78.50%). Respondents speak in the national language (49.00%) when they 
meet their close friends rather than in local languages (35.40%). They also 
use the national language when they meet in their community of residence. 
When speaking with people at government offices, almost all respondents 
speak in the national language (93.50%). 
Table 3.15b Language use for Muslim and Christian respondents
Table 3.15b indicates that Muslim respondents have a higher level 
of ethnic identification than Christian respondents do, based on language 
use at home and at family gatherings. However, when speaking at the 
university, community residence, and government offices, most Muslim 
and Christian respondents tend to use the national language rather than 
ethnic languages.
 
 
22. What is the 
language that you 
mainly speak at 
home? 
RESPONDENTS 
AMBON YOGYA TOTAL 
Muslim 
(n=348) 
(%) 
Christian 
(n=344) 
(%) 
Muslim 
(n=454) 
(%) 
Christian 
(n=245) 
(%) 
Muslim 
(n=802) 
(%) 
Christian 
(n=589)  
(%) 
 
Indonesian 36.50 55.20 23.80 58.40 29.30 56.50 
Your ethnic language 59.80 39.80 75.10 40.40 68.50 40.10 
Other language 3.70 4.90 1.10 1.20 2.20 3.40 
 
23. What is the 
language that you 
mainly speak in big 
family gatherings? 
RESPONDENTS 
AMBON YOGYA TOTAL 
Muslim 
(333) 
(%) 
Christian 
(n=329) 
(%) 
Muslim 
(n=450) 
(%) 
Christian 
(n=250) 
(%) 
Muslim 
(n=783)  
(%) 
Christian 
(579) 
(%) 
Indonesian 41.10 57.40 36.20 62.40 38.30 59.60 
Your ethnic language 54.10 40.700 63.10 36.80 59.30 39.00 
Other language 4.80 1.8 .70 .80 2.40 1.40 
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Friends by ethnicity
The measurement of “friends by ethnicity” refers to the number of an 
individual’s  close friends from the ethnic in-group and out-groups. This 
variable represents the degree to which individuals identify themselves 
with a certain ethnic group and differentiate themselves from other ethnic 
groups. The more ethnic in-group friends an individual has, and the fewer 
ethnic out-group friends, the higher their degree of ethnic identification. 
The question about friends by ethnicity is phrased as “How many of your 
close friends are… (Javanese, Sundanese, etc.)?” 
Due to the location of our research sites in Ambon and Yogyakarta, 
Ambonese and Javanese respondents dominated our sample. Therefore, 
respondents who identify how many of their close friends are Javanese 
range from some (35.30%), to relatively many (29.90%), to almost all 
(22.30%). A similar pattern is seen for respondents who have Ambonese 
as close friends, with 25.70% of respondents answering that some of their 
friends are Ambonese, 16.50% answering that relatively many of their 
friends are Ambonese, 19.40% answering that almost all of their friends are 
Ambonese, and 15.60% answering that all of their friends are Ambonese. 
Respondents who have close friends from other ethnic groups display a 
different pattern. Most respondents have some close friends from the 
following groups: Makassarese (53.50%), Buginese (40.10%), Sundanese 
(38.20%), Bataknese (37.70%), Toraja (37.00%), Madurese (31.20%), 
Chinese (29.30%), Butonese (28.50%), Minangkabau (27.30%), and 
Minahasa (21.60%). 
Participation in ethnic ceremonies
We consider participation in ethnic group ceremonies to be a good indicator 
for the individual’s degree of identification with certain ethnic groups. The 
assumption behind this category of inquiry is that people in our research 
sites have their own customs and traditions. These traditions also function 
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as an instrument of socialization to maintain social integration within the 
in-group. We asked whether individuals know of, attend, or participate 
in the ethnic group rituals held by their community. The question used to 
measure this indicator was based on Tuti’s questionnaire about participation 
in religious ceremonies, “Could you indicate whether you participate or 
not in the religious ceremony/rituals in…. (religious ceremonies)?” It was 
adjusted to ask, “Could you indicate whether you know these ceremonies 
and whether you and/or your family participate or not in these ethnic 
ceremonies or rituals?” 
Table 3.16 Ethnic ceremonies
Likert scale 1-5 (from totally disagree to totally agree)
The ethnic ceremonies listed are birth rituals, wedding rituals, 
moving house, illness rituals, funerals, and others. The survey results 
clearly demonstrate that respondents participate in a variety of ethnic 
ceremonies. Their participation in ethnic ceremonies is relatively lower 
than their participation in religious ceremonies. For example, the mean 
values for participation in ethnic ceremonies are between 2.44 (illness) and 
3.42 (wedding rituals) for Muslim respondents, and between 2.18 (illness) 
Could you indicate whether 
you know these ceremonies 
and whether you and/or your 
family participate or not in 
these ethnic ceremonies or 
rituals 
RESPONDENTS 
AMBON YOGYAKARTA TOTAL 
 
Muslim 
(n=307) 
 
Christian 
(n=281) 
 
Muslim 
(n=468) 
 
Christian 
(n=253) 
 
Muslim 
(n=755) 
 
Christian 
(n=546) 
 
15. Birth rituals M:  2.62 
SD: 1.24 
M:  2.11 
SD: 1.32 
M: 3.16 
SD:  .981 
M:  2.48 
SD: 1.23 
M:  2.95 
SD: 1.12 
M:  2.29 
SD: 1.29 
16. Wedding rituals M:  3.26 
SD: .87 
M: 3.21 
SD:1.07 
M: 3.52 
SD:  .80 
M: 3.45 
SD:  .84 
M: 3.42 
SD:  .84 
M: 3.32 
SD:  .98 
17. Moving house M:  2.34 
SD: 1.32 
M:  2.15 
SD: 1.37 
M:  2.70 
SD: 1.17 
M:  2.34 
SD: 1.26 
M:  2.56 
SD :1.24 
M:  2.25 
SD: 1.31 
18. Illness M:  2.34 
SD: 1.39 
M:  2.28 
SD: 1.39 
M:  2.50 
SD: 1.26 
M:  2.07 
SD: 1.23 
M:  2.44 
SD: 1.31 
M:  2.18 
SD: 1.32 
19. Wake/ 
Funeral 
M:  3.26 
SD: 1.02 
M:  3.14 
SD: 1.24 
M: 3.42 
SD: .94 
M: 3.39 
SD:  .94 
M: 3.36 
SD:  .98 
M:  3.26 
SD: 1.12 
20. Others, specify:___ M:  2.24 
SD: 1.43 
M:  2.07 
SD: 1.34 
M:  3.05 
SD: 1.20 
M:  2.78 
SD: 1.46 
M:  2.63 
SD: 1.38 
M:  2.27 
SD :1.40 
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and 3.32 (wedding rituals) for Christian respondents. Both Muslim and 
Christian respondents display the same pattern in that they participate less 
in ceremonies for illness and participate more in weddings and funeral 
rites. Muslim respondents in Yogyakarta also have relatively high level 
of participation in birth rituals (M=3.16) and other rituals (M=3.05). The 
standard deviation of values for Muslim respondents is between .84 and 
1.38, and those for Christians are between .98 and 1.40. Both Muslim 
and Christian respondents have equally heterogeneous answers to these 
questions.  
Membership and participation in ethnic organizations
This measurement describes an individual’s affiliation to and participation 
in ethnic organizations, representing the degree to which individuals 
identify themselves with a certain ethnic group, and distinguish themselves 
from other ethnic groups. Similar to how we view affiliation to religious 
organizations, we presume that membership in ethnic organizations plays a 
major role in preserving ethnic identity. The more frequently a respondent 
participates in the activities of their ethnic organizations, the higher his or her 
degree of ethnic identification. The first question used in this measurement 
is “Are you a member or a supporter of any ethnic organization?”, while 
the second question asked is, “On average, how often did you participate in 
the activities of your ethnic group organization in the past year?” 
In our sample, the majority of respondents (77.30%) are not members 
or followers of any ethnic organizations, both in Yogyakarta (82.00%) and 
in Ambon (72.50%). Only a small percentage of respondents are members 
(9.00%) or followers (7.30%) of any ethnic organizations. The percentage of 
respondents involved in ethnic organizations in Ambon (16.10%) is almost 
the same as in Yogyakarta (16.40%). More than half of these respondents 
participate in the activities of ethnic organizations only on special days 
(52.50%). More of the respondents in Ambon (57.00%) participated in 
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the activities of ethnic organizations on special days than in Yogyakarta 
(48.00%). The number of respondents who said that they participate in these 
activities once a week or more than once a week (21.70%) is higher than 
those who answered that they participate at least once a month (12.30%).
 
3.2.3 Individual determinants 
Individual determinants are a set of social categories that are used as control 
variables in statistical analysis. All of these determinants are conceptually 
related to the avoidance of intergroup contact in various ways, either 
induce or reduce it. Individual determinants include gender, age, the level 
of education achieved by the respondent’s parents, occupational status, 
household income, urbanization, and the area of residence (Coenders et al., 
2007; ESS 2008/2009). 
Gender and age
The sex of respondents was recorded in our surveys, since we assume that 
women have less involvement in violent conflict than men. This study 
attempts to ascertain if avoidance of contact with out-group members varies 
according to sex. A study on refugees in Eastern Indonesia by Putranti and 
Subagya (2005) points out that men and women have different roles in 
reconciliation processes.
The age of respondents was recorded to examine whether older 
or younger student tend to avoid intergroup contact. While our original 
question to determine a respondent’s age was, “In what year were you born? 
In the year 19….” we revised this question to, “When is your birthday?” 
after the pilot study. 
In our sample, we have more male (52.78%) than female (47.22%) 
respondents, with 55.49% men and 44.50% women in Yogyakarta, and 
50.07% men and 49.93% women in Ambon. These numbers correspond 
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with the composition of the population in the city of Ambon49.50% male 
and 49.84% female in 2010. The average age of our respondents is 22 years, 
with an average age of 22.50 years in Ambon and 21.70 years in Yogyakarta. 
A few respondents are considerably older, especially those who study in 
the faculties of nursing and public heath in Ambon. Respondents’ status 
at university ranges from students in their second year (6.00%), third year 
(30.60%), fourth year (29.80%), fifth year (15.30%), and other (9.90%). A 
large percentage of respondents in Ambon are students in their third year 
(30.40%), and a large percentage of respondents in Yogyakarta are in their 
fourth year (39.30%). The number of respondents from each faculty and 
university can be seen in table 3.1.  
Place of birth, living and growing up
Place of birth refers to the city or region in which an individual was born. 
This question is necessary to find out whether respondents are part of native 
or migrant communities. Respondents who answer that the research site is 
their place of birth are considered native. The question about birthplace 
is adapted from ESS (2008/2009), “Where were you born (country)?” 
However, we changed it into, “Where were you born? Place of birth?” 
Information on native-migrant status is necessary to classify whether 
natives have more of a tendency to avoid intergroup contact than migrants. 
To further clarify residence patterns, we asked, “Where do you live now? 
Length of stay.” Based on the pilot survey, this question was changed into, 
“What is the name of the town or city where you live now,” and “length of 
stay.” The classification “place of growing up” is based on the area where 
a respondent grew up. This measurement aims to document information on 
the early life histories of respondents, to ascertain whether they come from 
rural or urban areas. The question regarding where they grew up is adapted 
from ESS (2008/2009): “Which phrase on this card best describes the area 
where you live? A big city, the suburbs, or the outskirts of a big city, a town 
or a small city, a country village, a farm or home in the countryside?” 
148
InteRgRoUP contAct AVoIdAnce In IndoneSIA
However, we revised it to say, “Where did you grow up?” After the pilot 
survey, this question was changed into “What is the name of the town/city 
where you grew up?” 
In our sample, 41.30% of the respondents live in the Yogyakarta 
Special Region, and 46.40% respondents live in the Moluccas province. 
Respondents in Yogyakarta live in the regencies of Sleman (40.50%), Bantul 
(10.80%), and the city of Yogyakarta (27.60%), while most respondents 
in the Moluccas live in the city of Ambon (79.20%). Respondents in 
Yogyakarta grew up in Central Java (23.50%), Yogyakarta (20.50%), East 
Java (14.90%), West Java (7.90%), and other provinces. Respondents in 
Maluku grew up in Maluku (86.00%), Southeast Sulawesi (1.50%), North 
Maluku (1.30%), and other provinces. Respondents have lived in their 
current place of residence for more than three years, (47.70%), for two to 
three years (15.60%), or for one to two years (25.40%), and for less than one 
year (9.30%). In Yogyakarta 54.30% of respodents have lived in their current 
place of residence for more than three years, and the pattern is similar in 
Ambon (41.10%). The percentage of respondents in the Yogyakarta Special 
Region who are apparently part of the migrant population (79.50%) is higher 
than the percentage of migrants in the Moluccas province (14.00%).
Parents’ background
The variables measured in relation to the background of a respondent’s 
parents consist of household income, parents’ education, occupational and 
occupation status. Parents’ education level is measured by the status of 
education for both fathers and mothers, ranging from primary school to 
Ph.D. Respondents whose parents graduated from university are assumed 
to be of the middle to upper classes. Parents’ occupational status includes 
the categories of self-employed, employee helped by paid workers, 
employee helped by unpaid workers, workers, free workers in agriculture, 
free workers in the non-agricultural sector, and unpaid workers. Parents’ 
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occupation is based on their field of occupation, such as professionals, 
technicians, and clerks. These questions build on the measurements from 
ESS (2008/2009).  
 Household income is an estimation of the monthly gross income 
of a respondent’s household, including the incomes of their parents and 
siblings. This measurement aims to identify the objective class of the 
respondent. We categorize respondents whose household income is under 
IDR 1,000,000 as lower class, while those whose household income is 
between IDR 1,000,000 and IDR 5,000,000 are categorized as middle class. 
We categorize respondents as upper class if their monthly gross household 
income is more than IDR 5,000,000. The question about household income 
asks, “Please kindly estimate the monthly gross income of all those earning 
in your household including your parents and siblings.” We calculated 
the answer categories based on the average of provincial minimum wages 
(UMP) for Yogyakarta and Maluku in 2010.6 In 2010, the UMP was IDR 
750,490 in Yogyakarta and IDR 1,400,990 in the Moluccas (BPS, 2010:26). 
The average UMP in the two provinces was IDR 1,075,000. This study uses 
this number (IDR 1,000,000) as the interval. Nevertheless, we adjusted the 
minimum household income to IDR 500,000 to adapt to the poverty line 
in Indonesia (IDR 232,989 per capita per month, or around IDR 464,000 
per household per month). In addition, the percentage of the population 
under the poverty line in 2010 was 16.80% in Yogyakarta, and 27.70% in 
Maluku.
6 The minimum wage, according to the Regulation of Ministry of Empowerment PER-01/
MEN/1999, is the lowest wage consisting of basic salary and fixed allowances. The UMP 
is the lowest wage that is put into effect at provincial level (Depnakertrans, 2011).
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Table 3.17a Household income of respondents 
In general, based on household income, most respondents fall within 
the middle class category (42.60%). However, while most respondents in 
Yogyakarta are middle class (51.00%), in Ambon the  the lower class category 
has the largest number of respondents in it (46.70%). The percentage of 
respondents who fall in the upper class category is higher in Yogyakarta 
(29.20%) than in Ambon (7.70%). Compared with the statistical data on 
poverty levels, the amount of people who fall in the lower class category in 
Ambon is higher than the percentage of the population who live under the 
poverty line in Maluku (23.00%). However, the percentage of respondents 
identified as lower class in Yogyakarta is in line with the percentage of 
the population living in poverty in Yogyakarta in 2011 (16.08%). Overall, 
respondents both in Yogyakarta (M=3.52) and in Ambon (M=3.41) feel 
satisfied with their parents’ income (M=3.47).
279. The monthly grass income 
of all those earning in your 
household including... 
RESPONDENTS 
AMBON YOGYAKARTA TOTAL 
Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent 
       Lower than IDR 500,000 221 29.50 47 6.30 268 17.90 
IDR 500,000 - IDR 999,999 129 17.20 79 10.50 208 13.90 
IDR 1,000,000 - IDR 1,999,999 119 15.90 113 15.10 232 15.50 
IDR 2,000,000 - IDR 2,999,999 86 11.50 115 15.30 201 13.40 
IDR 3,000,000 - IDR 3,999,999 60 8.00 98 13.10 158 10.50 
IDR 4,000,000 - IDR 4,999,999 22 2.90 56 7.50 78 5.20 
IDR 5,000,000 - IDR 5,999,999 18 2.40 65 8.70 83 5.50 
IDR 6,000,000 and over 40 5.30 154 20.50 194 12.90 
Missing 55 7.30 23 3.10 78 5.20 
Total 750 100.00 750 100.00 1500 100.00 
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Table 3.17b Household income for Muslim and Christian respondents
More Muslim respondents (37.60%) come from lower class 
households than Christian respondents (28.00%). However, in middle class 
households, the percentage of Christian respondents (50.00%) is higher 
than the percentage of Muslim respondents (44.70%). In general, Christian 
respondents’ households are more economically prosperous than Muslim 
respondents’ households are.
The question about parents’ education is “What is the highest level 
of formal education received by your father (mother)? We adjusted the 
available answers to reflect the Indonesian context, listing the categories 
of, “primary school, senior high school, diploma, bachelor (S1), master 
(S2), and Ph.D (S3).” After the pilot survey, we added two more categories: 
“No formal education” and “Pre-school.” The question on occupational 
status is “What is the occupational status of your father (mother)?” The 
answer categories refer to Indonesian statistical categories, including: “self-
employed, employee helped by paid workers, employee helped by unpaid 
workers, workers, free workers in agriculture, free workers in the non-
agricultural sector, and unpaid workers.” The question regarding occupation 
status is, “What is the field of your father’s (mother’s) occupation?” After 
the pilot survey, we revised this question to say, “What is the occupation of 
your father (mother)?”
 
279. The monthly grass 
income of all those earning 
in your household 
including... 
RESPONDENTS 
AMBON YOGYAKARTA TOTAL 
Muslim 
(n=356) 
% 
Christian 
(n=338) 
% 
Muslim 
(n=467) 
% 
Christian 
(n=245) 
% 
Muslim 
(n=583)  
% 
Christian 
(n=583) 
% 
 
Lower than IDR 500,000 43.50 19.50 8.10 3.30 23.50 12.70 
IDR 500,000 - IDR 999,999 19.10 17.80 10.30 11.80 14.10 15.30 
IDR 1,000,000 - IDR 1,999,999 14.60 19.80 16.70 13.50 15.80 17.20 
IDR 2,000,000 - IDR 2,999,999 7.90 17.20 17.80 11.40 13.50 14.80 
IDR 3,000,000 - IDR 3,999,999 6.70 10.70 13.70 12.20 10.70 11.30 
IDR 4,000,000 - IDR 4,999,999 3.40 3.00 5.80 11.80 4.70 6.70 
IDR 5,000,000 - IDR 5,999,999 1.10 4.10 7.30 12.70 4.60 7.70 
IDR 6,000.000 and over 3.70 8.00 20.30 23.30 13.10 14.40 
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Table 3.18a Level of father’s education
In our sample, Christian respondents’ fathers (40.20%) are more 
educated (diploma to Ph.D.) than Muslim respondents’ fathers (30.00%). In 
Ambon, the percentage of Christian respondents’ fathers who graduated in 
high school education (diploma to Ph.D.) (34.10%) is almost twice as high 
as Muslim respondents’ fathers (16.20%). In Yogyakarta, the percentage of 
Christian respondents’ fathers who graduated with a high school education 
(48.70%) is higher than that of Muslim respondents’ fathers (42.30%). 
Table 3.18b Level of mother’s education 
 
281. What is the 
highest level of formal 
education received by 
your father? 
 
RESPONDENTS 
AMBON YOGYAKARTA TOTAL 
 
Muslim 
(n=356) 
% 
 
Christian 
(n=346) % 
 
Muslim 
(n=473)  
% 
 
Christian 
(n=251) % 
 
Muslim 
(n=829) 
% 
 
Christian 
(n=597) % 
 
No formal education 2.50 .30 1.70 1.20 2.10 .70 
Kindergarten - - .40 - .20 - 
Primary school 31.50 12.70 14.00 8.00 21.50 10.70 
Secondary school 21.60 10.70 10.80 8.00 15.40 9.50 
Senior high school 30.60 42.20 30.90 34.30 30.80 38.90 
Diploma (D1-D4) 3.90 12.10 9.50 7.60 7.10 10.20 
Bachelor (S1) 7.30 19.40 23.90 29.50 16.80 23.60 
Master (S2) 2.50 2.30 7.40 8.00 5.30 4.70 
Ph.D (S3) 2.50 .30 1.50 3.60 .80 1.70 
 
 
281. What is the 
highest level of formal 
education received by 
your mother? 
 
RESPONDENTS 
AMBON YOGYAKARTA TOTAL 
 
Muslim 
(n=351) 
% 
 
Christian 
(n=340) % 
 
Muslim 
(n=468)  
% 
 
Christian 
(n=250) % 
 
Muslim 
(n=819) 
% 
 
Christian 
(n=590) % 
 
No formal education 3.70 .90 1.70 2.00 2.60 1.40 
Kindergarten   .40  .20  
Primary school 47.90 15.60 16.70 8.40 30.00 12.50 
Secondary school 21.10 12.10 13.90 8.80 17.00 10.70 
Senior high school 22.80 43.80 30.80 34.00 27.40 39.70 
Diploma (D1-D4) 2.30 11.80 10.50 15.20 7.00 13.20 
Bachelor (S1) 2.00 15.00 22.90 27.20 13.90 20.20 
Master (S2) .30 .90 2.10 4.40 1.30 2.40 
Ph.D (S3)   1.10  .60  
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Respondents’ mothers had similar patterns of level of education 
as their fathers. The percentage of Christian respondents’ mothers who 
achieved degrees (diploma to Ph.D) (35.80%) is higher than that of 
Muslim respondents’ mothers (22.80%). In Yogyakarta, more Christian 
respondents’ mothers graduated with a diploma up to a Ph.D. (46.80%) 
than Muslim respondents’ mothers (36.60%). In Ambon, the number of 
Christian respondents’ mothers who achieved diplomas (27.70) is higher 
compared with Muslim respondents’ mothers (4.60%).
 In our sample, a larger number of respondents’ fathers are self-
employed (33.00%) or workers (including officer and labour) (33.50%). 
In Yogyakarta, the percentage of respondents’ fathers who are employed 
as workers (41.50%) is higher than the percentage that is self-employed 
(27.70%). Otherwise, in Ambon, more respondents’ fathers are self-
employed (38.30%) than employed as workers (25.60%). Only a small 
percentage of respondents’ fathers are employed as free workers in the 
agricultural sector, both in Ambon (7.90%) and in Yogyakarta (4.70%). In 
general, the pattern of occupational status for respondents’ mothers is similar, 
with 38% answering they are self-employed and 22.80% answering that 
they are employed as workers. More respondents’ mothers answered that 
they are self-employed in Ambon (45.50%) than in Yogyakarta (30.70%). 
Table 3.19a Fathers’ occupation 
283a. What is the occupation of 
your father? 
RESPONDENTS 
AMBON YOGYAKARTA TOTAL 
Muslim 
(n=356) 
(%) 
Christian 
(n=335) % 
Muslim 
(n=464) 
% 
Christian 
(n=246) % 
Muslim 
(n=820) 
% 
Christian 
(n=581) % 
 
Officials of government and 
special-interest organizations, 
corporate executives, managers, 
managing proprietors and 
supervisors 
.30 2.40 4.50 3.70 2.70 2.90 
Professionals 1.40 1.20 5.20 8.50 3.50 4.30 
Technicians and Associate 
Professionals 
1.10 1.20 1.70 2.00 1.50 1.50 
Clerks 14.00 36.70 28.00 36.20 22.00 36.50 
Service Workers and Shop and 
Market Sales Workers 
1.70 4.20 5.80 8.50 4.00 6.00 
Farmers, Forestry Workers, and 
Fishermen 
55.10 26.00 20.90 3.70 35.70 16.50 
Trades and Related Workers 9.00 4.20 14.20 16.30 12.00 9.30 
Plant and Machine Operators 
and Assemblers 
2.00 2.10 2.60 .40 2.30 1.40 
Labourers and Unskilled 
Workers 
2.50 3.30 5.40 2.80 4.10 3.10 
Special Occupations (specify)  3.40 10.70 6.70 8.90 5.20 10.00 
Dead/absent 9.60 8.10 5.00 8.90 7.00 8.40 
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Table 3.19a shows the percentage of Christian respondents’ fathers 
who work as clerks (36.50%) is higher than the percentage of Muslim 
respondents’ fathers who work in that profession (22.00%). The percentage 
of Muslim respondents‘ fathers who work as farmers, forestry workers, and 
fishermen (35.70%) is higher than the percentage of Christian respondents’ 
fathers in those occupations (16.50%). In Ambon, a large number of Muslim 
respondents’ fathers work as farmers (55.10%), while a larger number of 
Christian respondents’ fathers work as clerks (36.75). The occupations of 
respondents’ fathers in Yogyakarta follow a similar pattern, although some 
Muslims (14.20%) and Christians (16.30%) also work in trades and related 
workers.
Table 3.19b Mothers’ occupation
Table 3.19b demonstrates that far more Christian respondents’ mothers 
work as associate professionals (31.70%) than Muslim respondents’ mothers 
(.40%). More Muslim respondents’ mothers work as farmers, forestry 
283a. What is the occupation 
of your father? 
RESPONDENTS 
AMBON YOGYAKARTA TOTAL 
Muslim 
(n=342) 
(%) 
Christian 
(n=314) 
(%) 
Muslim 
(n=447) 
(%) 
Christian 
(n=245) 
(%) 
Muslim 
(n=789) 
(%) 
Christian 
(n=559) 
(%) 
 
Officials of government and 
special-interest organizations, 
corporate executives, 
managers, managing 
proprietors and supervisors 
.30 1.00 .90 1.20 .60 1.10 
Professionals .30 1.00 4.00 4.50 2.40 2.50 
Technicians and Associate 
Professionals 
5.00 32.80 .70 30.20 .40 31.70 
Clerks .60 1.60 23.90 9.80 15.70 5.20 
Service Workers and Shop 
and Market Sales Workers 
47.70 24.50 5.40 3.70 3.30 15.40 
Farmers, Forestry Workers, 
and Fishermen 
20.80 11.80 17.20 22.90 30.40 16.60 
Trades and Related Workers .60 .30 21.90 1.20 21.40 .20 
Plant and Machine Operators 
and Assemblers 
16.40 1.00 .20 21.20 .10 1.10 
Labourers and Unskilled 
Workers 
8.50 15.00 4.00 5.30 2.50 17.70 
Special Occupations (specify)  .30 11.10 16.60 1.20 16.50 8.60 
Dead/absent .30 1.00 5.10 4.50 6.60 1.10 
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workers, and fishermen (30.40%) than Christian respondents’ mothers 
(16.60%). In Ambon, less than half of Muslim respondents’ mothers are 
employed as shop workers (47.70%), while some Christian respondents’ 
mothers work as associate professionals (32.80%). In Yogyakarta, some 
Muslim respondents’ mothers work as clerks (23.90%) and trade workers 
(21.90%), while some Christian respondents’ mothers work as associate 
professionals (30.20%) and farmers (22.90%).
 
3.2.4 Intermediary variables
Intermediary variables are expected to mediate ethno-religious identification 
and avoidance of intergroup contact in different ways. The following section 
describes indicators of each intermediate variable.
3.2.4.1  Salience of identity
In this research, salience identity is divided into two indicators, namely 
saliency of religious identity and saliency of ethnic identity. 
Salience of religious identity
Salience of religious identity measures the degree to which an individual 
perceives religious affiliation to be important, as well as religion’s influence 
on everyday life and social relations. The statements used to assess this 
indicator are based on the measurements used in Duckitt’s questionnaire 
on the salience of cultural identity (2006), and the questionnaire by Eisinga 
et al. on the salience of identity (1991). The first question is derived from 
Duckitt’s questionnaire [my cultural identity is very important to me”], 
modified to the statement, “My religious identity is very important to me.” 
The second statement is about the degree to which “I see myself as a ‘real’ 
member of my religious group.” The third statement is modified from 
Eisinga’s questionnaire [my religion has much influence on my daily life] 
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and says, “My religious beliefs have a great deal of influence in my daily 
life.” The fourth statement is, “my religious beliefs have a great deal of 
influence on how I make important decisions.” In addition, we have added 
a statement about the degree to which “My religious beliefs have a great 
deal of influence on how I relate to others.” 
Table 3.20 Salience of religious identity
Likert scale 1-5 (from totally disagree to totally agree)
We find among respondents that their religious identities are more 
salient than ethnic identities. The mean values of Muslim respondents are 
between 4.12 (committed member) and 4.55 (importance), while those 
of Christian respondents are between 3.98 (committed member) and 4.41 
(importance). In general, Muslim respondents seemingly have a higher 
level of salience of religious identity than Christian respondents. Muslim 
respondents in Ambon (M=4.24 to 4.78) have a higher degree of salience 
of religious identity than those in Yogyakarta (M=4.03 to 4.38). Christian 
respondents in Ambon also have a higher level of salience religious identity 
than those in Yogyakarta. The values of the standard deviation for Muslim 
Religious identity 
RESPONDENTS 
AMBON YOGYAKARTA TOTAL 
Muslim 
(n=365) 
Christian 
(n=368) 
Muslim 
(n=476) 
Christian 
(n=254) 
Muslim 
(n=841) 
Christian 
(n=622) 
 
40.  My religious identity is very 
important to me. 
M: 4.78 
SD:  .46 
M: 4.65 
SD: .59 
M: 4.38 
SD:  .79 
M: 4.06 
SD: 1.00 
M: 4.55 
SD:  .70 
M: 4.41 
SD :  .84 
41. I see myself as a committed 
member of my religious 
group. 
M: 4.24 
SD:  .83 
M: 4.11 
SD:  .89 
M: 4.03 
SD:  .85 
M: 3.80 
SD:  .88 
M: 4.12 
SD:  .85 
M: 3.98 
SD  : .89 
42. My religious beliefs have a 
great deal of influence in 
my daily life. 
M: 4.47 
SD:  .89 
M: 4.54 
SD:  .77 
M: 4.33 
SD:  .74 
M: 4.26 
SD:  .79 
M: 4.39 
SD:  .80 
M: 4.42 
SD:  .79 
43. My religious beliefs have a 
great deal of influence on 
how I make important 
decisions. 
M: 4.29 
SD:  .95 
M: 4.41 
SD:  .84 
M: 4.23 
SD:  .81 
M: 4.21 
SD:  .82 
M: 4.26 
SD:  .87 
M: 4.33 
SD:  .84 
44. My religious beliefs have a 
great deal of influence on 
how I relate to others. 
M: 4.25 
SD:1.05 
M: 4.13 
SD:1.21 
M: 4.05 
SD:  .95 
M: 3.92 
SD:  .99 
M: 4.14 
SD:  .99 
M:  4.05 
SD: 1.13 
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respondents are between .70 and .99, while those for Christian respondents 
are between .79 and 1.13. The heterogeneity of answers from Christian 
respondents is higher than answers from Muslim respondents.
Salience of ethnic identity
Salience of ethnic identity measures the degree to which individuals 
perceive ethnic group affiliation to be important, as well as the influence 
of a respondent’s ethnic group on everyday life, and the ethnic group’s 
influence on social relations. Questions about salience of ethnic identity 
refer to questions about the salience of religious identity by changing term 
‘ religious identity’  in ‘ethnic identity’.
Table 3.21 Salience of ethnic identity
Likert scale 1-5 (from totally disagree to totally agree)
 
 Similar to the patterns we see with regards to salience of religious 
identity, respondents also have a high level of salience of ethnic identity. 
The mean values from Christian respondents vary between 3.32 (important 
Ethnic identity 
RESPONDENTS 
AMBON YOGYAKARTA TOTAL 
Muslim 
(n=368) 
Christian 
(n=346) 
Muslim 
(n=475) 
Christian 
(n=253) 
Muslim 
(n=978) 
Christian 
(n=599) 
 
257. My ethnic identity is 
very important to me. 
M: 4.30 
SD:  .72 
M: 4.18 
SD: .67 
M:  3.69 
SD:  .87 
M:  3.73 
SD:  .89 
M:  3.96 
SD:  .86 
M: 3.99 
SD:   .80 
258. I see myself as a 
committed member of 
my ethnic group. 
M:  3.61 
SD: 1.05 
M:  3.60 
SD: .95 
M:  3.59 
SD:  .81 
M:  3.52 
SD:  .83 
M:  3.60 
SD:  .93 
M: 3.56 
SD:   .90 
259. My ethnic identity has a 
great deal of influence in 
my daily life. 
M:  3.79 
SD:  .93 
M:  3.76 
SD:  .96 
M:  3.66 
SD: .79 
M:  3.62 
SD: .83 
M:  3.71 
SD: .86 
M:  3.70 
SD: .91 
260. My ethnic identity has a 
great deal of influence 
on how I make 
important decisions. 
M:  3.41 
SD: 1.02 
M:  3.40 
SD: 1.05 
M:  3.24 
SD:  .94 
M:  3.20 
SD :  .87 
M:  3.32 
SD:  .98 
M:  3.32 
SD:  .98 
261. My ethnic identity has a 
great deal of influence 
on how I relate to  
others. 
M:  3.49 
SD: 1.03 
M:  3.51 
SD: 1.08 
M:  3.45 
SD:   .93 
M:  3.39 
SD:   .91 
M:  3.47 
SD:   .97 
M:  3.46 
SD: 1.01 
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decisions) and 3.99 (importance), while the mean values from Muslim 
respondents are between 3.32 (important decisions) and 3.96 (importance). 
The level of salience of ethnic identity apparently is lower than salience of 
religious identity. Muslim respondents in Ambon (M=3.41 to 4.30) have a 
higher level of salience of ethnic identity than those in Yogyakarta (M=3.24 
to 4.18). Also, Christian respondents in Ambon (M=3.40 to 4.18) have a 
higher level of salience of ethnic identity than those in Yogyakarta (M=3.20 
to 3.73). The standard deviation from the answers of Muslim respondents is 
between .86 and .98, and those from Christian respondents are between .80 
and 1.01. The heterogeneity of answers from Muslim respondents is almost 
the same as those from Christian respondents.
3.2.4.2 Perceived group threat
Perceived group threat refers to religious groups rather than ethnic groups, 
because the primary concern of this study is religious intergroup relations. 
Perceived threat refers to the feeling of being threatened by religious out-
groups in reference to cultural practices, way of life, job prospects, housing, 
positions in government, security, business opportunities, and preferential 
treatment (Scheepers et al. 2002; Coenders and Lubbers, 2007; Semyonov 
et al., 2007; Schneider 2008: Savelkoul et al., 2010). These questions build 
on the measurements used by Scheepers et al. (2002) on majority-minority 
relations. In addition, some of Savelkoul (2010) and Tuti’s (2008) questions 
are added to this study because they refer to threats in relation to housing, 
culture, and politics. 
Based on the first question from Scheepers et al. (2002), the term 
minority group is adjusted to include other religious groups. The statement 
we use is “The religious practices of people from other religious groups 
threaten our own way of life.” The second statement was broken down 
into two statements to become “I am worried that the security in my 
neighbourhood will decline due to the presence of other religious groups,” 
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and “I am worried that security in my university will decline due to the 
presence of students of other religious groups.” The third statement was 
revised to say, “People from other religious groups are given preferential 
treatment by the authorities.” The fourth statement was divided into 
two statements with two aspects, namely job prospects and business 
opportunities.7 
7 The category about job prospects is more relevant to students in respect to unemployment. 
The category of business opportunities was added as a new aspect, referring to when the 
presence of other religious groups makes the local economy worse. Therefore, the new 
questions are, “I am worried that job prospects for members of my group would decline 
due to the presence of other religious groups,” and “Members of other religious groups 
are in control of business opportunities.”
160
InteRgRoUP contAct AVoIdAnce In IndoneSIA
Table 3.22 Perceived group threat
Likert scale 1-5 (from totally disagree to totally agree)
Group threat 
RESPONDENTS 
AMBON YOGYAKARTA TOTAL 
Muslim 
(n=367) 
Christian 
(n=354) 
Muslim 
(n=476) 
Christian 
(n=252) 
Muslim 
(n=843) 
Christian 
(n=606) 
 
152. I am afraid that the 
customs of my group will 
be lost due to the presence 
of other religious groups. 
M: 3.09 
SD: 1.18 
M: 2.70 
SD: 1.15 
M: 2.59 
SD: 1.00 
M: 2.22 
SD: 0.83 
M: 2.80 
SD: 1.11 
M: 2.50 
SD: 1.05 
153. The migration of people 
of different religious 
groups to my community 
is a threat to my own 
religious group. 
M: 2.88 
SD: 1.18 
M:  2.46 
SD: 1.05 
M: 2.38 
SD:  .92 
M: 2.00 
SD: .68 
M:2.60 
SD: 1.07 
M: 2.27 
SD: .94 
154. I am worried that job 
prospects for members of 
my group will decline due 
to the presence of other 
religious groups. 
M: 2.80 
SD: 1.08 
M: 2.56 
SD: 1.02 
M: 2.42 
SD: .89 
M: 2.14 
SD: .76 
M: 2.59 
SD: .99 
M: 2.39 
SD: .94 
155. I am worried that study 
grant opportunities will 
decline due to the 
presence of other religious 
groups. 
M: 2.46 
SD: 1.01 
M: 2.30 
SD: .91 
M: 2.30 
SD: .89 
M: 2.11 
SD: .78 
M: 2.37 
SD: .95 
M: 2.22 
SD: .86 
156. I am worried that security 
in my university will 
decline due to the 
presence of students of 
other religious groups. 
M:  2.69 
SD: 1.16 
M: 2.35 
SD: .96 
M: 2.26 
SD: .84 
M: 2.10 
SD: .77 
M: 2.44 
SD: 1.01 
M: 2.24 
SD: .89 
157. The day will come when 
members of other 
religious groups will 
occupy crucial positions 
in the government.  
M:  3.00 
SD: 1.12 
M:  2.80 
SD: 1.09 
M: 2.97 
SD: 0.99 
M:  2.80 
SD: 1.02 
M: 2.98 
SD: 1.05 
M: 2.80 
SD: 1.06 
158. I am worried that the 
security in my 
neighbourhood will 
decline due to the 
presence of other religious 
groups. 
M:2.93 
SD: 1.12 
M:2.59 
SD: 1.08 
M:2.33 
SD: .88 
M:2.19 
SD: .85 
M:2.59 
SD: 1.03 
M:2.42 
SD: 1.01 
159. The religious practices of 
people from other 
religious groups threaten 
our own way of life. 
M: 2.94 
SD: 1.19 
M: 2.65 
SD: 1.09 
M: 2.40 
SD: .92 
M: 2.18 
SD: .78 
M: 2.63 
SD: 1.08 
M: 2.45 
SD: 1.00 
160. People from other 
religious groups are given 
preferential treatment by 
the authorities. 
M: 2.56 
SD: 1.09 
M: 2.68 
SD: 1.12 
M: 2.41 
SD: .90 
M: 2.79 
SD: 1.10 
M: 2.47 
SD: .99 
M: 2.72 
SD: 1.12 
161. Members of other 
religious groups are in 
control of business 
opportunities. 
M: 2.69 
SD: 1.03 
M: 2.64 
SD: 1.04 
M: 2.66 
SD: .96 
M: 2.54 
SD: .91 
M: 2.67 
SD: .99 
M: 2.60 
SD: .99 
162. I am afraid of increasing 
violence in my 
neighbourhood due to the 
presence of other religious 
groups. 
M: 2.97 
SD: 1.14 
M: 2.68 
SD: 1.09 
M: 2.47 
SD: .92 
M: 2.39 
SD: .89 
M: 2.69 
SD: 1.05 
M: 2.56 
SD: 1.02 
163. The chances of getting 
space in a boarding house 
will decline due to the 
presence of other religious 
groups. 
M: 2.43 
SD: 1.02 
M: 2.29 
SD: .91 
M: 2.26 
SD: .91 
M: 2.12 
SD: .79 
M: 2.33 
SD: .96 
M: 2.22 
SD: .87 
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The first question from Savelkoul et al. (2010) is modified to use 
the term boarding house instead of housing market, stating, “The chances 
of getting space in a boarding house will decline due to the presence of 
other groups.” The second question was also divided into two statements, 
separately referencing cultural groups and religious groups, becoming, “I 
am afraid that the customs of my group will be lost due to the presence of 
other religious groups,” and “The migration of people of different religious 
groups to my community is a threat to my own religious group.” This study 
also comes up with three questions in relation to grant opportunities (for 
studying), political threats, and violence.8 
In our sample, both Muslim and Christian respondents have moderate 
levels of perceived group threat. The mean values for Muslim respondents 
are between 2.33 (boarding house) and 2.98 (position of government), and 
those for Christian respondents are between 2.22 (boarding house, grant 
opportunities) and 2.80 (position in government). Muslim respondents in 
Ambon perceive more threat than those in Yogyakarta. The mean values 
for Muslim respondents in Ambon are between 2.43 (boarding house) 
and 3.09 (customs), while those for Muslim respondents in Yogyakarta 
are between 2.26 (boarding house) and 2.97 (positions in government). In 
addition, Christian respondents in Ambon perceive more threat than those 
in Yogyakarta. The mean values for Christian respondents in Ambon are 
from 2.29 (boarding house) to 2.97 (positions in government), while those 
of Christian respondents in Yogyakarta are from 2.12 (boarding house) 
to 2.80 (positions in government). The values of standard deviation for 
Muslim respondents are between .95 and 1.11, while those for Christian 
respondents are between .86 and 1.12. The heterogeneity of answers from 
Muslim respondents is almost the same as that of Christian respondents.
8 The first question from Tuti’s questionnaire (2008) was modified to address the provision 
of student grants. The new statement is, “I am worried that study grant opportunities 
will decline due to the presence of other religious groups.” The second statement was 
developed to represent two different dimensions, namely politics and violence. The new 
statements are, “The day will come when members of other religious groups will occupy 
crucial positions in the government,” and “I am afraid of violence increasing in my 
neighbourhood due to the presence of other religious groups.”
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3.2.4.3 Intergroup contact
This measurement assesses an individual’s contact with religious out-
groups as relatives, close friends, classmates, board mates, and neighbours 
over the previous year. We classify actual intergroup contact by the quantity 
of contact and the quality of contact. 
Quantity of contact 
This variable measures the frequency of an individual’s contact with 
religious out-group members such as relatives, close friends, classmates, 
board mates, and neighbours (Nick, 1993; Wagner et al., 2006; Tabory, 2007; 
Schneider, 2008). These questions build on the measurements from Tabory 
(2007), Schneider (2008), and Wagner et al., (2008). The first question is 
adapted from Schneider and Wagner’s questions, changing the dimensions 
of the terms used.  We changed the term “immigrant friends” into “people 
of other religious groups,” and expanded the terms “neighbourhood and 
work place” into “neighbours, close friends, classmates, board mates, and 
relatives”. The first question is, “In the past year, have you had contact with 
people of other religions as neighbours, close friends, classmates, board 
mates, and relatives?” The second question was adapted from Tabory and 
Wagner’s questions by changing the terms  “religious and non-religious 
group” into “Muslim and Christian,” so our question is, “In the past year, 
how often did you have contact with Christians (or Muslims) as neighbours, 
close friends, classmates, board mates, and relatives?” 
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Table 3.23a Quantity of contact (version 1)
Likert scale 1-6 (never to several times a day), the option ‘not 
applicable’ (for respondents who have no religious out-group members as 
their neighbours, classmates, boardmates, close friends, and relatives) is 
recoded as 1 (never). Muslim respondents answered the questions in relation 
to Christians (question 106-110), and Christian respondents answered the 
questions in relation to Muslims (question 111-115).
Table 3.23b Quantity of contact (version 2)
The Likert scale 1-6 (never to several times a day), the option ‘ not 
applicable,’ is considered as a ‘missing value’ in statistical analysis. Muslim 
respondents answered the questions in relation to Christians (question 106-110), 
and Christian respondents answered the questions in relation to Muslims (question 
111-115).
 
In the past year, how often 
did you have contact with 
Christians (Muslims) as.... 
RESPONDENTS 
AMBON  YOGYAKARTA  TOTAL  
Muslim 
(n=356) 
Christian 
(n=338) 
Muslim 
(n=467) 
Christian 
(n=251) 
Muslim 
(n=823) 
Christian 
(n=589) 
 
neighbours? M: 1.95 
SD: 1.77 
M: 2.75 
SD: 2.13 
M: 2.82 
SD: 1.95 
M: 4.96 
SD: 1.60 
M: 2.44 
SD: 1.92 
M: 3.71 
SD: 2.21 
classmates? M: 2.68 
SD: 2.14 
M: 4.28 
SD: 1.97 
M: 3.47 
SD: 2.25 
M: 4.22 
SD: 2.13 
M: 3.12 
SD: 2.23 
M: 4.25 
SD: 2.03 
 board/dorm/housemates? M: 1.42 
SD: 1.27 
M: 2.00 
SD: 1.82 
M: 2.32 
SD: 2.02 
M: 3.51 
SD: 2.35 
M: 1.92 
SD: 1.79 
M: 2.69 
SD: 2.20 
close friends? M: 2.46 
SD: 2.02 
M: 3.75 
SD: 2.11 
M: 3.07 
SD: 2.17 
M: 4.28 
SD: 2.02 
M: 2.81 
SD: 2.12 
M: 3.98 
SD: 2.09 
relatives? M: 2.03 
SD: 1.72 
M: 3.40 
SD: 2.07 
M: 2.39 
SD: 1.91 
M: 3.97 
SD: 2.02 
M: 2.23 
SD: 1.83 
M: 3.64 
SD: 2.06 
 
In the past year, how 
often did you have contact 
with Christian (Muslim) 
as.... 
RESPONDENTS 
AMBON  YOGYAKARTA  TOTAL  
Muslim 
(n=297) 
Christian 
(n=307) 
Muslim 
(n=424) 
Christian 
(n=242) 
Muslim 
(n=717) 
Christian 
(n=550) 
 
neighbours? M: 2.15 
SD: 1.89 
M: 2.94 
SD: 2.16 
M: 3.00 
SD: 1.95 
M: 5.08 
SD: 1.48 
M 2.66 
SD:1.97 
M:3.90 
SD: 2.16 
classmates? M: 3.01 
SD: 2.19 
M: 4.42 
SD: 1.88 
M: 3.79 
SD: 2.19 
M: 4.56 
SD: 1.95 
M:3.46 
SD: 2.29 
M: 4.48 
SD: 1.90 
board/dorm/housemates? M: 1.57 
SD: 1.44 
M: 2.31 
SD: 1.98 
M: 2.77 
SD:2.17 
M: 4.16 
SD: 2.21 
M: 2.25 
SD: 1.98 
M: 3.17 
SD: 2.28 
close friends? M: 2.74 
SD: 2.09 
M: 3.96 
SD: 2.04 
M: 3.43 
SD:  2.15 
M: 4.55 
SD: 1.87 
M: 3.14 
SD: 2.15 
M: 4.21 
SD: 1.99 
relatives? M: 2.28 
SD: 1.83 
SD: 3.65 
SD: 2.02 
M: 2.72 
SD: 1.99 
M: 4.24 
SD: 1.88 
M:2.53 
SD: 1.93 
M: 3.9 
SD: 1.98 
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Overall, Christian respondents report more frequent contact with 
Muslims than Muslims report having with Christians. The mean values 
for Muslim respondents vary from 1.93 (housemate) to 3.12 (classmates). 
Meanwhile, the mean values for Christian respondents are between 2.69 
(housemates) to 4.25 (classmates). Muslim respondents in Yogyakarta 
have more contact with Christians than those in Ambon. The mean values 
for Muslim respondents in Ambon range from 1.42 (housemates) to 2.46 
(classmates), while those for Muslim respondents in Yogyakarta range from 
2.38 (relatives) to 3.47 (classmates). Christian respondents in Yogyakarta 
also have more intergroup contact than those in Ambon. The range of mean 
values for Christian respondents in Ambon is between 2.00 (housemates) 
and 4.28 (classmates), while those of Christian respondents in Yogyakarta 
are between 3.51 (housemates) to 4.96 (neighbours). Table 3.23a shows 
the values of standard deviation for Muslim respondents are between 1.79 
and 2.23, while those for Christian respondents are between 2.03 and 2.21. 
The heterogeneity of Muslim respondent’s answers is higher than that of 
Christian respondents.
Quality of contact 
This variable indicates how individuals rate their social interaction in terms 
closeness, equality, and cooperativeness with religious out-group members 
(Nix, 1993; Brown, 2007). Based on Nix’s (1993) and Brown’s (2007) 
measurements of the quality of contact, this indicator has four questions. 
We adapted Nix’s first question to ask, “How would you rate your contact 
with them [people from different religious groups] as neighbours, close 
friends, classmates, board mates, and relatives?” The remaining questions 
were adapted from Brown by changing positive statements into questions 
and by introducing the dimension of social distance from neighbours and 
relatives. Those questions are “How close are you with your neighbours, 
close friends, classmates, board mates, and relatives from other religious 
groups?” “How equal would you say you are with your neighbours, close 
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friends, classmates, board mates, and relatives from other religious groups?” 
and “How much do you cooperate with your neighbours, close friends, 
classmates, board mates, and relatives from other religious groups?”
Table 3.24 Quality of contact  
Likert scale 1-6 (very negative to very positive), the option ‘not applicable’ is recoded 
into missing in statistical analysis.
In general, Christian respondents give a more positive rating to the 
quality of their contact with Muslims than Muslim respondents do about 
their contact with Christians. The mean values for Christian respondents are 
between 3.99(housemate) and 4.19 (close friends), while those for Muslim 
respondents are between 3.68 (housemate) and 3.89 (classmates). Muslim 
respondents in Yogyakarta give a more positive rating to their interactions 
with Christians than Muslim respondents in Ambon. Christian respondents 
in both Ambon and Yogyakarta reported the same positive evaluation for 
their interactions with Muslims. The values of standard deviation for Muslim 
respondents are between .78 and .90, while for Christian respondents they 
are between .67 and .74. The heterogeneity of the answers of Muslim 
respondents is higher than that of Christian respondents.
How would you rate your contact 
with them as... 
 RESPONDENTS 
AMBON  YOGYAKARTA  TOTAL  
Muslim 
(n=229) 
Christian 
(n=302) 
Muslim 
(n=363) 
Christian 
(n=242) 
Muslim 
(n=564) 
Christian 
(n=520) 
 
116. neighbours? M: 3.55 
SD: .89 
M: 3.98 
SD: .85 
M: 3.87 
SD: .68 
M:  4.04 
SD: .62 
M: 3.76 
SD: .78 
M: 4.01 
SD:  .74 
117. classmates? M: 3.67 
SD: .93 
M: 4.20 
SD: .70 
M: 4.04 
SD: .67 
M: 4.07 
SD: .63 
M: 3.89 
SD: .81 
M: 4.15 
SD: .68 
118. board/dorm/housemates? M: 3.36 
SD: 1.06 
M: 3.88 
SD: .89 
M: 3.87 
SD: .74 
M: 4.08 
SD: .59 
M: 3.68 
SD: .90 
M: 3.99 
SD: .75 
119. close friends? M: 3.66 
SD: 1.03 
M: 4.21 
SD: .75 
M: 4.01 
SD: .72 
M: 4.18 
SD: .55 
M: 3.87 
SD: .87 
M: 4.19 
SD: .67 
120. relatives? M: 3.62 
SD: .99 
M: 4.18 
SD: .75 
M :3.89 
SD:  .77 
M: 4.14 
SD: .58 
M: 3.78 
SD: .88 
M: 4.16 
SD: .68 
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Table 3.25 Degree of closeness 
Likert scale 1-5 (not close at all to very close), option ‘not applicable’ (for respondents 
who have no contact with people from different religious groups, is considered as missing 
value.
Table 3.26 Degree of equality 
Likert scale 1-5 (not equal at all to very equal), option ‘ not applicable’ is considered as 
missing value. 
Table 3.27 Degree of cooperativeness 
Likert scale 1-5 (not cooperative at all to very cooperative), option ’not applicable’ is 
considered as missing value.
How close are you with your 
... from other religious 
groups? 
RESPONDENTS 
AMBON  YOGYAKARTA  TOTAL  
Muslim 
(n=239) 
Christian 
(n=307) 
Muslim 
(n=356) 
Christian 
(n=244) 
Muslim 
(n=579) 
Christian 
(n=528) 
 
121. neighbours  M: 2.75 
SD: 1.33 
M: 3.61 
SD: 1.13 
M: 3.19 
SD: .97 
M: 3.67 
SD: .84 
M: 3.02 
SD: 1.14 
M: 3.64 
SD: .99 
122. classmates M:  3.38 
SD: 1.31 
M: 4.10 
SD: .88 
M: 3.74 
SD: .90 
M: 4.03 
SD: .69 
M: 3.59 
SD: 1.10 
M: 4.07 
SD: .81 
123. board/dorm/housemates M:  2.69 
SD: 1.41 
M: 3.59 
SD: 1.19 
M: 3.48 
SD: .99 
M: 3.87 
SD: .79 
M: 3.17 
SD: 1.24 
M: 3.74 
SD: 1.01 
124. close friends M: 3.40 
SD: 1.46 
M: 4.18 
SD: .98 
M: 3.90 
SD: .89 
M: 4.24 
SD: .72 
M: 3.69 
SD: 1.19 
M: 4.21 
SD: .87 
125. relatives M: 3.19 
SD: 1.40 
M: 4.04 
SD: .94 
M: 3.70 
SD: .96 
M: 4.11 
SD: .75 
M: 3.48 
SD:  1.20 
M: 4.07 
SD: .86 
 
How equal would you say you 
are with your ...  from other 
religious groups? 
RESPONDENTS 
AMBON  YOGYAKARTA  TOTAL  
Muslim 
(n=222) 
 Christian 
(n=296) 
Muslim 
(n=352) 
Christian 
(n=238) 
Muslim 
(n=553) 
Christian 
(n=518) 
 
126. neighbours  M:  2.95 
SD: 1.18 
M: 3.84 
SD: .78 
M: 3.68 
SD: .73 
M: 4.02 
SD: .61 
M: 3.43 
SD: .97 
M: 3.94 
SD: .69 
127. classmates M: 3.39 
SD: 1.16 
M: 4.06 
SD: .61 
M: 3.80 
SD: .76 
M: 4.08 
SD: .53 
M: 3.63 
SD: .96 
M: 4.07 
SD: .58 
128.  board/dorm/housemates  M: 2.91 
SD: 1.28 
M: 3.88 
SD: .84 
M: 3.69 
SD: .82 
M: 4.08 
SD: .57 
M: 3.39 
SD: 1.09 
M: 3.99 
SD: .71 
129.  close friends  M: 3.32 
SD: 1.21 
M: 4.09 
SD: .66 
M: 3.83 
SD: .77 
M: 4.16 
SD: .54 
M: 3.63 
SD: 1.01 
M: 4.12 
SD: .61 
130.  relatives  M: 3.19 
SD: 1.18 
M: 4.03 
SD: .75 
M: 3.76 
SD: .80 
M: 4.14 
SD: .56 
M: 3.52 
SD: 1.02 
M: 4.08 
SD: .67 
 
How much do you cooperate 
with your .... from other 
religious groups? 
RESPONDENTS 
AMBON  YOGYAKARTA  TOTAL  
Muslim 
(n=229) 
Christian 
(n=304) 
Muslim 
(n=353) 
Christian 
(n=243) 
Muslim 
(n=531) 
Christian 
(n=590) 
 
131. neighbours  M:  2.99 
SD: 1.24 
M: 3.81 
SD: .92 
M: 3.49 
SD: .96 
M: 3.94 
SD: .69 
M: 3.32 
SD: 1.09 
M: 3.89 
SD: .81 
132. classmates  M: 3.51 
SD: 1.22 
M: 4.13 
SD: .71 
M: 3.90 
SD: .94 
M: 4.21 
SD: .55 
M: 3.74 
SD: 1.08 
M: 4.17 
SD: .65 
133.  board/dorm/housemates M: 2.78 
SD: 1.37 
M: 3.83 
SD: .97 
M: 3.65 
SD: 1.04 
M: 4.13 
SD: .53 
M: 3.32 
SD: 1.25 
M: 3.99 
SD: .77 
134. close friends M: 3.45 
SD: 1.33 
M: 4.17 
SD: .77 
M: 3.95 
SD: .96 
M: 4.27 
SD: .54 
M: 3.75 
SD: 1.15 
M: 4.21 
SD: .67 
135. relatives  M: 3.22 
SD: 1.31 
M: 4.03 
SD: .77 
M: 3.77 
SD: 1.03 
M: 4.15 
SD: .59 
M: 3.53 
SD: 1.19 
M: 4.08 
SD: .69 
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In our sample, as well as giving a more positive rating to quality 
of contact, Christian respondents also report a higher degree of closeness, 
equality, and cooperativeness than Muslim respondents. The mean values 
of closeness for Christian respondents are between 3.64 (neighbours) and 
4.21 (close friends); while those for Muslim respondents are between 
3.02 (neighbours) and 3.69 (close friends). The mean values of equality 
for Christian respondents are between 3.94 (neighbours) and 4.12 
(close friends), while those for Muslim respondents are between 3.39 
(housemates) and 3.63 (classmates and close friends). The mean values 
for cooperativeness of Christian respondents are from 3.89 (neighbours) to 
4.21 (close friends), while Muslim respondents are from 3.32 (neighbours 
and housemates) and 3.75 (close friends). In all questions, the standard 
deviations for Muslim respondents are between .96 and 1.25, while those 
for Christian respondents are between .65 and 1.01. The answers from 
Muslims display more heterogeneity than the answers from Christians.
3.2.4.4 Religiosity
Religiosity refers to religiocentric attitudes, different attitudes toward 
religious plurality, and interpretation of sacred writing. 
Religiocentrism
Religiocentrism is analogous to ethnocentrism – it refers to a combination 
of positive attitudes towards the religious in-group and negative attitudes 
towards religious out-groups (Sterkens 2001, 158-165). These statements on 
religiocentrism build on measurements from the questionnaire of Sterkens 
and Anthony (2008; cf. Anthony, Hermans & Sterkens, 2015:143-167)). 
The question inquires to what extent the respondents agree with statements 
displaying positive attitudes towards the in-group and negative attitudes 
towards out-groups. 
168
InteRgRoUP contAct AVoIdAnce In IndoneSIA
Table 3.28a Positive attitudes toward religious in-group
In the Likert scale 1-5 (from totally disagree to totally agree), Muslim respondents only 
answered questions about Christians (question 45-47) and Christian respondents only 
answered questions about Muslims (question 51-53).
In our research, Muslim respondents show higher levels of positive 
attitude towards the in-group than Christian respondents do. The range of 
mean values for Muslim respondents is between 3.19 (good people) and 
4.29 (respond to God), while those for Christian respondents is between 
3.01 (good people) and 3.97 (respond to God). Respondents in Ambon have 
higher positive attitudes towards the in-group than those in Yogyakarta. 
The standard deviation values for Muslim respondents are between 0.89 
and 1.23, and those for Christian respondents are between 1.11 and 1.21. 
The heterogeneity of answers from Muslim respondents is lower than of 
the heterogeneity of answers from Christian respondents.
Table 3.28b Negative attitudes towards religious out-group
In the Likert scale 1-5 (from totally disagree to totally agree), Muslim respondents only 
answered questions about Christians (question 48-50) and Christian respondents only 
answered questions about Muslims (question 54-56).
Positive attitudes towards  
in-group 
RESPONDENTS 
AMBON YOGYAKARTA TOTAL 
Muslim 
(n=361) 
Christian 
(n=359) 
Muslim 
(n=471) 
Christian 
(n=251) 
Muslim 
(n=831) 
Christian 
(n=610) 
 
1. Muslims/Christians respond 
to God the most faithfully. 
M:  4.42 
SD: .89 
M:  4.39 
SD:   .89 
M:  4.19 
SD:   .88 
M:  3.36 
SD: 1.12 
M:  4.29 
SD:   .89 
M:  3.97 
SD: 1.11 
2. Thanks to their religion, most 
Muslims/Christians are good 
people. 
M:  3.16 
SD: 1.34 
M:  3.20 
SD: 1.23 
M:  3.21 
SD: 1.14 
M:  2.74 
SD:   .94 
M:  3.19 
SD: 1.23 
M:  3.01 
SD: 1.15 
3.    Muslims/Christians are best 
able to talk meaningfully 
about God. 
M:  4.30 
SD:   .84 
M:  3.69 
SD: 1.16 
M:  3.79 
SD: 1.10 
M:  2.75 
SD: 1.06 
M:  4.01 
SD: 1.03 
M:  3.30 
SD: 1.21 
 
Negative attitudes towards 
out-group 
RESPONDENTS 
AMBON YOGYAKARTA TOTAL 
Muslim 
(n=361) 
Christian 
(n=359) 
Muslim 
(n=471) 
Christian 
(n=251) 
Muslim 
(n=831) 
Christian 
(n=610) 
 
1. Christians/Muslims only 
talk about doing good 
deeds without practising 
them. 
M:  2.99 
SD:   .99 
M:  2.62 
SD: 1.00 
M:  2.60 
SD:    .95 
M:  2.41 
SD:  .79 
M:  2.77 
SD:   .99 
M:  2.53 
SD:   .93 
2. When it comes to religion, 
Christians/Muslims are less 
tolerant. 
M:  3.12 
SD: 1.03 
M:  2.78 
SD: 1.05 
M:  2.64 
SD: 0.91 
M:  2.79 
SD:  .97 
M:  2.84 
SD:  .99 
M:  2.79 
SD: 1.02 
3. Christians/Muslims are 
often the cause of religious 
conflict. 
M:  3.02 
SD: 1.15 
M:  2.81 
SD: 1.24 
M:  2.49 
SD:  .99 
M:  2.73 
SD: 1.09 
M:  2.72 
SD: 1.09 
M:  2.78 
SD: 1.18 
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Muslim respondents have a higher level of negative attitudes towards 
out-groups than Christian respondents do. The mean values for Muslim 
respondents are between 2.72 (religious conflict) and 2.84 (less tolerant), 
while those for Christian respondents are between 2.53 (good deeds) and 
2.79 (less tolerant). Respondents in Ambon have more negative attitudes 
towards out-groups than those in Yogyakarta. The standard deviation values 
of Muslim respondents are between 0.99 and 1.09, and those of Christian 
respondents are between .93 and 1.18. The heterogeneity of answers from 
Muslim respondents is lower than from Christian respondents.
Attitudes toward religious plurality
This measurement represents different individual’s interpretations of 
religious plurality in relation to the normative truth claims of the own 
tradition. The three different models we distinguish are (exclusive and 
inclusive) monism, religious pluralism and religious relativism (cf. Anthony, 
Hermans & Sterkens, 2005; 2015:117-142).9 
9 Exclusive monism refers to the affirmation that one’s own religion is the only true 
religion in the world. Meanwhile, inclusive monism is an affirmation that there is a partial 
truth in other religions, although absolute truth is the provenance of one’s own religion. 
Commonality pluralism emphasizes underlying common elements expressed by different 
religions in varied ways. Differential pluralism is the idea that differences amongst 
religions are real and that their particularities are sources for reciprocal enrichment and 
growth. Relativistic pluralism holds that there is no absolute truth among religions, due 
to the fact that religious words and experiences are true only within the given context of 
particular religions. The questions from Anthony et al. (2005) are selected as the basis of 
our measurement, with some revision to parts of the sentences.
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Table 3.29a Religious monism
Likert scale 1-5 (from totally disagree to totally agree)
In our sample, Muslim respondents display a higher level of monism 
than Christian respondents. The mean values of Muslim respondents are 
between 3.37 (God partial truth) and 3.84 (way to liberation), while the 
mean of values of Christian respondents is from 2.49 (God experience) to 
3.49 (way to liberation). Muslim respondents in Yogyakarta have a lower 
level of monism compared to their fellows in Ambon. In addition, Christian 
respondents in Yogyakarta are less monistic than Christian respondents 
in Ambon. The values of standard deviation for Muslim respondents are 
between .94 and 1.14, while those for Christian respondents are between 
.93 and 1.33. The responses from Muslim respondents display less 
heterogeneity than the answers from Christian respondents.
Monism 
RESPONDENTS 
AMBON YOGYAKARTA TOTAL 
Muslim 
(n=366) 
Christian 
(n=362) 
Muslim 
(n=473) 
Christian 
(n=255) 
Muslim 
(n=837) 
Christian 
(n=617) 
 
78. Compared with other 
religions, my religion 
offers the surest way to 
liberation. 
M:  3.94 
SD:  1.09 
M:  3.73 
SD:  1.19 
M:  3.76 
SD: 1.02 
M:  3.15 
SD: 1.14 
M:  3.84 
SD: 1.06 
M:  3.49 
SD:  1.21 
81. Other religions do not 
provide as deep a God-
experience as my 
religion.  
M:  3.63 
SD: 1.18 
M:2.64 
SD:1.17 
M:3.26 
SD:1.08 
M:2.27 
SD: 0.82 
M:  3.42 
SD: 1.14 
M:  2.49 
SD: 1.05 
84. The truth about God is 
found only in my 
religion. 
M:  4.09 
SD: 1.14 
M:  3.11 
SD: 1.39 
M:  3.85 
SD: 1.09 
M:  2.60 
SD: 1.17 
M:  3.96 
SD: 1.12 
M:  2.89 
SD: 1.33 
87. Compared with my 
religion, other religions 
contain only partial 
truths. 
M:  3.54 
SD: .98 
M:  2.64 
SD: .97 
M:  3.24 
SD: .95 
M:  2.55 
SD:  .86 
M:  3.37 
SD: .94 
M:  2.60 
SD: .93 
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Table 3.29b Religious pluralism
Likert scale 1-5 (from totally disagree to totally agree)
The numbers indicate that Christian respondents display more 
pluralism than Muslim respondents. The mean values of Christian 
respondents are between 3.39 (different aspect of God) and 3.99 (mutual 
enrichment), and the mean values of Muslim respondents range from 3.46 
(spiritual development) to 3.57 (knowledge of God). Christian respondents 
in Yogyakarta manifest slightly higher levels of pluralism compared to 
their fellows in Ambon. Meanwhile, Muslim respondents in Ambon are 
slightly more pluralistic than their fellows in Yogyakarta. The values of 
standard deviation for Muslim respondents are between .95 and 1.03, while 
those for Christian respondents are between .87 and .96. The heterogeneity 
of answers from Muslim respondents is higher than that of answers from 
Christian respondents.
Pluralism 
RESPONDENTS 
AMBON YOGYAKARTA TOTAL 
Muslim 
(n=359) 
Christian 
(n=360) 
Muslim 
(n=474) 
Christian 
(n=255) 
Muslim 
(n=833) 
Christian 
(n=615) 
 
79. In religious traditions, 
different aspects of God are 
revealed. 
M:  3.56 
SD: 1.01 
M:  3.35 
SD: 1.05 
M:  3.46 
SD: .89 
M:  3.45 
SD: .83 
M:  3.50 
SD: .95 
M:  3.39 
SD: .96 
82. Differences between 
religions are a basis for 
mutual enrichment. 
M:  3.47 
SD: 1.07 
M:  3.90 
SD: 1.03 
M:  3.62 
SD: .96 
M:  4.11 
SD: .81 
M:  3.56 
SD: 1.01 
M:  3.99 
SD: .95 
85. Differences between 
religions provide more 
knowledge of God. 
M:  3.65 
SD: 1.03 
M:  3.86 
SD: .94 
M:  3.50 
SD: 1.03 
M:  3.90 
SD: .90 
M:  3.57 
SD: 1.03 
M:  3.87 
SD: .93 
88. Differences between 
religions are a source of 
spiritual development. 
M:  3.53 
SD: .97 
M:  3.80 
SD: .92 
M:  3.41 
SD: .96 
M:  3.84 
SD: .78 
M:  3.46 
SD: .96 
M:  3.82 
SD: .87 
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Table 3.29c Religious relativism
Likert scale 1-5 (from totally disagree to totally agree)
As with the previous indicators, here we find that Christian respondents 
have higher level of religious relativism than Muslim respondents. The 
mean values for Christian respondents are between 3.72 (the same value) 
and 4.05 (ways to ultimate truth), meanwhile those of Muslim respondents 
are between 2.93 (the same value) and 3.17 (paths to liberation). Christian 
respondents in Ambon have higher level of religious relativism than their 
fellows in Yogyakarta. Muslim respondents in Yogyakarta have a higher 
degree of religious relativism than their fellows in Ambon. The values of 
standard deviation for Muslim respondents are between 1.11 and 1.29, while 
those of Christian respondents are between .94 and 1.02. The heterogeneity 
of answers from Muslim respondents is higher than that of answers from 
Christian respondents.
Interpretation of sacred writing
The interpretation of sacred writing consists of two measurements, 
intratextual fundamentalism and hermeneutic interpretation. Questions 
regarding intratextual fundamentalism build on the measurements from 
Williamsons et al. (2010). After the pilot survey, Duriez’s and Hutsebaut’s 
questions (2005) were included as well, since their questions measure two 
Relativism 
RESPONDENTS 
AMBON YOGYAKARTA TOTAL 
Muslim 
(n=363) 
Christian 
(n=362) 
Muslim 
(n=476) 
Christian 
(n=255) 
Muslim 
(n=839) 
Christian 
(n=617) 
 
80. All religions are equally 
valid ways to ultimate 
truth. 
M:  3.02 
SD: 1.32 
M:  4.14 
SD: .93 
M:  3.20 
SD: 1.19 
M:  3.93 
SD: .93 
M:  3.12 
SD: 1.26 
M:  4.05 
SD: .94 
83. All religions are equally 
valid paths to liberation. 
M:  3.03 
SD: 1.21 
M:  4.04 
SD: .89 
M:  3.28 
SD: 1.11 
M:  3.94 
SD: .88 
M:  3.17 
SD: 1.16 
M:  4.00 
SD: .89 
86. Everything that is said about 
God in other religions has 
the same value. 
M:  2.76 
SD :1.09 
M:  3.77 
SD: .99 
M:  3.06 
SD: 1.11 
M:  3.66 
SD: .88 
M:  2.93 
SD: 1.11 
M:  3.72 
SD: .95 
89. At the deepest level, all 
religions are the same. 
M:  2.76 
SD 1.31 
M:  4.13 
SD: 1.02 
M:  3.21 
SD: 1.26 
M:  3.91 
SD:.99 
M:  3.01 
SD: 1.29 
M:  4.04 
SD: 1.02 
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important aspects of interpretation; namely orthodoxy (literal affirmation 
or fundamentalist interpretation) and naiveté (symbolic affirmation or 
hermeneutic interpretation). 
Table 3.30a Religious intratextual fundamentalism
Likert scale 1-5 (from totally disagree to totally agree). Question 64 should be reverse 
coded.
Muslim respondents have a more intratextual fundamentalist 
orientation than Christian respondents do. The mean values for Muslim 
respondents range from 1.50 (the words of man, which should be reverse 
coded in scale construction) to 4.46 (truth of sacred writing), while those 
for Christian respondents are between 2.09 (the words of man) to 4.36 
(truth of sacred writing). Respondents in Ambon are more fundamentalist 
compared with those in Yogyakarta. The standard deviation values for 
Muslim respondents are between .73 and 1.20, and for Christian respondents 
are between .84 and 1.33. The heterogeneity of answers from Muslim 
respondents is lower than that of answers from Christian respondents.
Intratextual fundamentalism 
RESPONDENTS 
AMBON YOGYAKARTA TOTAL 
Muslim 
(n=369) 
Christian 
(n=364) 
Muslim 
(n=470) 
Christian 
(n=254) 
Muslim 
(n=840) 
Christian 
(n=618) 
 
62. Everything in the Sacred Writing 
is absolutely true without 
question.  
M:  4.62 
SD: .70 
M:  4.34 
SD: .94 
M:  4.19 
SD: 1.01 
M:  3.48 
SD: 1.27 
M:  4.38 
SD: .92 
M:  3.99 
SD: 1.16 
63. The Sacred Writing should never 
be doubted, even when scientific 
or historical evidence outright 
disagrees with it.  
M:  4.26 
SD: 1.00 
M:  4.17 
SD: .97 
M:  3.99 
SD: 1.06 
M:  3.41 
SD: 1.19 
M:  4.11 
SD: 1.04 
M:  3.86 
SD: 1.13 
64. The Sacred Writing is NOT really 
the words of God, but the words 
of man.  
M:  1.40 
SD: .66 
M:  1.94 
SD: .99 
M:  1.58 
SD: .86 
M:  2.30 
SD: .98 
M:  1.50 
SD: .78 
M:  2.09 
SD: 1.00 
65. The truths of the Sacred Writing 
will never be outdated, but will 
always apply equally well to all 
generations.  
M:  4.56 
SD: .66 
M:  4.58 
SD: .69 
M:  4.38 
SD: .77 
 
M:  4.04 
SD: .93 
 
M:  4.46 
SD: .73 
 
M:  4.36 
SD: .84 
 
66. The Sacred Writing is the only 
one that is true above all Holy 
Books. 
M:  4.57 
SD: .74 
M:  3.61 
SD: 1.33 
M:  4.18 
SD: .98 
M:  2.72 
SD: 1.14 
M:  4.35 
SD: .90 
M:  3.25 
SD: 1.33 
67. I think that the Sacred Writing 
should be taken literally, as it is 
written. 
M:  4.10 
SD: .90 
M:  3.96 
SD: 1.07 
M:  3.14 
SD: 1.23 
M:  2.75 
SD: 1.24 
M:  3.56 
SD: 1.20 
M:  3.45 
SD: 1.29 
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Table 3.30b Religious Hermeneutic interpretation
Likert scale 1-5 (from totally disagree to totally agree)
Nevertheless, Christian respondents have a higher level of symbolic 
fundamentalism than Muslim respondents do. The mean values for Muslim 
respondents vary between 3.46 (open interpretation) and 3.68 (personal 
reflection), while those for Christian respondents are between 3.77 (open 
to interpretation) and 4.06 (personal reflection). The standard deviation 
values for Muslim respondents are between 1.06 and 1.19, and those for 
Christian respondents are between .91 and 1.09. The answers from Muslim 
respondents demonstrate more heterogeneity than the answers from 
Christian respondents.
3.2.4.5 Perceived discrimination
Perceived  discrimination  consists of  both general  and specific 
discrimination. General discrimination is the feeling of being discriminated 
against based on one or more indicators including colour or race, 
nationality, religion, language, ethnic group, age, gender, sexuality, 
and disability (Verkuyten and Yildiz, 2006: 545; ESS, 2008/2009). Our 
questions are “Do you consider yourself to be a member of a group that 
is discriminated against in this city?” and “If yes, on what grounds are 
your group discriminated against?”  Specific discrimination is the feeling 
of being discriminated against by religious out-groups in the domain of 
politics, economics, culture, and religion (Fox, 2000). Questions related 
Hermeneutic interpretation 
RESPONDENTS 
AMBON YOGYAKARTA TOTAL 
Muslim 
(n=369) 
Christian 
(n=364) 
Muslim 
(n=470) 
Christian 
(n=254) 
Muslim 
(n=840) 
Christian 
(n=618) 
 
68. The meanings of the Sacred 
Writing are open to change 
and interpretation. 
M:  3.34 
SD: 1.26 
M:  3.72 
SD: 1.16 
M:  3.56 
SD: 1.12 
M:  3.84 
SD: .99 
M:  3.46 
SD: 1.19 
M:  3.77 
SD: 1.09 
69. The Sacred Writing holds a 
deeper truth which can only 
be revealed by personal 
reflection. 
M:  3.74 
SD: 1.06 
M:  4.21 
SD: .92 
M:  3.63 
SD: 1.06 
M:  3.84 
SD: .85 
M:  3.68 
SD: 1.06 
M:  4.06 
SD: .91 
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to this variable build on the measurements from Fox (2000) on racial 
discrimination, using the question, “Whether you would agree or disagree 
that your own ethno-religious group experiences the following limitations 
in…(economy, politics, culture, and religion).” 
After the pilot survey, the queries in this question regarding political 
discrimination were rephrased as freedom of expression, freedom to 
choose a place of residence, recruitment as a civil servant, and attaining 
higher positions in government offices.10 The queries regarding economic 
discrimination are access to credit, access to government subsidy, 
participation in the local market, access to the housing market, and access to 
the job market.” After the pilot survey, a limitation on the query about access 
to credit was deleted due to the low correlation with the other questions. 
The queries about cultural discrimination were changed to celebration of 
a group’s ceremony, dress, behaviour, and marriage.11 The queries about 
religious discrimination are public observance of religious services, public 
observance of religious holy days, public observance of religious festivals, 
building places of worship, forced observance of religious laws of other 
group, running of religious schools, and the observance of religious laws 
on marriage and divorce. After the pilot survey, limitations on religious 
services and religious holidays were deleted from the questionnaire.
In our sample, most respondents (77.8%) do not consider themselves 
to be members of a discriminated against group. Only a few respondents 
(17%) consider themselves members of groups that are being discriminated 
against. The perceived discrimination against their group is grounded in 
religion (66%) and ethnicity or ethnic group affiliation (14.9%). Respondents 
in Ambon tend to feel more discriminated against on the grounds of religion 
10 Before the pilot survey, the options for this question were freedom of expression, free 
movement and place of residence, rights in judicial proceedings, political organization, 
voting, recruitment to the police and military, access to the civil service, and attainment 
of high office.
11 The queries regarding cultural discrimination are celebration of a group’s holiday, 
ceremonies, and cultural events, limitations on wearing cultural dress, appearance, and 
behavior, and limitations on inter-ethnic marriage.”
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(73%) than ethnicity (12%). The same pattern is apparent for respondents 
in Yogyakarta(47.9% and 22.5% respectively).
Table 3.31 Perceived discrimination
Likert scale 1-5 (from totally disagree to totally agree)
 
Economic  
RESPONDENTS 
AMBON YOGYAKARTA TOTAL 
Muslim 
(n=362) 
Christian 
(n=347) 
Muslim 
(n=474) 
Christian 
(n=254) 
Muslim 
(n=836) 
Christian 
(n=601) 
190. Limitations on access to government 
subsidy 
M:2.21 
SD:.97 
M:2.31 
SD:1.04 
M:2.04 
SD:.78 
M:2.39 
SD:.99 
M:2.12 
SD:.87 
M:2.35 
SD:1.02 
193. Limitations on participation in the local 
market 
M:2.26 
SD:.95 
M:2.29 
SD:1.03 
M:2.08 
SD:.76 
M:2.26 
SD:.87 
M:2.16 
SD:.85 
M:2.28 
SD:.97 
196. Limitations on access to the housing 
market 
M:2.32 
SD:.93 
M:2.24 
SD:1.00 
M:2.09 
SD:.81 
M:2.26 
SD:.90 
M:2.19 
SD:.87 
M:2.25 
SD:.96 
199. Limitations on access to the  job market M:2.19 
SD:.94 
M:2.28 
SD:1.01 
M:2.97 
SD:.75 
M:2.34 
SD:.99 
M:2.12 
SD:.84 
M:2.30 
SD:1.00 
 
Politics 
RESPONDENTS 
AMBON YOGYAKARTA TOTAL 
Muslim 
(n=362) 
Christian 
(n=348) 
Muslim 
(n=476) 
Christian 
(n=254) 
Muslim 
(n=837) 
Christian 
(n=602) 
188. Limitations on freedom of expression M:2.22 
SD:1.00 
M:2.27 
SD:1.03 
M:1.99 
SD:.81 
M:2.36 
SD:1.02 
M:2.09 
SD:.91 
M:2.31 
SD:1.03 
191. Limitations on freedom to choose a 
place of residence 
M:2.21 
SD:1.04 
M:2.19 
SD:1.00 
M:2.02 
SD:.81 
M:2.26 
SD:.95 
M:2.10 
SD:.92 
M:2.22 
SD:.98 
201. Limitations on recruitment as a civil 
servant 
M:2.18 
SD:1.04 
M:2.22 
SD:1.09 
M:2.05 
SD:.78 
M:2.43 
SD:1.12 
M:2.11 
SD:.90 
M:2.31 
SD:1.11 
203. Limitations on attaining higher 
positions in government offices 
M:2.23 
SD:1.04 
M:2.26 
SD:1.07 
M:2.16 
SD:.87 
M:2.57 
SD:1.19 
M:2.19 
SD:.94 
M:2.39 
SD:1.13 
Culture 
 
RESPONDENTS 
AMBON YOGYAKARTA TOTAL 
Muslim 
(n=361) 
Christian 
(n=347) 
Muslim 
(n=478) 
Christian 
(n=255) 
Muslim 
(n=839) 
Christian 
(n=602) 
189. Limitations on celebration of group’s 
ceremonies 
M:  2.20 
SD: .92 
M:  2.11 
SD: .89 
M:  2.07 
SD: .82 
M:  2.27 
SD: .98 
M:  2.12 
SD: 0.87 
M:  2.18 
SD: .93 
192. Limitations on dress M:  2.87 
SD: 1.28 
M:  2.59 
SD: 1.17 
M:  2.65 
SD: 1.15 
M:  2.49 
SD: 1.00 
M:  2.75 
SD: 1.21 
M:  2.55 
SD: 1.10 
197. Limitations on marriage M:  2.50 
SD: 1.18 
M:  2.31 
SD: 1.07 
M:  2.48 
SD: 1.08 
M:  2.56 
SD: 1.09 
M:  2.48 
SD: 1.12 
M:  2.42 
SD: 1.09 
194. Limitation on behaviour M:  2.69 
SD: 1.21 
M:  2.56 
SD: 1.18 
M:  2.63 
SD: 1.12 
M:  2.61 
SD: 1.09 
M:  2.65 
SD: 1.16 
M:  2.58 
SD: 1.14 
 
Religion 
RESPONDENTS 
AMBON YOGYAKARTA TOTAL 
Muslim 
(n=362) 
Christian 
(n=345) 
Muslim 
(n=474) 
Christian 
(n=253) 
Muslim 
(n=834) 
Christian 
(n=598) 
195. Limitations on public observance of 
religious festivals 
M: 2.22 
SD: 1.07 
M: 2.13 
SD: .97 
M: 2.13 
SD: .84 
M: 2.35 
SD: 1.03 
M: 2.17 
SD: .95 
M: 2.22 
SD: 1.00 
198. Limitations on building places of 
worship 
M: 2.35 
SD: 1.18 
M: 2.12 
SD: 1.05 
M: 2.18 
SD: .89 
M: 2.56 
SD: 1.23 
M:  2.26 
SD: 1.03 
M: 2.31 
SD: 1.15 
200. Forced observance of religious laws of 
other group 
M: 1.84 
SD: .92 
M: 2.01 
SD: .97 
M: 1.97 
SD: .88 
M: 2.28 
SD: 1.11 
M: 1.91 
SD: .90 
M:  2.13 
SD: 1.04 
202. Limitations on running of religious 
schools 
M: 2.21 
SD: 1.04 
M: 2.11 
SD: .95 
M: 2.06 
SD: .81 
M: 2.41 
SD: 1.12 
M:  2.12 
SD:  .92 
M:  2.24 
SD: 1.04 
204. Limitations on the observance of 
religious laws on marriage and divorce 
M: 2.38 
SD: 1.09 
M: 2.36 
SD: 1.09 
M: 2.33 
SD: .99 
M: 2.50 
SD: 1.09 
M:  2.35 
SD: 1.04 
M:  2.42 
SD: 1.09 
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The levels of perceived discrimination are relatively moderate for 
both Muslim and Christian respondents. For the category of economic 
discrimination, the mean values for Muslim respondents are between 
2.12 (government subsidy) and 2.19 (housing); while those for Christian 
respondents are between 2.25 (housing) and 2.35 (government subsidy). 
In the category of political discrimination, the mean values for Muslim 
respondents are between 2.09 (freedom of expression) and 2.19 (position in 
the government offices), while those for Christian respondents are between 
2.22 (place for residence) and 2.39 (position in government offices). The 
mean values of cultural discrimination and religious discrimination also 
display the same pattern. In short, Christian respondents feel slightly more 
discriminated against than Muslim respondents, based on the grounds 
of economy, politics, culture, and religion. In all questions, the standard 
deviations for Muslim respondents are between .84 and 1.16, and those 
for Christian respondents are between .93 and 1.14. The heterogeneity of 
answers from Muslim respondents is almost the same as that of the answers 
from Christian respondents.
3.2.4.6 Individual memory of violence
This variable measures an individual’s memories and experience of direct 
or indirect communal violence in the past.  These memories might result 
in trauma and have the potential to influence attitude, behaviour, and 
ways of thinking about other ethno-religious groups (Doherty and Poole, 
1997; Novak and Rodseth, 2006). We inquire about memories of violence 
by asking how frequently respondents witnessed, remember, and discuss 
violence within the family, and how frequently they were victims of 
communal violence in their provinces in the past  (Sahdra and Ross, 2007). 
Questions about memories are derived from the measurements in Sahdra 
and Ross’s (2007) inquiry into remembering communal violence, and from 
Hayes and McAllister’s survey (2001) on (2001) Irish social mobility. 
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Table 3.32 Individual memory of violence
In our sample, almost half of the respondents (49.50%) mentioned 
that their province had experienced ethno-religious violence in the past 10 
years. Some of them answered that they could remember two (24.10%) 
to three incidents (19.20%). Most respondents (58.10%) talk about ethno-
religious violence with their family in both Ambon (76.30%) and Yogyakarta 
(39.90%). More than half of respondents answered that they sometimes 
(54.30%) talk about the ethno-religious violence that occurred. The 
percentage of respondents who talk about religious violence in their family 
in Ambon (55.60%) is slightly higher than in Yogyakarta (51.80%). Less 
than half of the respondents (45.30%) witnessed ethno-religious violence, 
and those who did were mainly in Ambon (61.60%) rather than Yogyakarta 
(28.90%). Almost half of the respondents (45.90%) who witnessed violence 
suffered some kind of physical injury on at least one occasion.
59a. In your family, did you 
talk about ethno-religious 
violence ….? 
RESPONDENTS 
AMBON YOGYAKARTA TOTAL 
Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent 
No 157 20.90 448 59.70 605 40.30 
Yes 572 76.30 299 39.90 871 58.10 
Missing 21 2.80 3 .40 24 1.60 
Total 750 100.00 750 100.00 1500 100.00 
59b. If yes, how often do you 
talk about it? 
 
AMBON YOGYAKARTA TOTAL 
Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent 
Never     - - 
Rarely 181 31.60 125 41.80 306 35.10 
Sometimes 318 55.60 155 51.80 473 54.30 
Often 72 12.60 16 5.40 88 10.10 
Missing 1 .20 3 1.00 4 .50 
Total 572 100.00 299 100.00 871 100.00 
60a. Did you witness 
violence, for example 
fighting or rioting …? 
 
AMBON YOGYAKARTA TOTAL 
Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent 
No 262 34.90 528 70.40 790 52.70 
Yes 462 61.60 217 28.90 679 45.30 
Missing 26 3.50 5 .70 31 2.10 
Total 750 100.00 750 100.00 1500 100.00 
61a. Have you suffered any 
kind of physical injury due 
to the violence…? 
 
AMBON YOGYAKARTA TOTAL 
Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent 
No 674 89.90 716 95.50 1390 92.70 
Yes 45 6.00 29 3.90 74 4.90 
Missing 31 4.10 5 .70 36 2.40 
Total 750 100.00 750 100.00 1500 100.00 
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Table 3.33 Family members and relatives
Most respondents said that their family members were not injured 
(78.50%) and did not lose their lives (84.50%). The percentage of 
respondents whose family members were injured in Ambon (34.90%) is 
higher than that in Yogyakarta (5.70%). The percentage of respondents 
whose family members lost their lives is also higher in Ambon (25.10%) 
than in Yogyakarta (3.30%). Also, most respondents mentioned their 
relatives were not injured (76.80%) and did not lose their lives (84.80%). 
There were relatively few respondents who reported that their relatives lost 
their lives (13.50%), both in Yogyakarta (22.90%) and Ambon (4.10%). 
70a. Were any of your 
immediate family members 
injured due to the violence 
…? 
RESPONDENTS 
AMBON YOGYAKARTA TOTAL 
Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent 
No 472 62.90 705 94.00 1177 78.50 
Yes 262 34.90 43 5.70 305 20.30 
Missing 16 2.10 2 0.30 18 1.20 
Total 750 100.00 750 100.00 1500 100.00 
71a. Did any of your 
immediate family members 
lose their lives due to the 
violence …? 
 
AMBON YOGYAKARTA TOTAL 
Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent 
No 544 72.50 723 96.40 1267 84.50 
Yes 188 25.10 25 3.30 213 14.20 
Missing 18 2.40 2 .30 20 1.30 
Total 750 100.00 750 100.00 1500 100.00 
72a. Were any of your 
relatives injured due to the 
violence …? 
 
AMBON YOGYAKARTA TOTAL 
Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent 
No 466 62.10 686 91.50 1152 76.80 
Yes 264 35.20 62 8.30 326 21.70 
Missing 20 2.70 2 .30 22 1.50 
Total 750 100.00 750 100.00 1500 100.00 
73a. Did any of your 
relatives lose their lives due 
to the violence …? 
 
AMBON YOGYAKARTA TOTAL 
Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent 
No 556 74.10 716 95.50 1272 84.80 
Yes 172 22.90 31 4.10 203 13.50 
Missing 22 2.90 3 .40 25 1.70 
Total 750 100.00 750 100.00 1500 100.00 
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Table 3.34 Close friends and neighbours
Almost all of the respondents said their close friends were not injured 
(82.70%) and did not lose their lives (91.30%). A minority of  respondents 
(15.50%) said that their close friends were injured. The percentage 
of respondents who reported that their close friends were injured was 
higher in Ambon (22.70%) than in Yogyakarta (8.30%). Few respondents 
(6.90%) said that their close friends lost their lives. Again, the percentage 
of respondents who had friends that lost their lives was higher in Ambon 
(9.60%) than in Yogyakarta (4.10%). Most respondents also mentioned that 
their neighbours were not injured (78.50%) and did not lose their lives 
(84.70%). The percentage of respondents whose neighbours were injured 
and lost their lives was higher in Ambon (32.10% and 23.30%) than in 
Yogyakarta (7.30% and 3.70% respectively). Overall, respondents in 
Ambon reported higher percentages of experiencing the results of violence 
74a. Were any of your 
close friends injured 
due to the violence …? 
RESPONDENTS 
AMBON YOGYAKARTA TOTAL 
Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent 
No 559 74.50 682 90.00 1241 82.70 
Yes 170 22.70 62 8.30 232 15.50 
Missing 21 2.80 6 .80 27 1.80 
Total 750 100.00 750 100.00 1500 100.00 
75a. Did any of your 
close friends lose their 
lives due to the violence 
…? 
RESPONDENTS 
AMBON YOGYAKARTA TOTAL 
Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent 
No 657 87.60 712 94.90 1369 91.30 
Yes 72 9.60 31 4.10 103 6.90 
Missing 21 2.80 7 .90 28 1.90 
Total 750 100.00 750 100.00 1500 100.00 
76a. Were any of your 
neighbours injured due 
to the violence …? 
RESPONDENTS 
AMBON YOGYAKARTA TOTAL 
Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent 
No 489 65.20 689 91.90 1178 78.50 
Yes 241 32.10 55 7.30 296 19.70 
Missing 20 2.70 6 .80 26 1.70 
Total 750 100.00 750 100.00 1500 100.00 
77a. Did any of your 
neighbours lose their 
lives due to the violence 
…? 
RESPONDENTS 
AMBON YOGYAKARTA TOTAL 
Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent 
No 555 74.00 716 95.50 1271 84.70 
Yes 175 23.30 28 3.70 203 13.50 
Missing 20 2.70 6 .80 26 1.70 
Total 750 100.00 750 100.00 1500 100.00 
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(including injury and death of their families, relatives, and neighbours) 
than respondents in Yogyakarta.  
3.2.4.7 Nationalistic attitudes
Nationalistic attitudes consist of romantic nationalism (patriotism), ethno-
centric nationalism (chauvinism), and regiocentrism (ethno-nationalism). 
Romantic nationalism or patriotism is an attachment to one’s own country, 
while ethnocentric nationalism or chauvinism is an individual’s feeling that 
his/her own country is superior to other countries. Regiocentrism refers 
to ethno-nationalism constructed by minority ethnic groups in opposition 
to nationalism. Questions about nationalism build on the measurements 
from Coenders (2001) and Todosijevic (1998) that include patriotism and 
chauvinism as dimensions. Based on their measurements, this study presents 
five questions on romantic nationalism and five questions on chauvinism. 
This study also adds four questions on regiocentrism by changing the 
dimension of nation to region.12 After the pilot survey, the term “region” 
was changed to “district,” and “ethno-religious group interest” became 
“national interest.”
12 The questions on region-centrism are (i) “I should support my region even if my region is 
wrong,” (ii) “I should always put regional interest above ethno-religious group interest,” 
(iii) I would rather be a resident of (my region) than of other regions in Indonesia,” and 
(iv) “I should respect my province and its traditions.”
182
InteRgRoUP contAct AVoIdAnce In IndoneSIA
Table 3.35 Romantic nationalism
Likert scale 1-5 (from totally disagree to totally agree)
In our sample, Muslim respondents have a higher level of romantic 
nationalism than Christian respondents. The mean values for Muslim 
respondents range between 3.62 (achievement in equal treatments) and 
4.39 (respect my nation), while those for Christian respondents are 4.12 
(national achievement in history) to 3.29 (achievement in equal treatment). 
In Ambon, Muslim respondents (M=4.55) are more nationalistic than 
Christian respondents are (4.44) in relation to the statement “one should 
(show) respect to the nation.” However, in Ambon, Muslim respondents 
(M=3.79) are less nationalistic than Christian respondents (M=3.85) in their 
response to the statement that, “I should always put national interest above 
ethno-religious group interest.” The standard deviation values for Muslim 
respondents are between .70 and 1.11, and those for Christian respondents 
are between .59 and 1.21. The heterogeneity of answers from Muslim 
respondents is lower than that of answers from Christian respondents.
Romantic nationalism 
RESPONDENTS 
AMBON YOGYAKARTA TOTAL 
Muslim 
(n=370) 
Christian 
(n=363) 
Muslim 
(n=478) 
Christian 
(n=253) 
Muslim 
(n=848) 
Christian 
(n=616) 
 
136. How proud are you of your 
country in terms of its 
achievements in history? 
M:  4.53 
SD:   .73 
M:  4.30 
SD:   .80 
M:  4.16 
SD:   .81 
M:  3.86 
SD:   .92 
M:  4.32 
SD:   .80 
M:  4.12 
SD:   .88 
137. How proud are you of your 
country in terms of its 
achievements in equal 
treatment of all groups in 
society? 
M:  3.78 
SD: 1.19 
M:  3.47 
SD: 1.22 
M:  3.51 
SD: 1.04 
M:  3.04 
SD: 1.17 
M:  3.62 
SD: 1.11 
M:  3.29 
SD: 1.21 
138. I should respect my nation 
and its tradition. 
M:  4.55 
SD:  .59 
M:  4.44 
SD:  .58 
M:  4.26 
SD:   .76 
M:  4.27 
SD:   .59 
M:  4.39 
SD:   .71 
M: 4.37 
SD: 0.59 
139. I should always put 
national interest above 
ethno-religious group 
interest. 
M:  3.79 
SD: 1.04 
M:  3.85 
SD: 1.04 
M: 3.82 
SD:  .92 
M: 3.74 
SD:  .84 
M: 3.81 
SD:  .97 
M: 3.80 
SD:  .96 
140. Renewing national ideas is 
our national task. 
M: 4.20 
SD:  .71 
M: 4.21 
SD:  .65 
M: 4.09 
SD:  .69 
M: 4.00 
SD:  .66 
M: 4.14 
SD:  .70 
M: 4.12 
SD:  .66 
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Table 3.36 Chauvinism 
Likert scale 1-5 (from totally disagree to totally agree)
In this question, Muslim respondents have higher chauvinistic 
views compared with Christian respondents. The mean values for Muslim 
respondents are between 2.47 (support my country) and 4.12 (citizenship), 
while those for Christian respondents are between 2.39 (support my 
country) and 3.76 (citizenship). Muslim respondents in Ambon (M=2.50 
to 4.42) apparently have a higher degree of chauvinistic views than those 
in Yogyakarta (M=2.45 to 3.89.) The standard deviation values for Muslim 
respondents are between .90 and 1.15, and those of Christian respondents 
are between .97 and 1.18. The heterogeneity of answers from Muslim 
respondents is lower than that of answers from Christian respondents.
Chauvinism 
RESPONDENTS 
AMBON YOGYAKARTA TOTAL 
Muslim 
(n=369) 
Christian 
(n=360) 
Muslim 
(n=479) 
Christian 
(n=254) 
Muslim 
(n=846) 
Christian 
(n=613) 
 
141. I would rather be a citizen 
of Indonesia than of any 
other country in the world. 
M: 4.42 
SD:  .82 
M:  3.91 
SD: 1.05 
M: 3.89 
SD:  .89 
M: 3.55 
SD: 1.04 
M: 4.12 
SD:   .90 
M:  3.76 
SD: 1.06 
143. My country is better than 
most other countries. 
M:  3.42 
SD: 1.17 
M:  2.96 
SD: 1.23 
M:  3.20 
SD: 1.07 
M:  2.79 
SD: 1.07 
M:  3.29 
SD: 1.12 
M:  2.89 
SD: 1.17 
145. I should support my 
country even if my country 
is wrong. 
M:  2.50 
SD: 1.24 
M:  2.39 
SD: 1.18 
M:  2.45 
SD: 1.07 
M:  2.39 
SD: 1.10 
M:  2.47 
SD: 1.15 
M:  2.39 
SD: 1.15 
147. My most important 
characteristics come from 
my nationality. 
M: 3.82 
SD:  .92 
M: 3.73 
SD:  .97 
M: 3.56 
SD:  .90 
M: 3.35 
SD:  .93 
M: 3.68 
SD:  .92 
M:  3.58 
SD:   .97 
149. There is something about 
Indonesia today that makes 
me feel shame.  
M:  3.48 
SD: 1.26 
M:  3.59 
SD: 1.29 
M:  3.88 
SD: 1.00 
M: 3.87 
SD:  .98 
M:  3.70 
SD: 1.14 
M:  3.71 
SD: 1.18 
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Table 3.37 Regiocentrism
Likert scale 1-5 (from totally disagree to totally agree)
Muslim respondents have similar levels of regio-centric attitudes as 
Christian respondents In two dimensions of this issue. In answering the 
statement “I would rather be a resident of my district” and “I should respect 
my district,” Muslim respondents have mean values of 3.16 and 4.13, while 
Christian respondents have mean values of 2.97 and 4.10. However, in 
responding to the statement “I support my district even if my district is 
wrong” and “I should put district interest above national interest,” Muslim 
respondents (M=2.44 and 2.49) display less region-centric tendencies 
than Christian respondents (M=2.63 and 2.51). In regards to the last two 
questions, respondents in Ambon have higher region-centric attitudes than 
those in Yogyakarta. The standard deviation values for Muslim respondents 
are between .72 and 1.13, and those for Christian respondents are between 
.75 and 1.19. The heterogeneity of answers from Muslim respondents is 
lower that of answers from Christian respondents.
3.2.4.8 Distrust
Questions about distrust build on the survey questionnaire “Living in 
Germany” conducted in 2003 that examined the social situation of households 
Regiocentrism 
RESPONDENTS 
AMBON YOGYAKARTA TOTAL 
Muslim 
(n=369) 
Christian 
(n=360) 
Muslim 
(n=479) 
Christian 
(n=254) 
Muslim 
(n=847) 
Christian 
(n=614) 
 
141.  I should support my 
district even if my district is 
wrong. 
M:  2.47 
SD: 1.19 
M:  2.61 
SD: 1.20 
M:  2.41 
SD: 1.07 
M:  2.64 
SD: 1.09 
M:  2.44 
SD: 1.12 
M:  2.63 
SD: 1.15 
144.  I should always put 
district interests above   
national interests. 
M: 2.49 
SD:  .96 
M:  2.51 
SD: 1.00 
M: 2.50 
SD:  .97 
M: 2.50 
SD:  .93 
M: 2.49 
SD:  .97 
M: 2.51 
SD : .97 
146. I would rather be a 
resident of my district than 
of other districts in 
Indonesia. 
M:  3.23 
SD: 1.18 
M:  3.07 
SD: 1.26 
M:  3.10 
SD: 1.10 
M:  2.84 
SD: 1.08 
M:  3.16 
SD: 1.13 
M:  2.97 
SD: 1.19 
148. I should respect my 
district and its tradition. 
M: 4.20 
SD:  .74 
M: 4.19 
SD:  .81 
M: 4.08 
SD:  .71 
M: 3.96 
SD:  .61 
M: 4.13 
SD:  .72 
M: 4.10 
SD:  .75 
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(Sozialforschung, 2004).  We made several changes to the questions to adapt 
them to the Indonesian social context and to the objectives of this study. The 
original questions are, “On the whole, one can trust people,” “Nowadays 
one can’t rely on anyone,” and “If one is dealing with strangers, it is better 
to be careful before one can trust them.” Those statements are assessed 
with the Likert scale, with possible answers ranging from from “totally 
disagree” to “totally agree.” All the questions were modified by changing 
the terms “one,” “stranger,” and “people” into “Muslim” or “Christian” 
as appropriate. Consequently, three of the questions were broken down 
into six questions to cover distrust against Muslims and distrust against 
Christians. The two other original questions are “Do you believe that most 
people would exploit you if they had opportunity?” and “Do you believe 
that most people would attempt to be fair toward you?” We revised those 
two questions into statements in the Likert scale, changing the people” and 
“you” into “Muslim” and “Christian” as appropriate. 
Table 3.38 Distrust
Likert scale 1-5 (from totally disagree to totally agree)
Regiocentrism 
RESPONDENTS 
AMBON YOGYAKARTA TOTAL 
Muslim 
(n=371) 
Christian 
(n=349) 
Muslim 
(n=473) 
Christian 
(n=252) 
Muslim 
(n=844) 
Christian 
(n=601) 
 
208. On the whole one can trust 
Muslims 
M=3.86 
SD=.94 
M=2.95 
SD=.92 
M=3.87 
SD=.80 
M=3.42 
SD=.79 
M=3.87 
SD=.86 
M=3.15 
SD=.89 
209. On the whole one can trust 
Christians 
M=2.86 
SD=.94 
M=3.48 
SD=.94 
M=3.44 
SD=.83 
M=3.58 
SD=.78 
M=3.19 
SD=.93 
M=3.53 
SD=.87 
210. On the whole one can rely on 
Muslims 
M=3.32 
SD=1.00 
M=2.67 
SD=.90 
M=3.57 
SD=.85 
M=3.07 
SD=.88 
M=3.46 
SD=.93 
M=2.84 
SD=.91 
211. On the whole one can rely on 
Christians 
M=2.67 
SD=.92 
M=3.14 
SD=1.00 
M=3.10 
SD=.84 
M=3.26 
SD=.89 
M=2.91 
SD=.90 
M=3.19 
SD=.96 
212. It is better to be careful if one 
is dealing with Muslims 
M=2.12 
SD=1.00 
M=2.66 
SD=.95 
M=2.29 
SD=.96 
M=2.70 
SD=.98 
M=2.22 
SD=.98 
M=2.68 
SD=.96 
213. It is better to be careful if one 
is dealing with Christians 
M=3.01 
SD=1.24 
M=2.26 
SD=.82 
M=2.64 
SD=1.06 
M=2.40 
SD=.86 
M=2.80 
SD=1.15 
M=2.32 
SD=.84 
214. Most Muslims would exploit 
me if they had the 
opportunity 
M=2.28 
SD=.97 
M=2.6 
SD=1.00 
M=2.14 
SD=.94 
M=2.60 
SD=.96 
M=2.20 
SD=.95 
M=2.60 
SD=.98 
215. Most Christians would 
exploit me if they had the 
opportunity 
M=2.80 
SD=1.10 
M=2.16 
SD=.83 
M=2.47 
SD=.99 
M=2.25 
SD=.81 
M=2.61 
SD=1.05 
M=2.20 
SD=.82 
216. Most of the time, Muslims 
attempt to act in their own 
interest 
M=2.16 
SD=1.00 
M=2.80 
SD=1.05 
M=2.17 
SD=.87 
M=2.77 
SD=.97 
M=2.17 
SD=.93 
M=2.79 
SD=1.02 
217. Most of the time, Christians 
attempt to act in their own 
interest 
M=2.81 
SD=1.19 
M=2.26 
SD=.87 
M=2.54 
SD=.97 
M=2.37 
SD=.79 
M=2.66 
SD=1.08 
M=2.31 
SD=.83 
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Questions 208 to 211 are on trust, while questions 212 to 217 are on 
distrust. Table 3.38 shows that Muslim respondents trust Christians (M=3.19 
for q209) and Christian respondents trust Muslims (M=3.15 for q208). 
Muslim respondents’ trust for Christians is similar to Christian respondents’ 
trust for Muslims. Questions on Christians’ distrust of Muslims have a 
range of mean values from 2.60 (q214) to 2.79 (q216), while questions 
on Muslims’ distrust of Christians have mean values between 2.61 (q215) 
and 2.80 (q213). In Ambon, Muslims’ distrust of Christians is higher than 
Christians’ distrust of Muslims. The standard deviation values indicate 
that the heterogeneity of answers from Muslim respondents and Christian 
respondents is similar.
3.2.4.9 Social dominance orientation
Questions about social dominance orientation build on the measurements 
from Sidanius and Pratto (1999:100-102). This study used the measurements 
they developed with almost no changes because all of their questions 
are relevant to the relationship between Muslims and Christians in the 
Indonesian context. However, we revised one question about equality, 
changing “increased social equality” into “all groups should be (be) free 
to move to a place where they choose to live.” The Sidanius scale consists 
of 16 items, which can be identified with dominant orientation and the 
dimension of equality.
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Table 3.39 Social dominance orientation
Likert scale 1-5 (from totally disagree to totally agree)
We classify these questions into dominance (q90-q97) and equality 
(q98-q105). In our sample, Muslim respondents have a slightly higher 
dominance orientation than Christian respondents. The mean values on 
q90-97 of Muslim respondents are between 2.25 and 2.97, while those of 
Christian respondents are between 2.09 and 2.71. Muslim respondents in 
Yogyakarta have higher mean values (between 2.22 and 3.03) than those 
in Ambon (between 2.16 and 2.89). Christian respondents in Yogyakarta 
Regiocentrism
RESPONDENTS
AMbON yOGyAKARTA TOTAL
Muslim 
(n=365)
Christian 
(n=360)
Muslim 
(n=477)
Christian 
(n=255)
Muslim 
(n=839)
Christian 
(n=614)
 
90. Some groups of people are simply 
inferior to other groups
M=2.29
SD=.96
M=2.36
SD=1.03
M=2.22
SD=.96
M=2.11
SD=.84
M=2.25
SD=.96
M=2.26
SD=.96
91. In getting what you want, it is 
sometimes necessary to use force 
against other groups
M=2.48
SD=1.11
M=2.28
SD=1.03
M=2.61
SD=1.06
M=2.38
SD=1.03
M=2.55
SD=1.09
M=2.32
SD=1.03
92. It's OK if some groups have more of a 
chance in life than others
M=2.89
SD=1.14
M=2.63
SD=1.09
M=3.03
SD=1.07
M=2.82
SD=1.15
M=2.97
SD=1.11
M=2.71
SD=1.11
93. To get ahead in life, it is sometimes 
necessary to step on other groups
M=2.48
SD=1.17
M=2.42
SD=1.11
M=2.49
SD=1.06
M=2.45
SD=1.06
M=2.49
SD=1.11
M=2.43
SD=1.09
94. If certain groups stayed in their place, 
we would have fewer problems
M=2.69
SD=1.01
M=2.58
SD=1.01
M=2.62
SD=.90
M=2.46
SD=.86
M=2.65
SD=.95
M=2.53
SD=.95
95. It's probably a good thing that certain 
groups are at the top and other groups 
are at the bottom
M=2.25
SD=.96
M=2.09
SD=.87
M=2.46
SD=1.00
M=2.20
SD=.93
M=2.37
SD=.99
M=2.14
SD=.90
96. Inferior groups should stay in their 
place
M=2.16
SD=.93
M=2.10
SD=.85
M=2.32
SD=.95
M=2.07
SD=.80
M=2.25
SD=.95
M=2.09
SD=.83
97. Sometimes other groups must be kept 
in their place
M=2.89
SD=1.09
M=2.65
SD=1.13
M=2.90
SD=1.05
M=2.71
SD=1.09
M=2.90
SD=1.07
M=2.67
SD=1.11
98. It would be good if groups could be 
equal
M=4.28
SD=.86
M=4.35
SD=1.83
M=3.97
SD=.95
M=4.10
SD=1.01
M=4.10
SD=.92
M=4.24
SD=1.54
99. Group equality should be our ideal M=4.14
SD=.92
M=4.15
SD=.88
M=3.80
SD=.96
M=3.96
SD=.94
M=3.95
SD=.96
M=4.07
SD=.91
100. All groups should be given an equal 
chance in life
M=4.41
SD=.70
M=4.44
SD=.65
M=4.18
SD=.71
M=4.38
SD=.62
M=4.28
SD=.72
M=4.42
SD=.64
101. We should do what we can to 
equalize conditions for different 
groups
M=4.24
SD=.75
M=4.35
SD=.63
M=4.11
SD=.66
M=4.18
SD=.68
M=4.17
SD=.70
M=4.27
SD=.66
102. All groups should be free to move to 
a place where they choose to live
M=4.17
SD=.77
M=4.15
SD=.86
M=3.98
SD=.80
M=4.13
SD=.69
M=4.06
SD=.79
M=4.14
SD=.79
103. We would have fewer problems if we 
treated people more equally
M=3.42
SD=1.21
M=3.55
SD=1.25
M=3.49
SD=1.07
M=3.66
SD=1.05
M=3.46
SD=1.13
M=3.60
SD=1.17
104. We should strive to make incomes as 
equal as possible
M=3.82
SD=.87
M=3.92
SD=.99
M=3.64
SD=.93
M=3.75
SD=.87
M=3.72
SD=.91
M=3.85
SD=.94
105. No one group should dominate in 
society
M=3.73
SD=1.13
M=4.00
SD=1.07
M=3.70
SD=.96
M=3.98
SD=.89
M=3.71
SD=1.03
M=3.99
SD=.99
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(between 2.07 and 2.82) also have higher mean values than those in Ambon 
(between 2.09 and 2.65). In respect to equality (q98-q105), Christian 
respondents have wider mean values than Muslim respondents. The mean 
values for Christian respondents are between 2.67 and 4.42, while those 
for Muslim respondents are between 2.90 and 4.28. In all questions, the 
standard deviation values for Muslim respondents are between .70 and 
1.13, while those for Christian respondents are between .66 and 1.17, which 
means that answers from Christian respondents are more heterogeneous.
3.3  Development of topic list
We designed a topic list to use in interviews with our respondents. The 
following section sheds light on the development of the topic list and on 
the selection of interviewees.
3.3.1 Topic guide development 
Interviews  consisted of unstructured  and  structured  approaches. 
Unstructured interviews are useful for understanding more detailed 
phenomena, while structured interviews are employed if the researcher 
already has a basic understanding of the phenomena. Unstructured 
interviews are informal conversations without predetermined questions 
and answer categories. Structured interviews involve operationalization 
of theory, collecting the subject ideas of interviewees, and analyzing the 
subject ideas in order to build up the researcher’s knowledge (Merton, 1957 
cf. Pawson, 1996:295-314). Both unstructured and structured interviews 
help us understand the cases in more detail. In carrying out structured 
interviews, the study needs a topic list that is a set of topics derived from 
operationalization of theory, from which the questions are developed.
We used the topic list to better illustrate the general processes and 
influential factors that we analyse through the survey, and to look for 
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additional explanations. The topic list also guides the interviewing process 
in a flexible way based on variables or on previously researched subjects. 
There might be some elements that we did not cover in the survey.
The structure of the topic list consists of main topics and sub-topics. 
The main topics refer to researched variables and contextual determinants 
that serve as umbrella categories for writing the sub-topic list. The main 
topics are ethno-religious identification, intergroup contact avoidance, 
intergroup contact, perceived group threat, perceived discrimination, 
memory and experience of violence, and nationalist versus regionalist 
orientation. Based on assumed relevant contextual factors, we developed 
a variety of additional topics (e.g. history of conflict, government policies, 
international influence, migration, education, mass media, and student 
organizations).
Sub-topics are elements of the main topic that provide more 
comprehensive and detailed questions. For example, the sub-topic for 
student organizations profiles provides questions on members, recruitment, 
funding, and alumni. Another example is the sub-topic of local values, 
which includes questions on which cultural values are used to resolve 
religious conflicts. A final example is the sub- topic on decentralization, 
which includes questions on which government policies have influenced 
contact avoidance and intergroup contestation. 
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Table 3.40 Topic list
We conducted pilot interviews to gather preliminary information 
on the research setting and to improve interview technique. We learned a 
number of lessons from these pilot interviews. First, the topics of contact 
avoidance and ethno-religious identification needed to be prioritized in all 
interviews. Furthermore, the interviewer needed to stick to the order of 
topics and give the respondents enough time to think about the questions. 
Another lesson learned was that the interviewer should give informants 
the topic list before the interviews. In addition, it was suggested that the 
interviewer press respondents to elaborate on superficial, socially desired, 
and politically correct answers to questions.
3.3.2 Selection of interviewees 
The interviewees consisted of both surveyed respondents and non-
surveyed respondents. The surveyed respondents were former respondents 
Main-topics Sub-topics  survey respondents 
 
Ethno-religious identification: 
ethnic  and religious identity 
6 (socialization, characteristics, ethnic organization, 
ceremonies, stereotypes, importance) 
Intergroup contact 5 (family, clan, friends, classmates, neighbours) 
Perceived discrimination 5 (social, economic, political, cultural, and religious) 
Perceived threat 3 (presence of out group, in and out migration, nature and 
impact of threat) 
Intergroup distrust 3 (experience and circumstance, reasons and effects, 
strengthening trust) 
Memory and experience of violence 4 (experience, bio-physical effects, effects on attitudes, 
religious effects) 
Contact avoidance 4 (practices, reasons and motivations, effects, contact barriers) 
Nationalist orientation 3 (affinity, national interest, multiple identity) 
 non-surveyed respondents 
History of conflict 4 (groups, tensions, incident, resolution) 
Student organizations 3 (profile, goal and activities, affiliations) 
Social and cultural organizations 3 (customary laws, conflict resolution, local values) 
National and local policies 3 (education and religion, decentralization, conflict resolution) 
Media 4 (portrayal, reporting, policies and practices, media groups) 
Migration 3 (presence of out group, nature and impact, adaptation and 
integration) 
Education 3 (religious education, opinion on curriculum, influences) 
International influences 3 (influences of colonial power, post influences, NGOs) 
Total 59 
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who answered that they totally agree, neither agree nor disagree, or totally 
disagree with avoiding contact with out-groups in the survey-questionnaire. 
Meanwhile, non-surveyed respondents were people chosen because they 
have good knowledge about inter-group relationships in the universities. To 
find the surveyed-respondents, we searched the responses of respondents 
to the questionnaire and selected interviewees from that group. To find the 
non-surveyed respondents, we used the snowball method.
Several of the non-surveyed respondents are prominent members of 
campus or student organizations or larger student organizations, such as 
student executive boards, Christian student unions, and Islamic student 
associations. To a certain degree, they may also be affiliated with politicians, 
bureaucrats, and ethno-religious organizations. Other respondents are 
lecturers and administrative staff who have knowledge about interreligious 
group relations within the university. The leaders of religious and ethnic 
organizations that are often consulted by students on issues of ethnicity 
or religion were a separate category of interviewees. Another category 
of people we interviewed were alumni of student organizations who are 
now members of parliament, government, and equivalent organizations. In 
addition, we included NGO and tribal leaders in order to represent elements 
of civil society.
We conducted semi-structured interviews in Ambon in April and 
May of 2011 and September through December of 2011. Interviews were 
conducted in Yogyakarta between June and July of 2011. All interviews 
were conducted in the Indonesian language. Every interview started with 
some questions about ethno-religious affiliation and practices and then 
the flow of the interview followed the order of the topic list. However, 
in the case of non-surveyed informants, we followed the main issues that 
they developed in the interviews. The duration of the interviews varied 
between one hour and two hours depending on the respondents’ availability. 
Interviews were conducted on campuses, in the offices of religious groups, 
cafes, informants’ houses, and in government offices. We recorded all of 
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the interviews and created some interview-transcripts in the Indonesian 
language. Sixteen transcripts were translated into English because they 
contained significant amounts of information on contact avoidance and 
ethno-religious identification.
There were some constraints on some of the interviews. During inter-
religious violence in the city of Ambon between September and December 
of 2011, it was rather difficult to find informants whose religion differed 
from ours, as they could not guarantee our security during the interview 
process. In this short period of tensions, we conducted observation at a few 
locations like refugee areas and the market, and wrote daily field notes. 
Another difficulty was following the order of the topic list in conversations, 
because informants drawn from the pool of non-surveyed respondents were 
only interested in talking about certain topics. Finally, in Yogyakarta, the 
time availability of was sometimes limited.
Table 3.41 Surveyed respondents in Ambon and Yogyakarta
14     Conducted by Tri Subagya during fieldwork in Yogyakarta.
Characteristics Composition Ambon Yogyakarta1 
 
Contact avoidance High 4  
 Moderate 10  
 Low 6  
Religion Islam 12 14 
 Christians 8 6 
Gender Male 7 15 
 Female 13 8 
Ethnic groups Ambonese 6 13 
 Migrants 14 7 
Total  20 20 
 
                                               
1 Conducted by Tri Subagya during fieldwork in Yogyakarta. 
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Table 3.42 Non-surveyed respondents in Ambon and Yogyakarta
3.4 Summary
All of the data collection procedures were conducted by the researchers, and 
all of the questions in the final survey were tested in the pilot survey. Some 
questions were adapted to fit with the state of respondents’ knowledge. 
Respondents selected by random sampling serve as a representation of the 
student population in the six universities surveyed. In the interviews, we 
were able to further inquire about almost all of the topics with a number of 
respondents. 
Our sample shows that Muslim respondents tend to avoid contact 
more than Christian respondents. Respondents in Ambon tend to avoid 
contact with out-groups more than respondents in Yogyakarta. Spouses 
from outside the in-group are the most avoided subjects, while classmates 
from outside the in-group are the least avoided. Both Muslim and Christian 
respondents have strong ethno-religious identification, as measured by 
ethno-religious practices, participation in religious ceremonies, and 
friendship by religion. Muslim respondents seem to have stronger ethno-
religious identification than Christian respondents. Most respondents 
are middle class and their parents are employed as workers. Christian 
respondents’ parents have a better position in terms of economic status 
Categories of informant Ambon Yogyakarta 
 
Journalist 3  
Priest 7 1 
Islamic leader 3 3 
Artist (poet) 2  
Tribal leader 1 1 
Lecture 10  
University senate 3  
University staff 1 2 
NGO 2 1 
Provincial parliament 1  
Campus based student unions 5 5 
Religion based student unions 7 6 
Ethnic based student unions 2 2 
Total 47 21 
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and education than Muslim respondents’ parents. Numbers of male and 
female respondents are almost the same, with an average age of 22 years. 
Religious identification is apparently stronger than ethnic identification for 
both groups of respondents. Most respondents have low levels of perceived 
threat and perceived discrimination, although Christian respondents feel 
slightly more discriminated against than Muslim respondents. However, 
Christian respondents have more contact with out-groups than Muslim 
respondents. Otherwise, Muslim respondents are more religiocentric, 
monistic, fundamentalistic, nationalistic, distrustful, and social-dominance 
orientated than Christian respondents. Finally, most respondents have few 
memories of violence, despite the fact that several incidents of ethno-
religious violence broke out in their hometowns in the past 10 years.
The standard deviations of all the variables show that respondents’ 
answers are rather homogenous. In the next chapter, results of the data 
survey will be further analysed with bivariate analyses between contact 
avoidance and ethno-religious identification, individual determinants, and 
intermediate variables. In addition, this study also uses multiple-regression 
analyses between contact avoidance and ethno-religious identification, 
while controlling for individual determinants and intermediate variables. 
The findings based on interviews and observations will be analysed 
descriptively. We use qualitative data and analysis to enrich and strengthen 
the interpretation of quantitative data. l 
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CHAPTER 4
THE SOCIAL LOCATION OF INTERGROUP 
CONTACT AVOIDANCE: 
Results from bi-variate analysis
Introduction 
This chapter describes the construction of measurements used in the course of our research, intergroup differences between Muslims and 
Christians, and the analysis of variance (ANOVA) in regard to intergroup 
contact avoidance. A Mokken scale analysis (MSA) is used in the 
construction of contact avoidance, while factor analysis is employed for 
the construction of other (metric) variables. In this chapter we review the 
validity and reliability of the measurements, with the goal of comparing 
the main denominations and describing the relevant differences between 
Muslims and Christians according to data gathered on intergroup contact 
avoidance and the other respective variables. We test for the linearity of 
the relationships between intergroup contact avoidance and these variables, 
using analysis of variance (ANOVA) to investigate possible relationships 
between them. Finally, we present a selection of representative quotes 
taken from qualitative interviews that illustrate conclusions drawn from 
the quantitative analysis. Selections from the interviews present statements 
from Muslim and Christian respondents in both research sites (Ambon and 
Yogyakarta).  
General procedures
Factor analysis is a method for investigating whether a number of questions 
are related to a smaller number of factors that represent some theoretical 
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variables (Kim and Mueller, 1978:9).1 The procedure analysis the factors 
in three steps: at the national level, which includes both religious groups 
(Islam and Christianity); at the group level; and then at the national level 
again to identify identical factors and questions. In the first step, we assume 
that all of the items (survey questions) have the same structure for both 
groups, while the second step shows whether the overall structure in the 
first step holds for each group and across intergroup differences. In the 
third step, we determine the commensurable factors after we test structural 
differences between the models in each group (Hermans & Sterkens 
2014:145-149; cf. Anthony et al. 2015:42ff). In each procedure, the KMO 
Bartlett’s test should be significant (p < .05), eigenvalues should be more 
than 1, commonalities should be > .20, and factor loadings should be > .30. 
We also remove questions that load highly (>. 30) on more than one factor. 
If the correlation between two factors is high (r ≥ .60), then both factors 
can be combined. Finally, we look for conceptually meaningful dimensions 
that can be given a substantive label. 
At this point in the process, we use Cronbach’s alpha (α) to test 
the reliability of the scale. The value of alpha depends on the number of 
questions in a scale; the more questions there are, the higher the value of α 
(Cortina, 1993:101). A scale is considered excellent if the α value is ≥ .91, 
and very good if α is between .81 and .90. A scale with an α value between 
.71 and .80 is considered good, and one with an α value between .61 and 
.70 is acceptable. The scale is considered poor if α is between .51 and 
.60 (Maholtra and Birks, 2007: 358). Scales are constructed by computing 
means of all questions included in a factor. We subsequently employ 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) to identify whether there are differences 
between means, (Field, 2009:349). If sample means are Ȳ1, Ȳ2, Ȳ3...Ȳk, then 
we use ANOVA to ascertain whether the sample means are significantly 
1 We use the confirmatory factor analysis rather than the exploratory factor analysis 
because our study addresses specific hypotheses, rather than exploring a set of underlying 
dimensions in the first place. This analysis assumes that some factors underlying several 
items are responsible for a covariation among the observed questions (Field, 2009:628).
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different. If the F-ratio is significant (p<.05), then the hypothesis is not 
rejected, which means that the differences between means are significant. 
This analysis also generates linearity and correlation coefficients. Pearson-r 
is for linear relationships, while eta is for non-linear relationships. All tables 
of factor analysis and ANOVA are included in Appendices 1 and 2.
4.1 Intergroup contact avoidance
Intergroup contact avoidance has three dimensions, namely contact 
avoidance, avoidance of future spouse from a different religion, and support 
for residential segregation. 
4.1.1 Contact avoidance
The first dimension of intergroup contact avoidance is contact avoidance. 
Our measurement of this dimension consists of nine questions presented to 
both Muslim and Christian respondents. A Mokken scale analysis (MSA), 
commonly employed in the analysis of ordinal scale data, is used to 
measure levels of contact avoidance through the following questions: “To 
what extent would you accept or avoid a Christian / Muslim as your city/
town mayor, civil servant, police officer, neighbour, classmate, board mate, 
houseboy, close friend, future spouse?” 
The analysis adapts a basic principle of the Guttman scale, which 
proposes that questions can be divided questions that engender more 
positive responses (easier), and more difficult questions that provide fewer 
positive responses (Van Schuur, 2011:6). Essentially, the idea is that more 
people agree with contact with easy contact roles than difficult ones. The 
most important concepts in the application of the Mokken scale are the 
mean score and Loevinger’s coefficient. Mean scores indicate the average 
percentage of respondents who answer positive to a certain question, and 
they also indicate the order that classifies questions as easier or harder. 
Loevinger’s coefficient (Loevinger’s H) measures the quality of a pair of 
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questions, which constitute a scale. We consider the scale to be poor if the 
Loevingers H is < .30, weak if the Loevingers H is between .30 and .40, 
and moderate if the Loevingers H is between .41 and .50. A good scale is 
indicated by having a Loevingers H ≥ .51 (Mokken, 1971).
Table 4.1 Mokken scale analysis
Source: Mokken, 1971:33
The process of using the Mokken Scale Analysis for the initial 
questions related to contact avoidance begins with recoding the answer 
categories to classify respondents as belonging to the binary categories of 
accept or avoid (Mokken, 1971:33). The answer categories totally accept, 
accept and neither accept nor avoid are recoded as accept (0), while 
avoid and totally avoid are recoded as avoid (1). Referring to Table 4.1, 
if a respondent answers avoid (1) to question 1, then he or she is likely 
answer avoid (option 1) to questions 2 up to 9. The same pattern also works 
for a respondent who answers avoid (option 1) to question 5, indicating 
that he or she would answer avoid (option 1) to questions 6 up to 9. We 
presume that question 1 is more difficult and question 9 is easier. The MSA 
results in two measurements, one displaying levels of contact avoidance by 
Muslim respondents, and the other displaying levels of contact avoidance 
by Christian respondents.
Items (questions) 
Respondents 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Score 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 9 
2 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 8 
3 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 
4 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 
5 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 5 
6 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 4 
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 3 
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 
9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
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Table 4.2 Contact avoidance by Muslims against Christians
The question regarding future spouses is excluded because it has 
a Loevinger’s coefficient under .30. Furthermore, since the question 
regarding housemaids has a different position between Muslim and 
Christian respondents, it is eliminated from the analysis. In general, the 
Loevinger’s coefficient for Muslim respondents is .64, meaning that the 
whole set of questions on contact avoidance for Muslim respondents 
has good scalability. The lowest mean score is for the answer category 
“classmate” at .0863, which means that 8.63% of Muslim respondents are 
unlikely to have contact with Christians in their classes. The question that 
refers to how likely they are to accept a mayor with a different religious 
background has the highest mean value of .3269, which means 32.69% of 
Muslim respondents indicated they would avoid having a Christian as their 
city mayor. The question about classmates is therefore identified as the 
easiest question on contact avoidance for Muslim respondents, while the 
question about city mayors is considered to be the most difficult. 
Contact 
avoidance 
target 
Obs. Mean 
score 
Observed 
Guttman 
errors 
Expected 
Guttman 
errors 
Loevingers 
H 
Z-stat. 
 
Classmate 823 .0863 111 352.07 .68 32.91 
Civil servant 823 .1094 167 429.36 .61 32.59 
Policeman 823 .1166 168 447.95 .62 33.93 
Neighbour 823 .1191 153 452.17 .66 35.97 
Boardmate 823 .1713 161 502.17 .68 36.11 
Close friend 823 .1981 180 507.49 .64 33.14 
Mayor 823 .3269 196 443.60 .59 22.22 
Scale 823  568 1567.40 .64 59.36 
 
200
InteRgRoUP contAct AVoIdAnce In IndoneSIA
Figure 4.1 Contact avoidance by Muslim respondents
In Figure 4.1, we display results of the questions on contact avoidance 
as answered by Muslim respondents, rank ordering the mean ratings of 
targets who were most accepted to targets who were most avoided. Since 
in this scale the category of mayor is not adjacent to the categories of civil 
servant and the policeman (indicating they are not closely conceptually 
related), we cannot distinguish here between intimate (private domain) and 
official subjects. Although Muslim respondents avoid having a Christian city 
mayor, they accept Christians as policeman and civil servants (see Figure 
4.1). Muslim respondents have a pattern of contact avoidance that differs 
completely from the Bogardus scale of social distance that is usually found 
in western societies (Hagendoorn and Hraba, 1987:323-324). For example, 
the Dutch avoid people of other ethnic groups in private domains (categories 
including physician, children’s marriage, and neighbours) more than in 
public domains (categories including work superiors, children’s school, 
and colleagues). Therefore, findings from this study are not consistent with 
most accepted               most avoided
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the Bogardus scale where the subjects who are avoided are more likely to 
be found in the intimate realm than in the official one.
    
Table 4.3 Contact avoidance by Christian respondents
The question about future spouses for Christian respondents is 
excluded here since the Loevinger’s coefficient for this question is under 
.30. The question on housemaids also falls into different positions due to the 
different answers from Muslim and Christian respondents; consequently the 
question is eliminated from the analysis. Overall, the Loevinger’s coefficient 
for Christian respondents is .56, which means that all the questions on 
contact avoidance for Christian respondents have good scalability. On all 
questions, Christian respondents show lower levels of contact avoidance 
than Muslims do.  The lowest mean score is found in the question about 
classmates (.0135), which means that 1.35% of Christian respondents 
avoid Muslims in their classes. The category of mayor shows the highest 
mean value (.0778), which means that 7.78% of Christian respondents are 
reluctant to have Muslims as their city mayor. 
Contact 
avoidance target 
Obs. Mean 
score 
Observed 
Guttman 
errors 
Expected 
Guttman 
errors 
Loevingers 
H 
Z-stat. 
 
Classmate 591 .0135 12 46.05 .74 25.15 
Neighbour 591 .0271 37 84.32 .56 25.61 
Boardmate 591 .0288 42 88.12 .52 24.32 
Close friend 591 .0321 59 98.72 .37 17.48 
Civil servant 591 .0338 42 95.53 .56 26.39 
Policeman 591 .0440 42 100.46 .58 25.99 
Mayor 591 .0778 32 97.75 .67 24.21 
 
Scale 591  133 302.97 .56 44.38 
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Figure 4.2 Contact avoidance by Christian respondents
In Figure 4.2, we again rank the order from least avoided to most 
avoided contact roles. Differing from Muslim respondents, Christian 
respondents’ answers display clear groupings that divide intimate contact 
roles from official ones in the ranking of whom they tend to avoid. 
Christian respondents rank mayors, civil servants, and policemen as the 
least accepted persons. This finding is consistent with the social distance 
scale for Western societies provided by Hagendoorn and Poppe (2004). 
Their studies on contact avoidance among Russians in the former Soviet 
republics distinguish between the private and the public domain. Other 
studies by Hagendorn and Hraba (1987:323-324) show that the Dutch 
tend to avoid contact with out-group members in the private (intimate) 
domain, such as physician, children’s marriage, and neighbours, more than 
in the public domain categories of work superiors, children’s school, and 
colleagues. Although Christian respondents in this study (and probably in 
Western societies generally) tend to categorize their social relations into 
private and public domains, they are more likely to accept intimate contact 
roles than official contact roles. However, people in Western countries are 
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more likely to accept official contact roles and are more likely to avoid 
intimate contact roles (Hagendoorn and Hraba, 1987). 
Besides strong scalability, both scales for Muslim and Christian 
respondents have strong reliability. The Cronbach’s alpha is .85 for Muslim 
respondents, and .80 for Christian respondents. The difference in overall 
mean of all the items shows that Muslim respondents score significantly 
higher on the measurement of contact avoidance (.16) than Christian 
respondents do (.04) (p<.01), as indicated by ANOVA testing. 
In this section, we present several examples of how informants 
avoid members of religious-out groups in formal and informal settings. 
Following Bogardus (1925b:1-2) we examined several indicators of contact 
avoidance, such as the rejection of members of religious out-groups serving 
as city mayors, policemen and civil servants, or as neighbours, housemates, 
and close friends. In the interviews, we found many examples of contact 
avoidance between Muslims and Christians, but relatively few examples of 
avoidance between members of different ethnic groups. Contact avoidance 
between members of distinct ethnic groups is less prevalent than contact 
avoidance between Muslims and Christians. 
The survey showed that Muslim respondents are more likely to avoid 
the appointment of city mayors and police commanders from religious out-
groups than Christian respondents are. In Ambon, this attitude is related 
to the fixation on equal religious representation in government. Muslim 
respondents disapprove when Christians fill both the position of mayor and 
the position of governor. Quite a few of them emphasize that the Muslim 
population is bigger than the Christian population at provincial level 
(50.61% Muslims in the Moluccas province according to Sensus Penduduk 
2010). More than once, Muslim respondents complained about the numeric 
imbalance between Christian and Muslim police officers, worrying that 
officers are likely to side with members of their own religious group when a 
conflict occurs. A female Muslim informant in Ambon, Fatima, explained: 
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“In my view, for positions of mayor, governor, and governmental offices, 
those officials prefer their own people [Christians] over us [Muslims]. There 
is no justice there. They do the same on the police force. In a moment of 
conflict, it is possible that some Christian policemen would shoot [Muslims] 
secretly. A Christian policeman, on 11th September 2011, shot a friend of 
my brother.” 
She added:
 “I do not mind actually [if a Christian becomes mayor], however, I wish that 
the power distribution between Muslims and Christians would be equal. It 
is fine that the governor is a Christian, but I want the mayor to be a Muslim. 
The fact is, now all high officials are Christians.” 
Another Muslim informant, Ayesa, stated: 
“If the [government] official is a Christian, he will only develop facilities 
for Christians. Churches will be built everywhere and nothing will be done 
for the allocation of mosques. However, if the official is a Muslim, he will 
only work to develop Islam. I dislike having more Christians than Muslim 
policemen because if there is a conflict, the Christian policemen will only 
protect Christians. Also, Muslim policemen will protect Muslims.” 
Discussing relationships between students at the university, several 
informants described how they avoid members of religious out-groups on 
campus after classes. The students in Universitas Pattimura usually gather 
in religious and ethnic groups after class sessions ends.  Lucas, a Christian 
student from Universitas Pattimura, said:
 
“If people sit together, they are grouped according to ethnic belonging or 
they cluster according to the village communities they are coming from. 
This group consists of students from Eastern Seram [Muslims]. That group 
is made up of students from the Southeast Moluccas [Muslim], and their 
members come together, sit, and socialize only with people of their own 
ethnic group. The other groups are students from Christian ethnicities; their 
members sit together under the trees.” 
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Contact avoidance between Muslim and Christian students also can 
be found in Yogyakarta. Amir, a Muslim student in Yogyakarta, explained: 
“In this faculty [Law-UGM], we mingle around in a cold manner. Muslim 
and Christian students separate after course sessions. There are usually 
bad Muslims, good Muslims, and Christian students. They do not interact. 
Members of HMI [Islamic University Student Association] communicate 
amongst themselves. There are also student communities based on the 
locations they gather in; for example, the parking lot, the mosque and coffee 
shops. They are named according to the places where they hang around.”
Another indicator of contact avoidance is segregation in boarding 
houses. Most respondents mentioned that they live in boarding houses that 
are restricted to members of a particular religious group. Some respondents 
explained that they feel religiously homogenous houses are necessary to 
preserve religious customs. Amir, a Muslim informant and member of 
KAMMI (Unity of Action of Indonesian Muslim Students) in Yogyakarta, 
said: 
“We live in a boarding house or we rent a house. We give a specific 
name to the house that we rent, e.g. Al Ikhwan, Hamas, etc. I think the 
house is needed to maintain relationships, and people who think in 
the same way have to inhabit it. I am ready to socialize [with non-
Muslims], but living in a mixed house is an impossible choice for me.” 
Unlike in Yogyakarta, many Muslim respondents in Ambon are afraid 
of having board mates from different religions for security reasons. A Muslim 
informant in Ambon mentioned: “I cannot be sure that they [Christian board 
mates] would have no intention of killing me. I am afraid that a religious 
conflict could possibly erupt in the night, while I am sleeping in my dorm.” 
During our interviews, we did not find any Christian informants who said 
that they are reluctant to have Muslims as their housemates.
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Differences between religious affiliations are likely the biggest barrier 
to contact between Muslims and Christians. Over the course of interviews 
in both locations, Informants explained in detail why that is the case. When 
asked why religion becomes a barrier to contact, Najib, a Muslim informant 
from Yogyakarta, said, “Muslims, as written in the Quran, will not follow 
non-Muslims’ way of life. Besides that, tensions between religious groups 
always exist because there are still efforts to convert Muslims into non-
Muslims or the other way around.” Religious values become a barrier 
to inter-religious interaction when both groups lack understanding about 
the values of religious out-groups. For instance, Muslim women and men 
are not allowed to hold hands in public before they marry. Such a rule 
would become a barrier to contact in cases where non-Muslims do not 
understand or are not aware of these religious rules. A Catholic informant 
from Yogyakarta, Maria, said:  
“Most of the time it is because of the religious principles people hold. 
In my view, going out with a friend of the opposite sex is common, 
but one day, when attending an event, I came with my boyfriend. We 
were holding hands. This turned out to be a problem [for Muslims].”
 
4.1.2 Avoidance of future spouse from a different religion 
The second dimension of intergroup contact avoidance is the avoidance 
of future spouses from a different religion. This topic was not included in 
the questions on contact avoidance based on the Mokken scale analysis. 
However, we included this question in the dimension of contact avoidance 
because it is seemed important in the Indonesian context. Individuals in 
Indonesia do not always choose their spouses. Parents, family, religious 
norms, and cultural traditions often determine who you have to marry. 
Marriages are deemed appropriate if they are arranged and conducted 
according to the religious regulations (UGM, 2010). Indeed, many 
interpretations of religious law in Indonesia forbid inter-religious marriage. 
Therefore, the question of how religion is involved in choosing a future 
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spouse differs from the other questions on contact avoidance, which 
assumed that individuals consciously and subjectively avoid or accept 
people from different religious groups.
Previous studies in Europe and Northern America include some 
questions on inter-ethnic or inter-religious marriages as part of the 
measurement of contact avoidance. For example, Tolsma et al. (2008) 
posed a question on inter-religious marital attitudes toward migrants 
in Netherlands. Bogardus (1925b; Hagendoorn, 1995) also included the 
subject as part of the social distance scale. This implies that the avoidance 
of a future spouse from an out-group is still common in Western countries 
and is included as an important avoided contact role in the social distance 
scale besides neighbours, close friends, colleagues, and fellow citizens. In 
this study, ‘avoidance of future spouse’ is a separate dimension of intergroup 
contact avoidance. Here too, we recoded the five answer categories into 
two categories: accept (0) and avoid (1). The difference in mean score 
demonstrates that Muslim respondents (.75) avoid future spouses who 
believe in another religious tradition more often than Christian respondents 
(.49) do.
It is evident from the survey data that both Muslim and Christian 
respondents avoid religious out-group members as future spouses. In the 
interviews, many Muslim respondents said that they are worried about being 
converted to Christianity. Fatima mentions that “I do not want to marry a 
[Christian]. I am afraid of being indoctrinated, as my faith is not firm yet.” 
Faisal, a Muslim informant in Yogyakarta said, “A Muslim must marry a 
Muslim. If a Muslim man marries a non-Muslim woman, that woman must 
convert to Islam. Besides, having a Muslim wife makes life easier because 
the couple shares the same vision and mission for their future life.” He 
added: 
“In Islam, we have rules and restrictions for both men and women in 
relationships. Men are not allowed to be too close to women and women 
are not permitted to go out at night. I see that non-Muslims have no such 
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restrictions. For me, that is a problem in building a relationship with 
them.” 
Similarly, Peter, a Christian informant in Yogyakarta, said:
“By having the same faith, there will be peace and togetherness. For 
example, when we go to church or celebrate events together, we could feel 
this togetherness. I learn it from my brothers [who married Muslims]. They 
respect each other’s religion, but they still have many conflicts. I want a 
harmonious life.”
4.1.3 Support for residential segregation
The third dimension of intergroup contact avoidance is support for residential 
segregation, as represented by q182 (I prefer to live in a neighbourhood 
inhabited by persons of the same religion) to q185 (There should be separate 
neighbourhoods where Muslims and Christians can live separately). We do 
not test the scale by  Mokken scale analysis and factor analysis because 
the questions only have one dimension, support for residential segregation. 
As with other dimensions of intergroup contact avoidance, we recoded the 
answer category into avoid (0) and accept (1). However, before recoding, 
the scores of q183 (I prefer to live in a neighbourhood inhabited by people 
of a different religion) were inverted because they contained a negative 
formulation. For both groups (Muslim and Christian respondents), the scale 
shows moderate reliability (α=.67) and also for Muslim respondents  (68). 
For Christian respondents, however, the scale contained a low reliability 
(α =.56). Since there are only few questions, the respective values are 
sufficient to indicate that these questions are reliable. The difference in 
overall mean scores indicates that Muslim respondents prefer to live in 
residential segregation (.40) more than Christian respondents do (.22), as 
tested by ANOVA. 
This view is supported by the interview data. A Muslim informant 
in Yogyakarta, Najib, mentioned: “I prefer a religiously homogenous 
neighbourhood. In religious practices, it is also more conducive. In social 
209
chAPteR 4 - the SocIAl locAtIon oF InteRgRoUP contAct AVoIdAnce
relationships, I respect differences when not related to religious practices.” 
Muhammad, a Muslim informant in Ambon, said:
“For me, nothing is greater than akidah [faith]. That is why I live in a 
neighbourhood with one religion. Besides, if there is religious violence, 
there will be many friends to defend us against aggressors before the 
troops arrive. Since the violence in 1999, housing is divided by religion, 
for example, the area from Kebun Cengkeh to STAIN is a Muslim area 
and the area from Karpan to STAIN is a Christian area. It is better to have 
prejudices and keep people at a distance than [to have] them living side 
by side. When the religious violence breaks out again, the violence will be 
greater if we [Muslims and Christians] stay side by side.” 
Some Christian respondents also seem to prefer to live in religiously 
segregated neighbourhoods. A Catholic informant in Yogyakarta, Maria, 
explained: “Considering my recent experiences, I think that living in a 
homogenous environment will be more pleasant. Living in a heterogonous 
environment is all right, but it is difficult to guarantee that there will be no 
[religious] fanaticism.”
4.1.4 Triangulation
Findings from the interviews confirm the survey results that demonstrate 
how the avoidance of intergroup contact is enacted in daily life. Both 
Christians and Muslims do not want to have people from the other religion 
serving as their city mayors, local policemen or regional civil servants. In 
addition to contact avoidance, most respondents also tend to avoid future 
spouses from religious out-groups, and avoid living in neighbourhoods 
inhabited by people of different religions. The interviews also confirm 
that Muslim respondents show higher intergroup contact avoidance than 
Christian respondents. The main reason for intergroup contact avoidance 
between Muslims and Christians is that both groups consider religious 
beliefs and practices to be barriers to contact. Consequently, to prevent 
religious tensions and conflicts, they prefer to avoid interaction with 
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religious out-group members. Our interviews also provide insight into how 
respondents rationalize the avoidance of contact with religious out-group 
members in specific instances. Few respondents avoid religious out-group 
members at all times. However, most of them avoid contact with people 
of other religions at specific times, such as during an outbreak of religious 
violence.
The interviews did not provide any additional information on the 
avoidance of religious out-group members as civil servants and close 
friends as described in the survey data. 
4.2 Intergroup contact avoidance and ethno-religious identification 
Referring to Phinney and Rotheram (1987), we define ethno-religious 
identification as ethno-religious definition and identification. The former 
refers to group categorization, while the latter indicates a group’s attitude, 
behaviour, and practices.
4.2.1 The construction of measurement
The construction of the measurement explains the procedure of factor 
analysis, answer categories, and descriptive statistics. 
4.2.1.1 Self-definition
We asked respondents whether they consider themselves to be Muslims, 
Protestants, Catholics, Hindus, or Buddhists. However, Hindus and 
Buddhists are excluded from the analysis because the focus of this study is 
on the relationship between Muslims and Christians. Ethno-religious self-
definition has a significant relation with contact avoidance, the avoidance 
of a future spouse from a different religion, and the support for residential 
segregation (p < .05). Ethnic identification includes thirteen categories of 
ethnic groups: Javanese, Sundanese, Ambonese, Buginese, Makasarese, 
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Madurese, Minangkabau, Butonese, Toraja, Minahasa, Chinese, Bataknese, 
and other minority ethnic groups. The cross tabulation between religions 
and ethnicities can be seen in Table 4.4. 
Table 4.4 Cross tabulation between ethnic and religious self-definition 
This data show that most Javanese, Butonese, Sundanese, Madurese, and 
Minangkabau respondents are Muslims. In contrast, most Ambonese, 
Chinese, Bataknese, and Torajanese respondents are Christians.
Self-definition in practice
In the following section, we describe how ethnic identity is expressed, 
given that respondents’ ethnic identities are more varied than their 
religious identities. Based on the interviews, we are able to illustrate 
how respondents identify with their religious or ethnic groups. All of our 
informants mentioned their religious identities during the interview, which 
is common in Indonesia since everyone is required to adhere to one of the 
six official religions. However, several respondents also mentioned their 
ethnicity; some respondents referred to their parents’ identities, while other 
respondents talked about places where they grew up. 
Ethnic groups Religions Total Muslim Christian 
 N % N %  
 
Javanese 348 41.83 104 16.99 452 
Sundanese 36 4.33 2 .33 38 
Madurese 36 4.33   36 
Minangkabau 17 2.04   17 
Ambonese 241 28.97 346 56.54 587 
Buginese 10 1.20   10 
Makassarese 2 .24 1 .16 3 
Butonese 95 11.42   95 
Toraja   20 3.27 20 
Minahasa   5 .82 5 
Chinese 1 1.20 43 7.03 44 
Bataknese 2 .24 35 5.72 37 
Others 44 5.29 56 9.15 100 
Total 832 100.00 612 100.00 1444 
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Many respondents categorize their ethnicity directly. Joseph, a Catholic 
informant in Ambon, said, ‘’I belong to the Kei ethnic group.” Faisal, a 
Muslim informant in Yogyakarta, said, ‘’I am proud to be a Javanese.” 
Most answers indicate that respondents inherited their ethnic identities 
from their parents, even in cases where respondents migrated from their 
ethnic regions and do not speak their ethnic language properly. Ahmed, 
a Muslim informant, was born in Sumatra, but his parents migrated from 
Java to Sumatra more than twenty years ago. With respect to his identity, 
he explained that ‘’Well, I see myself as Javanese. I was born and brought 
up in an environment in which Javanese people are the majority. Although 
I live in an area with Malay people, my community is still Javanese.’’
In other cases, ethnicity is fluid. Several respondents report that 
they use their ethnic identities functionally, depending on the occasion. 
A Muslim, Ayesa, gave an example. She was born in Masohi, in Central 
Moluccas, from a Butonese father and an Ambonese mother. She speaks 
both Butonese and Ambonese. When asked about her identity, she said: 
“I declare myself Butonese only when I meet people from Buton. However, 
I say I am Ambonese in front of common people. On campus, I consider 
myself Butonese, but I also often say I come from Ambon or Seram. If I 
meet people at the market, I say I am both Ambonese and Butonese. But 
it is more comfortable to be Butonese, because Ambonese are associated 
with horrible, stubborn, and rough behaviour.”
Many informants in Ambon did not directly state their ethnicity, but 
only mentioned their hometowns or family names. Unlike other provinces 
in Indonesia, the Moluccas has consisted of villages divided according 
to religious and ethno-linguistically related groups since the 17th century. 
Moreover, each family name belongs to a specific Christian or Muslim 
village. For example, Souwakil is a family name in Ambalau, Southern 
Buru Island, and people with this family name are mostly Muslim. Soselisa 
is a family name in Saparua and people with this surname are mostly 
Christian. Ufi is a family name in the Kei islands, and those who carry 
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the name are mostly Catholic. Consequently, among the Ambonese or 
Moluccans, religious and ethnic identities are easily recognized through 
geographic associations and family names. Therefore, when our informants 
stated only their family names or hometowns in interviews, there was 
an assumption that we would recognize their ethnicity and religion. For 
example, an informant introduced herself by saying, “My name is Fatima 
Salwa Tuanany from Kailolo.” This indicated that she is from the Hatuhaha 
ethnic group and that she is a Muslim. Another informant said, “My name 
is Johannes Weruatwarin from Wetlaar, Kei Islands,” indicating that he is a 
Catholic from the Kei Islands. 
4.2.1.2 Religious identification
Religious identification has several dimensions, including religious 
ceremonies, religious practices, religious friendships, and membership and 
participation in religious organizations. However, we use factor analysis 
for determining ‘factors on religious ceremonies and religious practices’ 
since these questions have the same scale, in terms of Likert scales.
1. Religious ceremonies and practices
We asked Muslims and Christians how often they attend religious 
ceremonies and participate in the religious practices of their own religious 
traditions. The questions about religious ceremonies are posed through 
the Likert scale.  For example, we ask, ‘could you indicate whether you 
participate or not in ... (religious ceremony)?’ The questions on religious 
practices ask about quantity, such as ‘How often do you go to religious 
services in mosques, churches, or other places of worship?’ We conducted a 
factor analysis separately for Muslims and Christians because the questions 
on religious ceremonies are different. We exclude the observation of Isra 
Miraj and Maulud, since Muslims do not widely celebrate these collective 
rites. 
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Table 4.5 Factor analysis for religious ceremonies and practices
The first and third step of factor analysis were not conducted due 
to different questions of religious ceremonies for Muslim and Christian 
respondents. The second step step for (Muslim respondents) produces 
three factors: collective rites (fasting, Idul Fitri and Idul Adha), rites of 
passage (marriage, circumcision, and funeral), and religious practices 
(praying, religious services, and reciting the Holy Scriptures). The second 
step (Christian respondents) results in two factors: religious ceremonies 
and religious practices. The question on fasting is excluded for Christians 
because of low communality (<.20). We split the factor analysis for Muslim 
respondents into two factors in order to adapt to the result of the second 
step (Christian respondents). However, the result is not statistically viable 
because it only consists of collective rites and rites of passage. Then, we 
divided the factor analysis for Christian respondents into three factors in 
order to adapt to the result of factor analysis for Muslim respondents at the 
 
 
Scale label 
for full population 
Muslims Christians 
Com. Factor loadings 
Pattern matrix 
Com. Factor loadings 
Pattern matrix 
 Collecti
ve rites 
Rites of  
passage 
practices  Collecti
ve rites 
Rites of  
passage 
practices 
 
28. Participation in religious 
ceremonies/rituals: Idul 
Fitri/Christmas 
.97 .98   .97 .98   
29. Participation in religious 
ceremonies/rituals: Idul 
Adha/Easther 
.93 .94   .96 .96   
27. Participation in religious 
ceremonies/rituals: Fasting .80 .87       
25. Participation in religious 
ceremonies/rituals: 
Marriage 
.72  .86  .65  -.83  
24. Participation in religious 
ceremonies/rituals: 
Circumcision 
.47  .67      
26. Participation in religious 
ceremonies/rituals: Funeral .49  .61  .66  -.75  
38. How often do you pray? .17   .72 .26   .50 
39. How often do you go to 
religious services in 
mosques, churches, temple 
or other places of worship? 
.20   .41 .27   .51 
57. How often do you read or 
recite the Holy Scripture 
(Koran, Bible)? 
.51   .41 .62   .80 
Initial eigenvalues  3.63 1.57 1.23  2.90 .74 1.74 
% of variance (extracted)  38.02 11.89 8.43  39.16 6.47 17.08 
Reliability (α)  .96 .78 .48  .98 .79 .60 
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beginning. The three factors are: collective rites (Christmas and Easter), 
rites of passage (marriage and funeral), and religious practices (praying, 
religious services, and reciting the Holy Scriptures). The question on 
baptism is excluded because it loads highly in two factors (>.30). The 
correlation between the three factors are significant (p <.05) and moderate 
(r<.60).
The reliability of collective rites is very high both for Muslim (.96) 
and Christian respondents (.98). Rites of passage is also high for both 
groups (.78 and .79), while religious practices are moderate for Christian 
respondents (.60) and are low for Muslim respondents (.48). Rites of passage 
consists of four answer categories, including: I do not participate in it and 
neither does my family (1), I do not participate in it but my family does (2), 
I do participate but for non-religious reasons (3), and I do participate for 
religious reasons (4). Collective rites is composed of three categories: I do 
not participate in it and neither does my family (1), I do not participate in it 
but my family does (2), and I do participate either for non-religious reasons 
or religious reasons (3). Religious practices has six categories: never and 
only on feast days (1), at least once a month (2), once a week (3), more than 
once a week (4), once a day (5), and several times a day (6).
2. Friendship by religion
The questions on religious friendship ask respondents how many of their 
friends have the same faith as them. The reliability of the three questions for 
both groups (Muslim and Christian respondents) is .52. The reliability of 
these questions for Christian respondents is .46 and for Muslim respondents 
is .08.. This measurement is divided into two dimensions: religious in-
group friends and religious out-group friends. This is in line with our 
conceptual framework: that among individuals, the more friends they have 
from the religious in-group, the more likely it is that they avoid contact 
with people from different religions. In contrast, the more friends they have 
from religious out-groups, the less likely it is that they avoid contact with 
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people from different religions. We compute both dimensions based on the 
maximum values because the questions emphasize the quantity of friends. 
The answer categories for both dimensions are recoded by combining 1 
(none) and 2 (some) into 1 to get a normal distribution curve. The results 
are none and some (1), relatively many and many (2), almost all (3), and 
all (4). 
3. Membership and participation in religious organization
Another dimension related to religious identity is membership and 
participation in religious organizations. The question about membership 
asks whether respondents are members, followers, and not members. We 
recoded the answer category to not members (0) and members or followers 
(1). The question about religious participation asks how frequently 
respondents participate in any religious organization, from never to more 
than once a week. To normalize the distribution, we recoded the answering 
category by combining category 4 (once a week) and 5 (more than once a 
week) into 4, therefore the results are never (1), only on special days (2), at 
least once a month(3), and at least once a week (4).
4.2.1.3 Ethnic identification
The measurement of ethnic identification consists of several dimensions, 
such as ethnic self-definition, ethnic ceremonies, ethnic languages, friendship 
by ethnicity, and membership and participation in ethnic organizations.
1. Ethnic ceremonies
The questions on ethnic ceremonies concern births, weddings, moving 
home, illnesses, and funerals. We ask respondents, ‘Could you indicate 
whether you know these ceremonies and whether you and/or your family 
participate or not in these ceremonies.’ The answer category consists of no 
knowledge (1), I do not participate in it and neither does my family (2), I 
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do not participate in it but my family does (3), and I do participate (4). The 
reliability of four questions is relatively high for both of the groups (.79), 
with Muslim respondents at (.76), and Christian respondents at (.81). 
2. Ethnic languages 
The questions about ethnic languages refer to languages ordinarily used 
at home, with families, at universities, with close friends, in communities, 
and with government officials. In Indonesia, everyday language use could 
be in a language or dialect different from the national language. The 
highest reliability—as presented by the Cronbach alpha—is for Christian 
respondents (.81), while the value of Cronbach alpha for Muslim respondents 
and for both groups are (.70) and (.75), respectively. We computed the 
number of occasions when respondents speak their ethnic languages. Lastly, 
we recoded the use of ethnic languages to obtain a normal distribution, 
therefore the ethnic languages have four intervals: never (0), one or two 
occasions (1), three or four occasions (2), and five or six occasions (3).
3. Friendship by ethnicity
Friendship by ethnicity is referred to as social embeddedness. These 
questions ask how many friends from the same ethnic group that a 
respondent has, ranging from none to all. The reliability of the questions 
is relatively high, as revealed by the Cronbach alpha for both groups (.88), 
Christian respondents (.81), and Muslim respondents (.77). We computed 
the relative number of friends who belong to a respondent’s ethnic group 
(‘homogeneous friends’). We expect that intergroup contact avoidance is 
stronger for those who have many friends from their own ethnic group. 
Here, we recoded social embeddedness into fewer categories to obtain a 
normal distribution by combining the available answers between none and 
some. Social embeddedness contains four answer categories: none and 
some (1), relatively many (2), almost all (3), and all (4).
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4. Memberships and participation in ethnic organizations
These questions focus on membership and participation in ethnic 
organizations. We ask whether respondents are not members, followers, 
or members of ethnic organizations. We recoded the answer category to 
not members (0) and followers or members (1). Meanwhile, the question 
on participation asks how often respondents participate in any ethnic 
organization, from never to more than once a week. We recoded the answer 
categories to find a normal distribution, i.e., never (1), only on special days 
(2), at least once a month and a week (3), and more than once a week (4).
4.2.2 Intergroup differences between Muslims and Christians
The following description is about intergroup differences between Muslim 
and Christian respondents in ethno-religious identification variables. Table 
4.6 lists the differences of mean scores between Muslims and Christians.
Table 4.6 intergroup differences in ethno-religious identification
Muslim and Christian respondents have significantly different mean 
scores in nine ethno-religious identification variables, the exceptions being 
religious practices, membership and participation in religious organization, 
 Muslim Christian
N M SD N M SD M diff. t-test df
 
Rites of passage 823 3.19 .85 583 3.40 .77 -.21 -4.78** 1323.99
Collective rites 825 2.89 .42 587 2.80 .46 .09 3.72** 1187.54
Religious practices 831 4.04 1.20 622 3.96 1.01 .08 1.36 1451
Religious In-group 
friends
842 3.22 .75 595 2.88 .85 .34 7.77** 1171.02
Religious out-group 
friends
760 2.05 .77 583 2.56 .72 -.51 -12.46** 1291.67
Membership in 
religious organization
828 .43 .49 580 .40 .49 .03 .97 1406
Participation in 
religious organization
346 2.58 .95 230 2.73 .97 -.15 -1.83 574
Ethnic ceremonies 761 2.62 .90 519 2.36 .98 .26 4.79** 1045.85
Ethnic languages 721 1.29 .88 541 .94 1.02 .35 6.40** 1066.78
Social embededness 776 2.67 .82 519 2.88 .874 -.21 -4.35** 1067.37
Membership in ethnic 
organization
822 .18 .38 564 .15 .36 .03 1.46 1384
Participation in ethnic 
organization
153 2.26 .80 90 2.43 .83 -.17 -1.59 241
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and membership and participation in ethnic organizations. Muslim 
respondents participate less in rites of passage (M=.319) than Christian 
respondents (M=3.40), but they are more in favor of attending collective 
rites (M=2.89) than Christian respondents (M=2.80). Muslim respondents 
are inclined to have more friends from the same religion (M=3.22) than 
Christian respondents do (M=2.88). In contrast, Christian respondents 
are more inclined to have more friends from different religions (M=2.56) 
compared to Muslim respondents (M=2.05). Table 4.6 indicates that Muslim 
respondents attend ethnic ceremonies more frequently (M=.262) than 
Christian respondents (M=2.36). Muslim respondents also speak an ethnic 
language more often (M=1.29) than Christian respondents (M=.94). In terms 
of social embeddedness, Christian respondents have more friends from the 
same ethnic group (M=2.88) than Muslim respondents (M=2.67).
Ethno-religious identifications by Muslims and Christians in practice
Survey findings showed that most Muslims celebrate Idul Fitri, Idul 
Adha, and most Christians celebrate Christmas. From the interviews, we 
find that almost all respondents celebrate these feast-days together with 
their families in their hometowns. Muslim communities in Ambon and 
Yogyakarta collectively celebrate Idul Fitri and Idul Adha. Christian 
communities hold Christmas parties in Ambon and Yogyakarta. In Maluku, 
the Idul Adha celebration features traditional rituals in which animals that 
will be slaughteredare paraded around the neighbourhood, and can include 
the reactivation of cultural bonds between villages. Fatima, a Muslim from 
Kailolo of Haruku Island said:
“At the Idul Adha celebration on Haruku Island, we have hadrat [parades]. 
There [in Kailolo of Haruku Island], we also have a ceremony to reactivate 
pela [the cultural bond] after the Idul Adha. We have it every year. In 
Ambon, we celebrate Idul Fitri in lapangan merdeka [the city square] and 
celebrate the Idul Adha at a mosque in a housing complex.” 
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In rural Maluku, it seems Islamic ceremonies are still intertwined 
with adat rituals, differing from local Christian ceremonies.  This is due to 
the historical practice of placing Muslim preachers under the adat structure 
(Bartels, 2001:139-140).
Respondents provided varied responses in regard to the frequency 
of their mosque and church visits. Some respondents report that they go to 
the mosque every day, and at the other end of the spectrum, some said they 
only go during special events. A Muslim informant, Ayesa, said: 
“I go to the mosque only on Islamic celebration days like Isra Miraj 
[ascendence of the prophet] and Maulid Nabi [the birthday of the prophet] 
and I am only a participant. Also I went to the mosque for shalat tarawih 
[collective praying in the night during fasting month].” 
Another Muslim informant, Muhammad, goes to the mosque almost 
every day. He says: “I perform shalat [religious services] in the campus 
mosque, but subuh [dawn praying] in Musholla Al-Kalam.” This mosque 
belongs to a community that is politically affiliated to PKS, the Prosperous 
and Justice Party, one of the Islamic parties in Indonesia.
Most Christians go to church every Sunday. A Christian informant, 
Elisabeth, mentioned: “I only go to the church on Sunday to participate in 
mass and to teach children in a Sunday school.” We did not find Christian 
informants who went to church only on Christian holy days. 
Praying is an important activity in the lives of both Muslims and 
Christians. Survey findings demonstrated that most respondents pray to 
God several times a day. In the interviews, some respondents confirm 
this. For example, Muhammad mentioned “doa [praying] was conducted 
several times a day, after every shalat [religious services]. That kind of 
praying is general, which is to pray for safety of parents, pray for safety in 
the world and in the hereafter. There are also special moments for praying, 
like when dealing with exams.” A Christian, Elisabeth, explained: “I pray 
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routinely before and after eating, sleeping, and going to campus. I also pray 
in special moments with God every day, between 12.00 and 02.30 pm or 
between 5.30 and 06.00 pm.” 
Another aspect of religious identification is reading the Holy 
Scriptures. Survey findings revealed that most Muslim and Christian 
respondents recite their Holy Scriptures at least once a day. In the interviews, 
many Muslim respondents mentioned that they recite the Quran after sunset, 
while most Christian respondents read the Bible during Sunday mass and 
during their morning prayers. A Muslim from Yogyakarta, Zahra, gave 
an example. When asked about when she recites the Quran, she replied, 
“after magrib [sunset praying], and when there is enough time after subuh 
[sunrise praying].” Henry, a Christian from Yogyakarta says that he reads 
the Bible during morning prayer.
Many respondents say that they have more friends belonging to 
their own religious groups than from other religions. However, several 
also mention that they have some friends from other religions, despite 
residential religious segregation. For example, a Muslim respondent from 
Ambon, Fatima, was asked whether she has Christian friends.  She said, “I 
have some. They are in Passo and in Karpan, and some of them live behind 
Soya. We began to know each other when participating in an English debate 
in Yogyakarta. At that time, I was in the third year of SMK [specialist 
senior high school].” A Catholic respondent, Johannes, has many Muslim 
friends. “I socialized with Muslims in SD [primary school], SMP [junior 
high school] and SMA [senior high school]. I had even lived with a Muslim 
family in Tual, the family of my classmate. In [student] associations, 
university, and GMNI [the Indonesian National Students Movement], we 
also have Muslim friends.” A Protestant respondent, Peter, says, “I have 
more Christian friends, but I have Muslim friends, too.”
 Another aspect of religious identification is participation in either 
religious organizations on campus or in mass-based religious organizations 
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outside campus. As mentioned earlier, several campus-based religious 
organizations were founded before the political reformation in 1998, such 
as the Campus Islamic Preaching Institute (Lembaga Dakwah Kampus, 
LDK); the Association of Christian University Students (Persekutuan 
Mahasiswa Kristen, PMK); and the Association of Catholic University 
Students (Keluarga Mahasiswa Katolik, KMK). In Ambon, several mass-
based religious organizations were established during the colonial period, 
such as the Youth Forces of Moluccan Protestant Churches (Angkatan 
Muda GPM, AM-GPM) and the Association of Muhammadiyah Teenagers 
(Ikatan Remaja Muhammadiyah, IRM). 
Although the survey findings showed that only a small percentage 
of respondents join religious organizations, it is worthwhile to give some 
examples. A Muslim in Ambon, Ayesa, stated, “I just participated in LDK. 
Our activities are studying religion [Islam] with various weekly topics. For 
examples about fiqih, Islamic laws, and how to dress in Islam. In my village 
[Masohi], I participated in IRM at Al-Muhajirin mosque.” A Christian, 
Lucas, explains, “I was a former teenage-chairman of AM-GPM at Bethel 
church, Mardika. I was then involved in the leadership of youth generation. 
Next, I was elected as a head of department at or the Indonesian Christian 
Students Movement [Gerakan Mahasiswa Kristen Indonesia, GMKI] of 
Economic-Unpatti.”
Like  religious  identification, ethnic  identification includes 
participation in ethnic ceremonies and organizations, use of ethnic 
languages, and friendship by ethnicity. As mentioned earlier, the survey 
findings indicated that most respondents participated in ethnic ceremonies, 
mainly wedding and funerals. The interviews also find that many respondents 
participate in ethnic ceremonies. A Muslim Butonese respondent, Ayesa, 
says, “I have also been a receptionist for a wedding committee. I was 
someone who delivered the property of the brides; there were scissors, 
blades [for women]; a long cloth for the groom. Then, as customs require, 
there was a pot for betel leaf.” Although ethnic ceremonies are not popular 
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in Christian villages in Ambon, they are still conducted in Catholic villages 
in the Southeast Moluccas. A Catholic, Johannes, explains: 
“For adat ritual activities, we were involved even in our childhood. For 
example, marriage and funeral rituals. There are rituals where children are 
involved, such as anak adat [native sons]. Without considering whether 
they are the first, second or third born child, from a Catholic, Muslim or 
Protestant family, if they are anak adat, they are given the chance to speak 
out at funerals. They speak in the release of the dead.”
 
Our survey findings revealed that Muslim respondents speak their 
ethnic language on more occasions than Christian respondents do. A 
Muslim, Fatima, says, “Our language is the Ambonese language because 
we have been living here a very long time. In Tulehu, I actually spoke the 
Kailolo language, but after moving here I completely forgot it because we 
speak the Ambonese language now.” Yusuf, another Muslim respondent, 
adds:
“Yes I speak in Sepa language. I learned it from my family. It was a 
traditional language. I began to learn it during childhood. In Sepa, we 
learned two languages, Ambonese-Malay and the mother tongue of our 
region. This language is used for talking about secret matters.”  
Johannes says he can speak his ethnic language from the Southeast 
Moluccas. “I know those [Kei] customs very well,” he says. “I speak the 
language too. I am familiar with all the customs of the Kei ethnic group.” 
Although Christian respondents from Java mostly speak Javanese, Christian 
respondents from Ambon generally do not speak their ethnic languages, 
which were replaced by the Malay languagewhen Dutch missionaries 
introduced Protestantism systematically in the 19th century (Chauvel, 
1990:4-14).
Friendship with people of the same ethnicity, a type of social 
embeddedness, is an important aspect of ethnic identification. It is common 
for respondents to have many ethnic in-group friends. Ayesa, a Muslim, has 
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a Butonese father and an Ambonese mother. She was born and grew up in 
the Central Moluccas. Unlike other Butonese, she does not use her father’s 
family name, but a common name, similar to the Javanese naming system. 
In Ambon, she studies at the State Islamic Institute and lives in a boarding 
house occupied by Butonese students. “In my rented house, almost all my 
friends are Butonese, they speak the Buton language. I am accepted because 
I know a little bit of it. But sometimes they mock me, saying that I am 
a fake Butonese,” she says. None of our Christian informants mentioned 
similar issues.
Another element of ethnic identification is participation in either 
mass- or campus-based ethnic organizations. Here, we give examples of 
two campus based-ethnic organizations in Ambon, the Evav Students’ 
Communication Forum (Forum Komunikasi Mahasiswa Evav, Fokusmapa) 
and the Sepa Students’ Association (Ikatan Pelajar Mahasiswa Sepa, 
IPMAS). Johannes says: 
“In Ambon, we have Fokusmapa. The main goal of this organization 
is to unify all student communities from the Southeast Moluccas and 
Tual City. All people that have blood relationships [with people in the 
Southeast-Moluccas] are united. They are advised to become a member 
of this organization. All students from the Kei Islands of Southeast 
Moluccas, without considering their religions, are welcome to join in the 
organization.” 
This ethnic student organization had around 8000 members studying 
in higher educational institutes in Ambon. Their activities, according to 
Johannes, include “some seminars on local wisdom in the Southeast 
Moluccas and collective religious celebrations, such as Christmas, Idul 
Fitri, and Easter, during which Kei students gather.”
On another ethnic organisation, IPMAS, Yusuf says: 
“We already have 12 branches throughout Indonesia. It is a national 
organization, with all its members from Sepa. University students or 
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those from any educational institution are included. This organization is 
open for students belong to negeri [an adat village] and petuanan [an 
administrative village]. Students from outside Sepa, who have a Sepa 
bloodline, have the right to join us.” 
This organization has around 100 members in Ambon and focuses on 
studying the history of Sepa and Islam.
The interview findings reveal that growing religious identification is 
in line with the decrease of ethnic identification. Hasan, a Muslim and head 
of LDK-Unpatti, says:
“In the Moluccas, culture is generally solid and strong. Among the 
many cultures is the culture of my village in Southern Buru, where adat 
[customary law] is unchangeable, and rather defies Islamic values [belief 
in God almighty]. Here is an example. Most people still believe in magic. 
We have laws in the Quran and Hadith but they believe in other parties 
beside Allah.” 
According to Hasan, people in his village still believe in supernatural 
powers. For example, during a long period of drought, they visited sacred 
places to pray for help. He and the other people from his village who study 
in Unpatti have tried to change this tradition to better reflect Islamic values. 
“Since my SMP [junior high school] years, I was still tied to our culture,” 
he says. “However, after studying in Ambon [Sciences-Unpatti], being 
introduced to tarbiyah [Islamic preaching] and understanding it [pure 
Islamic belief], my village-mates and I attempted to change the tradition.” 
When asked which bond is stronger, he says, “I have to say that my bond 
is to my religion.” 
Triangulation
The findings from the interviews confirm the results of the survey findings 
that indicate ethno-religious identification is relatively stronger among 
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respondents in Ambon than in Yogyakarta. Unlike the survey findings, the 
interviews are able to illustrate the growing religious identification among 
Muslim respondents in urban Moluccas, which is related to a decrease 
in traditional cultural systems. Relevant studies, for instance Lowry and 
Littlejohn (2006) and Bartels (2001), also point out that some cultural 
bonds have eroded due to the spread of conservative Islamic beliefs. In 
the interviews, Muslim respondents generally show stronger religious 
and ethnic identification than Christian respondents. In rural Moluccas, 
particularly in Muslim villages, this is due to the fact that religious 
practices and institutions are mostly subordinated under adat institutions. 
At the same time, we find that there are no significant differences between 
Muslim and Christian respondents in religious practices and membership 
in religious or ethnic organizations. Ten of the sixteen respondents say that 
they frequently attend religious services and that they pray several times 
a day. Additionally, more than half of them are affiliated with an ethnic or 
religious organization, although they are not members.
4.2.3 Intergroup contact avoidance and ethno-religious identification
In the following section, we present ANOVA results on the relationship 
between intergroup contact avoidance and ethno-religious identification. 
Only significant correlations will be described.
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Table 4.7 intergroup contact avoidance and ethno-religious identification
*= p value < .05 ** p value < .01, M = mean score
Muslim respondents
The following section describes the social location of intergroup contact 
avoidance among Muslim respondents. Participation in rites of passage 
has a significant effect on contact avoidance and the avoidance of future 
spouses from a different religion (p < .01). Among Muslim respondents, 
we discover that the more they participate in rites of passage, the more 
they tend to avoid contact with Christians (eta=.13), and the more they 
tend to avoid Christians as future spouses (eta=.16). There is a significant 
relationship between participation in collective rites and the avoidance 
of future spouses from a different religion (p < .05). The more frequently 
Muslims participate in collective rites, for example, the more they tend to 
avoid Christians as their future spouses (eta= .09). The amount of religious 
in-group friends an individual has significantly affects both contact 
avoidance and the support for residential segregation (p < .01). Among 
Muslim respondents, we discover that the more Muslims friends they have, 
Contact avoidance Avoidance of future spouse Support for residential 
segregation
Muslim Christian Muslim Christian Muslim Christian
M r/eta M r/eta M r/eta M r/eta M r/eta M r/eta
Rites of passage .16 .13** .04 .11** .75 .16*
Collective rites .75 .09*
Religious practices .04 .08* .49 .14**
Religious  in-group 
friends .16 .25** .03 .14** .40 .40** .22 .25**
Religious out-group 
friends .15
-
.29**
.75 -.17* .39 -.38** .21 -.21**
Membership in 
religious organizations .16 .11** .40 .10** .22 .11**
Participation in 
religious organizations .76 .17*
Ethnic  self-definition .16 .23** .03 .17** .75 .11** .40 .37** .22 -.31**
Ethnic ceremonies .74 -.10* .51 .18** .21 .12*
Ethnic languages .16 -.09* .52 .11* .39 -.08* .22 .16**
Social embededness .16 .16** .03 .16** .40 .24** .23 .25**
Membership in ethnic 
organizations .16 .07*
Participation in ethnic 
organizations .76 -.19*
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the more they tend to avoid contact with Christians (r=.20 eta=.25) and the 
more they tend to support residential segregation (r=.33 eta=.40). 
Having religious out-group friends is significantly related to contact 
avoidance, avoidance of future spouses from a different religion, and 
support for residential segregation (p < .01). For Muslim respondents, the 
more friends from different religions they have, the less they tend to avoid 
contact with Christians (r = -.29), the less they avoid Christians as their future 
spouses (r=-.17), and the less they support residential segregation (r= -.38). 
Membership in a religious organization has an effect on contact avoidance 
and on support for residential segregation (p < .01). Muslim respondents 
who become members or followers of any religious organization tend to 
avoid contact with Christians (eta=.10) and membership makes them more 
likely to support residential segregation (eta=.11). Participation in religious 
organizations is only significantly related to the avoidance of future spouses 
from a different religion. For Muslim respondents, the more participations 
in any kind of religious organization they engage in, the more they avoid 
Christians as their future spouses (eta=.17). 
Differences in ethnic groups have significant effects on contact 
avoidance (p < .01), on avoidance of future spouses from a different religion 
(p < .01), and on support for residential segregation (p <. 01). Among 
Muslim respondents, the more they are affiliated with ethnic groups, the 
more they tend to avoid contact with Christians (eta=.23), the more they 
tend to avoid Christians as their future spouses (eta=.11), and the more they 
tend to support residential segregation (eta=.37). Participation in ethnic 
ceremonies is significantly related to the avoidance of a future spouse 
from a different religion (Muslims p <. 05). We identify that the more 
frequently Muslim respondents participate in ethnic ceremonies, the less 
they tend to avoid Christians as their future spouses (r=-.10). Differences 
in using ethnic languages have a significant effect on contact avoidance 
(Muslim p < .03) and on support for residential segregation (Muslims p < 
.05). The more that Muslim respondents speak their ethnic languages, the 
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less they avoid contact with Christians (r=-.09), and the less they support 
residential segregation (r=-.08). Having friends from the same ethnicity is 
also significantly related to contact avoidance and support for residential 
segregation (p <.01). The ANOVA table shows that the more friends a 
Muslim respondent has with the same ethnic out-groups, the more they tend 
to avoid contact with Christians (eta=.16), and the more they tend to support 
residential segregation (eta=.24). Also, differences between members 
and non-members in any ethnic organization are significantly related to 
contact avoidance. Here, we find that the more that Muslim respondents 
become members or followers of any ethnic organization, the more they 
tend to avoid contact with Christians (eta=.07). In addition, participation 
in ethnic organizations has a significant effect on the avoidance of a future 
spouses from a different religion (p <. 05). The more Muslim respondents 
participate in ethnic organizations, the less they avoid Christians as future 
spouses (r=-.19).
Christian respondents
The following section describes the social location of intergroup contact 
avoidance among Christian respondents. Similar to Muslim respondents, 
attendance at rites of passage is significantly related to contact avoidance (p 
< .01). The more that Christian respondents participate in rites of passage, 
the more likely they are to avoid contact with Muslims (eta=.11). Moreover, 
religious practices relate significantly to contact avoidance (p < .05) and to 
the avoidance of future spouses from a different religion (p = .01). The 
more that Christian respondents engage in religious practices, the more 
they avoid contact with Muslims (r=.08) and the more they avoid Muslims 
as their future spouses (r=.14). Having friends from the same religion is 
related to contact avoidance (p < .01) and support for residential segregation 
(p <. 01). Among Christian respondents, we find that the more Christian 
friends they have, the more they tend to avoid contact with Muslims 
(r=.14), and the more they tend to support residential segregation (r=.25). 
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Having friends from different religions is also significantly associated 
with support for residential segregation (p < .01). The more friends from 
different religions Christian respondents have, the less they tend to support 
residential segregation (r=.-21). Membership in any religious organization 
has a significant relationship with support for residential segregation. The 
more that Christian respondents become members and followers of any 
religious organizations, the more they tend to support residential segregation 
(eta=.11). 
Among Christian respondents, differences in ethnic self-definition are 
significantly related to all measures of intergroup contact avoidance. The 
more they affiliate with their ethnic groups, the more they tend to support 
residential segregation (eta=.31) and contact avoidance (eta=.11). Also, 
participation in ethnic ceremonies is significantly related to the avoidance 
of a future spouse from a different religion (p < .05), and support for 
residential segregation (p <. 05). The more frequently Christian respondents 
participate in ethnic ceremonies, the more they avoid Muslims as their 
future spouses (eta=.18), and the more they tend to support residential 
segregation (eta=.12). Use of ethnic languages is significantly related to the 
avoidance of a future spouse of a different religion (p < .05) and to support 
for residential segregation (p<.01). The more often Christian respondents 
speak their ethnic languages, the more they avoid Muslims as their future 
spouses (r=.11), and the more they tend to support residential segregation 
(eta=.16). Having friends from the same ethnicity is significantly related to 
contact avoidance and support for residential segregation. The more friends 
from the same ethnic groups Christian respondents have, the more they 
tend to avoid contact with Muslims (eta=.16), and the more they tend to 
support residential segregation (eta=.25).
4.3 Intergroup contact avoidance and individual determinants
This section describes the construction of the measurement for intergroup 
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differences, and the analysis of variance between individual determinants 
and intergroup contact avoidance.
4.3.1 The construction of measurement
We use several variables for identifying the social characteristics of our 
respondents: gender, parents’ religions, household income, parents’ 
education, occupational status, and occupation status. 
1. Gender
Gender consists of the categories of female and male.
2. Parents’  religions 
We asked respondents which religious tradition their mothers and fathers 
belong to, and then constructed a cross tabulation of respondents’ religions 
and their parents’ religions. Homogamous parents refers to respondents who 
are the same religion as their fathers and mothers, while non-homogamous 
parents refers to respondents whose parents have a different religion. Table 
4.10 indicates that almost all Muslim respondents (98.83%) and Christian 
respondents (96.18%) are from homogamous parents.
Table 4.8 Homogamous and non-homogamous parents
3. Household income
The question on household consists of eight possible answer categories, as 
follows: lower than IDR 500,000 (1), IDR 500,000 - IDR 999,999 (2), IDR 
1,000,000, - IDR 1,999,999 (3), IDR 2,000,000, - IDR 2,999,999 (4), IDR 
 Muslim Christian 
Frequency % Frequency % 
 
Non-homogamous parents 10 1.17 24 3.82 
Homogamous parents 843 98.83 605 96.18 
Total 853 100 629 100 
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3,000,000, - IDR 3,999,999 (5), IDR 4,000,000, - IDR 4,999,999 (6), IDR 
5,000,000, - IDR 5,999,999 (7), over than IDR 6,000,000, (8). We recoded 
the answer categories from 8 into 3 to be in line with the classification 
of household income in the Indonesian social-economy survey, using the 
classifications of lower, middle, and upper income (Oktavianti, 2008:133; 
Arianingsih, 2012:471). We classify respondents whose household income 
is lower than IDR 1,000,000 as part of the ‘lower class’ and those whose 
household income is between IDR 1,000,000 and IDR 4,999,999 as part 
of the ‘middle class’. We classify respondents whose household income is 
IDR 5,000,000 or more as part of the ‘upper class’.
4. Parents’ education
The question on parents’ education refers to inquiries about father’s 
educational level and mother’s educational level. Both questions reflect the 
nine levels of education in the Indonesian educational system, as follows: 
no formal education (1), kindergarten (2), primary school (3), secondary 
school (4), senior high school (5), diploma or D1-D4 (6), bachelor or S1 
(7), master or S2 (8), and PhD or S3 (9). We recoded the answer categories 
into four categories to adjust it to the standard Indonesian classification 
of the educational system, which consists of no formal education (1), 
basic education (2), middle education (3), and higher education (4) (Pusat 
Statistik Pendidikan, 2012). Basic education refers to kindergartens and 
primary schools, while the middle education refers to secondary and senior 
high schools. Higher education includes diploma, bachelor, master, and 
PhD. In addition, we compute parents’ education by combining the mean 
values of both parents’ level of education. 
5. Occupational status
This question requests information on both mothers’ and fathers’ 
occupational status. Each question has sevenanswer categories: self-
employed (1), employee helped by paid workers (2), employee helped 
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by unpaid workers (3), workers (4), free workers in agriculture (5), free 
workers in non-agriculture sector (6), and unpaid workers (7). We recoded 
the categories of self-employed (1), employee helped by paid workers 
(2), and employee helped by unpaid workers (3) into self-employed. Free 
workers in agriculture (5) and free workers in non-agriculture sector (6) 
were recoded into free workers. New answer categories are self-employed 
(1), workers (2), free workers (3), and unpaid workers(4) . We recoded the 
answer category to adapt with the conceptual definition of occupational 
status. 
6. Occupation status
We asked respondents about their parents’ occupation status. Each question 
has 11 answer categories: executives, professionals, technicians, clerks, 
sales workers, farmers, trades, machine operators, unskilled workers, 
special occupations, and dead or absent. 
4.3.2 Intergroup differences between Muslim and Christian
Table 4.9 Intergroup differences in social characteristics
Muslim and Christian respondents display significant differences 
in mean scores for gender, parents’ religion, household income, parents’ 
education, and occupation status. There were more female Muslim 
respondents (M=1.50) than female Christian respondents (M=.144). Muslim 
respondents also reported that more of their parents share their religion 
(M=.99) than Christian respondents (M=.96). In terms of household income, 
 Muslim Christian    
N M SD N M SD M diff. t-test df 
\ 
Gender (1=m; 2=f) 838 1.50 .50 621 1.44 .49 .06 2.26* 1341.39 
Parents’ religion 853 .99 .11 629 .96 .19 .03 3.11** 917.64 
Household income 823 1.80 .72 583 1.94 .70 -.14 -3.63** 1265.23 
Parents education 568 2.96 .77 415 3.24 .67 -.28 -6.10** 948.73 
Occupational status 758 1.61 .83 550 1.61 .77 -.00 -.07 1306 
Occupation status 630 6.18 1.76 439 5.96 2.00 .22 1.92 1067 
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more Christian respondents belonged to the upper class category (M=1.94) 
compared to Muslim respondents (M=1.80). Christian respondents parents’ 
had higher levels of education (M=3.24) than Muslim respondents’ parents 
(M=2.96). 
4.3.3 Intergroup contact avoidance and individual determinants
Table 4.10 Intergroup contact avoidance and individual determinants
*= p value <.05, ** =p value <.01, M = mean score
Muslim respondents
Among Muslim respondents, several measures of individual determinants 
have a significant relationship with avoidance of intergroup contact. Gender 
differences are related to the avoidance of a future spouse from a different 
religion (p <. 01). Female respondents appear more inclined to avoid a 
future spouse of a different religion than male respondents. Moreover, 
disparities in household income have a significant relationship with contact 
avoidance, and support for residential segregation (p < .01). The ANOVA 
table shows that the higher Muslim respondents’ household income is, the 
more they tend to avoid contact with Christians (r=.12 eta=.15), and the 
less they tend to support residential segregation (r=-.25). Differences in 
parents’ educational levels are significantly related to contact avoidance 
(p < .01) and to support for residential segregation (p <  .01). For Muslim 
respondents, the higher their parents’ educational levels are, the less they 
 Contact avoidance Avoidance of future spouse Support for residential 
segregation 
Muslim Christian Muslim Christian Muslim Christian 
M r/eta M r/eta M r/eta M r/eta M r/eta M r/eta 
 
Gender     .75 .18** .49 .27**   .22 .08* 
Parents religion             
Household 
income .16 .15**     .49 .20** .40 -.19**   
Parents education .15 -.14**     .49 .14* .40 -.25**   
Occupational 
status         .41 .17**   
Occupation status  .16 .19*       .42 .30**   
235
chAPteR 4 - the SocIAl locAtIon oF InteRgRoUP contAct AVoIdAnce
tend to avoid contact with Christians (r=-.14) and the less they tend to 
support residential segregation (r=-.25). 
Differences in parents’ occupational status are significantly related to 
support for residential segregation (p < .01). The scalar order of occupational 
status ranges from higher (self-employed) to lower (unpaid workers), and 
among Muslim respondents, the lower their parents’ occupational status, the 
more they tend to support residential segregation (eta=.17). Differences in 
parents’ occupation status are also significantly related to contact avoidance 
(p <. 05), and to support for residential segregation (p < .01). The scalar 
order of occupational status ranges from higher (top executive) to lower 
(deceased father), and among Muslim respondents, the lower their parents’ 
occupation status is, the more they tend to avoid contact with Christians 
(eta=.19) and support residential segregation (eta=.30).
Christian respondents
Similar to the case with Muslim respondents, gender differences in Christian 
respondents are significantly related to the avoidance of a future spouse of 
a different religion (p < .01). More female Christian respondents indicated 
that they tend to avoid a future spouse of a different religion (eta=.27) than 
female Muslim respondents (eta=.18).However, different from Muslim 
respodents, differences in gender among Christian respondents is related 
to support for residential segregation (p<.05). Differences in household 
income are also related to the avoidance of a future spouse from a different 
religion (p < .01). The higher Christian respondents’ household income 
is, the more they tend to avoid Muslims as their future spouses (r=.14). 
Lastly, differences in parents’ education are significantly related to support 
for residential segregation. Among Christian respondents, the higher their 
parents’ levels of education, the more they tend to avoid Muslims as future 
spouses (r=.14).
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4.4 Intergroup contact avoidance and intermediary variables
The following section describes the construction of the measurement 
for intermediate variables, intergroup differences between Muslims and 
Christians, and the analysis of variance.
4.4.1 The construction of measurements
Intermediate variables consist of salience of identity, perceived group threat, 
intergroup contact, religiosity, individual memory of violence, perceived 
discrimination, nationalism, distrust, and social dominant orientation. 
4.4.1.1 Salience of  identity
The questions regarding salience of identity explore to what extent religious 
and ethnic identities are important and influential in daily life. Since the 
questions are for Muslim and Christian respondents, we used three steps 
of factor analysis in order to extrapolate the factors. As we said in the 
description of the general procedure, we constructed a cross-religious 
comparability in order to discover the intergroup differences between 
Muslim and Christian respondents. It is also useful to find out whether or 
not the overall structure in both groups holds well for each group. In the 
first step (both groups), q40 (my religious identity is important) and q41 
(committed member of religious group) loads highly (>.30) on two factors. 
Both questions were excluded from the next steps. The first step shows two 
factors, namely religious and ethnic salience. The second step (Muslim and 
Christian respondents separately) and the third step (both groups) have two 
identical factors that contain the same questions on religion and ethnicity 
(see Table 1, Appendix 1). The reliability of ethnicity is .82 while the 
reliability of religion is .77; therefore, both factors have high reliability. We 
decided to have two different factors because the correlation value is quite 
low (.35). To normalize the distribution, we recoded the answer categories 
into totally disagree and disagree (1), neither disagree nor agree (2), agree 
(3), and totally agree (4). 
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4.4.1.2 Perceived group threat
Both Muslim and Christian respondents were asked whether they feel 
threatened by religious out-groups in the context of the economy (job 
prospects, study grants, control of business, boarding houses), social 
contexts (security on campus, security of their neighbourhoods, violence 
in their neighbourhoods), politics (migration, crucial positions, preferential 
treatment), and in the context of culture (customs). In the first step (both 
groups), q157 (The day will come when members of other religious groups 
will occupy crucial positions in the government) has low communality 
(.24) and disappears in a patterned matrix. The result of the first step is two 
factors, political economy threat and socio-cultural threat. In the second step 
(for Muslim respondents), q162 (I am afraid of increasing violence in my 
neighbourhood due to the presence of other religious groups) loads highly 
(>.30) on two factors, and both are excluded from the next steps. The second 
step (Muslim and Christian respondents separately) and the third step (both 
groups) have two identical factors with the same items, namely political 
economy and culture (see Table 2, Appendix 1). The correlation between 
both factors is .58, which suggests that we should merge both factors into 
one factor. The reliability for one factor is .92, while the reliability for 
two factors is .92 and .80. We recoded the answer category to normalize 
the distribution into totally disagree (1), disagree (2), neither disagree nor 
agree (3), agree (4), and totally agree (5). The total number of respondents 
is 1,441 with an average score of 2.16.
4.4.1.3 Intergroup contact
The measurement for actual intergroup contact consists of the quantity of 
contact and the quality of contact.  
1. Quantity of contact
We asked respondents about the frequency of their contact with their 
neighbours, housemates, close friends, classmates, and relatives from 
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different religions over the past year, from never to not applicable. The 
answer option not applicable (7) was recoded into missing. We do not use 
a factor analysis since quantity of contact only has one dimension. The 
questions have a high Cronbach alpha both for Muslim (.89) and Christian 
respondents (.84), indicating that all questions are reliable. The quantity 
of contact is made up of six answer categories: never (1), at least once a 
month (2), once a week (3), more than once a week (4), once a day (5), 
and several times a day (6). The mean value is 3.11 and the number of 
respondents who answer all of the questions on the quantity of contact is 
also high (1,220). 
2. Quality of contact
Both Muslim and Christian respondents were asked to what extent they 
are close to, equal with, and cooperative with their neighbours, close 
friends, classmates, board mates, and relatives from different religions. 
Here, the answer option not applicable (6) is recoded into missing. We 
conducted a factor analysis in three procedures since all of the questions 
are applicable to both Muslim and Christian respondents. The result of the 
factor analysis in the first step (both groups) is identical with the result of 
the second step (Muslim respondents). Both of them have three factors: 
closeness and cooperativeness, evaluation, and equality. However, the 
second step (Christian respondents) has four factors that are in line with 
the conceptual framework. Then, we formulated the factor analysis of 
Christian respondents into three factors in order to adapt with the first step 
(both groups) and the second step (Muslim respondents). The third step 
(both groups) produces three identical factors that are similar to the first and 
second step  (See table 3 Appendix 1). The Cronbach alpha at national level 
is .97, while for Muslim respondents it is .97 and for Christian respondents 
it is .95. This means that the reliability of these questions is very high. 
We recoded the answering categories into very negative (1), negative (2), 
neither negative nor positive (3), and positive (4). The average score of the 
1,030 respondents is 3.45. 
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4.4.1.4 Religiosity
The measurement for religiosity consists of religiocentrism, attitudes 
toward religious plurality, and interpretation of sacred writing.
1. Religiocentrism
The questions on religiocentrism combine items on positive in-group 
attitudes and negative out-group attitudes for both Muslims and Christians. 
In this variable, we conduct one test procedure as we separate the 
questions between Muslim and Christian respondents. The results of the 
factor analysis for Muslim and Christian respondents are identical if both 
questions and factors are in accordance with the conceptual framework, i.e. 
religiocentrism as the combination of positive in-group attitudes and the 
negative out-group attitudes (see Table 4, Appendix 1). After recoding to 
normalize the distribution, the positive in-group attitudes have four answer 
categories, namely totally disagree and disagree (1), neither disagree nor 
agree (2), agree (3), and totally agree (4). Meanwhile, the negative out-
group attitudes has five answer categories from disagree to totally agree. 
The mean value of the positive in-group category (3.23) is higher than 
negative out-group category (2.49). Moreover, the number of respondents 
who answered questions on the positive in-group attitudes (1,443) is higher 
than the number who answered regarding the negative out-group attitudes 
(1,434).
2.  Attitudes toward Religious plurality
We asked Muslim and Christian respondents about their interpretations 
of the truth claims of their own religions in relation to other religions. 
Theoretically, we distinguish three different models of interpreting religious 
plurality: monism, pluralism, and relativism. To check the cross-religious 
comparability, a three-step procedure of factor analysis was followed. 
In the first step (both groups), q78 (Compared with other religions, my 
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religion offers the surest way to liberation) has low communality (.18) and 
is excluded from the next steps. The second step Muslim and Christian 
respondents separately) and the third step (both groups), produce two 
identical factors that contain the same questions, namely monism and 
pluralism (see Table 5, Appendix 1). The reliability of monism (.81) is a 
little higher than the reliability of pluralism (.80). The correlation value 
between monism and pluralism is lower than .60, therefore maintaining 
two factors is appropriate. The monism and pluralism categories have five 
answer categories ranging from totally disagree to totally agree. The mean 
value of monism (3.00) is lower than the mean value of pluralism (3.15). 
The number of respondents who answered questions on pluralism (1,456) 
is a little higher than the number who answered questions on monism 
(1,450).
3.   Interpretation of sacred writing
The questions on interpretation of sacred writing concern the way 
respondents interpret their Holy Scriptures, either intratextually or 
symbolically. We conducted three procedures of factor analysis, but the 
results are rather complicated in terms of identical questions. The first step 
(both groups) results in two factors, intratextual and symbolic, where the 
loading value of q64 (The Sacred Writing is not really the word of God, but 
the word of man) is negative, while in contrast, other values are positive. 
The second step (Christian respondents) has the same pattern as the first 
step. The second step  (Muslim respondents) has a different result, with 
the second factor (symbolic) having only one question. In addition, q67 
(I think that the Sacred Writing should be taken literally, as it is written) 
and q68 (The meanings of the Sacred Writing are open to change and 
interpretation) have low commonalities (<.20). We excluded these 
questions from the next steps, including q64. The second step (Muslim and 
Christian respondents separately) and third step (both groups) have two 
identical factors that contain similar items, intratextual fundamentalism 
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and hermeneutic interpretation. The correlation value between both factors 
are very low (.08), therefore we decided to keep these two factors (See 
Table 6, Appendix 1). After recoding, intratextual fundamentalism consists 
of four categories, which range from totally disagree and disagree (1) to 
totally agree (4). Hermeneutic interpretation consists of five categories 
ranging from totally disagree (1) to totally agree (5). The mean score of 
questions on intratextual fundamentalism (3.85) is higher than the mean 
score of questions on hermeneutic interpretation (3.55). Respondents were 
more likely to answer questions on intratextual fundamentalism (1,457) 
than questions of hermeneutic interpretation (1,446).
4.4.1.5  Perceived discrimination
We asked respondents to what extent they feel discriminated against by 
religious out-group members in politics, the economy, culture, and religion. 
We conducted three procedures of factor analysis. The first step (both 
groups) produced two factors, where the first factor consists of 14 questions 
(on politics, the economy, and religion) and the second factor contains 
three questions (on culture). In the second step (Muslim respondents), q195 
(Limitations on public observance of religious festivals), q198 (Limitations 
on building places of worship), and q204 (Limitations on the observance of 
religious laws on marriage and divorce) load highly (>.30) in two factors 
and these questions are exlcuded from the next steps. In the second step 
(Christian respondents), q197 (Limitations on marriage) loads highly (>.30) 
in two factors and is deleted from the next steps. The second step (Muslim 
and Christian respondents separately) and third step (both groups) produce 
two identical factors that contain similar questions, public discrimination 
and private discrimination (See Table 7, Appendix 1). The reliability of 
public discrimination (.91) is higher than that of private discrimination 
(.78). The correlation between factors is .49 for Muslim respondents and 
.63 for Christian respondents, therefore we decided to use only the factor 
of discrimination. The reliability of discrimination is also very high (.91). 
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This scale has four answer categories from totally disagree (1) to agree and 
totally agree (4). The mean value of discrimination is low (1.94), and 1,440 
respondents answered all of the questions.  
4.4.1.6 Individual memory of violence
The questions regarding memories of violence inquire whether respondents 
and their families, relatives, friends, and neighbours suffered any kind of 
physical injuries or loss of life due to violence. We only consider respondents 
who have experienced or witnessed violence in their hometowns between 
2001 and 2011. Based on our literature review (Pooley and Doherty, 1997; 
Anderson and Shuttleworth, 2003), we classify memories and experiences 
of violence into three dimensions: memory, direct experience, and indirect 
experience. The category memory includes some questions on places, 
socialization, and witnesses. Meanwhile, direct experience contains several 
questions about physical injury, families, and relatives. Indirect experience 
only includes two questions about close friends and neighbours (See Table 
8, Appendix 1). The Cronbach alpha of memory for Muslims (.71) is higher 
than that for Christians (.65), and for that of both groups (.69). Direct 
experience of violence for Muslims also has the higher Cronbach alpha (.81) 
compared to that for Christians (.79) and both groups (.80). Meanwhile, the 
indirect experience of violence for both groups and Christians (.76) has 
a similar alpha with that of Muslims (.75). All questions have a higher 
alpha (.85) for both groups and each group. After recoding to normalize the 
distribution, the memory of violence has four answer categories, namely no 
experience (0), one occasion (1), two occasions (2), and three occasions (3). 
Both direct violence and indirect violence consist of four answer categories 
from no experience (0) to three and more occasions (3). Respondents are 
more likely to answer questions on indirect violence (1452) compared to 
questions on memory (1,431) and direct violence (1,434). The correlation 
values between dimensions are low (<.60), therefore we decide to keep the 
three dimensions.
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4.4.1.7 Nationalism
The measurement for nationalism consists of nationalism itself, 
regiocentrism, and national pride. 
1. Nationalism and regiocentrism
The questions on nationalism ask to what extent respondents love and respect 
their own country and regencies. We conducted three procedures of factor 
analysis. The first step (both groups) resulted in two factors, nationalism 
and regiocentrism. Moreover, q149 (There is something about Indonesia 
today that makes me feel shame) and q146 (I would rather be a resident 
of my district than of other districts in Indonesia) have low communality 
(<.20); while q143 (My country is better than most other countries) and 
q147 (My most important characteristics come from my nationality) load 
highly (>.30) in two factors. We excluded these four questions from the 
next steps. The second step (Muslim respondents) also produces two 
factors, but q145 (I should support my country even if my country is wrong) 
loads highly (>.30) in two factors and is excluded from the next steps. The 
second  step (Christian respondents) and the third step (both groups) have 
two identical factors, which are the same with the second step (Muslim 
respondents), i.e., nationalism and regiocentrism (See Table 9, Appendix 
1). The Cronbach alpha of nationalism (.66) is not much different from 
the alpha of regiocentrism (.62). The correlation between the two factors 
is very low (<.20), therefore it is reasonable to maintain two factors. After 
recoding, nationalism has four answer categories, from totally disagree 
and disagree (1) to totally agree (4), while regiocentrism consists of five 
categories from totally disagree (1) to totally agree (5).
2. National pride
We exlcuded the following questions on national pride: q136 (How proud 
are you of your country in terms of its achievement in history?) and q137 
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(How proud are you of your country in terms of its achievement in equal 
treatment of all groups in society?).  We exlcuded these questions due to 
their interrogative form. National pride consists of five answer categories 
from totally disagree to totally agree. The questions on nationalism have 
a higher mean value (3.76) than the questions on regiocentrism (2.34) and 
national pride (3.68). The number of respondents who answered all of the 
questions of the three factors is 1,438. The questions on regiocentrism 
were answered by more respondents (1,464) than were the questions on 
nationalism (1,459) and national pride (1,448).
4.4.1.8 Distrust
Muslim respondents were asked to what extent they trust or distrust 
Christians, and Christian respondents were questioned to what extent they 
trust and distrust of Muslims (See Table 10, Appendix 1). The score of 
questions q208-q211 (On the whole one can trust Muslims, On the whole 
one can trust Christians, On the whole one can rely on Muslim, On the whole 
one can rely on Christians) are inverted because they contain a negative 
formulation. After recoding, distrust consists of four answer categories 
from totally disagree (1) to agree and totally agree (4). Additionally, the 
mean value of distrust from a significantly high number of respondents 
(1,442) is quite moderate (2.43).
4.4.1.9 Social Dominance Orientation (SDO)
We asked both Muslim and Christian respondents to what extent they feel 
dominance and equality in intergroup relations is important. The score of 
questions q98 (It would be good if groups could be equal) to q105 (No 
one group should dominate in society) are inverted because they contain 
a negative formulation. We used three procedures of factor analysis. 
The first step (both groups) consists of three factors. Question q104 (We 
should strive to make incomes as equal as possible) loads highly within 
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two factors (>.30) and is excluded from the next steps. In the second step 
(Muslim respondents), q103 (We would have fewer problems if we treated 
people more equally) has a low communality value (<.02) and it is excluded 
from the next steps. The result of the second step (Muslim respondents) is 
three factors, while the second step (Christian respondents) is two factors. 
Then, we formulate the factor analysis (Muslim respondents) into two 
factors. Question q90 (Some groups of people are simply inferior to other 
groups) and q105 that have low communality (<.20) are excluded from 
this analysis. The second step (Christian respondents) and third step (both 
groups) have the same results as the second  step (Muslim respondents). The 
two identical factors contain the same questions, namely dominance and 
equality (See Table 11, Appendix 1). After recoding, dominance has four 
answer categories from totally disagree (1) to totally agree and agree (4), 
while inequality has three answer categories that consist of totally disagree 
(1), disagree (2), and neither, agree, and totally agree (3). The questions on 
dominance have a higher mean value (2.15) than the questions on equality 
(1.62). More respondents answered questions on dominance (1,452) than 
on inequality (1,439). 
4.4.2 Intergroup differences between Muslim and Christians
Here we present the findings regarding the differences in mean scores 
between Muslim and Christian respondents
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Table 4.11 Intergroup differences in intermediate variables
Muslim and Christian respondents display several significant 
differences in the mean scores of all intermediate variables, except for 
religious salience, ethnic salience, and inequality. Muslim respondents tend 
to indicate a stronger sense of perceived threat (M=2.21) than Christian 
respondents (M=2.09). Christian respondents have more frequent contact 
(M=3.72) with Muslim respondents (M=2.65), and have a more positive 
evaluation of such contact (M=2.71) compared to Muslim respondents 
(M=2.29). In the religiocentrism category, Muslim respondents have 
a more positive image of their in-group (M=2.54) and a more negative 
picture of out-groups (M=2.53) than Christian respondents (M=1.87 and 
M=2.44 respectively). Muslim respondents also tend to have a stronger 
religious monistic view (M=3.33) than Christian respondents (M=2.56). 
Not surprisingly, then, Christian respondents show more support for 
 Muslim Christian  
N M SD N M SD M diff. t-test df 
 
Religious salience 835 3.09 .83 617 3.08 .84 .01 .17 1450 
Ethnic salience 842 1.45 .58 598 1.43 .62 .02 .63 1438 
Perceived threat 838 2.21 .77 603 2.09 .73 .12 2.92** 1340.86 
Quantity of contact 688 2.65 1.71 532 3.72 1.67 -1.07 -10.91** 1154.14 
Quality of contact 528 2.29 .74 502 2.71 .62 -.43 -10.11** 1011.63 
Positive in-group 835 2.54 .85 608 1.87 .76 .67 15.70** 1386.28 
Negative out-group 827 2.53 .91 607 2.44 .89 .09 1.98* 1320.39 
Monism 832 3.33 .86 618 2.56 .92 .78 16.33** 1273.87 
Pluralism 839 2.88 .87 617 3.51 .72 -.63 -15.18** 1433.58 
Intratextual  
fundamentalism 
841 3.07 .77 616 2.58 .92 .49 10.73** 1179.93 
Hermeneutic 
interpretation 
831 3.39 .92 615 3.76 .84 -.37 -8.02** 1380.14 
Perceived 
discrimination 
838 1.88 .64 602 2.02 .74 -.15 -4.03** 1169.13 
Memory of violence 836 1.38 1.18 595 1.78 1.12 -.40 -6.43** 1318.77 
Direct violence 830 .57 1.04 604 .76 1.12 -.18 -3.15** 1240.39 
Indirect violence 834 .42 .85 618 .65 1.01 -.23 -4.65** 1186.99 
Nationalism 845 2.80 .68 614 2.71 .69 .09 2.40* 1311.77 
Regiocentrism 848 2.29 .89 616 2.40 .94 -.11 -2.34* 1285.26 
National pride 835 3.79 .87 613 3.53 .94 .26 5.46** 1265.30 
Distrust 842 2.42 .75 600 2.44 .68 -.03 -.68 1440 
Dominance 839 2.22 .70 613 2.04 .69 .17 4.64** 1327.68 
Equality 836 1.66 .58 612 1.56 .58 .10 3.15** 1320.36 
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religious pluralism (M=3.51) than Muslim respondents (M=2.88). In terms 
of religious fundamentalism, Muslim respondents are more in favour of 
textual interpretations based on their Holy Scriptures (M=3.07) than 
Christian respondents (M=2.58). In contrast, Christian respondents are 
more in favour of hermeneutic interpretations of their Holy Scriptures 
(M=3.76) compared to Muslim respondents (M=3.39).
Christian respondents feel more discriminated against (M=2.02) than 
Muslim respondents (M=1.88). In terms of memory of violence, Christian 
respondents remember more occasions of violence (M=1.78) than Muslim 
respondents(M=1.38). Christian respondents reported experiencing more 
occasions either of direct violence (M=.76) or indirect violence (M=.65) 
compared to Muslim respondents (M=.57 M=.42).Muslim respondents tend 
to have stronger nationalistic views (M=2.80) than Christian respondents 
(M=2.29).  Additionally, Muslim respondents also have stronger feeling 
of regiocentrism (M=2.29) than Christian respondents (M=2.40). Muslim 
respondents also take more pride in their country (M=3.79) than Christian 
respondents (M=3.53). Muslim respondents are inclined to have a stronger 
orientation of dominance (M=2.22) and a stronger orientation of inequality 
(M=1.66) compared to Christian respondents (M=2.04; M=1.56).
4.4.3 Intergroup contact avoidance and intermediate variables
In this section, we will describe the summary of ANOVA between our 
dependent variables and all intermediate variables.
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Table 4.12 Intergroup contact avoidance and intermediate variables
*= p value <.01, ** =p value <.05, M = mean score
Muslim respondents
The following description provides an explanation of social location of 
intergroup contact avoidance among Muslim respondents. Religious salience 
relates significantly to contact avoidance, avoidance of future spouses from 
a different religion, and support for residential segregation (p < .01). Among 
Muslim respondents, we can see that the more religious salience they have, 
the more they tend to avoid contact with Christians (eta=.15), the more 
they tend to avoid Christians as future spouses (r=.11), and the more they 
tend to support residential segregation (eta=.19). Likewise, ethnic salience 
has a significant effect on contact avoidance (Muslims p < .05) and on 
 Contact avoidance Avoidance of future 
spouse 
Support for residential 
segregation 
Muslim Christian Muslim Christian Muslim Christian 
M r/eta M r/eta M r/eta M r/eta M r/eta M r/eta 
 
Religious salience .17 .15**   .75 .11**   .40 .19** .22 .18** 
Ethnic salience  .16 .07*       .40 .26** .22 .26** 
Perceived threat .16 .42** .04 .28** .75 .11*   .41 .43** .22 .24** 
Quantity of contact .14 -.24**       .38 -.35** .22 -.23** 
Quality of contact .13 .38** .03 -.16** .74 -.12** .49 .18** .35 -.42**   
Positive in-group .16 .17** .03 .14**     .40 .24** .22 .29** 
Negative  
out-group .16 .34** .03 .37**     .40 .41** .22 .24** 
Monism .16 .29** .04 .13** .75 .15** .49 .13** .41 .30** .22 .26** 
Pluralism .16 -.22**   .74 -.14**   .40 -.23**   
Intratextual 
fundamentalism .16 .11** .03 .16** .75 .19** .49 .14** .40 .22** .22 .27** 
Hermeneutic 
interpretation .16 .15**   .75 .14** .49 .13* .40 .12* .22 .20** 
Perceived 
discrimination .16 .15**     .49 -.09* .40 .15** .22 .11* 
Memory of violence .16 .14**   .75 .11**   .40 .19** .22 .17** 
Direct violence .16 .13**       .40 .19** .22 .15** 
Indirect violence         .40 .10** .22 .23** 
Nationalism .16 .12**   .75 .10*   .40 .10*   
Regiocentrism .16 .14**       .40 .16** .22 .18** 
National pride   .04 .18** .75 .16**   .40 .15** .22 .15** 
Distrust .16 .27** .03 .09* .75 .09*   .41 ..31** .22 .36** 
Dominance       .49 .12* .41 .10** .22 .13** 
Equality             
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support for residential segregation (p < .01). For Muslim respondents, the 
more ethnic saliency they have, the more they tend to avoid contact with 
Christians (r=.07) and the more they tend to support residential segregation 
(eta=.26). As in previous cases, perceived group threat relates significantly 
to contact avoidance, to the avoidance of future spouses, and to support for 
residential segregation (p < .01). The ANOVA table indicates that the more 
that Muslim respondents feel threatened by Christians, the more likely they 
are likely to avoid contact with Christians (eta=.42), the more likely they 
are to avoid Christians as future spouses (r=.11), and the more likely they 
are to support residential segregation (eta=.43).
Quantity of contact is significantly related to contact avoidance and 
support for residential segregation (p < .01). We find that among Muslim 
respondents, the more frequently they have contact with Christians, the 
less they tend to avoid contact with Christians (r=-.24), and the less they 
tend to support residential segregation (r=-.35). Quality of contact has a 
significant association with contact avoidance, avoidance of future spouses 
from a different religion, and support for residential segregation (p < .01). 
For Muslim respondents, the more positively they rate the quality of their 
contact with Christians, the less they tend to avoid contact with Christians 
(eta=.38), the less they tend to avoid Christians as future spouses (r=-.12), 
and the lower they tend to score on residential segregation (r=-.42). Positive 
religious in-group attitudes significantly relates to contact avoidance and 
support for residential segregation (p < .01). The ANOVA table indicates 
that among Muslim respondents, the more positive images they have of their 
in-group, the more they tend to avoid contact with Christians (r=.17), and 
the more they tend to support residential segregation (r=.24). Negative out-
group attitudes also has a significant relationship with contact avoidance 
and support for residential segregation (p < .01). The ANOVA table shows 
that among Muslim respondents, the more negative images of Christians 
they have, the more they tend to avoid contact with Christians (eta=.34), 
and the more they tend to support residential segregation (r=.41).
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Monism relates significantly to all dependent variables. For Muslim 
respondents, we can see that the more they have a religiously monistic 
view, the more they tend to avoid contact with Christians (eta=.29), the 
more they tend to avoid Christians as their future spouses (r=.15), and the 
higher they tend to score on support for residential segregation (r=.30). On 
the other hand, the more that Muslims support religiously pluralistic views, 
the less they tend to avoid contact with Christians (r=-.22), the less they 
tend to avoid Christians as future spouses (r=-.14), and the less they tend to 
support residential segregation (r=-.23). We also find here that intratextual 
fundamentalism has a significant relationship to all dependent variables (p 
<. 01). Among Muslim respondents, we discover that the more they favor 
intratextual fundamentalism in relation to their Holy Scriptures, the more 
they tend to avoid contact with Christians (r=.11), the more they tend to 
avoid Christians as their future spouses (eta=.19), and the more they tend 
to support residential segregation (r=.22). Hermeneutic interpretation is 
also significantly related to all dependent variables (p < .05), but contact 
avoidance is not related to Christian respondents. Moreover, the ANOVA 
table indicates that the more that Muslim respondents favor symbolic 
fundamentalism, the more they tend to avoid contact with Christians 
(eta=.15), the more they tend to avoid Christians as future spouses (eta=.14), 
and the more they tend to support residential segregation (eta=.12).
Perceived discrimination is significantly related to all dependent 
variables (p < .05), but contact avoidance is not related to Christian 
respondents. The avoidance of future spouses from a different religion 
is not related to Muslim respondents. Among Muslim respondents, we 
discover that the more they feel discriminated against, the more they 
tend to avoid contact with Christians (eta=.15), and the more they tend to 
support residential segregation (eta=.15). Similarly, memory of violence 
is significantly related to all dependent variables (p < .01). For example, 
the ANOVA table shows that the more occasions of violence that Muslim 
respondents remember, the more they tend to avoid contact with Christians 
251
chAPteR 4 - the SocIAl locAtIon oF InteRgRoUP contAct AVoIdAnce
(eta=.11), the more they tend to avoid Christians as their future spouses 
(r=.11), and the more they tend to support residential segregation (eta=.19). 
Direct violence is significantly related to contact avoidance and support 
for residential segregation (p < .01), but contact avoidance is not related 
to Christian respondents. Among Muslim respondents, we find that the 
more occasions of direct violence they experience, the more they tend to 
avoid contact with Christians (eta=.13), and the more they tend to support 
residential segregation (eta=.19).Indirect violence is significantly related 
to support for residential segregation (p < .01). For Muslim respondents, 
the more occasions of indirect violence that they experience, the more they 
tend to support residential segregation (r=.10).
Nationalism has a significant relationship to all dependent variables 
(p <.05). The ANOVA table indicates that the more nationalistic Muslim 
respondents are, the more they avoid contact with Christians (r=.12), the 
more they avoid Christians as future spouses (r=.10), and the more they 
support residential segregation (r=.10). Regiocentrism is also significantly 
related to contact avoidance and to support for residential segregation (p < 
.01), but contact avoidance is not related to Christian respondents. Among 
Muslim respondents, the more regiocentrism they have, the more they 
avoid contact with Christians (r=.14), and the higher they tend to score on 
residential segregation (eta=.16). Indeed, the ANOVA table indicates that 
the more national pride Muslim respondents have, the more they avoid 
Christians as future spouses (eta=.16), and the more they support residential 
segregation (eta=.15). Distrust of out-groups is significantly related to all 
dependent variables (p <. 01). Among Muslim respondents, we find that 
the more they distrust Christians, the more they tend to avoid contact 
with Christians (eta=.27), the more they tend to avoid Christians as future 
spouses (r=.09), and the more they tend to support residential segregation 
(eta=.31). The orientation of dominance has a significant relationship with 
the avoidance of future spouses from a different religion and with support 
for residential segregation (p < .01). However, the avoidance of a future 
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spouse from a different religion is not related to Muslim respondents. 
Table 4.12 points out that among Muslims respondents, the more they 
have an orientation of dominance, the more they tend to support residential 
segregation (r=.10).
Christian respondents
The following section describes the social location of intergroup contact 
avoidance among Christian respondents. Religious salience and ethnic 
salience are significantly related to support for residential segregation (p 
< .01). Among Christian respondents, we discover that the more religious 
salience they have, the more they tend to support residential segregation 
(eta=.18). Likewise, the more ethnic salience they have, the more they 
tend to support residential segregation (eta=.26). Moreover, perceived 
threat is significantly related to contact avoidance (p < .01), and support for 
residential segregation (p < .01). Among Christian respondents, the more 
they feel threatened by Muslims, the more they are likely to avoid contact 
with Muslims (eta=.28) and the more they are likely to support residential 
segregation (r=.24). Quantity of contact is only significantly related to 
support for residential segregation (p<.01), while quality of contact is 
significantly associated with all dependent variables (p<.01). The more 
frequently Christian respondents have contact with Muslims, the less they 
tend to support residential segregation (r=-.23). The more positively they 
rate the quality of their contact with Muslims, the less they tend to avoid 
contact with Muslims (r=-.16), but the more they tend to avoid Muslims as 
future spouses (eta=.18).
Positive religious in-group attitudes and negative religious out-group 
attitudes are significantly related to contact avoidance and to support for 
residential segregation. The more positively that Christians view their own 
group, the more they tend to avoid contact with Muslims (r=.14), and the 
more they tend to support residential segregation (r=.29). Furthermore, 
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the more negatively that they view Muslims, the more they tend to 
avoid contact with them (eta=.37), and the more they support residential 
segregation (r=.24). Religious monism is significantly related to all 
dependent variables (p < .01). Among Christian respondents, we find that 
the more they show higher levels of support for religious monism, the more 
they tend to avoid contact with Muslims (r=.13), the more they tend to 
avoid Muslims as future spouses (r=.13), and the more they tend to support 
residential segregation (r=.26). Intratextual fundamentalism is significantly 
associated with all dependent variables (p <. 01). The more that Christian 
respondents favour intratextual fundamentalism in regards to their Holy 
Scriptures, the more they tend to avoid contact with Muslims (eta=.16), 
the higher they avoid Muslims as their future spouses (eta=.14), and the 
higher they tend to score on residential segregation (eta=.27). However, 
hermeneutic interpretation (symbolic fundamentalism) is significantly 
related to the avoidance of a future spouse from a different religion (p < 
.01) and to support for residential segregation (p < .01). The more that 
Christian respondents favour symbolic fundamentalism, the more they tend 
to avoid Muslims as future spouses (eta=.13), and the more they tend to 
support residential segregation (eta=.20). 
Perceived discrimination is significantly related to the avoidance 
of a future spouse from a different religion (p < .01) and to support for 
residential segregation (p < .01). Among Christian respondents, we find 
that the more they feel discriminated against, the less they tend to avoid 
Muslims as their future spouses (r=-.09), and the more they tend to support 
residential segregation (r=.11). Memory of violence, direct violence, and 
indirect violence, have significant associations with support for residential 
segregation (p < .01). The more occasions of violence that Christian 
respondents remember, the more they tend to support residential segregation 
(r=.17). The more occasions of direct violence that they experience, the more 
they tend to score on residential segregation (r=.15). Futhermore, the more 
occasions of indirect violence they experience, the greater their support 
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for residential segregation (eta=.23). Also, regiocentrism is significantly 
related to support for residential segregation. Among Christian respondents, 
we can see that the more regiocentric attitudes they have, the morethey tend 
to support residential segregation (eta=.18). As with Muslim respondents, 
Christians’ national pride is significantly related to contact avoidance (p < 
.01) and to support for residential segregation (p < .01). Among Christian 
respondents, the more national pride they have, the more contact avoidance 
they tend to show (eta=.18), and the more they tend to support residential 
segregation (r=.15). 
In addition, distrust is significantly related to contact avoidance 
(p<.01) and to support for residential segregation (p < .01) among Christian 
respondents. We can observe that the more they distrust Muslims, the more 
they tend to avoid contact with them (eta=.09), and the more they tend to 
support residential segregation (eta=.36). Finally, orientation of dominance 
has a significant relationship with the avoidance of a future spouse from a 
different religion (p < .05) and with support for residential segregation (p < 
.01). Among Christian respondents, the more they display an orientation of 
dominance, the more they tend to avoid Muslims as future spouses (eta=.12) 
and the more they tend to support residential segregation (eta=.13). 
4.5 Summary
We tested the reliability and validity of all of the questions and grouped 
them into dimensions and factors. All of the factors and dimensions were 
computed, and their bivariate relations were tested by ANOVA. Muslim 
and Christian respondents have some significant differences in the mean 
scores of contact avoidance, ethno-religious identification, individual 
determinants, and intermediary variables. In general, the differences 
indicate that Muslim respondents tend to avoid contact, and incline to have 
stronger ethno-religious identification, moreso than Christian respondents.
We acknowledge that several variables of ethno-religious 
identification, individual determinants, and intermediate variables are not 
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comparable between Muslim and Christian respondents. The ANOVA table 
shows that the number of variables that have significant associations for 
Muslims and Christians are limited (see Appendix 1). Nevertheless, several 
ethno-religious identification and intermediate variables are significant 
for both Muslim and Christian respondents. Contact avoidance, rites of 
passage, religious in-group, ethnic self-definition, and social embeddedness 
have significant relationships for both groups. Most intermediate variables 
also have significant relationship for both groups, such as the quantity of 
contact, quality of contact, positive in-group, negative out-group, monism, 
intratextual fundamentalism, and distrust. Other variables only have 
significant relationships for one group. 
In the avoidance of future spouses from different religions, few 
variables have a significant relation for both Muslim and Christian 
respondents. Only ethnic self-definition and gender are significantly 
related to the avoidance of future spouses for both groups. For intermediate 
variables, quality of contact, monism, intratextual fundamentalism, 
hermeneutic interpretation, and perceived discrimination are significant. 
Nevertheless, support for residential segregation has more variables 
that display significant associations for both groups. Religious in-group 
friends, religious out-group friends, membership in religious organizations, 
ethnic self-definition, ethnic languages, and social embeddedness are all 
significantly related to support for residential segregation in both groups. 
All intermediate variables are significantly related to support for residential 
segregation. Only quality of contact, pluralism, nationalism, and equality 
are not significantly related to support for residential segregation.
In the next chapter, we employ multivariate analysis between 
intergroup contact avoidance and ethno-religious identification, social 
characteristics, and intermediate variables. However, we did not separate 
the analysis between Muslim and Christian respondents because the focus 
of this study is to investigate to what extent ethno-religious identification 
influences intergroup contact avoidance. 
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CHAPTER 5
 INTERGROUP CONTACT AVOIDANCE on 
the INDIVIDUAL LEVEL: 
Results from multivariate 
model testing
This chapter describes the procedures and the results of multivariate analyses. We use regression analyses to test whether ethno-religious 
identification, individual determinants, and several intermediate variables 
affect intergroup contact avoidance. This chapter is structured in six 
sections, as follows. The first section illustrates briefly how we derive 
hypotheses from ethnic group conflict theory (Gijsberts, Hagendoorn, 
Scheepers, 2004), from social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner, 1986), 
and from other theories. The second section describes the procedures of 
our regression analyses. The third section explains the construction of 
regression models and the subsequent building of four empirical models. 
The fourth section summarizes our findings, including the effect of ethno-
religious identification after controlling for individual determinants and 
several intermediate variables. The fifth section elaborates on the results of 
multivariate analyses by considering the findings from in-depth interviews. 
The final section discusses our empirical findings within broader theoretical 
frameworks incorporating other relevant studies.
5.1 Theoretical models and hypotheses
We use social identity theory, ethnic group conflict theory, and other 
relevant theories to derive hypotheses with regard to the effects of ethno-
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religious identification, individual determinants, and intermediate variables 
on contact avoidance. Social identity theory postulates that group identity 
and group identification play a significant role in hostility and prejudice 
between conflicting groups (Tajfel and Turner, 1986; Gijsberts et al., 2004). 
Group membership is sufficient in itself to generate in-group favouritism 
and discrimination against out-groups. According to social identity theory, 
having stronger positive attitudes toward in-groups and stronger negative 
attitudes towards out-groups leads to exclusionary reactions (Turner, 1981). 
Moreover, self-categorization per se and intergroup comparison also tend to 
increase exclusionary attitudes (Turner, 1999). Hence, our first hypothesis 
is that ethno-religious self-definition is likely to be related to the avoidance 
of intergroup contact (hypothesis 1).
Ethnicity and religion are the bases for group categorization, 
identification, and comparison. Phinney and Rotheram (1987) defined ethnic 
identity as one’s sense of belonging to an ethnic group and one’s perceptions, 
feelings, attitudes, and behaviours deriving from ethnic group membership. 
Following Phinney and Rotheram (1987), we categorize ethnic identity 
as involving ethnic self-definition and ethnic behaviours, i.e. the use of 
ethnic languages, participation in ethnic ceremonies, social embededness, 
and the membership of and participation in ethnic organizations. Likewise, 
we consider religious identity to involve religious self-definition and 
religious behaviours, i.e. religious practices, participation in collective rites 
and rites of passage, having friends from the same/different religion, and 
membership of and participation in religious organizations. Based on social 
identity theory, we expect that ethnic and religious identification will have 
positive effects on contact avoidance.
  Therefore, our second hypothesis is that the stronger people’s 
ethnic and religious identification is, the higher will be the level of 
intergroup contact avoidance (hypothesis 2). More specifically, people 
who participate more in religious practices (2a), in collective rites (2b), 
and in rites of passage (2c); who have more friends from their religious 
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in-group and fewer friends from their religious out-groups (2d and 2e); 
who are members of religious organizations (2f); who often participate in 
their religious organizations (2g) and in ethnic ceremonies (2h); who often 
use their ethnic languages (2i); who have more friends from their ethnic 
in-group than from their ethnic out-groups (2j); who are members of ethnic 
organizations (2k); and who often participate in their ethnic organizations 
(2l), will tend  to avoid contact with out-groups.
The theoretical rationale for the next proposition is derived from ethnic 
group conflict theory, which posits that the stronger the actual competition 
between ethnic groups is, the stronger the perceived ethnic threat will 
be. This, in turn, due to stronger social identification, will then tend to 
induce exclusionary reactions. However, the level of actual competition 
and perceived group threat, which may vary between groups, apparently 
influences exclusionary reactions (Gijsberts et al., 2004:18). Many studies 
on exclusionary reactions in Western countries provide evidence that these 
reactions affect certain groups more than others. For example, avoidance 
of inter-ethnic marriages is more prevalent among lower social classes 
(Tolsma, Lubbers, and Coenders, 2008), and people with lower education 
levels tend to support in-group favouritism, compared to those with higher 
education levels (Coenders and Scheepers, 2003). Moreover, discriminatory 
attitudes are more likely to be expressed by males than females (Sidanius 
and Veniegas, 2000). In addition, one study showed that people with 
higher occupational statuses are more inclined to live in racially segregated 
residential areas (Iceland and Wilkes, 2006). We also add parents’ religion 
as one of the individual determinants, as certain religious orientations tend 
to induce prejudice (Allport, 1954; Hunsberger, 1995).  
These individual determinants from Western studies, i.e. gender, 
parents’ religion, education of parents, social class or household income, 
parents’ occupational status, can possibly have an effect on contact 
avoidance. However, we propose that the effects of ethno-religious 
identification overwhelm the effects of such determinants. In other words, 
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after taking into account individual characteristics in Western countries, 
ethno-religious identification determinants will still have significant effects 
on contact avoidance. Hence, our third hypothesis: the stronger people’s 
ethno-religious identification is, the higher will be the level of avoidance of 
intergroup contacts, even after controlling for gender, household income, 
religion of parents, education of parents and occupational status of parents 
(hypothesis 3). 
The fourth hypothesis is also derived directly from ethnic group 
conflict theory, which adopts perceived ethnic threat from a neo-realistic 
conflict theory (Bobo, 1988; Bobo and Hutchings, 1996). Central to ethnic 
group conflict theory is the proposition that perceived group threat is an 
intermediate determinant to discriminatory behaviour, prejudice, and 
negative feelings towards out-group members (Gijsberts et al., 2004). We 
expect that the relationship between ethno-religious identification and 
contact avoidance can be explained by perceived group threat. Therefore, 
our fourth hypothesis is the stronger the perceived group threat is, the 
stronger contact avoidance will be (hypothesis 4a).
Another theory mentions that group identification does not directly 
induce hostility toward out-groups (Allport, 1954 [1958]; Brewer and 
Campbell, 1976; Brewer and Miller, 1996). The meaning and importance 
of ethnic identity is more salient in certain situations (Phinney and Ong, 
2007, Phinney and Rotheram, 1987). Duckit (2006:154) called it salience of 
ethno-cultural group attachment. This study identifies salience of identity, 
which consists of the salience of religious identity and ethnic identity. 
We expect that salience of ethnic and religious identity will mediate the 
relationship between ethno-religious identification and contact avoidance. 
Thus, the salience of ethnic and religious identity will likely induce contact 
avoidance (hypothesis 4b and 4c).
Another theory that explains exclusionary attitudes is the contact 
hypothesis, which postulates that intergroup contact can reduce negative 
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intergroup attitudes (Allport, 1954 [1958]). However, contact alone will 
be not be effective in reducing prejudice, not without specific conditions, 
i.e. equal status between groups and shared common goals (Pettigrew, 
1998; Brown, Vivian, and Hewstone, 1999). Other studies mention that 
intergroup contact will reduce prejudice against the out-group if the contact 
has stronger and more beneficial effects on favourable intergroup attitudes 
(Maras and Brown, 1996, Eller and Abrams, 2004; Brown et al., 2007). 
In this study, we also expect that both quantity of contact and quality of 
contact will reduce contact avoidance. This study expects that more actual 
intergroup contact and more positive intergroup contact will likely reduce 
contact avoidance (hypothesis 4d and 4e).
Studies on religiosity emphasize that religiocentrism, attitudes towards 
religious plurality, and fundamentalism are likely related to exclusionary 
reactions (Anthony and Sterkens, 2005; Sterkens and Anthony, 2008; 
Williamson, et al., 2010). Religiocentric attitudes are defined as one’s 
positive attitudes toward religious in-groups and negative attitudes toward 
religious out-groups. We classify attitudes towards religious plurality i.e. an 
individual’s interpretation of different religions as sources of truth and values, 
into monism and pluralism. Fundamentalism is defined as “intratextual 
disposition toward the text that a tradition holds as sacred” (Williamson et 
al., 2010:722). We use the intratextual fundamentalism scale (Williamson et 
al., 2010), which is opposed to the hermeneutic interpretation scale (Duriez 
et al., 2005). This study expects that stronger positive attitudes towards in-
groups, coupled with stronger negative attitudes toward out-groups, will 
likely induce contact avoidance (hypothesis 4f and 4g). Stronger monism 
and weaker pluralism will induce greater contact avoidance (hypothesis 
4h and 4i). More fundamentalism and less hermeneutic interpretation are 
likely to reinforce contact avoidance (hypothesis 4j and 4k). 
Studies on communal violence in Northern Ireland describe 
how memories and experiences of violence are related to residential 
segregation, contact avoidance, and confrontation between Catholics and 
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Protestants (Doherty and Pooley, 1997; Anderson and Shuttleworth, 2003). 
We distinguish people’s memory and experience of violence into three 
categories: memory of violence, direct experience of violence, and indirect 
experience of violence. It is expected that both memory and experience 
of violence will have positive effects on contact avoidance. Having more 
memories of violence, and more experience of direct violence or indirect 
violence, will likely induce more contact avoidance (hypothesis 4l, 4m, and 
4n). 
The literature on discrimination suggests that the activation of social 
boundaries will increase discriminatory attitudes (Tilly, 2005). Unfair 
daily treatment and discriminatory experiences are more likely to create 
perceived discrimination. Another piece of research by Iceland and Wilkes 
(2000) explained that perceived discrimination plays an important role 
in supporting residential segregation, which is one indicator of contact 
avoidance. We expect that perceived discrimination will intermediate the 
relationship between ethno-religious identification and contact avoidance. 
Hence, the stronger the perceived discrimination is, the stronger the contact 
avoidance will be (hypothesis 4o).
Studies on nationalistic attitudes found that both romantic nationalism 
and chauvinism tend to induce ethnic exclusionism and intolerance toward 
national minorities (Latcheva, 2010; Coenders, 2001). Similarly, stronger 
ethno-religious identification is more likely to increase nationalistic attitudes 
(Gellner, 2006; Loizides, 2000) than weak ethno-religious identification. In 
Indonesia, the strong attachment one has to one’s region (regiocentrism) 
became prominent after the fall of the authoritarian regime in 1998. 
Therefore, in this study, we distinguish between nationalistic attitudes, 
national pride, and regiocentrism. Here, too, we expect that these variables 
will intermediate the relationship between ethno-religious identification 
and contact avoidance. Our hypothesis is that nationalism, national pride, 
and regiocentrism will likely reinforce contact avoidance (hypothesis 4p, 
4q, and 4r).
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The literature on social trust posits that trust is a basic element of a 
society because that society would disintegrate without it (Simmel, 1990; 
Möllering, 2001). Less trust in out-groups and less acceptance of out-groups 
will reinforce in-group identification. In-group identifications are likely to 
induce mutual distrust between groups, which then will increase avoidance 
of intergroup interaction (Tropp et al., 2006). It is expected that distrust will 
mediate the relationship between ethno-religious identification and contact 
avoidance. Hence, our hypothesis is that the stronger the distrust of out-
groups is, the stronger will be contact avoidance (hypothesis 4s).
Social dominance theory explains that the existence of group 
hierarchies depends on social dominance orientation and social equality 
orientation (Sidanius and Pratto, 1999). According to the theory, superior 
groups tend to legitimize their domination over subordinate groups. In 
contrast, inferior groups will support equality between groups. Therefore, 
our hypothesis is that strong social dominance orientation will likely induce 
contact avoidance, while strong social equality orientation will likely 
reduce contact avoidance (hypothesis 4t and 4u).
5.2 Procedures of analysis
We use regression analyses to observe the influence of ethno-religious 
identification variables on contact avoidance, and to control for individual 
determinants and intermediate variables. According to Field (2009:198), 
regression is a way of predicting an outcome variable (Y) (i.e., a dependent 
variable) from one or several determinants (X
1
, X
2
,.., Xn). We use the 
parameters, R2, adjusted R2, and the significance of parameters to interpret 
the results of regression analyses. The parameter of a determinant (beta 
or b-coefficient) is the change of an outcome value if the value of the 
determinant changes by one unit. R2 points out how much the variance of 
an outcome is accounted for by the regression model from our sample. 
Adjusted R2 indicates how much the variance of an outcome will be 
accounted for if the number of determinants in the model is taken into 
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account (Field, 2009:221). We use a significance level of .05 (two tailed), 
except for dummy variables because the direction is presumed to be one-
way (te Grotenhuis, 2009:115). The t-statistic tests the null hypothesis that 
the difference in the estimated parameter is zero, which means there is no 
relationship between an outcome and a determinant. If the significance of 
the estimated parameter is less than .05, we have sufficient evidence to 
accept the alternative hypothesis that difference in the estimated parameter 
is not zero, which indicates that the determinant has a significant influence 
on the outcome.
To draw conclusions regarding a population based on regression 
analysis, we should test the assumptions of linearity and multicollinearity 
(Field, 2009:220). Regression analysis can accurately estimate the 
relationship between dependent and independent variables if the 
relationships are linear and there are no perfect linear relationships 
between the independent variables. We conduct twelve (12) linearity tests 
between contact avoidance and ethno-religious identification based on 
analysis of variance (See table 42 Appendix 2). ‘Religious practices’ has 
a linear relationship supporting residential segregation. ‘Ethnic languages, 
collective rites, religious in-group friends, and religious out-group friends’ 
have linear relationships to the avoidance of a marriage with somebody from 
another religious tradition (which we label in short as ‘avoidance of future 
spouse’). Both ‘religious in-group friends’ and ‘religious out-group friends’ 
have significant linear and non-linear relationships to contact avoidance and 
the support for residential segregation. Referring to Weisberg (1985:148), 
we tested both ‘religious in-group friends’ and ‘religious out-group friends’ 
by using a regression, which transformed independent variables into log 
linear. If the R2 increases by more than 25%, the variable has not a linear 
relationship to the dependent variable. Based on the test, we keep ‘religious 
in-group friends’ as having a linear relationship to contact avoidance. Also, 
we keep both ‘religious in-group friends’ and ‘religious out-group friends’ 
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in linear relationships in support for residential segregation.1
One way of identifying multicollinearity is to run correlations between 
all pairs of determinants and observe if the variables are highly correlated 
(above .80) or not. We ran correlations among all pairs of determinants and 
found high correlations between membership of a religious organization 
and participation in religious organization, and between membership of an 
ethnic organization and participation in ethnic organization. We excluded 
one of them by comparing R2 between two models: between the first model 2a 
(contact avoidance and all religious identification, excluding membership) 
and the second model 2a (excluding participation). We keep participation 
in religious organization because the R2 of the first model (.20) is higher 
than the second model (.17). Also, we compare R2 between the first model 
2b (contact avoidance and all ethnic identification, excluding membership) 
and the second model 2b (excluding participation). Participation in ethnic 
organization is incorporated due to the R2 of the first model 2b (.28) being 
higher than the second model 2b (.14). 
Another test of multicollinearity is the Variance of Inflation Factor 
(VIF) to indicate whether a determinant has a strong linear relationship 
with the other determinants (Field, 2009:223-224). If VIF is above 10, 
Myers (1990) suggests that it indicates a strong linear relationship (Field, 
ibid.). For ethno-religious identification, individual determinants, and 
intermediate variables, no VIFs exceed 2.07, which indicates that there 
is no multicollinearity among our determinants (See table 42 appendix 
4). Therefore, there will be no biases in our regression results and in the 
standard errors of our regression models.
1 The R2 of contact avoidance by ‘religious out-group friends’ increases by more than 
25% and the R2 of contact avoidance by ‘religious in-group friends’ decreases by 10%. 
The R2 of support for residential segregation by ‘religious in-group friends’ decreases by 
10%, while the R2 of support for residential segregation by ‘religious out-group friends’ 
increases less than 25%. This means that ‘religious in-group friends’ has a linear relation 
to both contact avoidance and support for residential segregation. ‘Religious out-group 
friends’ has a linear relation to support for residential segregation.
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The following steps are general procedures in using regression 
analysis. Ethnic and religious identification variables, which have no 
linear relationship to our dependent variables, are dummy coded to enter 
into regression models (Dunn and Clark, 1987:345). Also, all individual 
determinants are transformed into dummy variables because we regard 
them as nominal and ordinal variables, while the measurement level of 
the intermediate variables are considered interval. To represent the two 
categories of a variable, we create a dummy and we assign the value 0 if 
respondents belong to category 1, and the value 1 if respondents belong to 
category 2. The number of dummies in a regression model is determined 
by the number of categories, i.e., the number of dummy variables minus 
one. For example, ‘household-income’ has three response categories and 
is coded as three dummies, low-income, middle income, and high-income. 
Two dummies are entered into the regression model and the other dummy 
variable becomes a reference category. In this study, the reference categories 
are the lowest response categories because we expect the higher categories 
to indicate stronger contact avoidance.
As mentioned earlier, we distinguish between ethno-religious self-
definition and ethno-religious identification, and we propose four sets 
of hypotheses. Based on hypothesis 1, we come up with model 1, which 
only contains ethno-religious self-definition as an independent variable. 
Hypothesis 2 is branched into three sub-models. Model 2a includes the effect 
of ethno-religious self-definition and elements of religious identification 
on contact avoidance. Model 2b incorporates the effects of ethno-religious 
self-definition and elements of ethnic identification. Model 2c is a fuller 
model that consists of ethno-religious self-definition, the religious-, and the 
ethnic identification. Hypothesis 3 will be tested in model 3, which includes 
ethno-religious identification and all individual determinants. Next, a set of 
hypotheses 4 will be tested in model 4, which incorporates ethno-religious 
identification, individual determinants, and intermediate variables.  All 
models can be seen in several formulations, as follows.
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We use the backward elimination method in selecting determinants – 
so-called model trimming – in order to have a simple and more parsimonious 
model. At the beginning, all determinants are incorporated in regression 
models according to the hypotheses. Then, we delete determinants that have 
the lowest t value based on the t-test or F-test (Dunn and Clark, 1987:341; 
Agresti and Finlay, 2008:632). We start trimming from model 2c to find 
the significant ethno-religious identification variables, by deleting one by 
one a metric variable or a set of dummy variables. A metric variable will 
be deleted if it has the lowest t value or the biggest p value from the t-test. 
A set of dummy variables will be eliminated if the set of dummies has a 
non-significant F-test (Agresti and Finlay, 2008:632). In model 3, again we 
trim firstly from the individual determinants, and then from the remaining 
religious and ethnic variables that become non-significant. Moreover, 
in model 4, we only trim on intermediate variables based on the t-test. 
At the end, a final regression model only has the remaining significant 
determinants.
In the previous chapter, we combined religious and ethnic self-
definition to form ethno-religious self-definition because there is a 
considerable overlap between both of them. We have twelve (12) major 
ethnic groups (e.g. Javanese, Ambonese, and Sundanese), and twenty-eight 
(28) smaller ethnic minorities (e.g. Timorese and Papua). An ethno-religious 
group must have at least 30 respondents to be included in regression models. 
Muslim ethnic groups with fewer than 30 respondents (e.g. Minangkabau, 
Buginese, Makassar, Batak, and Chinese) are combined into Muslims-rest. 
Yi = (b0 + b1 ERD) + ε................................................................ Model 1 (hypothesis 1) 
Yi = (b0 + b1 ERD + b2RI) + ε...................................................... Model 2a (hypothesis 2) 
Yi = (b0 + b1ERD +b2EI) + ε........................................................ Model 2b (hypothesis 2) 
Yi = (b0 + b1 ERD + b2RI + b3EI) + ε............................................. Model 2c (hypothesis 2) 
Yi = (b0 + b1ERD + b2RI + b3EI) + (b4SOC) + ε............................. Model 3 (hypothesis 3) 
Yi = (b0 + b1ERD + b2RI + b3EI + b4SOC) + (b5INTER) + ε............ Model 4 (hypothesis 4) 
 
Yi = Intergroup contact avoidance    ERD = Ethno-religious self-definition ε  = error 
RI = Religious identification  EI = Ethnic identification 
SOC = individual determinants                 INTER = Intermediate variables 
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In the same way, Christian ethnic groups with fewer than 30 respondents 
(e.g. Sundanese, Makassar, Toraja, and Minahasa) are combined into 
Christians-rest. We identify 28 ethno-religious groups, which in total have 
104 respondents, as ‘other Muslims’ or ‘other Christians’. We distinguish 
‘rest’ from ‘other’ ethnic groups, because the rest-ethnic groups are 
significant minorities in Yogyakarta and Ambon. Another reason is that the 
rest-ethnic groups are identified with certain religious groups. For example, 
Torajanese and Minahasa are Christians, while Minangkabau and Buginese 
are Muslims. Furthermore, the other-ethnic groups represent smaller groups 
on the periphery of the Indonesian archipelago (van Klinken, 2003).
Table 5.1 Ethno-religious self-definition
*= 0 < p value < .05 and ** = 0 < p value < .01
We distinguish between Javanese Muslims, Sundanese Muslims, 
Madurese Muslims, Ambonese Muslims, Butonese Muslims, Other Muslims, 
Muslims-rest, Javanese Christians, Ambonese Christians, Chinese 
Christians, Batak Christians, Other Christians and Christians-rest. The 
reference category of ethno-religious self-definition is the ethno-religious 
group with the largest number of respondents (24.10%), i.e. Javanese 
Muslim  
Ethnic groups 
n Mean Christian  
Ethnic groups 
n  Mean 
 (% of 
1444) 
Contact 
avoidan
ce 
Avoid
ance 
of 
future 
spouse 
Support for 
residential 
segregation 
 (% of 
1444) 
Contact 
avoidance 
Avoidan
ce of 
future 
spouse 
Support for 
residential 
segregation 
Javanese Muslims  348 
(24.10) 
.10 .74 .29 Javanese 
Christians 
104 (7.2) .02 .56 .12 
Sundanese 
Muslims 
36 (2.49) .10 .60 .30 Ambonese 
Christians  
346 
(23.96) 
.04 .47 .29 
Madurese 
Muslims 
36 (2.49) .23 .50 .46 Chinese 
Christians 
43 (2.98) .03 .56 .15 
Ambonese 
Muslims 
241 
(16.69) 
.20 .77 .53 Batak Christians 35 (2.42) .01 .46 .12 
Butonese Muslims 95 (6.58) .25 .84 .54 Other Christians 56 (3.88) .02 .43 .14 
Other Muslims 44 (3.05) .18 .75 .37 Christians-rest 28 (1.94) .02 .49 .14 
Muslims-rest 32 (2.22) .18 .75 .37 General means  .11 .64 .33 
     Range  1 1 1 
     Min and Max  0 and 1 0 and 1 0 and 1 
     F-test  7.12** 3.92** 14.63** 
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Muslims. Differences between ethno-religious groups on avoidance of 
intergroup contact are very significant, based on the F-test. Here, we could 
ascertain that Muslim ethnic groups tend to score higher than Christian 
ethnic groups on contact avoidance, on avoidance of future spouses, and on 
support for residential segregation.
5.3 Empirical models
We present three regression models: contact avoidance; avoidance of future 
spouse; and support for residential segregation. The complete results of 
regression analyses are reported in Appendix 3.
5.3.1 Contact avoidance
In model 1, we expect that all ethno-religious groups are significantly 
different from Javanese Muslims in contact avoidance scores. The adj. R2 
is .12, which indicates that ethno-religious self-definition explains 12% 
of the variance of contact avoidance (see table 1 Appendix 3). All ethno-
religious groups have significant differences on contact avoidance, except 
for Sundanese Muslims. We establish that Madurese Muslims (b=.13), 
Ambonese Muslims (b=.10), Butonese Muslims (b=.15), and Muslims-
rest (b=.07) score significantly higher on contact avoidance compared 
to Javanese Muslims. On the other hand, Javanese Christians (b=-.09), 
Ambonese Christians (b=-.09), Chinese Christians (b=-.07), Batak 
Christians (b=-.09), and Christians-rest (b=-.08) score lower on contact 
avoidance compared to Javanese Muslims. In short, Muslims ethnic groups 
tend to avoid contact with out-group more than Christians ethnic groups.
When all religious identification variables are included in model 2a, 
Butonese Muslims and Ambonese Christians still have significant differences 
on contact avoidance, but differences between other ethnic groups become 
non-significant. Among all religious identification variables, only ‘religious 
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out-group friends’ significantly explains contact avoidance. Respondents 
who have some, relatively many, almost all, and all friends from different 
religions tend to avoid contact with religious out-group members less 
compared to those who have none. Other determinants of religious 
identification have no significant effects on contact avoidance. In model 
2a, adj. R2 is .15 (see table 1 Appendix 3). After all ethnic identification 
variables are incorporated into model 2b, Madurese Muslims and Butonese 
Muslims still have significant differences on contact avoidance. Among 
all religious identification variables, only ‘ethnic languages’ significantly 
explains contact avoidance. Respondents who speak ethnic languages on 
three or four occasions avoid contact less than those who never speak in 
ethnic languages. The explained variance (adj. R2=.16) is slightly higher 
compared to the previous model (adj. R2=.15) (see table 1 Appendix 3). 
When all religious and ethnic identification variables are included 
in model 2c, only Muslims-rest has a significant difference on contact 
avoidance. Similar to model 2a, ‘religious out-group friends’ remains 
significant. Adj. R2 decreases drastically to .04 (See table 1 Appendix 
3). We then trim and exclude some independent variables based on the 
F-tests, as follows: ethnic ceremonies (p=.79), ethnic languages (p=.75), 
rites of passage (p=.64), participation in religious organizations (p=.78), 
participation in ethnic organizations (p=.99), religious practices (p=.63), 
social embeddedness (p=.26), and collective rites (p=.61). After trimming, 
all ethno-religious groups significantly explain contact avoidance, except 
for Sundanese Muslims, Madurese Muslims, and Chinese Christians. Ambon 
Muslims, Butonese Muslims, and Muslims-rest tend to avoid more contact 
with Christians compared to Javanese Muslims. In contrast, Javanese 
Christians, Ambonese Christians, Batak Christians, and Christians-rest 
tend to avoid contact with out-groups less than Javanese Muslims. Here, 
too, respondents who have some, relatively many, almost all, and all 
friends from different religions still have significant differences on contact 
avoidance, while ‘religious in-group friends’ has a significant positive effect 
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on contact avoidance. The explained variance (adj. R2) increases drastically 
from .04 to .16  (see table 1 Appendix 3).
When all the significant variables in model 2c together with all 
individual determinants are included in model 3, Butonese Muslims, 
Ambonese Christians, and Christians-rest still have significant differences 
on contact avoidance. The difference of Sundanese Muslims on contact 
avoidance also becomes significant. ‘Religious out-group friends’ remains 
significant, while ‘religious in-group friends’ is reduced to non-significant. 
In occupation status, respondents from traders’ families show less contact 
avoidance compared to those from farmers’ families. The adj. R2 (.20) 
is higher than in model 2c (adj. R2 =.16) (See table 2 Appendix 3). The 
following individual determinants are deleted in model trimming: parents’ 
religion (p=.92), occupational status (p= .73), parents’ education (p=.76), 
household income (p=.74), and gender (p=.20). After trimming, the 
differences of Ambonese Muslims and Muslims-rest on contact avoidance 
increases to significant. The difference of Sundanese Muslims on contact 
avoidance reduces to non-significant. The differences of Butonese Muslims, 
Ambonese Christians, and Christians-rest on contact avoidance remain 
significant. ‘Religious in-group friends’ and ‘religious out-group friends’ 
remain significant.  Moreover, ‘occupation status’ remains significant. The 
adj. R2 decreases slightly from .20 to .17  (see table 2 Appendix 3).
When all the significant variables in model 3 together with all 
intermediate variables are included in model 4, only the differences 
of Butonese Muslims and Muslims-rest on contact avoidance remain 
significant. Here, too, ‘religious in-group friends’ has a significant positive 
influence on contact avoidance. Also, ‘religious out-group friends’ remain 
significant. However, ‘occupation status’ is reduced to non-significant. 
Whereas ‘quality of contact’, ‘pluralism’, and ‘regiocentrism’ have 
significant negative effects on contact avoidance, ‘perceived group threat’, 
‘negative out-group’, and ‘indirect violence’ have positive effects on contact 
avoidance. The adj. R2 (.25) is higher compared to model 3 after trimming 
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(.17) (see table 2 in Appendix 3). In model trimming, these intermediate 
variables are excluded: ethnic saliency (t=.05; p=.96), religious saliency 
(t=-.10; p=.92), orientation of equality (t=.27; p=.79), quantity of contact 
(t=.63; p=.53), positive in-group (t=.27; p=.78), national pride (t=-.41; 
p=.68), nationalism (t=.70; p=.48), distrust (t=.69; p=.49), discrimination 
(t=.89; p=.37), memory (t=-.83; p=.41), monism (t=.89; p=.37), orientation 
of dominance (t=-1.01; p=.31), indirect violence (t=1.51; p=.13), direct 
violence (t=-.87; p=.38), hermeneutic interpretation (t=1.41; p=.16), 
intratextual fundamentalism (t=1.60; p=.11), and regiocentrism (t=-1.84; 
p=.07). After trimming, the differences of Butonese Muslims and Muslims-
rest on contact avoidance remain significant. However, the differences 
of Javanese Christians and Ambonese Christians turn into significant. 
Both ‘religious out-group friends’ and ‘religious in-group friends’ remain 
significant. ‘Indirect violence,’ and ‘regiocentrism,’ are reduced to non-
significant. While ‘perceived group threat’ and ‘negative out-group’ 
significantly induce contact avoidance, ‘quality of contact’ and ‘religious 
pluralism’ significantly reduce contact avoidance. The adj. R2  remains the 
same before and after trimming (.25) (see table 2 Appendix 3). 
5.3.2 Avoidance of future spouse
All ethno-religious group are expected to have significant differences from 
Javanese Muslims in the avoidance of future spouse scores. The adj. R2 is 
quite low (.08), which means that this model only explains 8% variance 
of the avoidance of future spouse (see table 3 in Appendix 3). With the 
exception of Ambonese Muslims and Muslims-rest, all ethno-religious 
groups have significant differences on the avoidance of future spouse. 
Sundanese Muslims (b=-.14), Madurese Muslims (b=-.24), Javanese 
Christians (b=-.18), Ambonese Christians (b=-.28), Chinese Christians 
(b=-.19), Batak Christians (b=-.29), and Christians-rest (b=-.26) tend to 
score lower on avoidance of future spouse compared to Javanese Muslims. 
Only Butonese Muslims score significantly higher than Javanese Muslims 
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on the avoidance of future spouse. In general, both Muslim and Christian 
ethnic groups tend to avoid out-group members as their future spouses. 
When all religious identification variables are included in model 2a, 
only the differences of Madurese Muslims, Ambonese Christians, and Batak 
Christians on the avoidance of future spouse remain significant. Among 
all religious identification, only ‘collective rites’ has a significant positive 
effect on the avoidance of future spouse. The adj. R2 is also quite low (.08) 
(see table 3 in Appendix 3). Once all ethnic identification variables are 
included in model 2b, only the difference of Ambonese Christians on the 
avoidance of future spouse remains significant. The adj. R2 (.07) is slightly 
lower than model 2a (.08) (see table 3 Appendix 3). 
After all ethnic and religious identification variables are incorporated 
into model 2c, none of ethnic and religious identification variables can 
significantly explain the avoidance of future spouse, which differs from 
our expectations, although the adj. R2 increases drastically from .07 to .32 
(see table 3 in Appendix 3). We trim model 2c and delete these variables 
based on F-tests: rites of passages (p=.95), social embeddedness (p=.97), 
ethnic ceremonies (p=.44), participation in ethnic organization (p=.76), 
and participation in religious organization (p=.94). The following variables 
are eliminated based on t-tests: religious in-group friends (t=.83 p=.41), 
ethnic languages (t=1.053 p=.29), and collective rites (t=1.55 p=.12). After 
trimming, the differences of Sundanese Muslims, Madurese Muslims, 
Javanese Christians, Ambonese Christians, Batak Christians, Chinese 
Christians, and Christians-rest on the avoidance of future spouse become 
significant. ‘Collective rites’ no longer has a significant effect on the 
avoidance of future spouse; however, ‘religious out-group friends’ has a 
significant negative effect on the avoidance of future spouse. Respondents 
who attend religious practices once a week, more than once a week, once 
a day, and several times a day tend to avoid out-group members as future 
spouses more than those who never attend or attend only on feast days. The 
adj. R2 decreases drastically from .32 to .10  (see table 3 Appendix 3). 
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When all significant variables in the previous model together with all 
individual determinants are incorporated into model 3, only the differences 
of Madurese Muslims, Javanese Christians, Ambonese Christians, and 
Batak Christians on the avoidance of future spouse remain significant. 
However, the differences of Sundanese Muslims, Chinese Christians, and 
Christians-rest on the avoidance of future spouse become non-significant. 
Here, ‘religious practices’ is reduced to non-significant, while ‘religious 
out-group friends’ remains significant. Female respondents score higher 
on avoidance of future spouses than male respondents. Respondents from 
uneducated families avoid out-group members as future spouses less than 
those from low-education families. Respondents whose parents are machine 
operators tend to avoid religious out-group members as future spouses 
more than those whose parents are farmers. The adj. R2 becomes higher, 
from .10 to .15 (see table 4 Appendix 3). We delete the following individual 
determinants based on F-tests in model trimming: parents’ religion (p=.75), 
occupational status (p=.78), parents’ education (p=.19).2 After trimming, 
the differences of Madurese Muslims, Javanese Christians, Ambonese 
Christians, and Batak Christians on the avoidance of future spouse remain 
significant. The differences of Sundanese Muslims and Christians-rest on 
the avoidance of future spouse become significant. Here, religious practices 
becomes significant and ‘religious out-group friends’ remains significant. 
‘Parents’ education’ is reduced to non-significant, while ‘household 
income’ becomes significant. Respondents from middle classes show less 
avoidance of future spouse compared to those from high classes. Gender 
and occupation status remain significant. The adj. R2 slightly decreases 
from .15 to .13  (see table 4 Appendix 3). 
After the significant variables in model 3 and all intermediate 
variables are incorporated into model 4, the differences of Sundanese 
Muslims, Madurese Muslims, and Ambonese Christians on the avoidance 
2 Household income still has significant effects on the avoidance of future spouses 
(p=.04), hence we keep it by changing its reference category from ‘low-income’ to ‘high-
income’.
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of future spouse remain significant. The differences of Javanese Christians 
and Christians-rest on the avoidance of future spouse are reduced to non-
significant. However, the difference of Javanese Christians on the avoidance 
of future spouse becomes non-significant. ‘Religious practices’ remains 
significant, while ‘religious out-group friends’ is reduced to non-significant. 
As in model 2c, female respondents show higher avoidance than male 
respondents of a future spouse who has a different religion. Respondents 
who come from middle class and lower class score significantly lower on 
the avoidance of future spouses than high class. Respondents whose parents 
are machine operators score higher on the avoidance of future spouses 
than those whose parents are farmers. Among all intermediate variables, 
‘monism’ and ‘distrust’ significantly increase the avoidance of future 
spouse, while ‘regiocentrism’ considerably decreases the avoidance of 
future spouse. The adj. R2 increases from .13 to .17 (See model 4 Appendix 
3). 
The trimming procedure excludes these variables: quantity of contact 
(t=-.09 p=.93), positive in-group (t=.02 p=.99), intratextual fundamentalism 
(t=.06 p=.95), orientation of equality (t=.08 p=.94), national pride (t=.23 
p=.82), negative out-group (t=.19 p=.85), quality of contact (t=-.43 
p=.66), perceived group threat (t=.50 p=.61), ethnic salience (t=.54 p=.59), 
hermeneutic interpretation (t=-.68 p=.50), nationalism (t=-.65 p=.52), 
religious salience (t=.65 p=.51), perceived discrimination (t=-1.13 p=.26), 
direct violence (t=-1.33 p=.18), indirect violence (t=.80 p=.42), religious 
pluralism (t=-1.27 p=.20), orientation of dominance (t=-1.45 p=.15), and 
memory of violence (t=1.71 p=.09). After trimming, the differences of 
Sundanese Muslims, Madurese Muslims, and Ambonese Christians on the 
avoidance of future spouse remain significant. Moreover, the differences of 
Javanese Christians and Christians-rest on the avoidance of future spouse 
become significant. Again, ‘religious practices,’ ‘religious out-group 
friends,’ ‘gender’, ‘household income’, and ‘occupation status’ remain 
significant. Also, ‘monism’ and ‘distrust of out-group’ significantly induce 
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the avoidance of future spouse, and ‘regiocentrism’ considerably reduces 
the avoidance of future spouse. The adj. R2 decreases slightly from .17 to 
.16 (see model 4 Appendix 3).
5.3.3 Support for residential segregation
Here, too, we expect that all ethno-religious group will have significant 
differences from Javanese Muslims in residential segregation scores. All 
ethno-religious groups have significant differences on the support for 
residential segregation, with the exception of Sundanese Muslims and 
Ambonese Christians. Madurese Muslims (b=.17), Ambonese Muslims 
(b=.24), Butonese Muslims (b=.25), Muslims-rest (b=.08) tend to support 
residential segregation significantly more than Javanese Muslims. In 
contrast, Javanese Christians (b=-.16), Chinese Christians (b=-.14), 
Batak Christians (b=-.17), and Christians-rest (b=-.15) support residential 
segregation significantly less than Javanese Muslims. In short, the Muslim 
ethnic groups support for residential segregation is greater than that of 
Christian ethnic groups. The explained variance of this model is higher (adj. 
R2 =.18) than avoidance of future spouse (adj. R2 =.08) and than contact 
avoidance (adj. R2 =.12) (see table 5 Appendix 3).
When all religious identification variables are included in model 2a, 
the differences of Ambonese Muslims, Butonese Muslims, and Muslims-rest 
on support for residential segregation remain significant. Respondents who 
do not participate in rites of passage but their families do, participate for 
religious reasons, and participate but for non-religious reasons, are less 
likely to support residential segregation than those who do not participate 
in it and nor do their families participate. Respondents who participate 
in collective rites for religious and non-religious reasons are more likely 
to support residential segregation than those who do not participate in it 
and nor do their families. Religious out-group friends has a significant 
negative effect on support for residential segregation, while religious in-
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group friends has a significant positive effect on support for residential 
segregation. Adj. R2 increases from .18 to .24 (see table 5 in Appendix 
3). Once all ethnic identification variables are incorporated into model 2b, 
only the differences of Ambonese Muslims and Butonese Muslims remain 
significant. Respondents who have relatively many ethnic in-group friends 
score less on support for residential segregation than those who have none 
and some. Also, respondents who participate in ethnic organizations only 
on special days score less on support for residential segregation compared 
to those who never participate in it. Adj. R2 is lower (.17) than model 2a 
(.24) (see table 5 Appendix 3). 
When all ethnic and religious identification variables are incorporated 
into model 2c, the differences between Ambonese Muslims and Muslims-
rest with Javanese Muslims on support for residential segregation remain 
significant. The difference of Ambonese Christians on support for residential 
segregation becomes significant. ‘Rites of passage’ and ‘religious out-
group friends’ remain significant, but ‘collective rites’ and ‘religious in-
group friends’ are reduced to non-significant. ‘Social embededdness’ and 
‘participation in ethnic organizations’ remain significant. Respondents 
who do not participate in ethnic ceremonies and nor do their families too, 
and those who do not participate in it but their families do, show higher 
support for residential segregation than those who have no knowledge on it. 
Also, respondents who speak ethnic languages on three or four occasions, 
and five or six occasions, show higher support for residential segregation 
than those who never speak ethnic languages. The adj. R2 becomes higher 
(.38) than in model 2a (.24) and model 2b (.17) (see table 5 Appendix 3). 
We exclude the following variables in model trimming: participation in 
religious organizations (p=.08), ethnic languages (p=.72), participation in 
ethnic organizations (p=.17), ethnic ceremonies (p=.50), collective rites 
(p=.39). After trimming, the difference of Ambonese Muslims on support 
for residential segregation remains significant, while the differences 
of Muslims-rest and Ambonese Christians on support for residential 
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segregation become non-significant. However, the differences of Butonese 
Muslims, Javanese Christians, Batak Christians, and Chinese Christians 
on support for residential segregation become significant. Again, ‘rites of 
passage,’ ‘religious out-group friends,’ and ‘social embeddedness’ remain 
significant. Differing from the situation before trimming, ‘religious in-
group friends’ becomes significant. The adj. R2 decreases from .38 to .27 
(see table 5 Appendix 3). 
When all the significant variables in model 2c together with all 
individual determinants are incorporated into model 3, the differences of 
Ambonese Muslims, Butonese Muslims, and Javanese Christians on support 
for residential segregation remain significant. The differences of Chinese 
Christians and Batak Christians on support for residential segregation are 
reduced to non-significant. ‘Rites of passage’ and ‘religious in-group friends’ 
are reduced to non-significant, while ‘religious out-group friends’ and ‘social 
embededdness’ remain significant. Respondents who come from worker 
families score lower on support for residential segregation than those who 
come from self-employed families. Respondents whose parents are traders 
score lower compared to those whose parents are farmers. The adj. R2 
increases slightly from .27 to .30 (see table 5 in Appendix 3). The following 
individual determinants are deleted in model trimming: parents’ religion 
(p=.91), parents’ education (p=.76), household income (p=.83), and gender 
(p=.28). After trimming, the differences of Ambonese Muslims, Butonese 
Muslims, and Javanese Christians on support for residential segregation 
remain significant. ‘Rites of passage,’ and ‘religious in-group friends,’ 
become significant. ‘Religious out-group friends,’ ‘social embeddedness,’ 
‘occupational status,’ and ‘occupation status’ remain significant. The adj. 
R2 decreases slightly from .30 to .28 (see table 5 Appendix 3). 
When all the significant variables in model 3 together with all 
intermediate variables are included in model 4, the differences of Ambonese 
Muslims and Butonese Muslims on support for residential segregation 
remain significant, while the difference of Javanese Christians on support 
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for residential segregation changes becomes non-significant. ‘Rites of 
passage,’ ‘religious out-group friends,’ and ‘religious in-group friends’ 
remain significant. However, ‘social embeddedness’ is reduced to non-
significant. ‘Occupational status’ remains significant, but ‘occupation 
status’ is reduced to non-significant. Whereas ‘salience ethnic identity’, 
‘perceived group threat’, ‘negative out-group’, ‘hermeneutic interpretation’, 
and ‘distrust’ have significant positive effects on support for residential 
segregation, ‘religious pluralism’ has a significant negative effect. The adj. 
R2 increases drastically from .28 to .37 (see table 6 Appendix 3). 
We exclude these intermediate variables based on t-tests: religious 
monism (t=-.06 p=.95), perceived discrimination (t=.06 p=.95), indirect 
violence (t=-.02 p=.98), quality of contact (t=.11 p=.91), positive in-group 
(t=-.01 p=.99), hermeneutic interpretation  (t=.01 p=.99), direct violence 
(t=-.64 p=.52), regiocentrism (t=.76 p=.45 ), national pride (t=.81 p=.42), 
memory of violence (t=-1.23 p=.22), orientation of equality (t=-1.30 
p=.19), negative out-group (t=1.51 p=.13 ), religious salience (t=-1.60 
p=.11), nationalism (t=1.52 p=.13), and orientation of dominance (t=-
1.81 p=.07). After trimming, the differences of Ambonese Muslims and 
Butonese Muslims on support for residential segregation remain significant, 
while the difference of Muslims-rest on support for residential segregation 
becomes significant. Again, ‘rites of passage’, ‘religious in-group friends,’ 
‘religious out-group friends’ and ‘occupational status’ remain significant. 
‘Negative out-groups’ are reduced to non-significant, while ‘quantity of 
contact’ becomes significant. ‘Salience of ethnic identity’, ‘perceived group 
threat’, ‘intratextual fundamentalism’, and ‘distrust’ significantly increase 
support for residential segregation. In contrast, ‘pluralism’ and ‘quantity of 
contact’ considerably reduce support for residential segregation. The adj. 
R2 increases from .37 to .41 (see table 6 Appendix 3).
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5.4 Summary of findings 
In the following section, we summarize the regression models. The focus 
of description is on how the b- and the beta-coefficients change from model 
1 to model 4.
5.4.1 Contact avoidance
We sum up our findings with respect to the effects of ethno-religious 
identification, individual determinants, and intermediate variables on 
contact avoidance.
Table 5.2 Contact avoidance and other determinants
*= 0 < p value < .05 and ** = 0 < p value < .01
Model Determinants Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 (Constant) .10** .13** .13** .09* 
 
1. Ethno-religious definition (ref: 
Javanese Muslims) 
    
Sundanese Muslims -.00 .02 .03 .04 
Madurese Muslims .13** .02 -.00 .00 
Ambonese Muslims .10** .05** .05* -.00 
Butonese Muslims .15** .09** .11** .09** 
Muslims-rest .07** .07** .07* .07 
Javanese Christians -.09** -.04* -.04 -.04* 
Ambonese Christians -.06** -.05** -.04* -.04* 
Chinese Christians -.07* -.04 -.02 -.04 
Batak Christians -.09* -.06* -.05 -.04 
Christians-rest -.08** -.06* -.05* -.04 
2c. Religious in-group friends  .09** .07* .07* 
Religious out-group friends (ref: 
none and some) 
    
Relatively many  -.09** -.08** -.07** 
Almost all  -.14** -.12** -.07** 
All  -.12** -.10** -.03 
3. Occupational status (ref: farmer)     
Executive   .07 .04 
Professionals   -.04 -.02 
Technicians   .02 .03 
Clerks   -.00 .01 
Sales   -.01 -.02 
Traders   -.03* -.02 
Machine   .00 -.02 
Unskilled   -.03 -.03 
Special   -.02 .02 
Absent   -.01 -.01 
4. Perceived  threat    .18** 
Quality of contact    -.11** 
Negative out-group    .15** 
Pluralism    -.11** 
R2 
 
 .34 .17 .41 .28 
  R2   Adj.  .12 .16 .17 .25 
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In relation to contact avoidance, the influence of ethno-religious 
self-identification is clear: most Muslim ethnicities tend to avoid contact 
with out-groups more than Javanese Muslims, which is not the case for 
Christian ethnicities, and this seems to be driven by several intermediate 
variables. When ‘religious in-group friends’ and ‘religious out-group 
friends‘ are included in model 2, the parameters of ethno-religious groups 
become smaller. Actually, it seems to be the case that the more respondents 
have religious in-group friends, the more they tend to avoid contact with 
out-groups. Respondents who have relatively many, almost all, and all 
religious out-group friends show less contact avoidance compared to those 
who have none and some. After ‘occupational status’ is incorporated into 
model 3, most parameters of ethno-religious groups, ‘religious in-group 
friends’, and categories belonging to ‘religious out-group friends’ decrease. 
In contrast, the parameter of Ambonese Muslims do not change, even after 
controlling for individual determinants. Respondents from traders’ families 
tend to avoid contact less than those from farmers’ families. 
When some intermediate variables are included in model 4, again, the 
parameters of ethno-religious groups and categories belonging to ‘religious 
out-group friends’ become smaller. In the end, only three ethno-religious 
groups have significant differences on contact avoidance from the reference 
category. The parameter of ‘religious in-group friends’ does not change, 
while parameters of categories belonging to ‘occupation status’ decrease, 
but they no longer have significant differences on contact avoidance. 
‘Perceived group threat’ and ‘negative religious out-group’ significantly 
increase contact avoidance, while ‘religious pluralism’ and ‘quality of 
contact’ considerably decrease contact avoidance. 
Butonese Muslims seemingly display more contact avoidance with 
Christians because they have more Muslim friends, more perceived group 
threats by Christians, and more negative images of Christians. On the other 
hand, Javanese Christians and Ambonese Christians tend to avoid contact 
with Muslims less because they have more Muslim friends, have positive 
contact with Muslims, and hold religious pluralism views.
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5.4.2 Avoidance of future spouse 
Now, let us have a look at the findings regarding the avoidance of a future 
spouse who is from a religious out-group. 
Table 5.3 Avoidance of future spouse and other determinants
*= 0 < p value < .05 and ** = 0 < p value < .01
Model Determinants Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 (Constant) .74** .72** .63** .28* 
1. Ethno-religious definition  
(ref: Javanese Muslims) 
    
Sundanese Muslims -.14* -.14* -.22* -.21* 
Madurese Muslims -.24** -.40** -.36** -.31** 
Ambonese Muslims .03 -.01 .01 -.04 
Butonese Muslims .10* .04 -.00 -.04 
Muslims-rest .01 .02 -.05 -.03 
Javanese Christians -.18** -.16** -.18** -.11* 
Ambonese Christians -.28** -.28** -.24** -.21** 
Chinese Christians -.19* -.17* -.13 -.11 
Batak Christians -.29** -.25** -.20* -.13 
Christians-rest -.26** -.20** -.18** -.13* 
2c. Religious practices (ref: never or on 
feast days) 
    
At least once a month  .07 .14 .14 
Once a week  .16* .17* .15 
More than once a week  .23** .25* .21* 
Once a day  .24** .28** .25* 
Several times a day  .17* .22* .17 
Religious out-group friends  -.12** -.12** -.07* 
3. Gender (ref: male)     
Female   .20** .21** 
Household income (ref: high income)     
Middle income   -.11* -.10* 
Low income   -.08 -.04 
Occupation status (ref: farmer)     
Executive   -.02 -.04 
Professionals   .15 .13 
Technicians   .14 .13 
Clerks   .07 .07 
Sales   .01 .02 
Traders   .03 .05 
Machine   .16* .15* 
Unskilled   .05 .04 
Special   .06 .05 
Absent   .05 .08 
4. Monism    .16** 
Regiocentrism    -.10** 
Distrust    .10** 
R2  .08 .11 .16 .19 
  R2   Adj.  .08 .10 .13 .16 
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Again, we find that many ethno-religious groups tend to be less likely 
than Javanese Muslims to avoid contact with a future spouse from out-
groups. This holds for all other Muslim ethnicities, except for Butonese 
Muslims, and for all Christian ethnicities. When ‘religious practices’ and 
‘religious out-group friends’ are incorporated into model 2, parameters of 
ethno-religious groups decrease except for Sundanese Muslims, Madurese 
Muslims, and Ambonese Christians. Respondents who participate in 
religious practices more than once a week and once a day tend to avoid 
future spouses more than those who never participate and only participate 
on feast days. With regard to ‘religious out-group friends’, the more 
respondents have friends from different religious groups, the less they will 
avoid people from a different religion as their future spouses. 
After several individual determinants are incorporated into model 
3, again, parameters of ethno-religious groups become smaller except for 
Sundanese Muslims and Javanese Christians. In contrast, the parameters 
of Sundanese Muslims, Javanese Christians, and categories belonging 
to ‘religious practices’ increase, even after controlling for individual 
determinants. Moreover, the parameter of ‘religious out-group friends’ does 
not change. Females, middle-income families, and machine operators appear 
to differ from their reference categories. Female respondents show higher 
avoidance of future spouse compared to males, even after controlling for 
several intermediate variables. Respondents from middle-income families 
tend to avoid future spouses from out-groups less than respondents from 
high-income families. Respondents from machine operators’ families tend 
to avoid people from different religions as future spouses more than those 
from farmers’ families do. 
When several intermediate variables are included in model 4, 
parameters of ethno-religious groups, ‘religious out-group friends,’ and 
categories belonging to ‘religious practices,’ become smaller. Parameters 
of categories belonging to ‘gender,’ ‘household income,’ and ‘occupation 
status’ also decrease. We also identify that intermediate variables significantly 
284
InteRgRoUP contAct AVoIdAnce In IndoneSIA
explain avoidance of future spouse in different directions. On the one hand, 
‘regiocentrism’ significantly reduces the avoidance of future spouse, which 
is different from what we propose in our research hypotheses. On the other 
hand, ‘monism’ and ‘distrust’ significantly increase the avoidance of future 
spouse. Sundanese Muslims, Madurese Muslims, Javanese Christians, 
Ambonese Christians, and Christians-rest score lower on the avoidance 
of future spouse than Javanese Muslims, as they are likely to have more 
regiocentric attitudes. Actually, Javanese Muslims show higher avoidance 
of future spouses than other ethno-religious groups, as they are likely to 
have more monistic attitudes and more distrust toward Christians. 
5.4.3 Support for residential segregation
Here, we present the result of multivariate analyses between support for 
residential segregation and all significant determinants. 
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Table 5.4 Support for residential segregation and other determinants
*= 0 < p value < .05 and ** = 0 < p value < .01
Model Determinants Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 (Constant) .29** .54** .57** .09 
1. Ethno-religious definition  
(ref: Javanese Muslims) 
    
 Sundanese Muslims .01 .04 .04 .05 
 Madurese Muslims .17** .03 -.00 .04 
 Ambonese Muslims .24** .18** .15** .10** 
 Butonese Muslims .25** .17** .19** .12** 
 Muslims-rest .08 .08 .10 .14* 
 Javanese Christians -.16** -.06* -.07* .00 
 Ambonese Christians .00 -.00 -.03 -.01 
 Chinese Christians -.14** -.08* -.07 -.05 
 Batak Christians -.17** -.08* -.07 -.01 
 Christians-rest -.15** -.06 -.11 -.06 
2c. Rites of passage (ref: I do not 
participate in it and neither does my 
family) 
    
 I do not participate in it but my 
family does 
 -.06 -.10 -.10 
 I do participate but for non-
religious reasons 
 -.10* -.14* -.13* 
 I do participate for religious 
reasons 
 -.08* -.11* -.11* 
 Religious in-group friends  .10** .11** .10** 
 Religious out-group friends  -.26** -.23** -.12** 
 Social embededness (ref: all)     
 Relatively many  -.10** -.09** -.07* 
 Almost all  -.07** -.05* -.04 
 None and some  -.06 -.00 -.01 
3. Occupational status (ref: self 
employed) 
    
 Worker   -.06* -.05* 
 Free worker   .00 -.02 
 Unpaid worker   .06 .00 
 Occupation status (ref: farmers)     
 Executive   -.01 -.01 
 Professionals   -.06 -.08 
 Technicians   .02 .01 
 Clerks   .02 .01 
 Sales   .01 -.02 
 Traders   -.07** -.04 
 Machine   .01 .01 
 Unskilled   -.02 -.04 
 Special   -.04 -.01 
 Absent   .05 .09 
4. Salience of ethnic identity    .13** 
 Perceived  threat    .16** 
 Quantity of contact    -.10* 
 Pluralism    -.10** 
 Intratextual fundamentalism    .14** 
 Distrust    .16** 
R2  .19 .29 .31 .44 
  R2   Adj.  .18 .27 .28 .41 
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Again, we find a similar pattern: Muslim ethnicities tend to support 
residential segregation more than Javanese Muslims and nearly all 
Christian ethnicities. Several intermediate variables strengthen or weaken 
the relationship between ethno-religious identification and the support for 
residential segregation. When several religious and ethnic identification 
variables are included in model 2, the parameters of ethno-religious groups 
become smaller. ‘Religious out-group friends’ has a significant negative 
effect on support for residential segregation, while ‘religious in-group 
friends’ has a considerable positive effect. Respondents who participate 
in rites of passage both for religious and non-religious reasons support 
residential segregation less than those who never participate in it. We also 
find that respondents who have relatively many and almost all ethnic in-
groups friends support residential segregation less than those who have 
all. 
Once some individual determinants are incorporated into model 3, 
only the parameter of Ambonese Muslims decreases, which differs from 
our expectations. The parameters of Butonese Muslims and Javanese 
Christians increase after controlling for individual determinants. 
Parameters of ‘religious out-group friends’ and categories belonging to 
‘social embeddedness’ become smaller, while parameters of ‘religious 
in-group friends’ and categories belonging to ‘rites of passage’ increase 
after controlling for individual determinants. ‘Occupational status’ and 
‘occupation status’ significantly explain support for residential segregation. 
Respondents from workers’ families score lower on support for residential 
segregation than respondents from self-employed families. Respondents 
whose parents are traders show less support for residential segregation 
than those whose parents are farmers. 
When several intermediate variables are included in model 4, the 
parameters of Ambonese Muslims and Butonese Muslims become smaller, 
while the parameter of Muslims-rest becomes bigger. Parameters of ‘religious 
in-group friends,’ ‘religious out-group friends,’ categories belonging 
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to ‘rites of passage’ and categories belonging to ‘social embeddedness’ 
decrease. Also, parameters of categories belonging to ‘occupational status’ 
and ‘occupation status’ become smaller. We can also identify that ‘salience 
of ethnic identity’, ‘perceived group threat’, ‘intratextual fundamentalism’, 
and ‘distrust’ have significant positive influences on support for residential 
segregation. To the contrary, ‘quantity of contact’ and ‘pluralism’ have 
significant negative effects on support for residential segregation. 
5.5 The relevant determinants of intergroup contact avoidance
Based on findings from our interviews, we will now illustrate several 
determinants that have a significant effect on contact avoidance, on 
avoidance of a future spouse from a different religion, and on support for 
residential segregation.
Perceived group threat
As was previously mentioned, we define perceived group threat as the 
perception of being threatened by religious out-groups in political, 
economic, socio-cultural, and religious realms. The threats are related to an 
increase in the size of out-groups resulting from migration, which increases 
intergroup competition. This competition strengthens social identifications, 
which can lead to exclusionary reactions (Gijsberts et al., 2004:18). Most 
of our respondents feel threatened by religious out-groups with regard 
to their religious convictions, security, and education. In Yogyakarta, 
Christian migrants, mainly students from outside of Java, are perceived to 
be a threat to Muslims’ way of life. When asked about Christian migrants 
in Yogyakarta, a Muslim respondent in our study, Faisal, says:
“I just predict whenever there is a majority in a society, policymaking will 
be dominated by the majority. Of course, religious aspects will influence 
their way of life. Here is, in my opinion, a potential problem. Every 
religion has a mission to persuade people to become followers. In this 
situation, it can become a source of competition.”
288
InteRgRoUP contAct AVoIdAnce In IndoneSIA
In the city of Ambon, the arrival of Muslim migrants became a 
perceived threat for the Christian Ambonese, leading to an escalation of 
violence between 1999 and 2004. Asked about Muslim migrants in the city, 
Marcus, a Christian respondent and the chairman of the student council of 
Unpatti university [Universitas Pattimura], describes his worries after the 
violence erupted in September of 2011: 
“If Ambon becomes violent, the perpetrators are usually [Muslim] 
migrants and this makes me afraid. What we know about them is about 
jihad. Jihad is teaching to kill, so there are many terror-bombs here. I feel 
that Ambon has become unsafe due to the many Muslim migrants and 
because the religious conflicts never end.”
Often, Muslim migrants are seen as a threat to the Christian Ambonese 
when they start competing for jobs – jobs in the police force, for example. 
A deputy dean from the Faculty of Sciences at Unpatti says: 
“They [Christian Ambonese] see police become[ing] a threat because 
they’ve recruited more and more [Muslim] Javanese and Makassarese. 
Their opportunities are greater [compared to the Ambonese] because they 
have enough money to pay the police-test fee [bribe], which is increasing. 
Before economic crisis, it cost IDR 10 million, then it increased to IDR 
20 million and now it is IDR 50 million. People who have enough money 
to pay it are mostly migrants. The Ambonese who can pay it are usually 
rich clove farmers.” 
However, not all respondents consider the presence of migrants 
from other religious groups to be a threat. Lucas, a Christian respondent 
in Ambon, has a positive perception of Muslim migrants, feeling that they 
can encourage Moluccans to improve the quality of their human resources. 
When asked to what extent the arrival of Muslim migrants is considered 
a threat to Christian Ambonese in competition for economic and political 
resources, he answers, “I do not feel threatened by their presence. What we 
have to compete on is our quality and the quality of our rivals, whether they 
are Muslim or non-Muslims.” According to him, it is unreasonable to refer 
289
chAPteR 5 - InteRgRoUP contAct AVoIdAnce on the IndIVIdUAl leVel
to ethnicities and religions in competition. Another Christian respondent, 
Marcus, does not see Muslims who migrate to Ambon to trade as a threat. 
“What we are really afraid of is if they come here with bad intentions,” he 
said.  
Many examples reveal that our Muslim respondents from Unpatti 
feel threatened by the presence of Christians. At this university, Muslim 
students consider Christian lecturers and students as sources of religious 
threats. Since the establishment of the university in 1970, it is clear that 
Muslims have been reluctant to send their children to study there because 
of concerns over their children converting to Christianity. A Muslim 
respondent, Yusuf, explains: 
“In my village, my parents are concerned with this issue [religious 
conversion]. However, we have no problems with it because we are boys. 
We forbid [Muslim] girls from studying here and it becomes our tradition. 
It is what our parents have told us. Boys are considered firmer physically 
and mentally to face problems here. That is why we are allowed study 
here.” 
Many in the Muslim community are suspicious that Unpatti tries to 
convert female Muslim students to Christianity.  
Some respondents also expressed a sense of being threatened 
politically, often in relation to religious belonging or to migration. More 
than once, respondents stated that Muslims had become a political threat 
to the Christian majority in Ambon. The deputy-dean of the Faculty of 
Sciences at Unpatti said: 
“If you know the provincial government, most civil servants are Christians. 
Historically, more Christians worked in the government than Muslims; 
later the number of Muslims increased. After ICMI become politically 
stronger [in the Moluccas], many Muslims from Hatuhaha of Haruku 
Island were appointed as government officials. Christians then perceived 
these people as a Muslim representation. While the Muslims [Hatuhaha] 
became high officials, Christian numbers were greater among middle and 
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low-level officials. So, the Christians’ hatred toward the Muslim Hatuhaha 
was directed at all Muslims in the Moluccas.”
 Moreover, the arrival of Butonese Muslim migrants increased political 
competition between migrants and natives in the Moluccas. A Muslim 
respondent in Ambon says, “Government officials who are Butonese will 
only care for their Butonese fellows. In the future, I am worried whether 
my brothers and sisters will have opportunities to work in government.” 
Salience of ethnic identity
According to Duckit (2006:154), ethnic saliency is the extent of an 
individual’s awareness about their ethnic identification, including the 
importance of this identity in daily life and in decision-making. Our survey 
findings indicate that respondents display a moderate degree of ethnic 
saliency in everyday life. Here we give several examples of ethnic saliency 
based on the interviews. 
Ethnic identity, which be analyzed as something separate from 
religion, can be considered salient when people from a certain ethnic group 
make use of it to interact with their people in daily life. Our interviews 
indicate that the Kei, an ethno-linguistic group from the Moluccas, tend 
to give preference to their ethnic identity over their religious identity. 
According to Johannes, a Catholic respondent from the Kei Islands, ethnic 
identity is very important in his life. He said: 
“[Ethnic] identity is very useful. I said earlier that Kei people have the 
strongest solidarity. If we have economic or academic problems, a lecturer 
from Kei will certainly help us, even if he is from a different religion. For 
example, the third deputy-rector at Unpatti is a Muslim Kei. If I have 
some problems, he would surely help me.” 
In Ambon, Muslim respondents tend to have higher levels of ethnic 
saliency than Christian respondents. A Muslim respondent, Fatima, 
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describes her experience while taking a mini-bus to the market driven by 
someone from her hometown: 
“After arriving at the market, the driver asked me, “Where are you from?” 
I answered, “From Kailolo.” Then we talked about his family name and 
his house where he lived in Kailolo. When leaving the bus my friend paid 
her ride, but I did not. All people with the family name of Tuanany are like 
brothers and sisters.” 
Fatima did not pay for the ride because the driver knew she was 
from his hometown, so he considered her as a sister because of their shared 
ethnicity. When studying in the school SMK Muhammadiyah in Ambon, 
Fatima says that a teacher from her hometown also helped her: 
“We had Mr. Sangadji from Rohomoni of Haruku Island. He taught 
mathematics. In the mid-semester test, he helped me. He knew that I came 
from the same community he belongs to. He gave me the answers to the 
test. I passed the test.”
 Quite a few respondents mentioned that they based their votes for the 
student executive board chairman on ethnicity. “I elected Malik Tuasamu 
because he is from Kailolo. From the poster and campaign, I could identify 
his family name, which indicates clearly that he is from my hometown,” 
Fatima says.
People from religious minorities identify with ethnic groups more than 
religious ones in order to affiliate with the religious majority. A Catholic 
respondent, Maria, regards her Javanese identity as very important, even 
stronger than her religious identity. Belonging to a religious minority in 
Yogyakarta often creates difficulties, such as discrimination and prejudice 
from neighbours. Consequently, by using her ethnic identity, Maria can 
reference shared boundaries with the religious majority. When asked which 
of her identities is stronger, Catholic, Javanese, or Catholic Javanese, she 
unequivocally states that her Javanese identity is the most important. “What 
I mean is,” she says, “according to the concept of ‘empan papan’ [adapting 
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to the environment], we have to put traditions into important aspects of 
our life, instead of religion.” People from ethnic minorities also use ethnic 
saliency as a way of distinguishing between their in-group and out-groups, 
allowing them to profit from daily interactions with people from the 
same ethnicity. For instance, a Muslim respondent from Riau studying in 
Yogyakarta shared his experience regarding the salience of ethnic identity. 
Although he comes from Riau, his parents are Javanese. In his hometown, 
therefore, he perceives his Javanese identity to be important in his daily 
life. “When we meet with a Javanese [in Riau], he or she usually treats us 
in a good manner and likes helping us,” he says.
We found several examples of why people from dominant groups 
consider their ethnic identities to be of importance. When ethnic identity 
plays a role in daily life, the significance of these identities is related to pride 
and practicality. A Javanese Muslim respondent, Faisal, mentions that his 
ethnic identity is important. “I am proud to be a Javanese, but I never think 
other ethnic groups are worse than mine. I am proud of being a Javanese, 
perhaps, because of its rich culture. For example, look at the complex nature 
of Javanese language and etiquette.” Fauzi says he references his ethnicity 
in everyday life, “As long as it is beneficial for me. For example, if I want 
to go shopping in Malioboro, I will benefit if I speak Javanese well, since 
some traders will give us friendlier treatment.” A female Javanese Muslim, 
Zahra, who regards ethnic identity to be of practical importance, gives 
another example. When asked about whether her ethnic identity influences 
her daily life, she says, “More or less yes. In friendships, for example, I 
tend to choose and feel more comfortable among the Javanese. Perhaps it 
is just about the similarities in values we hold. Different values make me 
feel uncomfortable.” 
It is clear from multivariate analyses that ethnic saliency significantly 
increases support for residential segregation. We propose that ethnic 
saliency, with its attached negative images of ethnic out-groups, probably 
has an influence on exclusionary reactions, including support for residential 
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segregation. Previous studies on prejudice and ethnocentrism say that, at 
least theoretically, ethnocentrism will lead to exclusionary reactions. Here, 
we would like to illustrate several examples of this attitude. Johannes, 
a Catholic respondent from the Kei Islands who lives in a religiously 
segregated neighbourhood in Ambon, shared negative stereotypes about 
the Ambonese: 
“What I dislike mostly from the Ambonese is that they do not have good 
manners. They are impolite in general. Their impoliteness shows in the 
way they speak, particularly among females. They do not respect others. 
The way they talk is different from us, the Southeast people. The people 
of the Southeast may sometimes be rude, but our accents are plain. They 
[Ambonese] speak uncontrolled, so it is not good. Their daily habits, 
which I have seen for a few years in Ambon, do not respect old people.” 
Zahra, A female Muslim respondent in Yogyakarta who lives in a 
segregated area, says, “For me, the Bataknese, for example, are typically 
tough, and bold. The people of Eastern Indonesia, such as the Ambonese, 
despite being tough and bold, tend to use violent ways. 
Intergroup contact
As was previously discussed, intergroup contact is distinguished by quantity 
and quality. Quantity of contact, following previous studies (Nix 1993:33-
35; Wagner et al., 2006:382), is the frequency of an individual’s interaction 
with religious out-group members, such as relatives, close friends, 
classmates, board mates, and neighbours. Quality of contact, referring to 
Brown (2007:3-4), is how individuals rate their contacts with religious out-
group members according to closeness, equality, and cooperativeness.
It seems that most respondents who are active in student organizations 
have many opportunities for contact with members of religious out-groups, 
some of whom include classmates and close friends. For example, a 
Christian interviewee, Lucas, who is the chairperson of the student union in 
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the Faculty of Economics at Unpatti, says, “I have a close friend from HMI 
[Islamic Students Association]. Now he is in Namlea on Buru Island. I also 
have close friends from IMM [Muhammadiyah Student Association] and 
PMII [Indonesian Muslim Students Movement]. They are close friends in 
university.” He also lives in a military housing complex where Muslims and 
Christians stay together. “The majority of people in our housing complex 
are Muslims,” he said. “My father was a sergeant there. My friends are 
mostly Muslims.” 
Compared to the period before 1999, the relationship between 
Muslims and Christians at Unpatti has improved. Umar, a Muslim director 
of the Social Development Institute at Unpatti said, “They [Christians] were 
very arrogant and felt more dominant. They thought Ambon was theirs, 
especially Unpatti. We really felt isolated. But after 1999, Christians started 
to promote peace more.” 
“Relations between [Muslims and Christians] are incredibly good now 
that the HMJ [Department of Student Associations] has been created. If the 
association conducts halal bi halal [the celebration of Idul fitri], Christian 
students attend it. When the association held a Christmas celebration, 
Muslim students also attended it. So relations are good.” 
As a lecturer in the Faculty of Education at Unpatti, Umar always 
combines Muslim and Christian students to work on group assignments. 
According to him, Muslim and Christian students have become closer since 
the conflict ended in 2004. “Their arrogance has dramatically decreased. 
However, nowadays, it disappears. It is possibly the result of the horrifying 
conflict between 1999 and 2004”. 
A number of respondents stated that inter-religious contact in Ambon 
is not limited to meeting on college campuses and at school, but also 
occurs in the course of everyday life, in places like markets and hospitals. 
A Muslim interviewee, Fatima, says she buys things from both Muslim and 
Christian traders in the city. When she gets sick, she even goes to a public 
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hospital that is located in a Christian area, as the hospital in the Muslim 
area has insufficient facilities. In addition, Fatima talks about her strategy 
to stay in contact with former classmates from different religions. She 
created a motorbike gang with Muslims and Christian members. “There are 
friends from the motorbike gang in Karpan [Christian area]. Every Friday 
or Saturday night, I go to Karpan to have fun with them. I am usually 
picked up from Kebun Cengkeh [a Muslim area] and then we go to Karpan 
to hang out with them”.  In addition, she always invites her friends to visit 
her during Islamic celebrations, but she never goes to the houses of her 
Christian friends, as her parents do not allow it.  She also uses Facebook to 
maintain her social network.
In rural areas of the Moluccas, it is difficult to have inter-religious 
contact in the course of one’s educational career, because educational 
institutions are religiously segregated. However, people between villages 
that have cultural ties, referred to as relations of pela and gandong, tend to 
have good relationships. 3 In Ambon, students from these villages work to 
maintain such relationships. For example, the Sepa of Central Moluccas 
has a pela relationship with the Kamariyan of Western Seram. Therefore, 
students from Sepa have a special bond with students from Kamariyan, 
regardless of their different religions. Yusuf, a Muslim respondent, says, 
“We know them through communicating with friends, or acquaintances of 
friends. I do not know all of them. I surely know the family names Penturi 
and Leomase.”
Most of our respondents in Ambon mentioned that after the violence 
ended in 2004, and up until 2011, Christian students went to Muslim 
friend’s houses in the city and vice versa. The recent violence, however, 
has stopped them from visiting each other as frequently. Johannes says:
“After the September 11, 2011 violence, I was a bit worried, but it only 
lasted one week. In Ambon, people are used to hearing bombs. I live 
within a community that is close to them [Muslims], and they accept me. 
3  See Chapter 1 section 1.3.2
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When going home late at night, however, I am still terrified. At noon we 
are free, but I worry at night.”
Another interviewee, a Muslim female student, also experienced 
difficulties in visiting some Christian areas after the riots. She explained: 
“A week and two days after the riots, I went to Karpan, AY Patti, Kudamati 
Street, and Halaussy Hospital by public city transport [shuttle bus]. In 
Kudamati, almost all people are Christians. I had to take my veil off. I was 
still worried although my veil was off. In the bus, I sat near the door. If 
something bad happened, I could jump out. I went there alone.”
In regard to contact with neighbours from different religions, quite 
a few respondents say that they have no Christian neighbours. A Muslim 
interviewee in Yogyakarta, Hakim, says there are no Christians living in 
his neighbourhood in Tasikmalaya, West Java. In contrast, several other 
interviewees who have neighbours from different religions describe their 
peaceful relationships. A Muslim female respondent, Zahra, provides a good 
example of contact between Muslims and Christians from a neighbourhood 
in Yogyakarta. When asked about her problems living in a religiously 
heterogeneous neighbourhood, she says, “Well, I once had a problem 
with a dog because I am afraid of dogs.” According to Zahra, Muslims in 
her village allow Christians keep their dogs in order to maintain peaceful 
relationships between them.
In Yogyakarta, it is still possible to find students who have relatives 
from different religions because inter-religious marriage was common in 
Java before the 1990s. A few respondents say they have some relatives from 
different religions. Peter, a Christian interviewee from Surakarta, says his 
father is a Muslim and his mother is a Christian. His father told Peter and 
his siblings that they could choose which religion they would practice. As a 
result, his brothers and sisters followed Christianity. However, when one of 
his brothers married a Muslim woman, he converted to Islam. After several 
years, he returned to Christianity. So, he has a Muslim sister-in-law and a 
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Muslim father. “Everyone in the family respects each other in practicing 
their religions,” he says. “For example, my brother who has a Muslim wife 
allows his wife to practice Islam.” Another respondent, a female Muslim, 
Zahra, also says she has relatives from different religions due to previous 
inter-religious marriages. Her grandmother’s sister married a Christian 
man, so she converted to Christianity. In addition, a grandfather’s brother 
married a Christian woman and he converted to Christianity. All of her 
relatives now live in Yogyakarta, and she still has good relations with her 
Christian relatives.
In the interviews, we found that Christian students have difficulty 
finding boarding houses in Yogyakarta, as Muslim owners tend to rent only 
to Muslim students. A Muslim respondent, Najib, says there are no Christian 
students in his boarding house, although he has many Christian classmates. 
Also, he admits that his interactions with Christian classmates are restricted 
to interacting on campus. Several Muslim respondents, however, want 
to live in a boarding house with students from different religions. For 
instance, a Muslim interviewee, Faisal, explains that he prefers to live in a 
more heterogeneous religious community, although more of his university 
classmates are Muslim than Christian. “I prefer heterogeneous housing,” 
he says. “Having non-Muslim friends is not a problem for me. One of our 
research group members is also a non-Muslim, and he respects me. When 
it is time to pray, he allows me to go first.” 
Aside from the quantity of contact, quality of contact is also 
important for reducing avoidance of intergroup contact. Many respondents 
state that they rate their contact with religious out-group members in 
terms of closeness and cooperativeness. A Catholic interviewee in Ambon, 
Johannes, says, “I have close relationships with a Muslim community 
[Amaci, the city of Ambon], and they accept me.” A Muslim respondent, 
Yusuf, mentions that his relationship with his Christian classmates became 
better after they had an in-depth discussion about the causes of the recent 
violence in 2011. “We became closer and closer after. After the conflict, we 
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are just closer friends”. In terms of cooperativeness, Fatima says she often 
helps her Christian friends in her motorbike gang. “We are used to helping 
each other. If I have a problem, they will help. Once a car hit my [Christian] 
friend in front of the telecommunication office, he was brought to the RST 
[a military hospital]. And then all the members of the motorbike gang came 
to see him.” 
Now we will provide some illustrations of inter-religious relationships 
in Yogyakarta, where Muslims are the majority and Christians the minority. 
Although both groups seem to have peaceful relations in daily life, a few 
problems of religious intolerance still exist. Some respondents rate their 
contact with religious out-group members positively, while other res-
pondents rate their contact with people from different religions negatively. 
When asked how he rates his contact with his Christian classmates, Faisal 
says, “I have positive views.” Another Muslim respondent, Zahra, says the 
same thing about her contact with her Christian relatives, and always visits 
them during Christmas celebrations. “So far, the interaction is very good,” 
she says. A female Catholic respondent, Maria, tells a different story. In the 
questionnaire, she states that she has many Muslim friends and neighbours. 
However, she also says that she has negative perceptions of her Muslim 
classmates and neighbours.  “My negative image of Muslims is due to the 
attitudes of Muslim neighbours to me. I tried to respect them, but they 
treated me offensively and impolitely. This forced me to think negatively 
about Muslims.” According to her, a group of people from a Muslim 
neighbourhood destroyed her car and house.
Religiosity
The results of the multivariate analyses indicate that negative views on 
religious out-groups, religious monism, and intratextual fundamentalism 
contribute considerably to avoidance of intergroup contact, while religious 
pluralism significantly reduces it. According to Sterkens and Anthony 
(2008:34), negative attitudes towards religious out-groups and positive 
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attitudes towards the religious in-group are representative of religiocentrism. 
Religious monism refers to the interpretation that truth and values only 
can be found in one respected religion, while religious pluralism refers 
to the interpretation that different religions are sources of both truth and 
values (Anthony et al., 2005:157-162). Intratextual fundamentalism, as 
considered in studies by Williamsons et al. (2010:723-724), is a form of 
religious fundamentalism based on a literal interpretation of a sacred text. 
Here we give some examples relating to negative attitudes toward religious 
out-groups, monism, pluralism, and hermeneutic interpretations.
Several respondents say they have a negative image of religious out-
group members. Muhammad clearly states his negative view of Christians: 
“Now, the governor is Christian, so the majority of positions in government 
are occupied by them [Christians]. So, I believe that Christians are the 
cause of religious conflict.” Another Muslim respondent, Fatima, provides 
another negative view about Christians, related to a bad experience she 
had with Christians in the past. She noticed that Christians seemed to 
denigrate Muslims when she attended a socialization program held by the 
Indonesian Red Cross. She says, “Once, they [Christians] laughed me at an 
event on drug counselling. A Christian student stated that the [intellectual] 
capacities of Muslim presenters are bad. His statement humiliated us 
[Muslims] and regarded the Muslims as lower than the Christians.” The 
same views are heard on the other side. Apparently, Christian students 
generally see Muslim students as too emotional and supportive of violent 
conflicts. When asked about his image of Muslims, Lucas from Unpatti, 
says, “What I fear are the stupid groups among the youth of Moluccans. For 
example, Moluccan youngsters are emotionally aggressive. We do not like 
to be told to study. However, when we are told to fight, we get very excited. 
Like what happened at the last demonstration [when Muslims burned the 
university registration’s building].” 
Quite a few respondents in Yogyakarta shared negative images of 
religious out-group members. Some Muslim respondents may tend to 
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identify Christians only with pork and liquor. Ahmed, says, “Another thing 
is about eating pork. Christian and Kong Hu Cu people eat it. If they invite 
us to their homes and serve some food, we would not eat it, even if they 
cook fried chicken. We think the chicken is cooked in the same pan with 
the pork.” Another Muslim respondent, Amir, mentions, “Before Muslim 
students held positions in student council in 2006, Christian students 
controlled it. Liquor, then, was usually found in the secretariat.” On other 
hand, a Catholic interviewee has a negative perception of her Muslim 
neighbours because of previous incidents. “A long time ago, some people 
threw stones at my house,” she says. “Previously, they also damaged my 
car.” Based on these incidents, her negative perception is that that Muslims 
like conflict and support violence. 
Data from our survey shows that Muslim respondents are more likely 
to believe that the truth can only be found in their religion, while Christian 
respondents are more likely to believe that the truth can be found in many 
religions. Therefore, we can state that Muslim respondents have stronger 
monistic religious views than Christian respondents, while Christian 
respondents have stronger religiously pluralistic views than Muslims. The 
interviews support these findings from the survey. It seems most Muslim 
respondents prefer monistic religious views. A Muslim respondent, Hakim, 
says: 
“The sources of Islam are the Quran and Hadith. The sources of Christianity 
are the Bible, but the Bible is not true. Men have modified it, so it is 
not the original Bible given by Jesus. Buddhism and Hinduism are even 
worse. They worship statues. What can a statue do for them? It is illogical. 
They have no common sense.”
A Christian respondent, Elisabeth, expresses a religiously pluralistic view:
“If Christianity is the only true religion, why did God create other religions? 
We can learn from others. For example, our Muslim brothers, they pray 
five times a day. I have observed what others consider not important. 
Muslims wake up at 05.00. They sell yellow rice at 07.00. Before they get 
on the bus, they say bismillah [in the name of God].”
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Another Christian interviewee, Peter, says:  
“What I admit is Jesus, who is the one who guides the way to live and the 
one who saves me. I am open to the possibility that other religions also 
have the way to salvation. For me, however, Jesus is the way to salvation. 
I do not mind people who say that they also find salvation in their religion; 
it is a reflection of their faith.” 
His statements indicate that he has a pluralistic view. “I like saying 
that religions are the same in an abstract level. I believe that [all] religions 
teach all good things”. 
Another characteristic of religiosity is hermeneutic interpretation. 
Again, the findings of the survey indicate that Muslim respondents are 
more likely to use hermeneutic interpretation than Christian respondents 
are. The interviews seemingly confirm these survey findings, demonstrating 
that several Muslim respondents interpret the Holy Scriptures literally. For 
example, Muhammad says, “The Holy Scriptures should be interpreted 
literally.” When asked about the interpretation of the Quran, a Muslim 
respondent named Hakim says, “The Quran is the way of life and guidance 
for us. There is an absolute truth, which we have to believe in it, so no need 
to interpret the verses.” Another Muslim, Najib, states, “The Quran for a 
Muslim is ‘qalamullah’ (God’s writing). It is given directly by God. In 
Islam, it is considered God’s word, so the truth is absolute and cannot be 
denied. Other people perhaps will use their logical thinking to question it, 
then, they believe it. For me, I need to believe it first, and then I shall find 
the truth.”
Regiocentric attitudes
Regiocentrism derives from ethnocentric-nationalism, or chauvinism, 
defined as a sentiment of the superiority of one’s country in comparison to 
other countries (Coenders, 2001:64; Todosijevic, 1998:14-15). Therefore, 
a ‘regiocentric attitude’ refers to ethnocentric-nationalism constructed in a 
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specific region as opposed to nationalism. As explained in the multivariate 
analyses, ‘regiocentric attitudes’ significantly reduce the avoidance of future 
spouses from a different religion. After the political reformation in 1998, 
regiocentrism seemingly flourished in line with the inception of political 
decentralization and the decline of nationalism. 
Our survey data indicates that Muslim respondents show higher 
levels of regiocentric attitudes than Christian respondents. In interviews 
many Muslim and Christian respondents expressed love for their region 
and ethnicity. When we asked whether the respondent Lucas whether 
he identifies more strongly as Indonesian, Moluccan, or Ambonese, he 
answered, “I am a proud to be Ambonese because I was born and grew up 
in Ambon. It is like Unpatti’s motto, hitimesse, meaning we [the Ambonese] 
develop from challenges.” Most Muslim respondents in Ambon seem to 
mix regiocentric attitudes with ethnicity. For them, both are similar in terms 
of opposition to provincial and national identities, since increased use of 
ethnic identities is related to the rise of a regiocentric identity. A Muslim 
respondent in Ambon, Fatima, says, “I am closer to the Kailolo people than 
other Moluccans, because in Kailolo, our traditions tend to unite people of 
the same culture. Therefore, in Ambon, we are relatively separated from 
other Moluccans. Adat is stronger in our villages than here.4” 
In Yogyakarta, the survey and interviews were conducted while 
debates took place in the national parliament on the position of the sultan 
as governor. This political situation probably influenced respondents from 
Yogyakarta towards emphasizing their regional and local identities rather 
than their national identities. In answering the question about which identity 
is stronger, Indonesian or being from Yogyakarta, a Catholic interviewee 
named Maria, responds, “I think, always Yogyakartan. I am proud to be from 
Yogyakarta. If we enlarge the scope, then, I am proud to be an Indonesian.” 
Quite a lot of respondents expressed that their love for their region is related 
4 See chapter 1 section 1.3.2; adat refers to all the traditional values and laws within a 
specific community (Sterkens and Hadiwitanto, 2009:69).
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to the government’s performance in fulfilling basic needs. When we asked 
which government they regard as more important, the local government 
or the national government, answers varied. Many respondents stated that 
they prefer the local government because they are satisfied with the state 
of development in their hometowns.  A Muslim interviewee named Ahmed 
says, “For local development, I am quite satisfied, but I am not satisfied 
yet with the issue of equity, balance, and justice. Well, they prioritize their 
community only, the native people.” 
In respect to regiocentrism, several respondents state that they love 
their region because the region means a lot to the people and makes them 
proud. Najib, a Muslim respondent from the Kutai group of Kalimantan 
states “Both [nationalism and regiocentrism] are important. I prefer 
regiocentrism because it only focuses on the region, not on the central 
government.” Another Muslim interviewee, Zahra, says: 
“Honestly, I am more proud to be from Yogyakarta. I am not sure, but 
I think because this situation is more conducive. The leaders are more 
concerned with their people than the leaders in the central government. 
Perhaps, also because I live in a neighbourhood where Javanese are in the 
majority.” 
 
When asked whether she is in favour of gubernatorial elections or 
the appointment of the sultan, she answers, “In my opinion, so far, it is no 
problem that that sultan is also in charge as the governor of Yogyakarta. 
Why should we question his position and qualification now? It is, in fact, a 
bit difficult to imagine two leaders in the same area. Besides, we all know 
that the people of Yogyakarta respect the sultan very highly.”
It seems that several respondents implicitly emphasized that the rise 
of regiocentrism is in line with a growing dissatisfaction with the national 
government and an increasingly favourable attitudes toward ethnic groups. 
A Muslim interviewee in Yogyakarta, Ahmed, explains: 
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“I am not satisfied. Our government is not clean anymore. Another thing 
that I am not satisfied with is that the current government has no grand 
design for development, unlike during the New Order period. At that 
time, we had designs for five-year and 25-year development. Now we 
have none.” 
This strong dissatisfaction indicates that Ahmed puts religious and 
ethnic interests above national interests. He adds, “Honestly, I want to put 
national interests as my priority, but I have to prioritize my religious and 
ethnic group because from there we can develop ourselves and our place.” 
Several respondents spoke positively about their ethnic group, which 
implies their strong attachment to their region. A Muslim interviewee from 
the Sepa ethnic groupsays: 
“What I am proud of is the voluntary labour, cooperation, and work for 
common interests; the people of Sepa are willing to help each other for 
such activities. For example, they will still participate in these activities 
even if there are hostilities between them. They give themselves to this 
work, such as repairing mosques, drainage systems, and so on.”
A Catholic interviewee, Johannes, gives a similar example. “The 
positive side of the Kei people generally is they have high solidarity. There 
is a custom in our society call yelim. In Indonesian, it is called sumbangan 
[contribution]. We practice it, for instance, when we have disasters, funerals, 
or marriages. If I have a problem both my close and distant relatives, and 
also neighbours, would give some contribution, wherever and whenever.”
Distrust
Distrust refers to negative expectations in certain religious groups when 
they perceive that religious out-group members are prejudiced against 
them, and in interaction between groups (Tropp et al. 2006:771-772). In 
this research we consider distrust to consist of an individual’s attitudes 
and behaviours that show distrust toward religious out-group members 
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in intergroup relationships. Our multivariate analyses demonstrate that 
distrust considerably increases support for residential segregation and for 
the avoidance of future spouses from a different religion. In addition, the 
survey data shows that Muslim respondents score higher on distrust toward 
religious out-group members than Christian respondents. Here, we provide 
several illustrations of distrust of religious out-group members that occur 
in the interviews.
Distrust of religious out-group members is seemingly greater in 
Ambon than in Yogyakarta, given that the city experienced a series of 
violence incidents between 1999 and 2004. Also, in 2011, some religious 
incidents also led to violence. Many respondents in Ambon mention their 
distrust of Christians directly. Fatima from Ambon says, “I still distrust 
those Christians. Before September 11, I went anywhere. But after the 
event, I am worried.” However, she still maintains a good relationship 
with her Christian classmates from senior high school, although she 
adds, “I once went up to Bentas and Karpan. Then, I trusted them, but my 
friends whispered to me ‘don’t be so close to them, and never be plunged 
into their religions’.” Fatima also doubts that peace will come after the 
recent violence. She remarks, “Now I disbelieve in such a thing [peace]. I 
thought that conflicts would not come again. However, today the facts say 
otherwise; conflicts keep on happening. I do not believe that the conflict 
will cease, it will happen again. I see Ambon is not peaceful anymore as the 
peace has broken.” Soldiers stationed in the border areas between Muslims 
and Christians often stimulate distrust for members of the religious out-
group. “There are RMS [Southern Moluccas Republic] supporters among 
Christians, according to the soldiers,” Fatima says. “They said that we have 
to be careful when going there.”
Another Muslim interviewee in Ambon, Ayesa, tells a story about how 
she distrusts Christians because of a traffic accident in which her classmate 
passed away. She says, “A Christian, who rode a motorcycle while drunk, 
hit him. It makes me angry. One of [the] perpetrator’s family members said 
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that the perpetrator also died, but I distrust them. They wanted to cover 
up the accident; it made me annoyed and angry.” In addition, she hears 
rumours that Christians raped a Muslim woman in their area. Such rumours 
in Ambon are quite sensitive and can increase prejudice, hatred, and distrust 
of other religious groups. Another Muslim respondent, Imran, explains that 
he lost trust in Christians when he studied in Unpatti between 2001 and 
2006 because of unfair treatment of Muslim students by Christian members 
of the university staff. “When you are in Unpatti, you will see that certain 
people get priority access to services and others do not,” he said.
Several Christian respondents, mainly in Yogyakarta, also stated they 
distrust Muslims. Maria, who gave a donation to the victims of the Mount 
Merapi eruption in 2010, talks about Muslims’ distrust of Christians. “What 
hurt me most is when there were disasters, Muslims rejected the supplies we 
gave to help the victims of Merapi eruption and the earthquake. I witnessed 
how difficult it was to distribute supplies. I think they had a crisis of trust, 
so they were afraid that we would convert them into Christianity.” It is 
likely Muslims thought that Christians did not want only to help, but also 
to spread their beliefs. She had this experience in several areas, not just in 
Muntilan after the Merapi eruption, but in Bantul after the earthquake: 
“I remember when I participated in helping victims of the disasters with 
Kentungan Seminary. We had a problem distributing goods because of 
religious issues. The donations and supplies sent to us piled up there. 
Finally, we divided the supplies into smaller amounts and removed the 
identity written on the containers.”
 
In another case, Maria also lost trust for Muslims when she found 
out that someone had killed her dog. She suspected the perpetrator was 
one of her Muslim neighbours. “What I do not understand is, according to 
my neighbours, the people who killed my dog are from the neighbouring 
village. How could they know that there is a non-Muslim family living in 
the neighbouring kampong. Moreover, my dogs were not noisy. The dogs 
were always kept inside the house.” 
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 Several Muslim respondents in Yogyakarta state that they dislike 
Christians who make trouble. A Muslim, Hakim, tells a story about his 
distrust for Christians in Yogyakarta:
“There used to be a Papuan in our boarding house. He was a non-Muslim. 
The owner disliked him because of his attitude. He liked hanging around 
with his friends, disturbing other people. The owner, then, forced him to 
leave. When I arrived there, the owner said that he would never accept 
another person from Papua again. Aside from a person from Papua, a non-
Muslim is not really welcomed either.”
In this interview, we discovered that the owner not only dislikes 
people from Papua, but also distrusts their ability to live harmoniously in 
his dormitory. In present-day Yogyakarta, distrust against the Papuan and 
Timorese, who are mostly Christians, has become more intense. Making 
racial and ethnic assumptions and stereotypes is common in Yogyakarta. 
The results of these interviews, and our analysis of the qualitative 
data, has strengthened and deepened interpretations of the results of the 
multivariate analyses related to the relevant intermediate variables. Based 
on the interviews, we find that perceived group threat, ethnic saliency, 
intergroup contact, religiosity, regiocentric attitudes, and distrust are strong 
among both Muslim and Christian respondents. Compared to Christian 
interviewees, Muslims interviewees show higher levels of perceived group 
threat, ethnic saliency, religious monism, negative religious out-group 
feelings, regiocentric attitudes, and distrust. Christian respondents show 
higher levels of religious pluralistic views than Muslim respondents. Some 
phenomena emerged in the interviews conducted in Ambon that were not 
present in the survey data. For example, Muslim migrants are considered 
to be political threats for Ambonese Muslims. Also, respondents reported 
that after the religious conflict ended in 2004, Muslims and Christians 
have experienced more peaceful relations, despite the fact that they live in 
religiously segregated residential areas. Finally, contact between Muslims 
and Christians takes place in many public places, and is not limited to 
schools, boarding houses, and neighbourhoods. 
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5.6 Discussion of results against wider theoretical background
We now discuss the findings from these multivariate analyses against the 
background of our theoretical framework, including social identity theory, 
ethnic group conflict theory and other relevant theories.
As mentioned earlier, social identity theory holds that categorization, 
identification and comparison are likely to induce exclusionary reactions 
(Turner, 1981; Tajfel and Turner, 1986; Gijsberts et al., 2004). We distinguished 
between ethno-religious self-definition (merely categorization), religious 
identification and ethnic identification. Findings from the regression 
analyses give evidence that ethno-religious self-definitions are significantly 
related to our dependent variables. Our first hypothesis is confirmed when 
social categorization itself significantly relates to avoidance of intergroup 
contact. Muslim ethnic groups tend to score higher on contact avoidance 
than Javanese Muslims, except for Sundanese Muslims, while Christian 
ethnic groups score lower on contact avoidance than Javanese Muslims. 
With the exception of Sundanese Muslims and Madurese Muslims, all 
Muslim ethnic groups show more avoidance of future spouse than Javanese 
Muslims. Christian ethnic groups show less avoidance of future spouses 
compared to Javanese Muslims. Apart from Ambonese Christians, all 
Christian ethnic groups show less support for residential segregation than 
Javanese Muslims. 
Also, our second set of hypotheses on the relationship between ethno-
religious identification and contact avoidance is supported, at least partially, 
because the behavioural elements of religious and ethnic identification 
have significant effects on intergroup contact avoidance. We identify that 
having relatively many friends from the religious in-group induces contact 
avoidance (hypothesis 2d), while having relatively many friends from 
religious out-group reduces contact avoidance (hypothesis 2e). People who 
frequently engage in religious practices are more likely to avoid religious 
out-group members as future spouses (hypothesis 2a), while those who 
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have more religious out-group friends are less likely to avoid religious out-
group members as future spouses (hypothesis 2e). People who frequently 
attend rites of passage (hypothesis 2c) and have more religious and ethnic 
in-group friends (hypotheses 2e and 2j) show more support for residential 
segregation, while those who have more religious out-group friends show 
less support for residential segregation. Participation in rites of passage, 
religious practices, and friendship by ethnicity and religion are found to be 
the most relevant experiences in relation to avoidance of intergroup contact. 
Experiences that are meaningful and relevant to individual identity will 
further reinforce the process of identification (Phinney and Ong (2007). 
This finding also supports the previous studies by Allport and Ross (1967), 
Scheepers et al. (2002), and Coenders et al. (2007) that church attendance 
is likely to induce prejudicial attitudes. 
Additionally, and differing from our expectations, other ethno-
religious identification variables, i.e. participation in collective rites, 
ethnic ceremonies, the use of ethnic languages, and participation in ethnic 
and religious organizations, do not significantly explain avoidance of 
intergroup contact. Suryadinata (2002) mentioned that most Indonesian 
Muslims are secular. For Muslim respondents, therefore, participation in 
collective rites is apparently related to cultural traditions. Ethnic languages 
become non-significant as the Indonesian language becomes a mediator of 
social interactions between geographically dispersed ethnic groups (Abas 
1987; Dardjowidjojo, 1998; Lowenberg, 1990; Sneddon, 2003 cf. Goebel, 
2008). Another linguistic study by Collin (1982) explains that the Christian 
villages of Central Moluccas lost their ethnic languages during colonial 
times. The recent study by Florey (2005:61) describes that 16 of 42 ethnic 
languages in Central Moluccas are known to have fallen into disuse. Ethnic 
ceremonies have less of a role in determining ethnic identification, because 
many traditional cultures are perceived as obstacles to socio-economic 
development (Dove, 1988 cf Hoey, 2003). These ceremonies become less 
popular because of the development of Islamic conservatism that proscribes 
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traditional rituals (Hefner, 1990). Membership of, and participation in, 
ethno-religious organizations are not significantly related to avoidance of 
intergroup contact among our respondents. Referring to Peek (2005), most 
ethnic and religious organizations seemingly offer psychological and social 
benefits instead of material benefits. 
According to ethnic group conflict theory, certain groups of personal 
details (e.g. gender, social class, and occupational status) are more related to 
exclusionary attitudes than others, because the level of actual competition 
and perceived group threat might be different between groups (Gijsberts et 
al., 2004:18). In our study, several individual determinants, i.e. occupation 
status, occupational status, gender, and household income, are significantly 
related to our dependent variables. People from traders’ families show less 
contact avoidance than those from farmers’ families. Also, women score 
higher on the avoidance of future spouse, a finding which is in contrast 
to Sidanius’ study (2000) which found that men express more prejudice 
than women. Differing from Tolsma et al. (2008), who found avoidance 
of interethnic marriage to be more prevalent among the lower class, in 
this study people from middle classes score lower on the avoidance of 
future spouse compared to those from higher classes. People from machine 
operators’ families show higher avoidance of future spouse than those 
from farmers’ families. People from workers’ families show less support 
for residential segregation than those from self-employed families. Also, 
people from traders’ families support residential segregation less than those 
from farmers’ families. Other individual determinants, mainly parents’ 
religion and parents’ education, do not significantly explain intergroup 
contact avoidance. 
In our study, people with higher social economic status show stronger 
contact avoidance than those with lower statuses, which is in contrast to 
Western societies. Status differences are likely related to power differences. 
Many current studies on Indonesian politics explain that Indonesia is a 
patrimonial state, which is characterized by the personification of power, 
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wide political stratifications, and a government which only serves the 
rulers (Webber, 2006). Despite having a democratic system, civil society 
in Indonesia is not strong as in Western countries (Fukuoka, 2012:16). 
Political and economic activity are still centered in an oligarchy of elites, 
while the lower classes have been excluded from politics since 1965 (Hadiz, 
2003:605; Fukuoka, ibid.). The middle and upper classes are more powerful 
in politics and businesses. As a result, they often differentiate themselves 
from the lower classes, a behavior which manifests itself in exclusive 
lifestyles. Access to political and economic resources is controlled by the 
middle and upper classes, leading to the lower classes being systematically 
marginalized by the state. 
Our third set of hypotheses is confirmed when the effects of ‘religious 
in-group friends’ and ‘religious out-group friends’, and the differences 
between ethno-religious groups and the reference category on avoidance 
of intergroup contact are still significant after controlling for these social 
categories (hypothesis 3); our findings indicate that this is the case, although 
initial differences between ethno-religious groups tend to decrease.
Looking at the fourth set of hypotheses regarding the explanatory 
power of intermediate variables on the relationship between ethno-
religious identification and the avoidance of intergroup contact, we find 
10 determinants that have significant effects on our dependent variables. 
Moreover, inclusion of these intermediate determinants further reduces 
initial differences between ethno-religious groups. As we expected, 
‘perceived group threat’ and ‘negative religious out-group attitudes’ induce 
contact avoidance, whereas ‘quality of contact’ and ‘pluralism’ reduce 
contact avoidance. In addition, ‘monism’ and ‘distrust’ induce the avoidance 
of future spouse, while ‘regiocentric attitudes’ reduce avoidance of future 
spouse. Moreover, ‘ethnic saliency’, ‘perceived group threat’, ‘hermeneutic 
interpretation’, and ‘distrust’ have positive effects on support for residential 
segregation, while ‘quantity of contact’ and ‘religious pluralism’ have 
negative effects on support for residential segregation.
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The multivariate analyses give strong support to the notion that 
‘perceived group threat’ intermediates the relationship between ethno-
religious identification and contact avoidance, which also holds for 
the relationship between ethno-religious identification and support for 
residential segregation. Therefore, these findings are consistent with our 
hypothesis (4a) and support previous studies that demonstrated perceived 
group threat as a determinant of prejudice and hostility toward out-groups 
(Bobo, 1988; Quillian, 1995; Coenders et al., 2007; Schlueter and Scheepers, 
2010; Savelkoul et al., 2010; Coenders et al., 2013). However, perceived 
group threat does not significantly explain the avoidance of future spouses, 
which is likely not related to the intergroup competition. Avoidance of future 
spouse in Indonesia apparently stems from the marriage law. According to 
the law, a marriage is valid if it is conducted according to their respective 
religious laws of each religion. However, most religious laws do not allow 
such inter-religious marriages (Bowen, 2005; Mujiburrahman, 2006).
Another intermediate variable that has a significant effect on 
intergroup contact avoidance is ‘salience of ethnic identity’. This finding 
confirms our hypothesis (4b), which states that salience of ethnic identity 
will likely induce support for residential segregation. We find that when 
ethnic identity becomes more salient, this induces stronger ethnic self-
definition, which in turn leads to greater exclusionary attitudes toward 
religious out-group members. This finding is consistent therefore with the 
studies of Allport (1954 [1958]), Brewer and Campbell (1976), and Brewer 
and Miller (1996). In Indonesia, although religious identity became more 
salient after the political reforms of 1998, ethnic identity is still important, 
because political decentralization revived regional autonomy. Consequently, 
native communities, compared to migrant communities, profited more from 
the regional autonomy, as they had the cultural legitimacy to rule their own 
regions (van Klinken, 2003).
Other intermediate variables that are found to have significant effects 
on intergroup contact avoidance are ‘quantity of contact’ and ‘quality of 
313
chAPteR 5 - InteRgRoUP contAct AVoIdAnce on the IndIVIdUAl leVel
contact’.  Consistent with our hypotheses (4d and 4e), the quantity of contact 
has a significant negative effect on support for residential segregation, while 
the quality of contact has a significant negative effect on contact avoidance. 
These findings support the contact hypothesis, which states that contact with 
out-group members will induce favourable intergroup attitudes and reduce 
hostilities towards out-groups (Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006:766; Wagner et 
al., 2006; Brown et al., 2007; Schlueter and Wagner, 2008). Referring to 
Allport (1954 [1958]) and Pettigrew (1998), having contact with out-group 
members (neighbours, classmates, board mates, close friends, and relatives) 
is likely to provide more opportunities for friendship and to reduce negative 
stereotypes, prejudice and discriminatory attitudes.
The significant findings on religiosity confirm our hypotheses on 
‘negative religious out-group attitudes’ (4g), ‘monism’ (4h), ‘pluralism’ 
(4i), and ‘intratextual fundamentalism’ (4j). ‘Negative religious out-
group’ has a significant positive effect on contact avoidance. ‘Pluralism’ 
has a significant negative effect on contact avoidance and on support for 
residential segregation. ‘Monism’ has a significant positive influence on the 
avoidance of future spouse. ‘Intratextual fundamentalism’ has a significant 
positive effect on support for residential segregation. Here, we find that that 
negative attitudes toward religious out-groups, toward religious plurality 
and toward the interpretation of Holy Scriptures are likely to increase 
prejudice and discriminatory behaviour. Therefore, these findings support 
the previous studies of Anthony et al. (2005), Sterkens and Anthony (2008), 
and Williamson et al. (2010).
The surprising finding of this study is the effect of ‘regiocentrism’ on 
the avoidance of future spouse, which is not consistent with our hypothesis 
(4r). Regiocentric attitudes in Indonesia have different characteristics 
compared to regiocentric attitudes in Western countries. In the study of 
exclusionary reactions in European countries, both Coenders (2001) and 
Latcheva (2010) explained that the more nationalistic and chauvinistic 
attitudes are, the more prejudice and discriminatory the citizens will 
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be. In contrast, our study provides evidence that a regiocentric attitude, 
as a sense of belonging to a hometown, reduces hostility and prejudice 
against out-group members. This finding is consistent with previous 
studies on Muslim-Christian relations in the Moluccas that cultural bonds 
will strengthen peaceful relations and reduce hostility toward out-group 
members (Cooley, 1962; Bartels, 1977). It seems that our respondents 
still have strong attachments to their hometown or villages, and that their 
regiocentric attitudes also foster the development of peaceful and traditional 
relationships with their religious out-groups.
 The other intermediate variable that is found to have a significant 
effect on avoidance of intergroup contact is the distrust of out-groups. Our 
hypothesis (4s) – the stronger that distrust of out-groups is, the stronger 
will be the avoidance of future spouse and the stronger will be support 
for residential segregation – is confirmed. This finding supports studies by 
Tropp et al. (2006). One of our research sites, Ambon, is a place of prolonged 
tensions between Muslims and Christians since colonial times. The mutual 
distrust between both groups led to the communal violence that took place 
between 1999 and 2004 (van Klinken, 2007; Adam, 2010a). It seems that the 
level of intergroup distrust is still high in present day Ambon, which likely 
induces avoidance of intergroup contact. Other intermediate variables, 
such as memory and experience of violence, perceived discrimination, and 
social dominance orientation (SDO) do not significantly explain avoidance 
of intergroup contact. Therefore, overall, these findings are inconsistent 
with the theoretical frameworks, as well as the previous research. l
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CHAPTER 6
OVERALL SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
This chapter summarizes all of the research questions and their answers, based on the findings from the survey and interviews. After reviewing 
the empirical answers, we will describe what progress we made in this 
study compared to other relevant studies. Also, we propose new research 
issues for future studies on ethno-religious conflicts. This chapter therefore 
consists of four sections. The first section describes both the descriptive and 
explanatory research questions at the individual level. The second section 
sets out to provide empirical answers, and the third section discusses the 
contributions of this study to further development of ethnic group conflict 
theory, methodological approaches to studying conflict, and the general 
field of conflict studies. The final section presents several possibilities for 
future research.
The general objective of this study was to find out about the relationship 
between ethno-religious identification and the avoidance of intergroup 
contact between Muslims and Christians in two regions in Indonesia 
(Ambon and Yogyakarta), taking into account factors at the individual 
level. Following Tajfel’s concept of social identity (1978b:63), we define 
ethno-religious identification as part of a self-concept that builds on the 
knowledge of membership of a social group, and the simultaneous attribution 
of value and emotional significance attached to that membership. Referring 
to Phinney and Rotheram (1987:14), we can further define this concept as 
an individual’s sense of belonging to an ethno-religious group, including 
their perceptions, feelings, behaviours and attitudes related to their ethno-
religious affiliation. Avoidance of intergroup contact is the degree to which 
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people evade interactions with out-group members, rooted in cognitive and 
emotional distance from these out-groups. We have endeavoured to observe 
avoidance of intergroup contact with the help of three indicators: contact 
avoidance of official and intimate out-group persons; avoidance of out-
group members as future spouses; and support for residential segregation 
(cf. Bogardus, 1925a; Sterkens, 2009:6). In this study, we have investigated 
the relationship of ethno-religious identification with intergroup contact 
avoidance at the individual level, including individuals’ perceptions, 
attitudes, and behaviours related to religious in-groups and out-groups.
This study also addresses a gap in the literature between studies 
that emphasize economic and political competition as main sources of 
conflict, and studies that focus on prejudice and discrimination as causes 
of conflict. As mentioned before, previous studies on conflict tend to focus 
predominantly on actual competition as a source of intergroup conflict, or 
on prejudice and discrimination (Green and Seher, 2003:510). According 
to Adam (2010a:43), empirical studies on how individuals support conflict 
and hostilities are unsatisfactory because they discuss very limited aspects 
of the problem. This study focuses on the individual level to provide an 
empirical perspective on latent conflicts which refer to the less explicit 
and unintended consequences of disputed relationships. In contrast with 
studies on contextual levels, this research explores how people’s ethnic and 
religious identities play a role in their support of exclusionary reactions 
against religious out-groups. We focus on the role of ethno-religious 
identification in latent conflict at the individual level, controlling for other 
personal characteristics and several intermediate determinants derived from 
well-developed theories such as perceived threat, salience of ethnic identity, 
intergroup contact, religiocentrism, pluralism, monism, regiocentrism, and 
distrust.
In studying ethno-religious conflict in Indonesia, this study aims to 
examine ethnic group conflict theory, which is relevant to the analysis of 
ethno-religious conflicts in Western countries. This theory postulates that 
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the social context of actual interethnic competition may foster stronger 
perceived ethnic threat, inducing the mechanisms of social (contra-) 
identification, which in turn contribute to stronger nationalist attitudes and 
exclusionary reactions (Gijsberts et al., 2004:18). Many studies use this 
theory to explain the support for exclusionary reactions against minority 
ethnic groups in Europe, such as Scheepers et al., (2002), Coenders et al., 
(2007), Tolsma et al., (2008), and Savelkoul et al., (2010). Where those 
studies provide strong evidence on the significance of actual competition 
and group identities in exclusionary attitudes, this study uses the theory 
of ethnic group conflict to analyse intergroup contact avoidance between 
Muslims and Christians in the cities of Ambon and Yogyakarta in Indonesia. 
We also utilize several theoretical propositions from other theories as 
intermediate determinants between different measures of ethno-religious 
identification and exclusionary attitudes, which will be described in section 
6.3. These intermediate determinants are: salience of identity, perceived 
threat, intergroup contact, religiocentrism, attitudes towards religious 
plurality, interpretation of sacred writing, perceived discrimination, 
memory of violence, nationalistic attitudes, distrust, and social dominance 
orientation.
 
6.1  Crucial questions
As mentioned above, the research questions for this study consist of 
descriptive and explanatory questions at the individual level.
Descriptive questions
This study originated four descriptive questions in order to find out how, and 
to what extent, ethno-religious identifications and avoidance of intergroup 
contact are present amongst Muslims and Christian respondents in Ambon 
and Yogyakarta. Also, we describe how Muslims and Christian respondents 
in both cities express ethno-religious identification and avoidance of 
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intergroup contact in their daily lives. The complete descriptive research 
questions are as follows:
“To what extent is ethno-religious identification present among Muslims 
and Christians in Ambon and Yogyakarta?” (Question 1a)
“To what extent is avoidance of intergroup contact present among Muslims 
and Christians in Ambon and Yogyakarta?” (Question 1b)
“In which ways is ethno-religious identification among Muslims and 
Christians observable in their daily lives?” (Question 1c)
“In which ways is avoidance of intergroup contact among Muslims and 
Christians observable in their daily lives?” (Question 1d)
Explanatory questions
Based on social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner, 1986, Gijsberts et al., 
2004), this study focuses on how ethno-religious identification is related to 
avoidance of intergroup contact. Thus, the first explanatory question is:
“To what extent is there a relationship between ethno-religious identification 
among Muslims and Christians in Ambon and Yogyakarta and avoidance of 
intergroup contact?” (Question 2a)
In line with ethnic group conflict theory, we also developed a question 
that examines whether the influence of ethno-religious identification on 
avoidance of intergroup contact varies according to individual determinants, 
such as gender, parents’ religion, household income, parents’ education, 
occupation and occupational status. Therefore, the second explanatory 
question is: 
“To what extent is there a relationship between ethno-religious 
identification and avoidance of intergroup contact among Muslims and 
Christians in Ambon, considering individual determinants such as gender, 
parents’ religion, household income, parents’ education, occupation  and 
occupational  status?” (Question 2b)
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The last question we proposed is how ethno-religious identification 
influences the avoidance of intergroup contact, considering particular 
intermediate determinants such as salience of identity, perceived threat, 
intergroup contact, religiocentrism, attitudes toward religious plurality, 
interpretation of sacred writing, perceived discrimination, experience of 
violence, nationalistic attitudes, distrust, and social dominance orientation. 
Hence, the third explanatory question is formulated as follows: 
“To what extent can we explain the relationship between ethno-religious 
identification and avoidance of intergroup contact among Muslims 
and Christians in Ambon and Yogyakarta with particular intermediate 
determinants such as salience of identity, perceived threat, intergroup 
contact, religiocentrism, attitudes toward religious plurality, interpretation 
of sacred writing, perceived discrimination, experience of violence, 
nationalistic attitudes, distrust, and social dominance orientation?” 
(Question 2c)
6.2   Empirical answers
Here we describe the empirical answers to both the descriptive and 
explanatory questions based on our descriptive and multivariate analyses. 
Question 1a: “To what extent is ethno-religious identification present 
among Muslims and Christians in Ambon and Yogyakarta?”  
From the results of the survey detailed in Chapter Three, we find high 
levels of religious identification among Muslim respondents, demonstrated 
by their participation in religious practices, which we define as frequency 
of praying, attending religious services, and reading the Holy Scriptures. 
Most Muslims surveyed pray several times a day, almost half of them go to 
the mosque more than once a week, and a little over half of those surveyed 
read the Quran more than once a week. Moreover, Muslim respondents 
show high levels of religious identification indicated by their levels of 
friendship by religion and participation in religious ceremonies. Almost all 
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of their friends are from the same religion, nevertheless, they have some 
religious out-group friends. The Muslims surveyed also frequently attend 
religious ceremonies, including rites of passage and collective rites.  We 
find a similar pattern among Christian respondents: a high level of religious 
practices and having more religious in-group friends and fewer religious 
out-group friends. Most Christians surveyed pray several times a day, almost 
half of them go to church more than once a week, and a little over half of 
those surveyed read the Bible once a day. Also Christian respondents show 
high levels of religious identification indicated by the level of attendance 
at religious ceremonies. In general, religious identification is strong among 
both Muslim and Christian respondents.
Besides religious identification, our research also addresses ethnic 
self-definition and ethnic identification. Ethnic self-definition refers to 
respondents’ statements that they consider themselves to be a member 
of a specific ethnicity (for example, Javanese or Ambonese). Muslim 
respondents state that they are Javanese, Sundanese, Madurese, Ambonese 
or Butonese, as well as members of some additional, smaller ethnic groups. 
A little less than half of the Muslim respondents surveyed are Javanese, 
and almost one-third of them are Ambonese. There were no Muslim 
respondents identifying as Toraja and Minahasa. Christian respondents 
identified themselves as Ambonese, Javanese, Chinese, Batak, Toraja, and 
some other smaller ethnicities. More than half of the Christian respondents 
identified themselves as Ambonese, with the remainder identifying as 
Javanese, Chinese, Batak, and some other ethnicities. There were no 
Christian respondents who identified as Madurese, Minangkabau, Buginese, 
or Butonese. We combined ethnicity and religion in ethno-religious self-
definition because of the considerable overlap. The overwhelming majority 
(if not all) members of a specific ethnicity in our samples of students are 
also members of a specific religious group.
With respect to ethnic identification among Muslim respondents, 
our survey results reveal that they rarely use their ethnic languages, and 
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only within their families. Muslim respondents participate frequently in 
only a few kind of ethnic ceremonies, particularly wedding and funeral 
ceremonies. In addition, differences between mean scores (as described in 
Chapter Four) indicate that Muslim respondents have many friends from 
the same ethnicity. Similarly, Christian respondents reported low levels 
of ethnic language use, infrequent participation in ethnic ceremonies, and 
many ethnic in-group friends. In general, this indicates lower levels of 
ethnic identification compared to religious identification among our both 
Muslim and Christian respondents. 
Significant differences between Muslim and Christian respondents 
in regards to religious and ethnic identification can be observed from the 
mean values in Chapter Four. Muslim respondents tend to participate in 
collective rites more often, and have more friends from the same religion, 
than Christian respondents. In contrast, Christian respondents are more 
likely to participate in rites of passage, and have more friends from different 
religions than Muslim respondents. Moreover, Muslim respondents tend to 
attend ethnic ceremonies and use ethnic languages more often than Christian 
respondents. Compared to Muslim respondents, Christian respondents have 
more friends from the same ethnicity, both in Ambon and in Yogyakarta. In 
addition, regional differences can be observed. Both Muslim and Christian 
respondents in Ambon show higher levels of religious identification, and 
lower levels of ethnic identification, than respondents in Yogyakarta.
Question 1b: “To what extent is avoidance of intergroup contact 
present among Muslims and Christians in Ambon and Yogyakarta?” 
As was previously mentioned, avoidance of intergroup contact 
consists of contact avoidance, avoidance of future spouses from another 
religion, and the support for residential segregation. 
In assessing contact avoidance, a distinction can be made between 
relationships with ‘official people’ (mayor, police officers, and civil 
servants), and ‘intimate people’ (classmates, neighbours, board mates, 
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and close friends). We have tested a set of indicators of contact avoidance, 
which resulted in valid and reliable measurements. The measurement we 
used to assess contact avoidance employs a ranking order from the most 
avoided subjects to the most accepted subjects. Based on the survey findings 
described in Chapter Four, we observed that most Muslims are likely to avoid 
having a Christian mayor. Next, many Muslim respondents are reluctant to 
have Christians as their board mates and close friends. Only a few Muslim 
respondents do not accept Christians as their neighbours, policemen, civil 
servants, and classmates.Most Christian respondents indicated they would 
prefer not to have a Muslim mayor. Christian respondents also indicated 
that they are reluctant to have Muslims serving as policemen and civil 
servants. Only a few Christian respondents do not accept Muslims as their 
close friends, board mates, neighbours, and classmates. 
The survey results also show that in both Yogyakarta and Ambon 
most Muslim respondents do not accept people from different religions as 
possible future spouses, and they do not want to live in a neighbourhood 
inhabited by people from other religions. Christian respondents in both 
cities demonstrated a similar pattern: a high level of avoidance of future 
spouses from a different religion, and support for residential segregation.
Overall, the level of contact avoidance between Muslims and 
Christians is fairly low in our samples of students in Ambon and Yogyakarta. 
The level of avoidance of future spouse however is relatively high. Total 
mean scores of contact avoidance and avoidance of future spouse are .11 
and .64 respectively (Likert scale between zero and one). The level of 
support for residential segregation is moderate, with a total mean score 
of .33. Still there are significant differences between the two religions, 
with Muslim respondents showing higher level of contact avoidance. 
Also, in both cities, Muslim respondents generally show higher levels of 
contact avoidance of future spouses from a different religion, and support 
for residential segregation, than Christians. These phenomena show that 
there are several barriers to contact between Muslims and Christians. Our 
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respondents mentioned that differences in religion, values, and attitudes are 
barriers to interreligious contact.
As was the case with ethno-religious identification, we discovered 
significant regional differences in patterns of contact avoidance between 
Muslims and Christians.  Survey data indicates that Muslim respondents 
in Ambon are more likely to avoid contact with Christians compared with 
those in Yogyakarta. Similarly, Muslim respondents in Ambon have a 
higher preference for living in religiously homogenous neighbourhoods 
than Muslims in Yogyakarta. Compared to Muslim respondents in Ambon, 
Muslim respondents in Yogyakarta are more likely to avoid Christians, and 
are more likely to avoid future spouses from other religions.  A similar 
pattern is apparent for Christian respondents in Ambon who avoid contact 
with Muslims and avoid Muslims as their possible future spouses. In 
addition, Christians in Ambon show more support for residential segregation 
than those in Yogyakarta. The prolonged rivalry between Muslims and 
Christians, and the recent violence in Ambon in 2011, apparently affected 
the answers of respondents in that region. Overall, Muslim and Christian 
respondents in Ambon have higher levels of intergroup contact avoidance 
than respondents in Yogyakarta.
Question 1c: “In which ways is ethno-religious identification among 
Muslims and Christians observable in their daily lives?”
As described in Chapter Four, findings from the interviews we 
conducted help to confirm the the data from survey results, adding to 
observations on religious identification among Muslim and Christian 
respondents in their daily lives by documenting their religious practice, 
participation in religious ceremonies, and the religious identities of their 
friends. In the interviews we found that Muslim respondents attend Friday 
prayers at mosques that are located inside or around campus, celebrate 
several religious ceremonies (including fasting, Idul Fitri, and Idul Adha), 
perform collective religious services at campus preaching institutes 
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(for example Lembaga Dakwah Kampus, LDK), recite the Quran in the 
evenings, and pray before starting an activity. Most Christian respondents 
attend weekly mass on Sunday at churches that are located inside or around 
campus, celebrate some religious ceremonies (including Christmas, Easter, 
and baptisms), pray collectively on campus, recite the Bible in the morning, 
and pray before doing something. Students’ patterns of interaction on 
campus could serve as an indicator of their religious identification. In reality, 
however, many institutes of higher education in Indonesia are affiliated 
with a religious tradition or even a particular religious denomination, which 
means that there is little or no opportunity to interact with people outside of 
a student’s religious group. 
  Findings from interviews were also used to support survey data 
on how Muslims and Christians use local languages, maintain friendships 
with people of the same ethnicity, and view attendance at ethnic ceremonies 
(like funerals and weddings) as expressions of their ethnic identification 
in daily life. The responses we gathered in interviews provided additional 
information about the processes of ethnic identification in both regions. 
Despite the fact that several kinds of ethnic ceremony are still practiced in 
Ambon and Yogyakarta, these ceremonies are often mixed with religious 
ceremonies. Interviewees indicated that religious groups in both regions, 
especially those in more urban areas, have abandoned such ethnic ceremonies 
and now only attend religious ceremonies, with the exception of weddings 
and funerals.  In addition, quite a few respondents reported that they make 
use of their ethnic identities in pursuit of profitable interactions with people 
who share the same ethnic identification. Moreover, many respondents no 
longer affiliate with their ethnic traditions and rituals or ethnic ceremonies 
due to the influence of stricter or more conservative religious values. 
No additional dimensions of ethnic and religious identification 
emerged in our interviews that were not covered by the survey findings. 
However, interviews did provide some contrast to sections of the survey 
findings.  For instance, the survey data indicate that few respondents are 
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members of religious and ethnic organizations, while in interviews many 
respondents reported that many students become members or followers of 
these kinds of organizations in both Ambon and Yogyakarta. The campus-
based religious organizations that are easily observed in both cities are 
the Campus Preaching Institutes (Lembaga Dakwah Kampus, LDK), the 
Christian Students Associations (Perkumpulan Mahasiswa Kristen, PMK), 
and the Catholic Students Associations (Keluarga Mahasiswa Katolik, 
KMK). In Ambon, many campus-based ethnic organizations represent the 
various ethno-linguistic groups in Maluku, such as Sepa, Kei, and East 
Seram. Local politicians and government officials in Maluku often make use 
of campus-based ethnic organizations in Ambon to promote their interests 
and their bids for leadership in gubernatorial and mayoral elections. In 
Yogyakarta, there are 30 campus-based ethnic organizations representing 
ethnic groups from outside of Java, complete with provisions for student 
housing from regional governments.  
Question 1d: “In which ways is avoidance of intergroup contact 
among Muslims and Christians observable in their daily lives?”  
As detailed in Chapter Four, findings from the interviews generally 
confirm survey results demonstrating that intergroup contact avoidance 
between Muslims and Christians can be observed in daily life through the 
use of measurements on contact avoidance, avoidance of future spouses 
from another religion, and support for residential segregation. Additional 
information on contact avoidance emerged in interviews conducted in the 
two sites. For example, contact avoidance between Muslim and Christian 
respondents can be seen in daily life in both cities, mainly with respect to the 
respondents’ tendency to avoid voting for a mayor, or expressing support 
for hiring police forces from the religious out-group. Consequently, in the 
elections for governor and city mayor, both groups indicated that they prefer 
to have a governor and a mayor that share their own religion. Many Muslim 
respondents in Yogyakarta mention that their reason for electing officials 
who share their religion is in accordance with the religious conviction that 
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Muslims should select a leader from the ranks of their religious fellows. 
Muslim respondents in Ambon said that Christian leaders tend to care only 
their fellow co-religionists. In the city of Ambon, both groups rejected 
the idea of hiring police from religious out-groups, as they suspect police 
officers of only protecting their religious fellows during periods of religious 
conflict. 
Strategies to evade or avoid contact with classmates and board mates 
from different religious groups were apparent in interviews with respondents 
in Ambon and Yogyakarta. We also observed contact avoidance at 
universities in both cities after class sessions, where students were grouped 
or gathered according to their religion and ethnicity. To a certain degree, 
students in both cities seem to avoid interaction with classmates who come 
from different religious groups or who have different religious beliefs. 
Choosing not to live in a boarding house occupied by people of different 
religions is common in both cities, with our respondents reporting that they 
consider the boarding houses to be places to preserve their religious beliefs 
and practices. It is difficult to find any boarding houses inhabited by people 
of different religions in Ambon, as the city has been religiously segregated 
since the religious conflicts starting in 1999. Unlike the survey findings, 
however, interview findings did not provide much more information on the 
avoidance of civil servants, close friends, and neighbours from religious 
out-groups. 
Based on the interviews we conducted, we found evidence that 
respondents in both Ambon and Yogyakarta tend to avoid the possibility 
of a future spouse from another religion, while support for residential 
segregation is more prevalent among respondents in Ambon. Muslim and 
Christian respondents in both cities express that they avoid having a spouse 
from different religion because of religious laws that prohibit inter-religious 
marriage. Both groups also avoid living in a neighbourhood inhabited by 
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people from different religions. In daily life, therefore, both Muslim and 
Christian respondents live in residential segregation based on religion, 
instead of living in religiously heterogeneous neighbourhoods. 
Question 2a: “To what extent is there a relationship between ethno-
religious identification among Muslims and Christians in Ambon and 
Yogyakarta and avoidance of intergroup contact?”
Based on the bi-variate analyses in Chapter Four, several measures of 
religious and ethnic identification have significantly moderate correlations 
with avoidance of intergroup contact among Muslim respondents. We 
find that among Muslims, having religious and ethnic in-group friends is 
positively related to contact avoidance, while having religious out-group 
friends is negatively related to contact avoidance. Also, participation in rites 
of passage and in religious organizations is positively related to avoidance 
of a future spouse from a different religion, while having religious out-
group friends and participation in ethnic organizations is negatively related 
to the avoidance of a future spouse from a different religion. Moreover, 
having religious and ethnic in-group friends is positively related to support 
for residential segregation, but having religious out-group friends is 
negatively related to support for residential segregation. Among Christian 
respondents, we observed that having ethnic in-group friends is positively 
related to contact avoidance. In addition, participation in ethnic ceremonies 
is positively related to the avoidance of future spouses from a different 
religion. Finally, having religious and ethnic in-group friends, and using 
ethnic languages, is positively related to the support for residential 
segregation, but having religious out-group friends is negatively related to 
support for residential segregation.
Our multivariate analyses in Chapter Five demonstrate that ethno-
religious self-definition, along with particular measures of ethno-religious 
identification, significantly account for avoidance of intergroup contact. 
Apart from Sundanese Muslims, all other Muslim ethnic groups are likely 
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to score higher on contact avoidance than the reference category of ethnic 
groups, Javanese Muslims. In contrast, Christian ethnic groups are likely to 
score lower on contact avoidance than Javanese Muslims. Muslim ethnic 
groups also tend to show more avoidance of future spouses from a different 
religion than Javanese Muslims, with the exception of Sundanese Muslims 
and Madurese Muslims. In contrast, Christian ethnic groups tend to show 
less avoidance of future spouses from different religions compared with 
Javanese Muslims. Moreover, Muslim ethnic groups are more likely to 
support residential segregation than Javanese Muslims. With the exception 
of Ambonese Christians, Christian ethnic groups are less likely to support 
residential segregation than Javanese Muslims. 
The multivariate analyses reveal that some measures of religious 
identification and one measure of ethnic identification have considerable 
effects on avoidance of intergroup contact. Consistent with our hypotheses, 
people who participate more frequently in religious practices and those 
who have fewer friends from different religions and ethnicities show more 
avoidance of intergroup contact. In contrast, people who participate more 
often in rites of passage, and those who have more friends from the same 
religion, show less avoidance of intergroup contact. In particular, people 
who have more friends from the same religion and fewer friends from 
other religions tend to avoid contact with religious out-group members. 
Furthermore, people who participate more frequently in religious practices 
and those who have fewer friends from different religions are more likely 
to avoid somebody from the religious out-group as their possible future 
spouse. Finally, people who participate more often in rites of passage, those 
who have a greater number of friends who share their religion and ethnicity, 
and those who have fewer friends from different religions tend to support 
residential segregation.
 Other elements of religious identification, such as participation in 
collective rites,  and participation in religious organizations, do not have 
significant effects on contact avoidance, avoidance of a future spouse from 
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a different religion, and support for residential segregation. Also, several 
elements of ethnic identification, such as participation in ethnic ceremonies, 
ethnic organizations, and the use of ethnic languages, do not contribute to 
the explanation of the avoidance of intergroup contact either. Overall, these 
findings are consistent with social identity theory. Social identity theory 
says that social identification is more likely to induce negative attitudes 
toward out-groups and positive attitudes toward in-groups (Turner, 1981; 
Tajfel and Turner, 1986).
Question 2b: To what extent is there a relationship between ethno-
religious identification and avoidance of intergroup contact among 
Muslims and Christians in Ambon, considering individual determinants 
such as gender, parents’ religion, household income, parents’ education, 
occupation and occupational status?
Our bi-variate analyses in Chapter Four display several moderate 
correlations between particular individual determinants and avoidance of 
intergroup contact. Among Muslim respondents, we find that household 
income and occupational status are positively related to contact avoidance, 
while parents’ education is negatively associated with contact avoidance. 
Men show lower levels of avoidance of a spouse from a different religion 
than women. Occupational status and occupation are positively related to 
support for residential segregation, while household income and parents’ 
education are negatively associated with support for residential segregation. 
Among Christian respondents, we find that differences in gender, household 
income, and parents’ education are positively related to avoidance of a 
future spouse from a different religion.
Based on the multivariate analyses in Chapter Five, we find that 
only particular individual determinants significantly explain avoidance 
of intergroup contact. Respondents from families employed in trade are 
more likely to avoid contact with religious out-group members than those 
from farmer families. Women avoid future spouses from other religious 
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traditions more than men do, and respondents from middle-income 
households are less likely to avoid the religious out-group as a pool for 
future spouses compared to those from high-income households. People 
from families employed in trade tend to avoid members of religious out-
groups as their future spouses than those from farmer families.. People 
from families with labourers’ backgrounds are more inclined to support 
residential segregation than those from families who are self-employed. 
Those from families with a background in trade are more likely to support 
residential segregation than those from farmer families. Overall, there are 
significant relationships between particular individual determinants and 
avoidance of intergroup contact. In contrast to our expectations, however, 
some individual determinants, such as parents’ religion and education, do 
not significantly explain contact avoidance, avoidance of a future spouse 
from a different religion, or support for residential segregation.
Consistent with our hypothesis, the stronger that people’s ethno-
religious identification is (the more they participate in religious practices 
and the more friends they have from the same religion), the higher the 
level of avoidance of intergroup contact. This is true even after controlling 
for gender, household income, occupation and occupational status. In 
summary, these findings support ethnic group conflict theory, which states 
that certain individual determinants are closely related to exclusionary 
attitudes, because the level of competition and perceived threat might be 
different between groups (Gijsberts et al., 2004). However, differing from 
Sidanius’s study (2000) that states men express more prejudice than women, 
in this study females tend to avoid members of religious out-groups as 
their future spouses more than males.  Also, this study is not consistent 
with Tolsma et al. (2008), who explained that avoidance of inter-ethnic 
marriage is more prevalent among the lower classes. In contrast, this study 
shows that avoidance of inter-religious marriage is more prevalent among 
the middle class. 
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Question 2c: To what extent can we explain the relationship between 
ethno-religious identification and avoidance of intergroup contact among 
Muslims and Christians in Ambon and Yogyakarta with particular 
intermediate determinants such as salience of identity, perceived threat, 
intergroup contact, religiocentrism, attitudes toward religious plurality, 
interpretation of sacred writing, perceived discrimination, experience 
of violence, nationalistic attitudes, distrust, and social dominance 
orientation?
The bi-variate analyses in Chapter Four shows several moderate 
correlations between particular intermediate determinants and avoidance 
of intergroup contact. Among Muslim respondents, we find that religious 
salience, perceived threat, quality of contact, positive in-group attitudes, 
negative out-group attitudes, monism, hermeneutic interpretation, perceived 
discrimination, and distrust have positive correlations to contact avoidance; 
but quantity of contact and pluralism have negative correlations to contact 
avoidance. In addition, monism, fundamentalism, and national pride have 
positive correlations to avoidance of a future spouse from a different religion. 
Furthermore, ethnic saliency, perceived threat, positive in-group attitudes, 
negative out-group attitudes, monism, fundamentalism, and distrust have 
positive correlations to support for residential segregation, while quantity 
of contact, quality of contact, and pluralism have negative correlations 
to support for residential segregation. Among Christian respondents, 
we discovered that perceived threat, negative out-group attitudes, and 
fundamentalism have positive correlations to contact avoidance, while 
quality of contact has a negative correlation to contact avoidance. Also, 
quality of contact has a positive correlation to avoidance of a future spouse 
from a different religion. Finally, ethnic saliency, perceived threat, positive 
in-group attitudes, negative out-group attitudes, monism, fundamentalism, 
hermeneutic interpretation, and distrust have positive correlations to 
support for residential segregation, while quantity of contact has a negative 
correlation to support for residential segregation.
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The multivariate analyses in Chapter Five show that the relationships 
between ethno-religious identification and avoidance of intergroup contact 
can be explained by several particular intermediate determinants: ethnic 
saliency, perceived threat, quantity and quality of contact, religiocentrism 
(negative out-group attitudes), monism, pluralism, fundamentalism, 
regiocentric attitudes, and distrust of religious out-groups. Consistent 
with our expectations, salience of ethnic identity is linked to support for 
residential segregation. Also, the stronger that perceived threat is, the 
stronger contact avoidance and support of residential segregation are.  
A few generalizations can be made based on the multivariate 
analyses.  First, more intergroup contact and a more positive evaluation 
of this contact are likely to reduce support for residential segregation. 
Next, stronger negative attitudes toward religious out-groups induce 
contact avoidance. Views that support religious pluralism reduce contact 
avoidance, while religious monism is likely to increase the tendency to 
avoid a future spouse from a different religion. Religious fundamentalism 
is likely to reinforce support for residential segregation. Differing from 
our original hypothesis, stronger regiocentric attitudes reduce the tendency 
to avoid a future spouse from a different religion. Lastly, as we expected, 
stronger distrust of religious out-groups leads to more contact avoidance 
and a greater tendency to avoid a future spouse from a different religion. 
Contrary to our expectations, other intermediate variables such as religious 
saliency, positive (religious) in-group attitudes, hermeneutic interpretation, 
perceived discrimination, memories of violence, direct violence, indirect 
violence, nationalism, national pride, dominance, and equality orientations 
have no significant influence on contact avoidance, avoidance of a future 
spouse from a different religion, and support for residential segregation.
 Overall, these findings provide evidence in support of ethnic group 
conflict theory and the other theories that we used in this study. Findings on 
perceived threat support the proposal made in ethnic group conflict theory 
that perceived threat is the most significant determinant of prejudicial 
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and discriminatory attitudes toward out-groups (Schlueter and Scheepers, 
2010; Savelkoul et al., 2011). Also, our findings on ethnic saliency confirm 
the previous studies theorizing that there is a correlation between stronger 
ethnic identification and ethnic saliency, which in turn induce exclusionary 
attitudes (Brewer and Campbell, 1976; Brewer and Miller, 1996). Also, our 
findings on intergroup contact are consistent with the contact hypothesis, 
which explains that contact with out-group members will reduce hostilities 
toward out-groups (Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006:766). Our findings on 
the topic of religiosity support previous research on religiocentrism and 
pluralism conducted by Anthony et al., (2005) and Sterkens and Anthony 
(2008). Their work demonstrated that negative attitudes toward religious 
out-groups induce hostility towards religious out-groups, while more 
pluralistic views combined with less religious monism reduces hostility. The 
findings from our research are also consistent with those of Williamson et 
al., (2010) who concluded that literal interpretations of the Holy Scriptures 
contribute to prejudice toward out-groups, while non-literal interpretations 
are related to less out-group derogation. Moreover, the findings on distrust 
confirm previous studies that emphasize how lower trust can solidify group 
identity, which in turn tends to reinforce exclusionary reactions (Tropp et 
al., 2006). However, our findings on regiocentric attitudes do not support 
previous studies that claim nationalistic attitudes are likely to increase 
exclusionary reactions (Coenders, 2001; Latcheva, 2010).
6.3  Innovations and progress
Based on the empirical findings, this study makes several contributions 
to both theoretical and methodological approaches in the field of conflict 
studies in Indonesia.
Contribution to empirical research questions
This study proposed some theory-driven explanations for contact avoidance 
between ethno-religious groups in Indonesia. We addressed several 
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socially relevant research questions on the relationship of ethno-religious 
identification with intergroup contact avoidance as a crucial dimension of 
ethnic exclusionism. These are questions that have not been previously 
explored in the field of Indonesian conflict studies. We tested several 
hypotheses concerning the partial influence of individual determinants 
and different measures of religious identification, as well as intermediary 
variables on exclusionary reactions. Previous conflict studies on Indonesia 
were predominantly descriptive, analysing how conflicts between ethno-
religious groups arose and developed. 
However, our research parallels earlier empirical studies on inter-
ethnic group relations in Indonesia, such as Warnaen’s study (1979) on 
ethnic stereotypes and Tuti’s study (2008) on ethnic identity and prejudice. 
We adopted several questions on ethnic identification from Tuti’s studies 
in the development of questions on ethnic and religious identifications. 
In contrast to these earlier studies, our research focuses on how ethno-
religious identification affects contact avoidance, even after considering 
several individual social characteristics and intermediate determinants. 
In addition, this study emphasizes the relationship between Muslims and 
Christians, while Warnaen and Tuti’s studies were primarily focused on 
inter-ethnic relations. Another recent study on religious identity in Indonesia 
by Hadiwitanto (2014) also tests several hypotheses, but his study focuses 
on the influence of religious identification on generalized trust.
Contribution to theory
This research examined a series of theories that guided empirical research 
on exclusionary reactions. As previously mentioned, this study utilizes 
theories that are usually used to analyse conflictual relationships between 
ethnic groups in European countries. According to ethnic group conflict 
theory, perceived threat is the most important intermediate determinant 
between ethnic identification and exclusionary attitudes toward out-
groups (Scheepers et al., 2002:18). Other theoretical propositions identify 
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alternative intermediate determinants as the most significant ones. Studies 
on salience of identity (Brewer and Miller, 1996; Duckit, 2006) propose that 
ethnic and religious saliency is likely to induce exclusionary reactions. The 
contact hypothesis (Brown et al., 2007) provides evidence that intergroup 
contact will likely reduce negative attitudes towards out-groups. Literature 
on religion  (Sterkens 2001; Sterkens and Anthony, 2008; Anthony et al. 
2015; Williamson et al., 2010) suggests that religiocentrism, monism, 
and fundamentalism are more likely to reinforce hostile attitudes towards 
out-groups, while religious pluralism and hermeneutic interpretation 
of Holy Scriptures are more likely to reduce those attitudes. Studies on 
communal violence (Doherty and Pooley, 1997) emphasize that memories 
and experiences of violence contribute to exclusionary reactions. 
Studies on discrimination (Iceland and Wilkes, 2000) say that perceived 
discrimination induces social avoidance. Empirical studies have found that 
nationalism and regiocentrism increase exclusionary reactions (Coenders, 
2001; Latcheva, 2010). Other studies on trust (Tropp et al., 2006) propose 
that distrust reinforces prejudice. Finally, according to studies by Sidanius 
and Pratto (1999), social dominance orientation (SDO) is a determinant of 
exclusionary reactions.
Based on the results of the multivariate analyses, a combination 
of the aforementioned determinants can explain how ethno-religious 
identification is related to avoidance of intergroup contact. Consequently, 
the majority of the theoretical propositions outlined above are relevant for 
analysing contact avoidance between Muslims and Christians in Indonesia. 
We have found that perceived threat and religiocentrism increase contact 
avoidance, while quality of contact and religious pluralism are more likely 
to reduce it. Religious monism and distrust of out-groups increase the 
avoidance of a future spouse from a different religion, but regiocentric 
attitudes reduce the avoidance of contact. Ethnic saliency, perceived threat, 
fundamentalism, and distrust of out-groups tends to induce support for 
residential segregation, while quantity of contact and religious pluralism 
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are more likely to reduce it. Other determinants, such as experience of 
violence, perceived discrimination, and social dominance orientation 
(SDO), do not significantly explain avoidance of intergroup contact. These 
findings are summarized in Figure 6.1. Overall, the ethnic group conflict 
theory and other theoretical propositions that are supported by evidence 
in Western countries are very worthwhile for analysing ethno-religious 
conflict in Indonesia.
Figure 6.1  Intergroup contact avoidance in Indonesia
Contribution to research methods
This study contributes to the development of research methods by adopting 
both quantitative and qualitative approaches. This kind of mixed method 
approach has not previously been applied to studies of ethno-religious 
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conflict in Indonesia. Our complementary data collection methods consisted 
of a survey and interviews. Topics we did not cover in the survey were 
covered in the interviews, and findings from the survey were  explored in 
more detail over the course of the interviews. The simultaneous application 
of both methods of data collection helped to improve our research. Firstly, 
at the analytical level, triangulation between quantitative and qualitative 
findings increased the validity and reliability of our findings. Secondly, 
distinct from conflict studies that only use a qualitative approach, this 
empirical study collected information from a wide group of student 
respondents through the application of large-scale sampling of individuals. 
In addition, the study was able to provide illustrations of contact avoidance 
and most intermediate determinants in the daily lives of our respondents, 
providing more context than a traditional quantitative analysis.  
Overall, the triangulation of data was extremely worthwhile. 
Findings from the survey were illustrated and explored in more detail 
by findings from the interviews. In the interviews, we did not find other 
relevant dimensions of the measurements at the individual level that were 
not covered in the questionnaire.  The findings from both the interviews 
and the surveys were complementary. Through the interviews, for example, 
we identified several extra reasons for avoiding contact with religious out-
group members (i.e. due to balance of power in provincial government, in a 
moment of communal violence) and for expressing ways of utilizing ethnic 
identity in daily life, but this information did not undermine the validity 
and reliability of our quantitative measurements. In general, most of the 
findings from the interviews support and confirm findings from the survey. 
Despite the discovery that there are still some limitations on the level 
of analysis (described in the next section), the mixed methods approach 
provided more information from fieldwork both in terms of representation 
of the respondents and in terms of the description of social contexts.
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Contribution to conflict studies in Indonesia 
Following Gismar (2000) and Adam (2010a), this empirical study addresses 
a gap in the literature in the field of conflict studies, where the scholarly 
literature primarily focuses on economic and political competition. While 
most of the previous studies on conflict in Indonesia pay more attention 
to the contextual levels of ethno-religious conflict in particular areas, this 
study comes up with a set of measurements to investigate latent conflict at 
the individual level both in an area of conflict and also in an area that has 
not experienced conflict. This study also explains to what extent individuals 
support contact avoidance by making use of their ethno-religious identities, 
while most previous studies on conflict discuss tensions and communal 
violence between ethno-religious groups. 
Studies on ethno-religious conflict in Indonesia generally emphasize 
that ethnic or religious identity are not the main causes of the conflict, but 
that ethnic and religious identities are mobilized and socially constructed 
at the moment of intergroup conflict (Van Klinken, 2007:53-71; Spiyer, 
2002:26-27). These studies predominantly focus on economic and political 
competition as the basis of ethnic or religious conflicts. For example, despite 
his focus on ethno-religious identity, Van Klinken (2007) proposes that 
political competition between political elites, and the prolonged rivalries 
between Muslims and Christians in the Moluccas, could be the main cause 
of the religious conflict in 1999. Another example is Wilson’s study on 
religious conflict in North Maluku (2008) that describes how political forces 
at the national level, and changes in political structure during the political 
reformation in 1998, stimulated religious conflict between Christians and 
Muslims. In opposition to those approaches, this study focuses on the 
individual level to investigate how ordinary people support hostile attitudes 
toward religious out-groups by primarily referring to their ethno-religious 
identity. 
In contrast to previous studies about conflict in Indonesia, this 
empirical study is innovative in that it focuses on the individual level in order 
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to answer how, and to what extent, ethno-religious identification supports 
latent conflict. It is clear that ethno-religious identity itself can generate 
exclusionary reactions, in particular, the avoidance of intergroup contact. As 
we described earlier, the avoidance of intergroup contact may result from a 
prolonged conflict between ethno-religious groups. Findings from this study 
on ethno-religious identification support other studies that document how 
conservative religious beliefs flourished, and religious identities seemed to 
become stronger, in Indonesia after the political reformation in 1998 (Van 
Bruinessen, 2003; Hasan, 2006; Feillard & Madinier, 2011). Nevertheless, 
differing from those studies that predominantly focus on the radicalization 
of some Muslim groups in Indonesia, this empirical research emphasizes 
latent conflict, particularly intergroup contact avoidance, between Muslims 
and Christians in Ambon and Yogyakarta. 
Contribution to the discourse of social distance in non-Western countries
Finally, this study sheds new light on the discourse about social distance 
in the context of non-Western countries. As stated earlier, in this study, 
social distance is identified with support for contact avoidance. In addition, 
the avoidance of a future spouse from a different religion, and support for 
residential segregation have been conceptually included on in the definition 
of social distance, but in a separate measurement. Here, we describe 
several differences between contact avoidance in Western countries and 
in Indonesia, based on our findings. In Western countries, individuals of 
other ethnic groups who are traditionally avoided the most are, in order 
of importance: (future) spouse, close friends, neighbours, colleagues, and 
fellow citizens (Bogardus, 1925b; Wark and Galliher, 2007). Apparently, 
in Indonesia, the people prefer to have officials (mayor, police officers, and 
civil servants), and intimates (close friends, housemates, neighbours, and 
colleague) from the same religions. 
In Western countries, avoidance of spouses from different out-groups 
is part of the social distance scale, which indicates that choosing a spouse 
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is a part of an individual’s attitudes. In this study, however, avoidance of a 
future spouse from a different religion is separated from the social distance 
scale. In our estimation, choosing a spouse in most cases is not only decided 
by individuals, but also by families and other social institutions to which 
individuals are affiliated. Lots of people have written to the contrary that 
in the context of Indonesia, as said before, it is difficult to register an inter-
religious marriage according to Indonesian marriage law; a marriage is 
legal if it is conducted according to religious laws that definitely prohibit 
interreligious marriage. Religious practitioners respect these rules, so 
inter-religious marriage is not common in Indonesia. Moreover, in Western 
countries, people seemingly avoid living in neighbourhoods inhabited by 
out-groups, mostly due to the unequal socio-economic levels (Iceland and 
Wilkes, 2006). In Indonesia, according to this study, people prefer to live in 
a neighbourhood inhabited by their in-group predominantly because they 
want to preserve their ethno-religious identities, not due to the effects of 
differences in socio-economic status.
We can identify several determinants of intergroup contact avoidance 
besides ethno-religious identification. People who have a less positive image 
of intergroup contact, a more negative attitude towards out-groups, and less 
belief in the concept of religious pluralism will likely avoid contact with 
out-group members. Those who have more religiously monistic views, less 
regiocentric views, and more distrust of out-groups are more likely to avoid 
out-group members as their future spouses. Also, people who have more 
ethnic saliency, perceive more threat from out-groups, have less contact with 
out-group members, have less belief in the concept of religious pluralism 
and more fundamental views, and are more distrustful of out-groups are 
more likely to support residential segregation. In addition, avoidance of 
intergroup contact is more prevalent among middle and upper classes 
based on their household income, occupation, and occupational status. In 
summary, this study is able to explore, explain, and compare social distance 
between Muslims and Christians in Indonesia, as well as providing a set of 
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measurements of social distance for non-Western countries derived from 
indicators of social distance in Western countries.
6.4  New research issues
Further studies on contact avoidance between ethno-religious groups
Despite the fact that we have reported a number of interesting findings 
from this study, research on contact avoidance can be further developed by 
utilizing an approach that distinguishes between individual and contextual 
levels, as well as by adding more research sites in cities inhabited by 
various ethno-religious groups, and by using more heterogeneous and 
representative samples. Further study, which distinguishes influences 
at individual and contextual levels, will further contribute to theoretical 
insights. Our study is limited because it does not analyse contextual factors 
such as recent migration, group size, history, and actual (versus perceived) 
intergroup competition by means of quantitative measurements. Although 
we discussed these contextual factors in our summary of the research 
setting in Chapter One, and in the discussion of interviews in Chapters Four 
and Five, we did not include them in the regression analyses, because our 
research sites were too limited. In order to provide a better representation 
of Indonesian society, it is necessary to duplicate studies like this in areas 
affected by ethno-religious violence, such as Poso, Sambas, and Sampit 
between 1998 and 2001. We also suggest that such studies be conducted in 
religiously pluralistic areas that seem to enjoy peaceful relations between 
ethno-religious groups, such as Jakarta, Surabaya, and Medan. Finally, we 
suggest that future studies use representative samples drawn from groups 
in society other than university students. Conducting more studies on 
avoidance of intergroup contact with multilevel analyses, in more areas, 
and with samples that are more representative, will enable us to draw a map 
of latent conflicts in Indonesia.
342
InteRgRoUP contAct AVoIdAnce In IndoneSIA
Studies on the importance of ethno-religious identity among the middle 
classes in daily lives
It is necessary to develop studies on the importance of ethno-religious 
identification among middle class individuals in their daily lives. This idea 
stems from the findings of this study, and other relevant studies on the 
development of fundamentalism in Indonesia. According to our research 
results, members of middle class, mainly students, are more likely to attend 
religious practices and ceremonies than to attend ethnic ceremonies. Also, 
avoidance of intergroup contact is more prevalent among people from 
the middle class, upper-level occupations, and people who are employed. 
Other studies propose that most people in Indonesia display a strong sense 
of religious identity, and consider their religious beliefs to be important 
in their daily lives. For instance, Hefner (1987) and Van Bruinessen 
(2003) emphasize that the spread of Islamic conservatism in Indonesia has 
increased since the 1980s, when the authoritarian government marginalized 
pious Muslims in politics. Other studies on charismatic Christians by 
Koning (2011) point to the spread of Christian conservatism among middle 
class groups in certain denominations. Consequently, religion in Indonesia 
has become a point of reference for creating a social identity, which has 
a tendency to increase negative attitudes towards out-groups and positive 
attitudes towards in-groups. Although ethnicity is still important in the 
present day Indonesia, religion seems to have become more important in 
decision-making and daily interactions. We hope that future studies will 
further develop measurements of religiosity for non-Western countries.
Studies on perceived threat in competition between ethno-religious groups
This study proposes that future research is needed on the development 
of perceived threat in political, economic, and socio-cultural competition 
between ethno-religious groups. This idea derives from the findings provided 
by this study showing that perceived threat can contribute to contact 
avoidance and can increase support for residential segregation. Perceived 
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threat is the most important determinant of exclusionary reactions, which 
indicates that competition between ethno-religious groups has a significant 
effect on how these groups relate to each other in contemporary Indonesia. 
Future studies should identify determinants of perceived threat and work 
to distinguish between symbolic and realistic threat. Furthermore, these 
studies could examine how differences in power, status, and group size 
between ethno-religious groups lead certain groups to feel more threatened 
in political, economic, and socio-cultural fields. These kinds of studies are 
important at this pivotal moment in Indonesia, since certain ethno-religious 
groups still dominate political and economic competition in certain regions, 
which creates an unequal distribution of resources. As demonstrated in our 
research, perceived threat and competition can still be found in educational 
and government institutions, which are characterized by divisions between 
ethno-religious groups. Consequently, several latent conflicts between 
ethno-religious groups that are expressed through contact avoidance have 
emerged, and have the potential to transform into communal violence in 
the future. 
Studies on the evolution of religious tolerance between Muslims and 
Christians
With the completion of this research, we propose a new study on the 
evolution of religious tolerance in Indonesia, which can be identified at the 
level of non-cooperation between religious groups and in attitudes towards 
religious plurality. According to this study, both Muslims and Christians 
should pay attention to intergroup contact and religious pluralism in 
order to support religious tolerance as well as to prevent the spread of 
religious conservatism. Consequently, future research should emphasize 
the evolution of religious values among Muslims and Christians, and 
whether their religious values become relatively more conservative or 
more moderate. Future studies could focus on the frequency of interactions 
between Muslims and Christians, and specifically on evidence of more or 
less contact avoidance between both groups of believers. In future research, 
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intergroup contact and religious pluralism could become determinants that 
reduce exclusionary attitudes. Also, it is necessary to seek other predictive 
values that impact on the evolution of religious tolerance and on the 
increase of religious conservatism. For example, according to this study, 
regiocentric attitudes may become a determinant to reduce exclusionary 
reactions between ethno-religious groups.
Studies on ethno-religious identity and social cohesion in Ambon and 
Yogyakarta
Given our conclusions about contact avoidance in these Indonesian cities, 
we also deem it necessary to study the formation of both formal and informal 
networks between ethno-religious groups to strengthen civic society and to 
prevent ethno-religious conflict in the future. This proposition is based on 
our analysis that contact avoidance between Muslims and Christians has 
become widespread in Ambon and has started growing in Yogyakarta. This 
situation has the potential to disturb social cohesion and inter-religious 
relationships. Furthermore, the absence of either formal or informal 
interactions between ethno-religious groups in most cases tends to evoke 
communal violence (Varshney, 2002:9). Referring to several studies, ethno-
religious identity also can be used in the creation of peaceful relationships. 
For example, studies on alliances between villages in the Moluccas, such 
as those by Bartels (1977) and Lowry & Littlejohn (2006), mention that 
hostilities between villages from different religions are reduced when these 
villages are tied under some cultural bonds like the pela and adat systems. 
Another study on Muslim and Christian relationships in Yogyakarta (Jae, 
2012:49-51) describes how moderate leaders from both groups developed 
many interfaith dialogues in 1998 when a series of incidents of religious 
violence erupted in several cities. For future research, therefore, we propose 
to develop an idea of how ethnic or religious identifications can generate 
peaceful relationships between ethno-religious groups. This hypothesis 
is acceptable as shared social boundaries between groups can be used to 
prevent hostilities and violent conflict. l
APPENDICES
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Appendix 1. Factor Analyses
Table 1. Salience of identityTable 1. Salience of identity 
 
Scale label 
for full population 
Muslim Christian 
Com. Factor loadings Pattern matrix Com. 
Factor loadings 
Pattern matrix 
  
Ethnic 
 
religion  
 
Ethnic 
 
religion 
260. My ethnic identity has a 
great deal of influence on how I 
make important decisions 
.59 .76  .56 .76  
259. My ethnic identity has a 
great deal of influence in my 
daily life 
.56 .76  .64 .80  
261. My ethnic identity has a 
great deal of influence on how I 
relate to others 
.52 .70  .45 .64  
257. My ethnic identity is very 
important to me .42 .64  .39 .62  
258. I see my self as a 
committed member of my 
ethnic group 
.29 .55  .42 .65  
43. My religious beliefs have a 
great deal of influence on how I 
make important decisions 
.64  .89 .67  .82 
42. My religious beliefs have a 
great deal of influence in my 
daily life 
.77  .81 .58  .78 
44. My religious beliefs have a 
great deal of influence on how I 
relate to others 
.56  .73 .46  .64 
Initial eigenvalues  3.18 2.03  3.38 1.70 
% variance of squared loadings 
extraction  34.01 20.63  36.33 15.82 
RELIABILITY  .81 .84  .82 .77 
 
 
Factor correlation matrix (Muslim)      Factor correlation matrix (Christian) 
 
Factor Ethnic    Religion 
 Ethnic  .22 
Religion .22  
  
 
 
 
 
Factor Ethnic Religion 
 Ethnic  .35 
 Religion .35  
Factor Religion 
Ethnic .22 
Factor Religion 
Ethnic .35 
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Table 2. Perceived group threat
Scale label 
for full population 
Muslim 
 Christian 
Com. 
 
Factor loading 
Pattern Matrix 
Com. 
 
Factor loading 
Pattern Matrix 
    Perceived threat 
  Political economy 
Socio-
cultural  
Political 
economy 
Socio-
cultural 
153. The migration of people of different 
religious groups to my community is a 
threat to my own religious groups 
.71 .91  .75 .95  
152. I am afraid that customs of my 
group will be lost due to the presence of 
other religious groups 
.59 .84  .53 .78  
154. I am worried that job prospects for 
members of my group will decline due 
to the presence of other religious groups 
.64 .81  .71 .83  
158. I am worried that the security in my 
neighbourhood will decline due to the 
presence of other religious groups 
.64 .75  .69 .59  
156. I am worried that security in my 
university will decline due to the 
presence of other religious groups 
.64 .68  .62 .78  
159. The religious practices of people 
from other religious groups threaten our 
own way of life 
.59 .64  .55 .54  
155. I am worried that study grant 
opportunities will decline due to the 
presence of other religious groups 
.54 .56  .59 .73  
163. The chances of getting space in a 
boarding house will decline due to the 
presence of other groups 
.41 .47  .54 .61  
160. People from other religious groups 
are given preferential treatment by the 
authorities 
.67  .78 .64  .80 
161. Members of other religious groups 
are in control of business opportunities .59  .75 .74  .81 
Initial eigenvalues  5.66 1.11  5.93 1.13 
% variance of squared loadings 
extraction  52.68 7.40 
 55.69 8.06 
RELIABILITY  .91  .92 
 
                       Factor correlation matrix (Muslim)          Factor correlation matrix (Christian) 
  
Factor Socio-cultural 
Political economy .57 
 
Factor Socio-cultural 
Political economy .58 
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Table 3. Quality of contact 
 
Scale label 
for full population 
Muslim Christian 
Com. Factor loadings Pattern matrix Com. 
Factor loadings 
Pattern matrix 
 
Closen
ess 
and 
cooper
ative 
ness 
evalua
tion equality  
Closeness 
and 
cooperati
ve 
ness 
evalua
tion equality 
133. How much do you 
cooperate with your 
board/dorm/housemates 
from other religious groups? 
.76 .91   .55 .70   
131. How much do you 
cooperate with your 
neighbours from other 
religious groups? 
.64 .88   .44 .48   
121. How close are you with 
your neighbours from other 
religious groups? 
.63 .83   .56 .69   
135. How much do you 
cooperate with your 
relatives from other religious 
groups? 
.75 .83   .60 .61   
123. How close are you with 
your 
board/dorm/housemates 
from other religious groups? 
.67 .80   .63 .70   
134. How much do you 
cooperate with your close 
friends from other religious 
groups? 
.78 .79   .70 .82   
125. How close are you with 
your relatives from other 
religious groups? 
.74 .74   .62 .71   
132. How much do you 
cooperate with your 
classmates from other 
religious groups? 
.73 .73   .57 .72   
122. How close are you with 
your classmates from other 
religious groups? 
.73 .66   .64 76   
124. How close are you with 
your close friends from other 
religious groups? 
.78 .66   .69 .78   
117. How would you rate 
your contact with them? As 
classmates 
.88  .92  .64  -.77  
119. How would you rate 
your contact with them? As 
close friends 
.84  .89  .81  -.83  
116. How would you rate 
your contact with them? As 
neighbours 
.86  .89  .79  -.80  
120. How would you rate 
your contact with them? As 
relatives 
.79  .89  .76  -.78  
118. How would you rate 
your contact with them? As 
board/dorm/housemates 
.80  .86  .77  -.78  
129. How equal would you 
say you are with your close 
friends from other religious 
groups? 
.89   -.96 .76   -.81 
127. How equal would you 
say you are with your 
classmates from other 
religious groups? 
.88   -.92 .75   -.81 
Table 3. uality of contact 
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128. How equal would 
you say you are with 
your 
board/dorm/housemat
es from other religious 
groups? 
.85   -.88 .68   -.75 
126. How equal would 
you say you are with 
your neighbours from 
other religious groups? 
.76   -.85 .75   -.82 
130. How equal would 
you say you are with 
your relatives from 
other religious groups? 
.81   -.81 .74   -.78 
Initial eigenvalues  13.31 1.73 1.12  10.53 2.07 1.79 
% variance of squared 
loadings extraction  65.47 7.964.53 4.53 
 51.06 8.95 7.36 
RELIABILITY  .97  .95 
 
             Factor correlation matrix (Muslim)                    Factor correlation matrix (Christian) 
 
Factor evaluation equality 
Closeness and 
cooperativeness 
.68 -.80 
  evaluation  -.64 
 
Factor evaluation equality 
Closeness and 
cooperativeness 
-.55 -.56 
  evaluation  .38 
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Table 4. Religiocentrism 
 
 
Scale label 
for full population 
Muslim Christian  
Com. Factor loadings Pattern matrix Com. 
Factor loadings 
Pattern matrix 
 Negative out-group 
Positive 
in-
group 
 Negative out-group 
Positive 
in-group 
48. When it comes to religion. Christians 
are less tolerant/54. Muslim .70 
.84  .72 .90  
50. Christians are often the cause of 
religious conflict/56. Muslim .62 
.79  .48 .64  
46. Christians only talk about doing good 
deeds without practicing them/52. 
Muslim 
.44 
.64  
.47 .65  
45. Muslims respond to God the most 
faithfully/51. Christian .51 
 .77 .41  .68 
49. Muslims are best able to talk 
meaningfully about God/55. Christian .64 
 .72 .85  .89 
47. Thanks to their religion. Most Muslims 
are good people/53. Christian .16 
 .32 .35  .47 
Initial eigenvalues  2.80 1.16  2.95 1.16 
% variance of squared loadings extraction  39.55 11.71  42.20 12.56 
RELIABILITY  .80 .62  .78 .74 
 
                  Factor correlation matrix (Muslim)          Factor correlation matrix (Christian) 
 
 Factor Positive in-group 
Negative out-group .50 
Factor Positive in-group 
Negative out-group .48 
Table 4. Religiocentrism 
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Table 5. Attitudes toward religious plurality 
 
Scale label 
for full population 
Muslim Christian 
Com. Factor loadings Pattern matrix Com. 
Factor loadings 
Pattern matrix 
 Pluralism Monism  Pluralism Monism 
83. All religions are equally valid 
paths to liberation .59 .68  .57 .72  
85. Differences between religions 
provide more knowledge of God .40 .64  .37 .61  
88. Differences between religions 
are a source of spiritual 
development 
.39 .64  .40 .63  
89. At the deepest level, all 
religions are the same .54 .63  .39 .59  
86. Everything that is said about 
God in other religions has the same 
values 
.47 .61  .33 .57  
80. All religions are equally valid 
ways to ultimate truth .51 .59  .42 .63  
82. Differences between religions 
are a basis for mutual enrichment .33 .58  .29 .53  
84. The truth about God is found 
only in my religion .55  .71 .64  .79 
81. Other religions do not provide 
as deep a God-experience as my 
religion 
.51  .69 .52  .72 
78. Compared with other religions, 
my religion offers the surest way to 
liberation 
.31  .57 .43  .65 
87. Compared with my religion, 
other religions contain only partial 
truths 
.31  .56 .54  .73 
Initial eigenvalues  3.94 2.09  3.42 2.55 
% variance of squared loadings 
extraction  31.15 13.64 
 26.02 18.59 
RELIABILITY  .83 .74  .80 .81 
 
      Factor correlation matrix (Muslim)                           Factor correlation matrix (Christian) 
 
Factor Monism 
Pluralism -.19 
Factor Monism 
Pluralism -.09 
Table 5. Attitudes toward religious plurality 
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Table 6. Interpretation of sacred writing 
 
Scale label 
for full population 
Muslim Christian 
Com. Factor loadings Pattern matrix Com. 
Factor loadings 
Pattern matrix 
 Intra textual Hermeneutic  
Intra 
textual Hermeneutic 
62. Everything in the Sacred Writing is 
absolutely true without question .75 .86  .81 .90  
63. The Sacred Writing should never be 
doubted. Even when scientific or historical 
evidence outright disagrees with it 
.52 .72  .75 .87  
65. The truths of the Sacred Writing will 
never be outdated, but will always apply 
equally well to all generations 
.34 .60  .32 .55  
66. The Sacred Writing is the only one that is 
true above all Holy Books .29 .54  .25 .50  
68. The meanings of the Sacred Writing are 
open to change and interpretation .21  .46 .30  .54 
69. The Sacred Writing holds a deeper truth 
which can only be revealed by personal 
reflection 
.21  .45 .42  .56 
Initial eigenvalues  2.40 1.20  2.61 1.27 
% variance of squared loadings extraction  32.17 7.02  36.97 10.61 
RELIABILITY  .77 .33  .78 .40 
 
 
          Factor correlation matrix (Muslim)                  Factor correlation matrix (Christian) 
   
 Factor Hermeneutic 
Intratextual .04 
Factor Hermeneutic 
Intratextual .08 
Table 6. Interpretation of sacred writing 
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Table 7. Perceived discrimination 
 
Scale label 
for full population 
Muslim Christian  
Com. Factor loadings Pattern matrix Com. 
Factor loadings 
Pattern matrix 
 Public Private  Public Private 
190. Limitations on access to government 
subsidy .62 .83  .66 .76  
199. Limitations on access to job market .62 .80  .72 .77  
201. Limitations on recruitment as a civil 
servant .52 .76  .77 .97  
188. Limitations on freedom of expression .49 .74  .59 .69  
191. Limitations on freedom to choose a 
place of residence .55 .71  .56 .62  
203. Limitations on attaining higher 
positions in government offices .53 .69  .75 .94  
189. Limitations on celebration of group's 
ceremonies .49 .66  .55 .68  
196. Limitations on access to the housing 
market .55 .65  .67 .57  
202. Limitations on running of religious 
schools .45 .62  .70 .87  
193. Limitations on participation in the local 
market .59 .61  .66 .56  
200. Forced observance of religious laws of 
other group .30 .57  .61 .82  
192. Limitations on dress .69  .84 .74  .84 
194. Limitations on behavior .58  .72 .59  .73 
Initial eigenvalues  6.54 1.30  8.16 1.09 
% variance of squared loadings extraction  46.76 7.09  60.23 5.88 
RELIABILITY  .91  .95 
 
                Factor correlation matrix (Muslim)                         Factor correlation matrix (Christian) 
 
Factor Private 
  Public .49 
 
 
Factor Private 
  Public .63 
Table 7. Perceived discrimination 
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Table 8. Individual memory of violence 
 
Scale label 
for full population 
Dimension Reliability 
 National Muslim Christian 
58a. Did any acts of ethno-religious violence 
occur in the province where you came from 
in the past 10 years? 
Memory of violence .69 .71 .65 
59a. In your family, did you talk about 
ethno-religious violence that happened in 
your province? 
60a. Did you witness violence, for example 
fighting or rioting (related to ethno-religious 
conflict), in the past 10 years? 
61a. Have you suffered any kind of physical 
injury due to the violence in the past 10 
years? 
Direct experience of 
violence .80 .81 .79 
70a. Were any of your immediate family 
members injured due to the violence in the 
past 10 years? 
71a. Did any of your immediate family 
members lose their lives due to the violence 
in the past 10 years? 
72a. Were any of your relatives injured due 
to the violence in the past 10 years? 
73a. Did any of your relatives lose their lives 
due to the violence in the past 10 years? 
74a. Were any of your close friends injured 
due to the violence in the past 10 years? 
Indirect experience 
of violence .76 .75 .76 
75a. Did any of your close friends lose their 
lives due to the violence in the past 10 years? 
76a. Were any of your neighbours injured 
due to the violence in the past 10 years? 
77a. Did any of your neighbours lose their 
lives due to the violence in the past 10 years? 
All questions  .86 .85 .85 
 
Table 8. Individual memory of violence 
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Table 9. Nationalism 
 
Scale label 
for full population 
Muslim Christian  
Com. Factor loadings Pattern matrix 
Com
. 
Factor loadings 
Pattern matrix 
 Nationalism 
Regioce
ntrism  
Nationa
lism 
Regio 
centrism 
140. Renewing national ideas is our 
national task .48 .69  .55 .74  
138. I should respect my nation and its 
tradition .48 .69  .33 .57  
139. I should always put national interest 
above ethno-religious group interest .30 .55  .41 .64  
141. I would rather be a citizen of 
Indonesia than of any other country in the 
world 
.23 .47  .24 .46  
142. I should support my district even if 
my district is wrong .47  .68 .55  .73 
144. I should always put district interest 
above national interest .34  .59 .41  .64 
Initial eigenvalues  2.08 1.42  2.09 1.51 
% variance of squared loadings extraction  24.66 13.82  25.15 16.45 
RELIABILITY  .67 .57  .66 .62 
 
         Factor correlation matrix (Muslim)           Factor correlation matrix (Christian) 
 
Factor Regiocentrism 
Nationalism -.00 
 
 
Factor Regiocentrism 
Nationalism .03 
Table 10. Distrust 
 
Scale label 
for full population 
Dimension Reliability 
 National Muslim Christian 
208. On the whole one can trust Muslims* 
Distrust of 
out group .70 .71 .69 
209. On the whole one can trust Christians* 
210. On the whole one can rely on Muslim* 
211. On the whole one can rely on Christians* 
212. It is better to be careful if one is dealing 
with Muslims 
213. It is better to be careful if one is dealing 
with Christians 
214. Most Muslims would exploit me if they 
had the opportunity 
215. Most Christians would exploit me if they 
had the opportunity 
216. Most of the time, Muslims attempt to act 
in their own interest 
217. Most of the time, Christians attempt to 
act in their own interest 
 
*= q208-211 are inverted because they contain a negative formulation 
 
able 10. Distrust 
Table 9. Nationalis  
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Table 11. Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) 
 
Scale label 
for full population 
Muslim Christian  
Com. Factor loadings Pattern matrix Com. 
Factor loadings 
Pattern matrix 
 Dominance Inequality  
Domi
nance Inequality 
91. In getting what you want. it is 
sometimes necessary to use force against 
other groups 
.29 .54  
.29 
.53  
92. It's OK if some groups have more of 
a chance in life than others 
.21 .47  .31 .56  
93. To get ahead in life. it is sometimes 
necessary to step on other groups 
.27 .52  .40 .63  
94. If certain groups stayed in their 
place. we would have fewer problems 
.27 .53  .31 .56  
95. It's probably a good thing that 
certain groups are the top and other 
groups are at the bottom 
.47 .63  
.48 
.66  
96. Inferior groups should stay in their 
place 
.47 .64  .55 .70  
97. Sometimes other groups must be 
kept in their place 
.38 .62  .39 .62  
98. It would be good if groups could be 
equal 
.28  .54 .29  -.55 
99. Group equality should be our ideal .48  .69 .37  -.61 
100. All groups should be given an equal 
chance in life 
.73  .85 .73  -.86 
101. We should do what we can to 
equalize conditions for different groups 
.52  .72 .68  -.82 
102. All groups should be free to move to 
a place where they choose to live 
.38  .60 .41  -.63 
Initial eigenvalues  2.38 3.52  2.65 3.61 
% variance of squared loadings 
extraction  14.91 24.87 
 17.69 25.74 
RELIABILITY  .73 .73  .74 .75 
 
              Factor correlation matrix (Muslim)                   Factor correlation matrix (Christian) 
 
Factor Inequality 
Dominance .18 
 
 
 
Factor Inequality 
Dominance -.13 
Table 1 . Soci l i ce Orientation (SDO)
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Appendix 2. Analysis of Variance (ANOVA)
Contact avoidance and ethno-religious identification
Table 1. Religious self-definition and contact avoidance 
 
Religious self-
definition 
Contact avoidance Avoidance for 
future spouse 
Support for residential 
segregation 
National National National 
Mean N Mean N Mean N 
1.00 .16 841 .75 843 .40 837 
2.00 .04 604 .49 604 .22 610 
Total .11 1445 .64 1447 .33 1447 
  Sig.  Sig.  Sig. 
F 121.24 .00 108.29 .00 137.12 .00 
Linearity       
Deviance       
r       
eta .28  .26  .29  
 
1=Islam, 2=Christian 
Table 2. Rites of passage and contact avoidance 
 
Passage 
Contact avoidance Avoidance for future spouse Support for residential 
segregation 
Muslim Christian Muslim Christian Muslim Christian 
Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N 
1.00 .19 23 .04 12 .78 23 .36 11 .46 23 .31 12 
2.00 .17 164 .03 66 .79 166 .40 65 .45 165 .25 65 
3.00 .11 258 .04 175 .68 259 .48 175 .33 257 .21 176 
4.00 .19 370 .03 314 .78 369 .52 316 .43 364 .22 316 
Total .16 815 .04 567 .75 817 .49 567 .40 809 .22 569 
  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig. 
F 4.61 .00 3.42 .02 6.89 .00 .20 .99 1.39 .24 1.01 .39 
Linearity 1.58 .21 .09 .76 .00 .974       
Deviance 6.12 .00 5.08 .01 10.34 .00       
r             
eta .13  .11  .16        
 
1 = I do not participate in it and neither does my family,  2= I do not participate in it but my family does,  
3= I do participate but for non- religious reasons, 4= I do participate for religious reasons. 
Table 1. Religious elf-definit on and contact avoidance
Table 2. Rites of passage and contact avoidance
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Table 3. Collective ritual and contact avoidance 
 
Collective 
ritual 
Contact avoidance Avoidance for future spouse Support for residential 
segregation 
Muslim Christian Muslim Christian Muslim Christian 
Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N 
1.00 .16 29 .02 13 .59 29 .31 13 .35 30 .27 14 
2.00 .19 34 .04 90 .62 34 .54 89 .41 33 .24 90 
3.00 .16 754 .03 468 .76 756 .49 469 .40 748 .21 469 
Total .16 817 .03 571 .75 819 .49 571 .40 811 .22 573 
  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig. 
F .19 .83 .35 .70 3.89 .02 1.31 .27 .44 .64 .70 .49 
Linearity     7.35 .01       
Deviance     .43 .51       
r     .09        
eta             
 
1 = I do not participate in it and neither does my family,  2= I do not participate in it but my family does, 
 3= I do participate but for non- religious reasons and I do participate for religious reasons. 
Table 4. Religious practices and contact avoidance 
 
Religious 
practices 
Contact avoidance Avoidance for future spouse Support for residential 
segregation 
Muslim Christian Muslim Christian Muslim Christian 
Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N 
1.00 .18 21 .02 16 .73 22 .19 16 .44 22 .25 16 
2.00 .14 56 .03 31 .66 56 .34 30 .33 57 .14 31 
3.00 .16 162 .02 108 .75 163 .41 108 .41 163 .21 111 
4.00 .14 307 .04 275 .78 308 .53 275 .39 302 .22 278 
5.00 .19 169 .03 141 .76 167 .53 142 .42 167 .23 141 
6.00 .18 196 .11 28 .72 106 .54 28 .43 104 .30 28 
Total .16 821 .04 599 .75 822 .49 599 .40 815 .22 605 
  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig. 
F .95 .45 2.53 .03 .85 .51 3.11 .01 1.10 .36 1.31 .26 
Linearity   3.83 .05   11.39 .00     
Deviance   2.21 .07   1.04 .38     
r    .08   .14      
eta             
 
1 = Never and Only on feast days or special holy days, 2= At least once a month,  
3= Once a week, 4=More than once a week, 5 = Once a day, 6 = Several times a day.  
Table 5. Religious in-group friends and contact avoidance 
 
Friends 
in-group 
Contact avoidance Avoidance for future spouse Support for residential segregation 
Muslim Christian Muslim Christian Muslim Christian 
Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N 
1.00 .19 17 .02 26 .65 17 .35 26 .41 16 .11 26 
2.00 .09 111 .02 173 .69 110 .50 173 .28 110 .14 175 
3.00 .11 377 .03 229 .73 377 .55 229 .30 374 .23 230 
4.00 .24 327 .07 154 .79 330 .45 153 .56 328 .30 157 
Total .16 832 .03 582 .75 834 .50 581 .40 828 .22 588 
  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig. 
F 17.94 .00 4.97 .00 1.99 .11 2.08 .10 51.63 .00 13.09 .00 
Linearity 35.34 .00 12.15 .00     105.56 .00 38.54 .00 
Deviance 9.24 .00 1.39 .25     24.67 .00 .37 .69 
r  .20  .14      .33  ,25 
eta  .25        .40   
 
1=None and Some, 2=Relatively many, 3=Almost all, 4=All. 
 
Table 3. Collective ritual and contact avoidance
Table 4. Religious practices and contact avoidance
Table 5. Religious in-group friends and contact avoidance
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Table 6. Religious out-group friends and contact avoidance 
 
Friends 
out-group 
Contact avoidance Avoidance for future spouse Support for residential 
segregation 
Muslim Christian Muslim Christian Muslim Christian 
Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N 
1.00 .27 182 .04 22 .83 182 .41 22 .59 180 .34 24 
2.00 .13 386 .03 261 .77 388 .52 259 .36 383 .26 262 
3.00 .06 160 .02 233 .65 159 .51 233 .22 159 .16 234 
4.00 .08 27 .05 55 .50 28 .36 55 .28 28 .15 56 
Total .15 755 .03 571 .75 757 .50 569 .39 750 .21 576 
  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig. 
F 26.98 .00 .62 .60 8.18 .00 1.90 .13 49.24 .00 1.01 .00 
Linearity 69.05 .00   23.13 .00   129.91 .00 27.24 .00 
Deviance 5.94 .00   .71 .49   10.55 .00 1.40 .25 
r -.29    -.17    -.38  -.21  
eta .31        .41    
 
1=None, 2= Some, 3=Relatively many, 4=Almost all and All. 
Table 7. Membership of religious organization and contact avoidance  
 
Religious 
membership 
Contact avoidance Avoidance for future spouse Support for residential 
segregation 
Muslim Christian Muslim Christian Muslim Christian 
Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N 
0.00 .13 466 .03 340 .73 467 .50 341 .38 468 .19 345 
1.00 .19 352 .04 227 .77 352 .48 227 .44 346 .25 229 
Total .16 819 .04 567 .75 818 .49 568 .40 814 .22 574 
  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig. 
F 10.64 .00 .22 .64 1.28 .26 .15 .69 7.81 .00 6.96 .01 
Linearity             
Deviance             
r             
eta .11        .10   .11 
 
0=Not member, 1=Members and followers. 
 
Table 8. Participation in religious organization and contact avoidance 
 
Religious 
participant 
Contact avoidance Avoidance for future spouse Support for residential 
segregation 
Muslim Christian Muslim Christian Muslim Christian 
Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N 
1.00 .15 35 .04 24 .63 35 .54 24 .41 35 .28 24 
2.00 .21 152 .06 73 .81 152 .39 73 .47 152 .25 75 
3.00 .19 80 .01 67 .82 80 .50 66 .46 77 .23 66 
4.00 .18 77 .04 60 .67 77 .60 60 .37 74 .29 61 
Total .19 344 .04 224 .76 344 .49 223 .44 338 .26 226 
  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig. 
F .46 .71 1.54 .20 3.50 .02 1.89 .13 1.87 .13 .50 .68 
Linearity     .31 .57       
Deviance     5.09 .01       
r             
eta     .17        
 
1 =Never, 2=Only on special days, 3=At least once a month and Once a week, 4=More than once a week.  
Table 6. Religious out-group friends and contact avoidance
Table 7. Membership of religious organization and contact avoidance
Table 9. Participation in religious organization and contact avoidance
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Table 9. Ethnic self-definition and contact avoidance 
 
Religious 
participant 
Contact avoidance Avoidance for future spouse Support for residential 
segregation 
Muslim Christian Muslim Christian Muslim Christian 
Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N 
1.00 .10 343 .02 102 .74 344 .56 102 .29 344 .12 103 
2.00 .10 35 .29 2 .60 35 .50 2 .30 35 .12 2 
3.00 .23 35 .04 324 .50 36   .46 36   
4.00 .18 17   .88 17   .29 17   
5.00 .20 237 .00 1 .77 238 .47 324 .53 234 .29 330 
6.00 .17 10   .60 10   .58 9   
7.00 .50 2 .00 20 .50 2 1.00 1 .50 2 .25 1 
8.00 .25 95   .84 94   .54 94   
9.00       .55 20   .16 20 
10.00   .00 5         
11.00 .00 1 .03 43 1.00 1 .56 43 .50 1 .15 43 
12.00 .00 2 .01 35 .50 2 .46 35 .00 2 .12 35 
13.00 .18 44 .02 56 .75 44 .43 56 .37 43 .14 56 
Total .16 821 .03 588 .75 823 .49 588 .40 817 .22 594 
  Sig
. 
 Sig
. 
 Sig
. 
 Sig.  Sig.  Sig. 
F 4.45 .00 2.13 .03 2.57 .00 .96 .46 12.53 .00 7.92 .00 
Linearity 20.59 .00 .80 .37 2.06 .15   44.73 .00 4.48 .03 
Deviance 2.66 .00 2.32 .02 2.63 .00   8.95 .00 8.41 .00 
r .15        .22  -.08  
eta .23  .17  .11    .37  .31  
 
1=Javanese, 2=Sundanese, 3=Madurese, 4=Minangkabau, 5=Ambonese, 6=Bugis, 7=Makassar,  
8=Buton, 9=Toraja, 10=Minahasa, 11=Chinese, 12=Batak, 13=Others. 
Table 10. Ethnic ceremony and contact avoidance 
 
Ethnic 
ceremon
y 
Contact avoidance Avoidance for future spouse Support for residential 
segregation 
Muslim Christian Muslim Christian Muslim Christian 
Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N 
1.00 .19 82 .05 110 .82 83 .41 109 .44 85 .23 112 
2.00 .18 247 .03 178 .79 249 .61 178 .39 246 .22 178 
3.00 .13 294 .02 146 .71 293 .43 147 .37 292 .17 148 
4.00 .15 130 .03 73 .69 130 .58 74 .38 127 .26 73 
Total .16 753 .03 507 .74 755 .51 508 .39 750 .21 511 
  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig. 
F 2.29 .08 1.18 .31 2.86 .04 5.53 .00 1.16 .32 2.61 .05 
Linearity     7.81 .00 .71 .40   .03 .85 
Devianc
e 
    .38 .68 7.93 .00   3.89 .02 
r      -.10       
eta        .18   .12  
 
1=No knowledge, 2=I do not participate in it and neither does my family,  
3=I do not participate in it but my family does, 4=I do participate 
Table 9. Ethnic self-definition and contact avoidance
Table 10. Ethnic ceremony and contact avoidance
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Table 11. Ethnic language and contact avoidance 
 
Ethnic 
language 
Contact avoidance Avoidance for future spouse Support for residential 
segregation 
Muslim Christian Muslim Christian Muslim Christian 
Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N 
0.00 .17 146 .04 235 .79 145 .47 235 .43 146 .25 239 
1.00 .19 270 .01 125 .74 273 .53 125 .43 271 .15 124 
2.00 .13 238 .04 117 .77 239 .54 117 .35 237 .21 116 
3.00 .12 60 .06 45 .72 60 .69 45 .38 60 .28 46 
Total .16 714 .03 522 .75 717 .52 522 .39 714 .22 525 
  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig. 
F 2.92 .03 2.0 .10 .63 .59 2.64 .05 2.59 .05 4.89 .00 
Linearity 5.28 .02     6.61 .01 4.85 .03 .06 .80 
Deviance 1.74 .18     .65 .52 1.46 .23 7.31 .00 
r -.09      .11  -.08    
eta           .16  
 
0=Never, 1=one and two, 2=three occasions and four occasions, 3=five and six occasions.  
The occasions are: ethnic languages in home, family gathering, university, close friends, neighbors, and government officers. 
 
Table 12. Social embededness and contact avoidance 
 
Social 
embedded-
ness 
Contact avoidance Avoidance for future spouse Support for residential 
segregation 
Muslim Christian Muslim Christian Muslim Christian 
Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N 
1.00 .25 58 .08 34 .75 59 .42 34 .49 57 .22 33 
2.00 .13 256 .01 128 .70 255 .47 128 .33 252 .15 129 
3.00 .14 336 .03 214 .78 336 .55 214 .39 336 .21 218 
4.00 .23 117 .05 134 .75 119 .47 132 .56 119 .33 135 
Total .16 767 .03 510 .75 769 .50 508 .40 764 .23 515 
  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig. 
F 6.41 .00 4.56 .00 1.67 .17 1.44 .23 15.57 .00 11.29 .00 
Linearity .70 .40 1.11 .29     14.26 .00 22.62 .00 
Deviance 9.27 .00 6.28 .00     16.23 .00 5.62 .00 
r          .13  .20 
eta  .16  .16      .24  .25 
      
1=None and Some, 2=Relatively Many, 3=Almost All, 4=All. 
 
Table 13. Membership of ethnic organization and contact avoidance 
 
Ethnic 
membershi
p 
Contact avoidance Avoidance for future spouse Support for residential 
segregation 
Muslim Christian Muslim Christian Muslim Christian 
Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N 
1.00 .15 662 .03 468 .75 664 .50 468 .40 663 .21 475 
2.00 .20 149 .05 84 .76 149 .48 84 .39 144 .22 85 
Total .16 811 .03 552 .75 813 .49 552 .40 807 .21 560 
  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig. 
F 4.25 .04 2.26 .13 .02 .89 .11 .74 .04 .85 .11 .74 
Linearity             
Deviance             
r             
eta  .07           
 
0=Not member, 1=Members and followers. 
Table 11. Ethnic language and contact avoidance
able 12. Social embededness and contact avoidance
Table 13. Membership of ethnic organization and contact avoidance
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Table 14. Participation in ethnic organization and contact avoidance 
 
Ethnic 
participation 
Contact avoidance Avoidance for future spouse Support for residential 
segregation 
Muslim Christian Muslim Christian Muslim Christian 
Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N 
1.00 .19 19 .14 7 .84 19 .57 7 .51 19 .36 7 
2.00 .21 90 .06 46 .78 90 .54 46 .39 87 .22 47 
3.00 .20 29 .01 23 .79 29 .30 23 .39 28 .18 23 
4.00 .13 14 .09 12 .43 14 .58 12 .45 14 .37 12 
Total .20 152 .06 88 .76 152 .49 88 .41 147 .24 89 
  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig. 
F .31 .82 1.35 .26 3.24 .02 1.44 .24 .82 .48 2.24 .09 
Linearity     5.67 .02       
Deviance     2.02 .14       
r     -.19        
eta             
 
1=Never, 2=Only on special days, 3=At least once a month and Once a week, 4=More than once a week.  
 
Contact avoidance and Individual determinants
Table 15. Gender and contact avoidance 
 
Gender 
Contact avoidance Avoidance for future spouse Support for residential 
segregation 
Muslim Christian Muslim Christian Muslim Christian 
Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N 
1.00 .16 416 .04 338 .67 418 .37 336 .40 413 .22 342 
2.00 .16 411 .03 259 .83 412 .64 261 .41 411 .22 260 
Total .16 827 .04 597 .75 830 .49 597 .41 824 .22 602 
  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig. 
F .00 .98 .77 .38 29.09 .00 47.73 .00 .58 .44 .16 .69 
Linearity             
Deviance             
r             
eta     .18  .27      
 
1=Male, 2=Female. 
Table 16. Parents religion and contact avoidance 
 
Parents 
religion 
Contact avoidance Avoidance for future spouse Support for residential 
segregation 
Muslim Christian Muslim Christian Muslim Christian 
Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N 
.00 .24 9 .02 23 .78 9 .39 23 .30 10 .12 23 
1.00 .16 832 .22 587 .75 834 .22 587 .41 827 .22 587 
Total .16 841 .04 604 .75 843 .49 604 .40 837 .22 610 
  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig. 
F .83 .36 .46 .50 .04 .84 .96 .33 1.08 .30 3.88 .05 
Linearity             
Deviance             
r             
eta           .08  
 
0=Non homogamous parents, 1=Homogamaous parents. 
ble 14. Participation ethnic orga izati  and contact avoidance
able 15. Gender and contact avoidance
Table 16. Parents religion and contact avoidance
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Table 17. Household income and contact avoidance 
 
Househol
d income 
Contact avoidance Avoidance for future spouse Support for residential 
segregation 
Muslim Christian Muslim Christian Muslim Christian 
Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N 
1.00 .21 304 .04 160 .78 305 .37 160 .48 301 .26 161 
2.00 .13 367 .03 284 .74 366 .49 283 .37 365 .21 287 
3.00 .14 144 .04 129 .71 144 .65 129 .33 143 .20 129 
Total .16 815 .04 573 .75 815 .49 572 .40 809 .22 577 
  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig. 
F 8.91 .00 .32 .73 1.46 .23 11.82 .00 16.13 .00 2.90 .06 
Linearity 12.04 .00     23.35 .00 29.14 .00   
Deviance 5.79 .02     .29 .59 3.11 .08   
r -.12      .20  -.19    
eta .15            
 
1=Lower than IDR 500,000 - IDR 999,999; 2=IDR 1,000,000, - IDR 4,999,999; 3=IDR 5.000.000 and over. 
Table 18. Parents education and contact avoidance 
 
Parents 
education 
Contact avoidance Avoidance for future spouse Support for residential 
segregation 
Muslim Christian Muslim Christian Muslim Christian 
Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N 
1.00 .17 10 .00 3 .70 10 .00 3 .40 10 .25 3 
2.00 .22 149 .03 45 .71 149 .40 45 .52 147 .21 46 
3.00 .14 259 .04 208 .75 258 .46 207 .41 261 .23 208 
4.00 .12 145 .03 149 .75 147 .57 149 .28 145 .20 152 
Total .15 563 .04 405 .74 564 .49 404 .40 563 .22 409 
  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig. 
F 4.35 .00 .39 .76 .32 .81 3.04 .03 14.91 .00 2.90 .06 
Linearity 10.63 .00     8.00 .00 39.10 .00   
Deviance 1.21 .30     .56 .57 2.82 .06   
r -.14      .14  -.25    
eta             
 
1=No formal education, 2=Kindergarten and Primary school, 3=Secondary school and Senior high school, 4=Diploma  
(D1 – D4), Bachelor (S1), Master (S2), PhD (S3). 
Table 19. Parents occupational status and contact avoidance 
 
Occupational  
status 
Contact avoidance Avoidance for future spouse Support for residential 
segregation 
Muslim Christian Muslim Christian Muslim Christian 
Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N 
1.00 .16 444 .03 291 .73 445 .48 292 .45 443 .23 295 
2.00 .13 166 .03 173 .75 166 .51 173 .31 165 .20 173 
3.00 .19 121 .02 63 .80 121 .48 63 .80 121 .21 63 
4.00 .19 16 .06 10 .94 17 .40 10 .51 17 .17 10 
Total .16 747 .03 537 .74 749 .49 538 .41 746 .21 541 
  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig. 
F 1.25 .29 .69 .56 2.13 .09 .28 .84 7.37 .00 .57 .63 
Linearity         3.39 .07   
Deviance         9.35 .00   
r             
eta         .17    
 
1=Self-employed, self employed but helped by temporary workers, and self employed but helped  
by permanent workers, 2=Workers/labour/officer, 3=Free workers in agriculture sector  
and free-workers in non-agriculture sector, 4=Work for family and unpaid workers. 
Table 17. Household income and contact avoidance
Table 18. Parents education and contact avoidance
Table 19. Parents occupational status and contact avoidance
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Table 20. Parents occupation status and contact avoidance 
 
Occupation 
status 
Contact avoidance Avoidance for future spouse Support for residential 
segregation 
Muslim Christian Muslim Christian Muslim Christian 
Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N 
1.00 .21 11 00 2 .73 11 .50 2 .36 11 .00 2 
2.00 .03 5 .00 6 .60 5 .67 6 .20 5 .08 6 
3.00 .16 13 .01 15 .92 13 .53 15 .29 13 .17 15 
4.00 .12 90 .03 123 .73 90 .52 122 .34 91 .20 123 
5.00 .11 25 .08 26 .52 25 .62 26 .33 25 .28 27 
6.00 .21 239 .04 83 .73 238 .37 84 .53 236 .25 86 
7.00 .11 138 .03 104 .70 139 .52 104 .32 140 .17 105 
8.00 .16 38 .02 14 .87 38 .71 14 .42 37 .23 14 
9.00 .12 38 .02 18 .76 38 .50 18 .40 37 .15 18 
10.00 .16 19 .04 31 .80 20 .52 31 .35 20 .27 30 
11.00 .26 6 .00 5 1.00 6 .40 5 .63 6 .25 5 
Total .16 622 .03 427 .73 623 .50 427 .42 621 .21 431 
  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig. 
F 2.21 .02 .68 .74 1.58 .11 1.10 .36 5.89 .00 1.46 .15 
Linearity .01 .90       1.34 .25   
Deviance 2.46 .01       6.39 .00   
r         .    
eta .19        .30    
 
1=Officials of government and special-interest organisations, corporate executives, managers, managing proprietors and 
supervisors, 2=Professionals, 3=Technicians and associate professionals, 4=Clerks, 5=Service workers and shop and market 
Sales workers, 6=Farmers, forestry workers and fishermen, 7=Trades and related workers, 8=Plant and machine operators 
and assemblers, 9=Laborers and unskilled workers, 10=Special occupation, 11=Parents dead or absent. 
Contact avoidance and intermediary variables
Table 21. Religious salience and contact avoidance 
 
Religious 
salience 
Contact avoidance Avoidance for future spouse Support for residential 
segregation 
Muslim Christian Muslim Christian Muslim Christian 
Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N 
1.00 .17 43 .03 33 .70 44 .31 32 .44 44 .21 33 
2.00 .09 119 .02 90 .66 119 .44 91 .26 116 .13 93 
3.00 .15 381 .04 268 .73 382 .50 268 .41 380 .21 270 
4.00 .21 285 .04 206 .81 284 .52 205 .45 282 .27 207 
Total .17 828 .03 597 .75 829 .49 596 .40 822 .22 603 
  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig. 
F 6.61 .00 .45 .71 4.33 .00 1.92 1.24 9.91 .00 6.97 .00 
Linearity 12.03 .00   10.49 .00   12.86 .00 14.24 .00 
Deviance 3.90 .02   1.26 .29   8.43 .00 3.33 .04 
r .12    .11    .12  .15  
eta .15        .19  .18  
 
1=Totally disagree and Disagree, 2=Neither disagree nor agree, 3=Agree, 4= Totally agree. 
 
Table 20. Parents occupation status and contact avoidance
Table 21. Religious salience and contact avoidance
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Table 22. Ethnic salience and contact avoidance 
 
Ethnic 
salience 
Contact avoidance Avoidance for future spouse Support for residential 
segregation 
Muslim Christian Muslim Christian Muslim Christian 
Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N 
1.00 .14 492 .03 369 .75 494 .47 369 .34 487 .17 376 
2.00 .19 305 .04 179 .76 304 .53 178 .50 305 .30 178 
3.00 .15 36 .05 39 .59 37 .56 39 .52 37 .35 40 
Total .16 833 .03 587 .75 835 .50 586 .40 839 .22 594 
  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig. 
F 4.15 .02 1.05 .35 2.37 .09 1.17 .31 30.53 .00 21.84 .00 
Linearity 4.66 .03       55.33 .00 42.02 .00 
Deviance 3.63 .06       5.69 .02 1.67 .20 
r  .07       .25  .26  
eta         .26    
 
1=Totally disagree and Disagree, 2=Neither disagree nor agree, 3=Agree and Totally agree. 
 
 
Table 23. Perceived group threat and contact avoidance 
 
Perceived 
group 
threat 
Contact avoidance Avoidance for future spouse Support for residential 
segregation 
Muslim Christian Muslim Christian Muslim Christian 
Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N 
1.00 .09 113 .01 98 .68 114 .49 97 .25 114 .17 100 
2.00 .12 481 .02 370 .73 482 .51 371 .35 478 .19 371 
3.00 .23 190 .07 101 .78 190 .43 100 .54 188 .30 104 
4.00 .47 37 .19 18 .89 37 .50 18 .82 37 .46 18 
5.00 .82 9 .14 5 1.00 9 .80 5 .89 9 .50 5 
Total .16 830 .04 592 .75 832 .49 591 .41 826 .22 598 
  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig. 
F 44.34 .00 12.36 .00 2.87 .02 .94 .44 47.50 .00 10.55 .00 
Linearity 140.71 .00 36.57 .00 10.71 .00   178.13 .00 36.03 .00 
Deviance 12.22 .00 4.29 .01 .25 .86   3.96 .01 2.06 .10 
r .37  .24  .11    .42  .24  
eta .42  .28      .43    
 
1=Totally disagree, 2=Disagree, 3=Neither disagree nor agree, 4=Agree, 5=Totally agree. 
Table 24. Quantity of contact and contact avoidance 
 
Quantity 
of contact 
Contact avoidance Avoidance for future spouse Support for residential 
segregation 
Muslim Christian Muslim Christian Muslim Christian 
Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N 
1.00 .21 278 .06 72 .78 281 .55 71 .50 278 .34 72 
2.00 .13 93 .06 65 .81 93 .51 65 .39 92 .30 65 
3.00 .11 85 .04 97 .69 85 .58 97 .31 82 .20 97 
4.00 .09 95 .02 104 .72 95 .42 104 .28 94 .21 104 
5.00 .06 82 .02 80 .76 82 .51 80 .24 82 .18 80 
6.00 .07 51 .03 108 .61 51 .46 108 .21 49 .15 108 
Total .14 684 .03 526 .75 687 .50 525 .38 677 .22 526 
  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig. 
F 9.47 .00 1.57 .17 2.16 .06 1.23 .29 19.67 .00 6.92 .00 
Linearity 41.75 .00       92.12 .00 30.69 .00 
Deviance 1.39 .23       1.56 .18 .97 .42 
r -.24        -.35  -.23  
eta             
 
1=Never, 2=At least once a month, 3=Once a week, 4=More than once a week, 5=Once a day, 6= Several times a day 
 
able 22. Ethnic salience and contact avoidance
le 23. P rceived group threat and c nta t avoidance
le 24. Quantity f contact and cont ct avoidance
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Table 25. Quality of contact and contact avoidance 
 
Quality of 
contact 
Contact avoidance Avoidance for future spouse Support for residential 
segregation 
Muslim Christian Muslim Christian Muslim Christian 
Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N 
1.00 .31 86 .14 12 .78 86 .45 11 .69 85 .40 12 
2.00 .12 206 .05 151 .80 207 .49 151 .31 203 .21 150 
3.00 .06 230 .02 301 .67 230 .53 301 .26 228 .21 304 
4.00 .05 3 .01 32 .67 3 .16 32 .08 3 .22 32 
Total .13 525 .03 496 .74 526 .49 495 .35 519 .22 498 
  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig. 
F 29.96 .00 6.14 .00 3.65 .01 5.39 .00 53.91 .00 2.06 .10 
Linearity 78.63 .00 13.08 .00 7.33 .01 2.24 .14 121.95 .00   
Deviance 5.63 .00 2.67 .07 1.81 .16 1.70 .00 19.89 .00   
r -.36  -.16  -.12    -.42    
eta .38      .18  .49    
 
1=Very negative, 2=Negative, 3=Neither negative nor positive, 4= Positive.    
 
Table 26. Positive in-group and contact avoidance 
 
Positive 
in-group 
Contact avoidance Avoidance for future spouse Support for residential 
segregation 
Muslim Christian Muslim Christian Muslim Christian 
Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N 
1.00 .07 94 .02 204 .63 93 .47 203 .24 93 .13 203 
2.00 .14 292 .03 276 .74 295 .48 275 .37 292 .23 279 
3.00 .18 338 .06 99 .77 337 .56 100 .45 335 .34 101 
4.00 .25 103 .10 11 .78 103 .27 11 .52 102 .36 11 
Total .16 827 .03 590 .74 828 .49 589 .40 822 .22 594 
  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig. 
F 8.66 .00 4.55 .00 2.52 .06 1.44 .23 17.27 .00 18.99 .00 
Linearity 25.50 .00 12.31 .00     50.42 .00 56.02 .00 
Deviance .24 .79 .67 .51     6.94 .50 .48 .62 
r .17  .14      .24  .29  
eta             
 
1=Totally disagree, and Disagree, 2=Neither disagree nor agree, 3=Agree, 4=Totally agree. 
Table 27. Negative out-group and contact avoidance 
 
Negative 
out-group 
Contact avoidance Avoidance for future spouse Support for residential 
segregation 
Muslim Christian Muslim Christian Muslim Christian 
Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N 
1.00 .08 83 .02 80 .64 83 .47 79 .19 84 .16 79 
2.00 .09 351 .02 242 .75 352 .48 242 .31 348 .17 246 
3.00 .20 271 .03 207 .76 271 .50 207 .49 266 .25 209 
4.00 .30 95 .06 49 .73 96 .49 49 .61 96 .37 49 
5.00 .47 20 .34 11 .85 20 .64 11 .65 20 .45 11 
Total .16 820 .03 589 .74 822 .49 588 .40 814 .22 594 
  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig. 
F 26.96 .00 23.53 .00 1.66 .16 .31 .87 43.01 .00 11.16 .00 
Linearity 98364 .00 31.94 .00     165.81 .00 38.19 .00 
Deviance 3.06 .03 20.73 .00     2.08 .10 2.15 .09 
r .32  .22      .41  .24  
eta .34  .37          
 
1=Totally disagree, 2=Disagree, 3=Neither disagree nor agree, 4=Agree, 5=Totally agree. 
a le 25. Quality of contact and contact avoidance
able 26. Posit ve in-group and cont ct avoidance
able 27. Negative out-group and cont ct avoidance
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Table 28. Monism and contact avoidance 
 
Monism 
Contact avoidance Avoidance for future spouse Support for residential 
segregation 
Muslim Christian Muslim Christian Muslim Christian 
Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N 
1.00 .08 17 .03 62 .45 18 .35 62 .19 18 .13 61 
2.00 .06 109 .02 242 .66 110 .46 242 .28 109 .18 247 
3.00 .12 322 .04 212 .72 322 .52 212 .35 317 .23 213 
4.00 .22 329 .06 70 .80 329 .61 70 .49 330 .39 70 
5.00 .37 47 .05 16 .83 47 .56 16 .62 46 .37 16 
Total .16 824 .04 602 .75 826 .49 602 .41 820 .22 607 
  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig. 
F 18.94 .00 4.05 .00 5.34 .00 2.80 .02 20.58 .00 13.12 .00 
Linearity 67.76 .00 10.26 .00 19.12 .00 10.20 .00 79.49 .00 45.46 .00 
Deviance 2.67 .05 1.99 .11 .74 .53 .34 .80 .94 .42 2.34 .07 
r .27  .13  .15  .13  .30  .26  
eta .29            
 
1=Totally disagree, 2=Disagree, 3=Neither disagree nor agree, 4=Agree, 5=Totally agree. 
 
Table 29. Pluralism and contact avoidance 
 
Pluralism 
Contact avoidance Avoidance for future spouse Support for residential 
segregation 
Muslim Christian Muslim Christian Muslim Christian 
Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N 
1.00 .35 52 .09 3 .91 53 1.00 3 .60 53 .25 3 
2.00 .21 200 .02 32 .76 201 .50 32 .47 198 .26 32 
3.00 .14 390 .05 264 .76 389 .52 266 .39 386 .20 263 
4.00 .11 175 .02 262 .68 176 .45 260 .32 176 .23 267 
5.00 .04 14 .01 40 .29 14 .55 40 .23 14 .23 41 
Total .16 831 .04 601 .74 833 .49 601 .40 827 .22 606 
  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig. 
F 12.18 .00 1.83 .12 7.24 .00 1.65 .16 12.05 .00   
Linearity 42.49 .00   17.53 .00   46.6 .00 .57 .69 
Deviance 2.07 .10   3.81 .01   .51 .68   
r -.22    -.14    -.23    
eta     .18        
 
1=Totally disagree, 2=Disagree, 3=Neither disagree nor agree, 4=Agree, 5=Totally agree. 
 
Table 30. Intratextual fundamentalism and contact avoidance 
 
Intratextual 
fundamen-
talism 
Contact avoidance Avoidance for future spouse Support for residential 
segregation 
Muslim Christian Muslim Christian Muslim Christian 
Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N 
1.00 .09 28 .03 82 .45 29 .51 82 .16 29 .13 82 
2.00 .11 131 .01 192 .61 131 .45 193 .31 130 .16 193 
3.00 .16 421 .05 223 .77 422 .46 222 .40 417 .26 226 
4.00 .19 252 .06 100 .81 252 .64 100 .48 252 .32 101 
Total .16 832 .03 597 .75 834 .49 597 .40 828 .22 602 
  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig. 
F 3.81 .01 5.22 .01 11.35 .00 3.88 .01 14.69 .00 16.54 .00 
Linearity 11.41 .00 9.40 .00 27.66 .00 3.36 .07 43.10 .00 46.71 .00 
Deviance .15 .86 3.13 .04 3.22 .04 4.14 .02 .49 .61 1.46 .23 
r .11  .12  .18    .22  .27  
eta   .16  .19  .14      
 
1=Totally disagree and Disagree, 2=Neither disagree nor agree, 3=Agree, 4=Totally agree. 
ble 28. Monism and ontact avoidance
ble 29. Pluralism a d ontact avoidance
able 30. In ratext al fund mentalism nd contact avoidance
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Table 31. Hermeneutic interpretation and contact avoidance 
 
Hermeneu
-tic inter-
pretation 
Contact avoidance Avoidance for future spouse Support for residential 
segregation 
Muslim Christian Muslim Christian Muslim Christian 
Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N 
1.00 .23 26 .06 5 .70 27 .20 5 .52 27 .29 6 
2.00 .13 99 .06 33 .79 99 .53 34 .39 99 .22 34 
3.00 .17 302 .03 164 .81 302 .49 164 .39 299 .19 165 
4.00 .13 321 .04 287 .67 321 .45 286 .38 318 .20 289 
5.00 .26 74 .03 109 .79 75 .60 109 .50 75 .33 109 
Total .16 822 .04 598 .75 824 .49 598 .40 818 .22 603 
  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig. 
F 4.59 .00 .47 .76 4.33 .00 2.38 .05 2.93 .02 6.56 .00 
Linearity .69 .41   2.97 .08 1.89 .17 .21 .64 10.54 .00 
Deviance 5.90 .00   4.78 .00 2.54 .06 3.84 .01 5.20 .00 
r         .  .13  
eta .15    .14  .13  .12  .20  
 
1=Totally disagree, 2=Disagree, 3=Neither disagree nor agree, 4=Agree, 5=Totally agree. 
 
Table 32. Perceived discrimination and contact avoidance 
 
Perceived 
discrimin
a-tion 
Contact avoidance Avoidance for future spouse Support for residential 
segregation 
Muslim Christian Muslim Christian Muslim Christian 
Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N 
1.00 .14 214 .02 129 .75 214 .56 128 .37 211 .19 134 
2.00 .15 514 .03 337 .75 517 .48 337 .39 513 .21 339 
3.00 .25 90 .06 102 .68 89 .50 102 .52 90 .26 101 
4.00 .30 11 .05 24 .82 11 .25 24 .64 11 .32 24 
Total .16 829 .04 592 .75 831 .49 591 .40 825 .22 598 
  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig. 
F 5.95 .00 1.69 .17 .74 .53 2.78 .04 6.54 .00 2.84 .04 
Linearity 11.42 .00     4.89 .03 13.66 .00 7.92 .00 
Deviance 3.22 .04     1.72 .18 2.98 .05 .29 .74 
r .12      -.09  .13  .11  
eta .15        .15    
 
1=Totally disagree, 2=Disagree, 3=Neither disagree nor agree, 4=Agree and Totally agree. 
 
Table 33. Memory of violence and contact avoidance 
 
Memory 
of 
violence 
Contact avoidance Avoidance for future spouse Support for residential segregation 
Muslim Christian Muslim Christian Muslim Christian 
Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N 
0.00 .14 271 .02 107 .67 273 .49 107 .37 274 .15 109 
1.00 .12 166 .02 125 .75 166 .46 125 .31 164 .19 126 
2.00 .21 181 .04 140 .82 182 .56 140 .45 180 .25 141 
3.00 .18 207 .05 205 .78 206 .48 206 .48 203 .26 208 
Total .16 825 .04 577 .75 827 .49 578 .40 821 .22 584 
  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig. 
F 5.27 .00 1.86 .13 4.86 .00 1.04 .37 10.11 .00 6.42 .00 
Linearity 6.96 .01   1.02 .00   19.21 .00 18.06 .00 
Deviance 4.42 .01   2.28 .10   5.56 .00 .60 .54 
r .09    .11    .15  .17  
eta .14        .19    
 
0=Not experience, 1=One occasion, 2=Two occasions, 3=Three occasions. The occasions are memory, place, and witness. 
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Table 34. Direct violence and contact avoidance 
 
Direct  
violence 
Contact avoidance Avoidance for future spouse Support for residential segregation 
Muslim Christian Muslim Christian Muslim Christian 
Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N 
1000 .14 599 .03 373 .73 602 .52 373 .38 597 .19 379 
1.00 .14 57 .03 64 .80 56 .48 64 .35 57 .23 63 
2.00 .26 73 .04 65 .81 73 .51 65 .56 71 .29 66 
3.00 .19 90 .07 83 .77 90 .40 84 .49 90 .29 83 
Total .16 819 .04 585 .75 821 .49 586 .40 815 .22 591 
  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig. 
F 4.85 .00 2.04 .11 1.08 .36 1.18 .31 10.07 .00 4.95 .00 
Linearity 8.19 .00       21.48 .00 14.02 .00 
Deviance 3.19 .04       4.36 .01 .41 .66 
r .09        .16  .15  
eta .13        .19    
 
0=Not experience, 1=One occasion, 2=Two occasions, 3=Three, for, and five occasions. The occasions are physical injury,  
family injury, family lose, relative injury, and relative lose. 
 
 
Table 35. Indirect violence and contact avoidance 
 
Indirect   
violence 
Contact avoidance Avoidance for future spouse Support for residential segregation 
Muslim Christian Muslim Christian Muslim Christian 
Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N 
0.00 .15 627 .02 389 .74 630 .50 389 .39 624 .18 392 
1.00 .15 86 .04 79 .74 86 .44 79 .44 87 .33 80 
2.00 .22 68 .04 74 .78 67 .46 74 .51 67 .29 76 
3.00 .18 42 .05 53 .83 42 .48 54 .45 42 .27 54 
Total .16 823 .03 595 .74 825 .49 596 .40 820 .22 602 
  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig. 
F 1.54 .20 1.06 .37 .77 .51 .38 .76 3.62 .01 11.38 .00 
Linearity         8.14 .00 18.79 .00 
Deviance         1.36 .26 7.67 .00 
r         .10  .17  
eta           .23  
 
0=Not experience, 1=One occasion, 2=Two occasions, 3=Three, and four occasions. The occasions are close friend injury,  
close friends lose, neighbor injury, and neighbor lose.  
 
 
Table 36. Nationalism and contact avoidance 
 
Nationalism 
Contact avoidance Avoidance for future spouse Support for residential 
segregation 
Muslim Christian Muslim Christian Muslim Christian 
Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N 
1.00 .25 21 .11 12 .50 22 .67 12 .47 22 .27 12 
2.00 .17 227 .04 220 .75 228 .49 220 .38 228 .19 222 
3.00 .14 486 .03 298 .76 486 .50 297 .40 480 .24 301 
4.00 .22 103 .03 69 .74 103 .42 69 .48 103 .24 70 
Total .16 837 .04 599 .75 839 .49 598 .40 833 .22 605 
  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig. 
F 3.95 .00 2.31 .08 2.57 .05 .97 .40 2.86 .04 1.73 .16 
Linearity .00 .99   1.46 .23   3.16 .08   
Deviance 5.93 .00   3.13 .04   2.71 .07   
r             
eta .12    .10    .10    
 
1=Totally disagree and Disagree, 2=Neither disagree nor agree, 3=Agree, 4=Totally agree. 
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Table 37. Regiocentrism and contact avoidance 
 
Regio- 
centrism 
Contact avoidance Avoidance for future spouse Support for residential segregation 
Muslim Christian Muslim Christian Muslim Christian 
Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N 
1.00 .18 138 .04 92 .77 140 .49 91 .42 139 .22 93 
2.00 .14 413 .04 257 .77 413 .53 256 .36 412 .19 262 
3.00 .14 206 .03 180 .70 206 .47 180 .44 203 .21 179 
4.00 .26 71 .05 58 .70 71 .37 59 .51 71 .34 59 
5.00 .30 12 .03 14 .83 12 .43 14 .58 11 .34 14 
Total .16 840 .04 601 .75 842 .49 600 .40 836 .22 607 
  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig. 
F 4.42 .00 .43 .79 1.32 .26 1.39 .23 5.32 .00 5.14 .00 
Linearity 3.41 .06       9.24 .00 9.28 .00 
Deviance 4.75 .00       4.01 .01 3.76 .01 
r         .10  .12  
eta .14        .16  .18  
 
1=Totally disagree, 2=Disagree, 3=Neither disagree nor agree, 4=Agree, 5=Totally agree. 
 
 
Table 38. National pride and contact avoidance 
 
National 
pride 
Contact avoidance Avoidance for future spouse Support for residential segregation 
Muslim Christian Muslim Christian Muslim Christian 
Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N 
1.00 .25 14 .13 12 .50 14 .50 12 .46 14 .29 13 
2.00 .14 37 .08 69 .50 38 .55 69 .36 38 .27 71 
3.00 .17 223 .03 189 .75 222 .49 188 .38 225 .17 189 
4.00 .14 385 .03 247 .79 385 .45 249 .38 378 .22 248 
5.00 .20 168 .03 81 .74 168 .52 80 .50 168 .28 82 
Total .16 827 .04 598 .75 827 .49 598 .40 823 .22 603 
  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig. 
F 2.27 .06 4.96 .00 5.14 .00 .68 .61 5.14 .00 3.65 .01 
Linearity   9.45 .00 6.59 .01   67.92 .01 .62 .43 
Deviance   3.46 .02 4.66 .00   3.47 .02 4.66 .00 
r   -.12  .09    .10    
eta   .18  .16    .15  .15  
 
1=Totally disagree, 2=Disagree, 3=Neither disagree nor agree, 4=Agree, 5=Totally agree. 
 
 
Table 39. Distrust and contact avoidance 
 
Distrust 
Contact avoidance Avoidance for future spouse Support for residential 
segregation 
Muslim Christian Muslim Christian Muslim Christian 
Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N 
1.00 .04 75 .01 31 .72 75 .50 30 .20 75 .19 31 
2.00 .08 395 .02 300 .70 397 .45 300 .29 392 .15 305 
3.00 .23 303 .04 227 .79 303 .53 228 .53 303 .27 228 
4.00 .50 60 .23 33 .85 60 .67 32 .81 59 .52 32 
Total .16 833 .03 591 .75 835 .49 590 .41 829 .22 596 
  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig. 
F 69.97 .00 34.29 .00 3.40 .02 2.32 .07 95.90 .00 28.68 .00 
Linearity 183.17 .00 49.97 .00 8.18 .00   272.41 .00 65.82 .00 
Deviance 13.37 .00 26.45 .00 1.00 .37   7.64 .00 10.12 .00 
r .42  .10  .09    .49  .31  
eta .27  .09      .31  .36  
 
1=Totally disagree, 2=Disagree, 3=Neither disagree nor agree, 4=Agree and Totally agree. 
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Table 40. Dominance orientation and contact avoidance 
 
Dominance 
Contact avoidance Avoidance for future spouse Support for residential 
segregation 
Muslim Christian Muslim Christian Muslim Christian 
Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N 
1.00 .15 113 .03 119 .81 114 .55 119 .37 113 .24 120 
2.00 .15 444 .03 342 .75 445 .47 341 .39 441 .20 343 
3.00 .18 253 .04 127 .73 253 .53 127 .43 252 .22 131 
4.00 .21 20 .07 10 .65 20 .10 10 .58 20 .45 10 
Total .16 830 .03 598 .75 832 .49 597 .41 826 .22 604 
  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig. 
F .86 .46 .63 .60 1.24 .29 3.05 .03 3.57 .01 3.49 .01 
Linearity       1.33 .25 8.34 .00 .39 .53 
Deviance       3.91 .02 1.18 .31 5.04 .01 
r         .10    
eta       .12    .13  
 
1=Totally disagree, 2=Disagree, 3=Neither disagree nor agree, 4=Agree and Totally agree. 
 
 
Table 41. Inequality orientation and contact avoidance 
 
Inequality 
Contact avoidance Avoidance for future spouse Support for residential 
segregation 
Muslim Christian Muslim Christian Muslim Christian 
Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N 
1.00 .16 330 .02 286 .77 329 .51 286 .42 324 .24 289 
2.00 .15 453 .05 285 .74 455 .48 284 .39 455 .21 288 
3.00 .20 45 .05 26 .61 46 .35 26 .39 45 .15 26 
Total .16 828 .04 597 .75 830 .49 596 .40 824 .22 603 
  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig. 
F .58 .56 2.56 .08 2.76 .06 1.48 .23 1.08 .34 1.73 .18 
Linearity             
Deviance             
r             
eta             
 
1=Totally disagree, 2=Disagree, 3=Neither disagree nor agree, Agree, and Totally agree. 
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Table 42. Linearity test between ethno-religious identification and contact avoidance  
 
 
Variables 
 
Contact avoidance 
 
Avoidance of future spouse 
 
Support of residential segregation 
 
F 
 
Lin. 
 
Dev. 
 
r 
 
eta 
 
F 
 
Lin. 
 
Dev. 
 
r 
 
eta 
 
F 
 
Lin. 
 
Dev. 
 
r 
 
eta 
Rites of passage 3.57*
* 
.03 5.34*
* 
 .09 2.06     7.79** 2.86 10.25**  .13 
Collective rites .88     3.85* 7.50** .21 .07  1.30     
Religious 
practices 
2.22* 3.41 1.93  .09 1.70     3.04** 6.77*
* 
2.11 .17  
Religious in-
group friends 
30.4
8** 
70.5
3** 
10.4
6** 
.2
2 
.25 5.22*
* 
13.15** 1.25 .10  70.85** 178.
80** 
16.87** .33 .37 
Religious out-
group friends 
53.0
6** 
118.
88** 
20.1
5** 
.2
9 
.33 16.1
8** 
46.98** .78 -
.19 
 85.47** 221.
86** 
17.28** -
.38 
.41 
Membership of 
religious 
organization 
10.1
1** 
   .09 .55     15.78**    .11 
Participation in 
religious 
organization 
1.32     .55     1.45     
Ethnic 
ceremonies 
.74     4.08*
* 
.08 6.08
** 
 .10 .53     
Ethnic 
languages 
2.75* .07 4.09*  .08 3.30* 8.27** .82 .09  .68     
Social 
embededness 
5.72*
* 
.01 8.58*
* 
 .11 2.81* .03 4.20
* 
 .08 16.12** 17.9
4** 
15.21** .12 .19 
Membership of 
ethnic 
organization 
8.19*
* 
   .08 1.11    .01 2.40    .01 
Participation in 
ethnic 
organization 
.65    .08  1.78   .15 2.40    .17 
 
Lin. =linearity, Dev. =deviation from linearity, *=p<.05, **=p<.01 
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Appendix 3. Regression Tables 
Table 1. Contact avoidance model 1 and 2 
 
Model Determinants Model 1 Model 2a Model 2b Model 2c Before After 
 (Constant) .10** .16 .18 .02 .13** 
1. Ethno-religious definition  
(ref: Javanese Muslims) 
     
Sundanese Muslims  -.00 -.01 -.06 .05 .02 
Madurese Muslims .13** .02 .23* .08 .02 
Ambonese Muslims .10** .04 .10 .16 .05** 
Buton Muslims .15** .10* .19* .20 .09** 
Muslims- rest .07** .06 .10 .29* .07** 
Javanese Christians -.09** -.04 -.06 -.00 -.04* 
Ambonese Christians -.06** -.09** -.09 .11 -.05** 
Chinese Christians -.07* -.09 -.25 -.07 -.04 
Batak Christians -.09* -.08 -.06 .06 -.06* 
Christians- rest -.08** -.05   -.06* 
2a. Rites of passage (ref: I do not participate in it 
and neither does my family) 
     
I do not participate in it but my family 
does 
 -.09  -.05  
I do participate but for non-religious 
reason 
 -.10  -.05  
I do participate for religious reason  -.10  .04  
Collective rites (ref: I do not participate in it and 
neither does my family) 
     
I do not participate in it but my family 
does 
 .07  .03  
I do participate for non-religious reason 
and I do participate for religious reason 
 .08  .08  
Religious practices (ref: Never and only on feast 
days)  
     
At least once a month  .08  .22  
Once a week  .06  .03  
More than once a week  .04    
Once a day  .10  .03  
Several times a day  .08  .09  
Religious in-group friends  .03  .06 .09** 
Religious out-group friends (ref: None)      
Some  -.11**  -.14 -.09** 
Relatively many  -.15**  -.24* -.14** 
Almost all and all  -.16**  -.16 -.12** 
Participation in religious organization (ref: 
Never) 
     
Only on special days  .02  .14  
At least once a month  .01  .08  
More than once a week  .01  .16  
2b & 
2c. 
Ethnic ceremonies (ref: No knowledge)      
I do not participate in it and neither does 
my family 
  .02 .09  
I do not participate in it but my family 
does 
  -.03 .01  
I do participate   .11 .00  
Ethnic languages (ref: Never)      
One and two occasions   -.02 .06  
Three and four occasions   -.131* .00  
Five and six occasions   -.12 -.03  
 Social embededness (ref: none and some)      
Relatively many   -.04 -.06  
Almost all   .05 -.03  
All    .00 -.03  
Participation in ethnic organization (ref: 
Never) 
     
Only on special days   .02 -.11  
At least once a month and once a week   -.06 -.16  
More than once a week   -.01 -.15  
 R2 
 
.34 .20 .28 .43 .17 
 R2 Adj. .12 .15 .16 .04 .16 
 
Model  1, 2a, and 2b is without trimming 
*= 0 < p value < .05 and ** = 0 < p value < .01 
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Table 2. Contact avoidance model 3 and 4
 
Model Determinants Model 3 Model 4before After before After
(Constant) .22** .13** .03 .09*
3. Ethno-religious definition (ref: Javanese Muslims)
Sundanese Muslim s .10* .03 .04 .04
Madurese Muslims .00 -.00 .05 .00
Ambonese Muslims .03 .05* -.01 -.00
Buton Muslims .11* .11** .10** .092**
Muslims- rest .03 .07* .09** .07**
Javanese Christians -.05 -.04 -.02 -.04*
Ambonese Christians -
.07**
-.04* -.02 -.04*
Chinese Christians -.06 -.02 -.02 -.04
Batak Christians -.05 -.05 -.02 -.04
Christians- rest -.07* -.05* -.01 -.04
Religious in-group friends .03 .07* .08* .07*
Religious out-group friends (ref: None)
Some -
.10**
-.08** -.07** -.07**
Relatively many -
.11**
-.12** -.07** -.07**
Almost all and all -
.11**
-.10** -.04 -.03
Gender (ref: male)
Female -.03
Parents religion (ref: heterogamy)
Homogamy .01
Household income (ref: low income)
Middle income -.03
High income -.04
Parents education (ref: low education)
No education -.05
Middle education .02
High education .05
Occupational status (ref: self employ)
Worker -.02
Free worker -.02
Unpaid worker -.01
Occupation status (ref :farmers)
professionals .05 .07 .04 .04
Technicians -.08 -.04 -.03 -.02
Clerks -.01 .02 .02 .03
Sales -.04 -.00 .00 .01
Farmers -.06 -.01 -.04 -.02
Traders -
.07**
-.03* -.02 -.02
Machine -.07 .00 -.02 -.02
Unskilled -.05 -.03 -.02 -.03
Special -.01 -.02 -.00 .02
Absent -.05 -.01 .01 -.01
4. Intermediate variables
Salience religious identity -.01
Salience ethnic identity .00
Perceived threat .18** .18**
Quantity of contact .03
Quality of contact -.10* -.11**
Positive in-group .034
Negative out-group .11* .15**
Monism .04
Pluralism -.17** -.11**
Intratextual fundamentalism .05
Hermeneutic interpretation .07
Perceived discrimination .04
Memory of violence -.03
Direct violence -.08
Indirect violence .10*
Nationalism .05
Regiocentrism -.11*
National pride -.03
Distrust .04
Dominance orientation -.05
Equality orientation .01
R2 .45 .41 .31 .28
R2   Adj. .20 .17 .25 .25
*= 0 < p value < .05 and ** = 0 < p value < .01
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Table 3. The avoidance of future spouse model 1 and 2 
 
Model Determinants Model 1 Model 2a Model 2b Model 2c    Before After 
 (Constant) .74** .28 .73** .73 .72** 
1. Ethno-religious definition (ref: Javanese 
Muslims) 
     
Sundanese Muslims  -.14* -.14 -.32 .11 -.14* 
Madurese Muslims -.24** -.28* -.01 -.14 -.40** 
Ambonese Muslims .03 -.03 .08 .07 -.01 
Buton Muslims .10* .02 .16 -.06 .04 
Muslims- rest .01 .11 -.02 -.16 .02 
Javanese Christians -.18** -.05 -.28 -.13 -.16** 
Ambonese Christians -.28** -.27** -.22* -.13 -.28** 
Chinese Christians -.19* .05 .15 .08 -.17* 
Batak Christians -.29** -.81* -.19 -.70 -.25** 
Christians-rest -.26** -.09   -.20** 
2a. Rites of passage (ref: I do not participate in it 
and neither does my family) 
     
I do not participate in it but my family 
does 
 .05  .11  
I do participate but for non-religious 
reason 
 -.03  .01  
I do participate for religious reason  -.02  .02  
Collective rites   .10*  .20  
Religious practices (ref: Never and only on 
feast days)  
     
At least once a month  .10  -.25 .07 
Once a week  .18  -.11 .16* 
More than once a week  .24   .23** 
Once a day  .29  -.02 .24** 
Several times a day  .19  -.26 .17* 
Religious in-group friends  -.00  .03  
Religious out-group friends  -.08  -.25 -.12** 
Participation in religious organization (ref: 
Never) 
     
Only on special days  .04  .0  
At least once a month  .06  -.04  
More than once a week  .08  .06  
2b & 2c. Ethnic ceremonies (ref: No knowledge)      
I do not participate in it and neither does 
my family 
  .14 .05  
I do not participate in it but my family 
does 
  -.10 -.09  
I do participate   -.03 -.25  
Ethnic languages    -.01 -.03  
Social embededness (ref: none and some)      
Relatively many   .12 .01  
Almost all   .10   
All   -.04 .06  
Participation in ethnic organization (ref: 
Never) 
   -.06  
Only on special days   .04 -.04  
At least once a month and once a week   -.07 -.23  
More than once a week   -.07 -.06  
 R2 .08 .13 .19 .56 .11 
 R2   Adj. .08 .08 .07 .32 .10 
 
Model  1, 2a, and 2b is without trimming; *= 0 < p value < .05 and ** = 0 < p value < .01 
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Table 4. The avoidance of future spouse model 3 and 4
 
Model Determinants Model 3 Model 4before After before After
(Constant) .65** .63** .40 .28*
3. Ethno-religious definition (ref: Javanese Muslims)
Sundanese Muslims .03 -.22* -.27* -.21*
Madurese Muslims -.44** -.36** -.24* -.31**
Ambonese Muslims .02 .01 -.11 -.04
Buton Muslims -.06 -.01 .01 -.04
Muslims- rest -.07 -.05 .01 -.03
Javanese Christians -.17* -.18** -.10 -.11*
Ambonese Christians -.21** -.24** -.23** -.21**
Chinese Christians .05 -.13 -.11 -.11
Batak Christians -.18* -.20* -.09 -.13
Christians-rest -.05 -.18** -.08 -.13*
Religious practices (ref: Never and only on feast days) 
At least once a month -.01 .14 .13 .14
Once a week .05 .17* .24* .15
More than once a week .08 .25* .30* .21*
Once a day .13 .28** .32* .25*
Several times a day .10 .22* .27* .17
Religious out-group friends -.13** -.07** -.02 -.07*
Gender (ref: male)
Female .23** .20** .24** .21**
Parents religion (ref: heterogamy)
Homogamy .04
Household income (ref: low income) -.12 -.12* -.04
Middle income -.03 -.11* -.11* -.10*
High income .11 reference reference reference
Parents education (ref: low education)
No education -.29*
Middle education .01
High education .10
Occupational status (ref: self employ)
Worker -.02
Free worker .03
Unpaid worker .11
Occupation status (ref :farmers)
professionals -.07 -.02 -.18 -.04
Technicians .01 .15 .12 .13
Clerks .06 .14 .11 .13
Sales -.04 .07 .02 .07
Farmers -.16 .01 -.01 .02
Traders -.09 .03 .01 .05
Machine .24* .16* .16* .15*
Unskilled .10 .05 .07 .04
Special -.09 .06 .02 .05
Absent -.03 .05 -.05 .08
4. Intermediate variables
Salience religious identity .04
Salience ethnic identity .07
Perceived threat .06
Quantity of contact -.00
Quality of contact -.02
Positive in-group .01
Negative out-group .02
Monism .13* .16**
Pluralism -.08
Intratextual fundamentalism .01
Hermeneutic interpretation -.04
Perceived discrimination -.07
Memory of violence .10
Direct violence -.11
Indirect violence .06
Nationalism -.05
Regiocentrism -.11* -.10**
National pride -.02
Distrust .10* .10**
Dominance orientation -.03
Equality orientation .01
R2 .20 .16 .25 .19
R2   Adj. .15 .13 .17 .16
*= 0 < p value < .05 and ** = 0 < p value < .01,
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Table 5.  The support of residential segregation model 1 and 2
 
Model Determinants Model 1 Model 2a Model 2b Model 2cbefore After
(Constant) .29** .31* .43** .71* .54**
1. Ethno-religious definition (ref: Javanese Muslims)
Sundanese Muslims .01 .06 -.09 -.22 .04
Madurese Muslims .17** .05 .18 -.01 .03
Ambonese Muslims .24** .20** .23** .41** .18**
Buton Muslims .25** .19** .21* .13 .17**
Muslims-rest .08* .10* .06 .26* .08
Javanese Christians -.16** .01 -.12 .17 -.06*
Ambonese Christians .00 .04 -.01 .29* -.00
Chinese Christians -.14** -.13 -.23 -.19 -.08*
Batak Christians -.17** -.22 -.09 -.07 -.08*
Christians- rest -.15** -.08 -.06
2a. Religious practices .07 .15
Rites of passage (ref: I do not participate in it and 
neither does my family)
I do not participate in it but my family does -.21* -.44 -.06
I do participate but for non-religious reason -.26** -.57* -.10*
I do participate for religious reason -.28** -.54 -.08*
Collective rites (ref: I do not participate in it and 
neither does my family)
I do not participate in it but my family does .08 .03
I do participate for non-religious reason and I do 
participate for religious reason
.19* .14
Religious in-group friends .13** -.05 .10**
Religious out-group friends -.24** -
.42**
-
.26**
Participation in religious organization (ref: Never)
Only on special days .00 .13
At least once a month .00 -.07
More than once a week -.01 .08
2b & 
2c.
Ethnic ceremonies (ref: No knowledge)
I do not participate in it and neither does my 
family
.08 .31**
I do not participate in it but my family does .05 .24*
I do participate .11 .13
Ethnic languages (ref: Never)
One and two occasions .02 .09
Three and four occasions -.01 .20*
Five and six occasions .04 .22*
Social embededness (ref: none and some)
Relatively many -.18* -.28* -
.10**
Almost all -.05 -.27* -
.07**
All .02 -.08 -.06
Participation in ethnic organization (ref: Never)
Only on special days -.15* -.21*
At least once a month and once a week -.16 -.09
More than once a week -.08 -.17
R2 .19 .27 .29 .60 .29
R2   Adj. .18 .24 .17 .38 .27
 
Model  1, 2a, and 2b is without trimming, *= 0 < p value < .05 and ** = 0 < p value < .01
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Table 6. The support of residential segregation model 3 and 4 
 
Model Determinants Model 3 Model 4 Before After Before After 
 (Constant) .64** .57** .07 .09 
3. Ethno-religious definition (ref: Javanese Muslims)     
Sundanese Muslims  -.01 .04 .03 .05 
Madurese Muslims .03 -.00 .10 .04 
Ambonese Muslims .14** .15** .13** .10** 
Buton Muslims .18** .19** .14* .12** 
Muslims-rest .10 .10 .10 .14* 
Javanese Christians -.08* -.07* -.01 .01 
Ambonese Christians -.05 -.03 .01 -.01 
Chinese Christians -.09 -.07 -.07 -.05 
Batak Christians -.06 -.07 -.03 -.01 
Christians-rest -.11 -.11 -.06 -.06 
Rites of passage (ref: I do not participate in it and neither 
does my family) 
    
I do not participate in it but my family does -.09 -.10 -.11 -.10 
I do participate but for non-religious reason -.10 -.14* -.12* -.13* 
I do participate for religious reason -.07 -.11* -.10 -.11* 
Religious in-group friends .08 .11** .15** .10** 
Religious out-group friends  -.25** -.23** -.13** -.12** 
Social embededness (ref: All)     
Relatively many -.09* -.09** -.05 -.07 
Almost all -.06* -.05* -.04 -.04 
None and some -.00 -.00 -.01 -.01 
Gender (ref: male)     
Female  -.01    
Parents religion (ref: heterogamy)     
Homogamy .01    
Household income (ref: low income)     
Middle income  -.03    
High income -.03    
Parents education (ref: low education)     
No education  -.05    
Middle education -.03    
High education  -.02    
Occupational status (ref: self employ)     
Worker -.07* -.06* -.08* -.05* 
Free worker -.04 .00 -.01 -.02 
Unpaid worker .10 .06 .01 .00 
Occupation status (ref :farmers)     
professionals -.01 -.01 .07 -.01 
Technicians -.06 -.06 -.01 -.08 
Clerks .03 .02 .06 .01 
Sales .02 .02 .07 .01 
Farmers -.03 .01 .02 -.02 
 Traders -.09* -.07** .01 -.04 
Machine -.02 .01 .03 .01 
Unskilled .00 -.02 .06 -.04 
Special -.01 -.04 .06 -.01 
Absent .09 .05 .18 .09 
4. Intermediate variables     
Salience religious identity   -.07  
Salience ethnic identity   .15** .13** 
Perceived threat   .15** .16** 
Quantity of contact   -.07 -.10* 
Quality of contact    .02  
Positive in-group   -.05  
Negative out-group   .10*  
Monism   -.00  
Pluralism   -.13** -.10** 
Intratextual fundamentalism   .14* .15** 
Hermeneutic interpretation   -.01  
Perceived discrimination   .00  
Memory of violence   -.03  
Direct violence   -.02  
 Indirect violence   -.01  
Nationalism   .03  
Regiocentrism   .03  
National pride   .06  
Distrust   .14** .16** 
Dominance orientation   -.04  
Equality orientation   -.06  
 R2 .35 .31 .44 .44 
 R2   Adj. .30 .28 .37 .41 
 
*= 0 < p value < .05 and ** = 0 < p value < .01, 
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Appendix 4. Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs) 
Table 1. VIFs of ethno-religious identification variables 
 
 
 
Determinants 
Collinearity Statistics 
Contact avoidance Avoidance of future 
spouse 
Support of residential 
segregation 
Tolerance VIF Tolerance VIF Tolerance VIF 
Religious practice .78 1.28 .77 1.29 .77 1.30 
Rites of passage .60 1.66 .61 1.63 .63 1.60 
Collective rites .58 1.74 .58 1.72 .60 1.68 
Religious in-group friends .81 1.23 .78 1.27 .75 1.34 
Religious out-group 
friends 
.85 1.18 .85 1.17 .83 1.20 
Participation in religious 
organization 
.67 1.49 .63 1.58 .63 1.58 
Ethnic ceremonies .87 1.15 .87 1.15 .85 1.17 
Ethnic languages .90 1.12 .89 1.12 .89 1.13 
Soc. embededness .81 1.23 .79 1.26 .76 1.32 
Participation in ethnic 
organization 
.79 1.27 .75 1.33 .75 1.33 
 
Table 2. VIFs of Individual determinants 
 
 
 
Determinants 
Collinearity Statistics 
Contact avoidance Avoidance of future 
spouse 
Support of residential 
segregation 
Tolerance VIF Tolerance VIF Tolerance VIF 
Gender 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Homogamy parents 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Household income .80 1.26 .79 1.26 .80 1.26 
Parents education .72 1.39 .72 1.38 .72 1.38 
Parents occupational 
status 
.95 1.05 .95 1.05 .95 1.05 
Parents occupation .82 1.21 .82 1.21 .82 1.21 
 
Table 3. VIFs of Intermediate variables 
 
 
 
Determinants 
Collinearity Statistics 
Contact avoidance Avoidance of future 
spouse 
Support of residential 
segregation 
Tolerance VIF Tolerance VIF Tolerance VIF 
Salience religious 
identity 
.77 1.29 .77 1.29 .77 1.29 
Salience ethnic identity .82 1.22 .82 1.21 .82 1.21 
Perceived threat .66 1.52 .66 1.51 .66 1.51 
Quantity contact .73 1.36 .73 1.36 .73 1.37 
Quality of contact .68 1.46 .68 1.46 .68 1.46 
Positive in-group .54 1.87 .54 1.86 .54 1.85 
Negative out-group .65 1.55 .64 1.55 .65 1.54 
Monism .48 2.07 .48 2.07 .48 2.07 
Pluralism .71 1.41 .71 1.41 .71 1.41 
Intratextual 
fundamentalism 
.56 1.80 .56 1.80 .56 1.79 
Hermeneutic 
interpretation 
.85 1.18 .85 1.18 .85 1.17 
Perceived discrimination .76 1.31 .76 1.31 .76 1.31 
Memory of violence .69 1.45 .69 1.45 .69 1.45 
Direct violence .52 1.93 .52 1.93 .52 1.92 
Indirect violence .56 1.78 .56 1.77 .57 1.77 
Nationalism .69 1.44 .69 1.44 .70 1.43 
Regiocentrism .85 1.18 .85 1.18 .85 1.17 
National pride .76 1.31 .76 1.31 .77 1.31 
Distrust .71 1.41 .71 1.41 .70 1.42 
Dominance orientation .86 1.16 .86 1.16 .86 1.16 
Equality orientation .80 1.25 .80 1.26 .80 1.25 
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Table 1. VIFs of ethno-religious identification variables 
 
 
 
Determinants 
Collinearity Statistics 
Contact avoidance Avoidance of future 
spouse 
Support of residential 
segregation 
Tolerance VIF Tolerance VIF Tolerance VIF 
Religious practice .78 1.28 .77 1.29 .77 1.30 
Rites of passage .60 1.66 .61 1.63 .63 1.60 
Collective rites .58 1.74 .58 1.72 .60 1.68 
Religious in-group friends .81 1.23 .78 1.27 .75 1.34 
Religious out-group 
friends 
.85 1.18 .85 1.17 .83 1.20 
Participation in religious 
organization 
.67 1.49 .63 1.58 .63 1.58 
Ethnic ceremonies .87 1.15 .87 1.15 .85 1.17 
Ethnic languages .90 1.12 .89 1.12 .89 1.13 
Soc. embededness .81 1.23 .79 1.26 .76 1.32 
Participation in ethnic 
organization 
.79 1.27 .75 1.33 .75 1.33 
 
Table 2. VIFs of Individual determinants 
 
 
 
Determinants 
Collinearity Statistics 
Contact avoidance Avoidance of future 
spouse 
Support of residential 
segregation 
Tolerance VIF Tolerance VIF Tolerance VIF 
Gender 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Homogamy parents 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Household income .80 1.26 .79 1.26 .80 1.26 
Parents education .72 1.39 .72 1.38 .72 1.38 
Parents occupational 
status 
.95 1.05 .95 1.05 .95 1.05 
Parents occupation .82 1.21 .82 1.21 .82 1.21 
 
Table 3. VIFs of Intermediate variables 
 
 
 
Determinants 
Collinearity Statistics 
Contact avoidance Avoidance of future 
spouse 
Support of residential 
segregation 
Tolerance VIF Tolerance VIF Tolerance VIF 
Salience religious 
identity 
.77 1.29 .77 1.29 .77 1.29 
Salience ethnic identity .82 1.22 .82 1.21 .82 1.21 
Perceived threat .66 1.52 .66 1.51 .66 1.51 
Quantity contact .73 1.36 .73 1.36 .73 1.37 
Quality of contact .68 1.46 .68 1.46 .68 1.46 
Positive in-group .54 1.87 .54 1.86 .54 1.85 
Negative out-group .65 1.55 .64 1.55 .65 1.54 
Monism .48 2.07 .48 2.07 .48 2.07 
Pluralism .71 1.41 .71 1.41 .71 1.41 
Intratextual 
fundamentalism 
.56 1.80 .56 1.80 .56 1.79 
Hermeneutic 
interpretation 
.85 1.18 .85 1.18 .85 1.17 
Perceived discrimination .76 1.31 .76 1.31 .76 1.31 
Memory of violence .69 1.45 .69 1.45 .69 1.45 
Direct violence .52 1.93 .52 1.93 .52 1.92 
Indirect violence .56 1.78 .56 1.77 .57 1.77 
Nationalism .69 1.44 .69 1.44 .70 1.43 
Regiocentrism .85 1.18 .85 1.18 .85 1.17 
National pride .76 1.31 .76 1.31 .77 1.31 
Distrust .71 1.41 .71 1.41 .70 1.42 
Dominance orientation .86 1.16 .86 1.16 .86 1.16 
Equality orientation .80 1.25 .80 1.26 .80 1.25 
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SUMMARY IN DUTCH 
Hoofdstuk 1: Introductie
Deze studie onderzoekt de relatie tussen etno-religieuze identificatie en de 
vermijding van intergroepscontact tussen moslims en christenen in Ambon 
en Yogyakarta, rekening houdend met factoren op individueel niveau. 
Daarmee probeert deze studie het gat in de literatuur te vullen tussen 
onderzoek dat de nadruk legt op economische en politieke competitie als 
belangrijkste oorzaken van conflict en onderzoek dat de nadruk legt op 
vooroordelen en discriminatie als belangrijke bronnen van conflict. De 
voornaamste hypothesen zijn gebaseerd op de etnische groep conflict 
theorie die met name werd ontwikkeld bij de analyse van (latente) etno-
religieuze conflicten in Westerse landen. Etno-religieuze identificatie 
wordt gezien als een onderdeel van het zelfconcept dat bouwt op de kennis 
ontleend aan groepslidmaatschap en de waarde en emotionele betekenis die 
aan dit groepslidmaatschap wordt toegekend (Tajfel, 1978). Etno-religieuze 
identificatie is het gevoel van een individu om bij een etno-religieuze groep 
te behoren, en waarbij de percepties, gevoelens, houdingen en gedrag die bij 
dit lidmaatschap horen worden gedeeld. Vermijding van intergroepscontact 
is de mate waarin mensen interactie met mensen buiten de eigen sociale 
of etno-religieuze groep ontwijken, voortkomend uit de cognitieve en 
emotionele afstand ten opzichte van hen. Vermijding van intergroepscontact 
wordt op drie aspecten gemeten: (1) algemene contactvermijding; (2) 
vermijding van mensen uit andere religieuze groepen als mogelijk 
toekomstige partner; en (3) steun voor residentiële segregatie.  
De centrale onderzoeksvraag is in welke mate er een relatie bestaat 
tussen etno-religieuze identificatie onder moslims en christenen in 
Ambon en Yogyakarta en het vermijden van intergroepscontact, rekening 
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houdend met factoren op het individueel niveau (geslacht, ouders’ 
religie, huishoudinkomen, alsook het onderwijsniveau, het beroep en 
de beroepsstatus van de ouders) en rekening houdend met intermediaire 
determinanten zoals saillantie van de identiteit, gepercipieerde 
groepsdreiging, feitelijk intergroepscontact, religiocentrisme, houdingen 
ten opzichte van religieuze pluraliteit, religiocentrisme, interpretatie van 
heilige schriften, gepercipieerde discriminatie, herinnering aan en ervaring 
met geweld, nationalisme, wantrouwen en sociale dominantie (‘social 
dominance orientation’). 
Hoofdstuk 2: Conceptueel kader
Contactvermijding tussen etno-religieuze groepen wordt in deze 
studie geproblematiseerd vanuit drie theoretische kaders:  de 
realistische conflicttheorie, de sociale identiteitstheorie, en de etnische 
groepsconflicttheorie. De realistische conflicttheorie ziet contactvermijding 
als deel van de (latente) conflicten tussen sociale groepen die voortkomen 
uit de competitie over schaarse bronnen die zowel materiële als immateriële 
goederen en waarden kunnen omvatten. Het kan daarbij bijvoorbeeld gaan 
om geld, goederen, macht of status. Realistische conflicttheorie stelt dat 
de schaarste aan bronnen conflict tussen groepen kan veroorzaken en kan 
resulteren in bijvoorbeeld meer vooroordelen,  steun voor discriminatie of 
contactvermijding. Recentelijk wordt gepercipieerde groepsdreiging als 
een intermediaire factor gezin tussen competitie over schaarse bronnen 
tussen groepen enerzijds en (latente) conflicten anderzijds. 
 De sociale identiteitstheorie beoogt te verklaren dat etno-religieuze 
identificatie een directe of indirecte invloed heeft op contactvermijding. De 
sociale identiteitstheorie beantwoordt de vraag waarom mensen hun eigen 
groep wél en andere groepen niet waarderen. Het belangrijkste standpunt van 
deze theorie is dat individuen een positief zelfconcept willen ontwikkelen. 
Sociale (contra-)identificatie is van belang in de constructie van een 
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positief zelfconcept en komt voort uit processen van sociale categorisering 
en sociale vergelijking. Individuen ontlenen hun  positief zelfconcept aan 
deze processen en bepalen de relatieve status en waarde van de eigen groep 
(‘in-group’) door deze te vergelijken met andere groepen (‘out-groups’).
Door contactvermijding tussen groepen in een breder perspectief te 
plaatsen en de positie van het individu in het geheel van het sociale systeem 
mee te nemen voegt etnische groepsconflicttheorie nieuwe dimensies toe 
aan de realistische conflicttheorie en de sociale identiteitstheorie. De theorie 
bevat de cruciale bewering dat “des te sterker de werkelijke competitie tussen 
etnische groepen op het individuele zowel als het contextuele niveau of des 
te sterker de waargenomen etnische dreiging, des te meer mechanismen 
van sociale (contra-)identificatie worden gesteund, leidend tot een sterkere 
nationalistische houding en discriminerende reacties” (Gijsberts et al. 2004: 
18). Aanvullend op deze drie belangrijke theorieën maakt dit onderzoek 
ook gebruik van andere theorieën en standpunten, door rekening te houden 
met saillantie van identiteit, feitelijk intergroepscontact, religiositeit, 
herinneringen aan en ervaringen met geweld, gepercipieerde discriminatie, 
nationalisme, wantrouwen en vertrouwen, en sociale dominantie (‘social 
dominance orientation’).
Hoofdstuk 3: dataverzameling en meetinstrumenten
We gebruikten kwalitatieve en kwantitatieve methoden om gegevens te 
verzamelen en te analyseren. De gegevens zijn verzameld middels enquêtes 
en interviews. Enquêtes werden afgenomen onder bachelorstudenten die 
hun eerste studiejaar reeds hadden voltooid in zes universiteiten in Ambon 
en Yogyakarta. Binnen iedere locatie werden een staatsuniversiteit, een 
christelijke universiteit en een islamitische universiteit gekozen. Meer 
specifiek zijn respondenten afkomstig van de volgende instellingen: Gadjah 
Mada Universiteit, (Universitas Gadjah Mada, UGM), de islamitische 
Staatsuniversiteit Sunan Kalijaga (Universitas Islam Negeri, UIN Sunan 
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Kalijaga) en de christelijke Duta Wacana Universiteit (Universitas Kristen 
Duta Wacana, UKDW) in Yogyakarta; en de Pattimura Universiteit 
(Universitas Pattimura, Unpatti), het islamitische Staatsinstituut van 
Ambon (Institut Agama Islam Negeri, IAIN Ambon) en de Indonesische 
Christelijke Universiteit in Maluku (Universitas Kristen Indonesia Maluku, 
UKIM) in Ambon. 
Onze steekproef laat zien dat moslims meer contact vermijden dan 
christenen. Onze respondenten in Ambon zijn meer geneigd om contact met 
andere etnisch-religieuze groepen te vermijden dan studenten in Yogyakarta. 
Mensen behorend tot een andere religieuze traditie worden sterk vermeden 
als mogelijke toekomstige partner. Klasgenoten met een andere etnisch-
religieuze achtergrond worden het minst gemeden. Zowel moslims als 
christenen hebben een sterke etnisch-religieuze identificatie, gebaseerd op 
metingen van etnische en religieuze praktijken, participatie in religieuze 
ceremonies en vriendschappen per religie. Islamitische respondenten 
blijken een sterkere etno-religieuze identificatie te hebben dan christelijke 
respondenten. De meeste respondenten komen uit de middenklasse en hun 
ouders zijn veelal werkzaam als arbeider. Gemiddeld hebben de ouders 
van christelijke respondenten een hogere sociaaleconomische positie 
(werk en opleiding) dan de ouders  van islamitische respondenten.  Het 
aantal mannelijke en vrouwelijke respondenten is nagenoeg gelijk, met een 
gemiddelde leeftijd van 22 jaar. 
Hoofdstuk 4: De sociale locatie van contactvermijding tussen groepen: 
resultaten van bivariate analyse
Moslims geven aan dat zij Javaans, Sundanees, Madurees, Ambonees of 
Butonees zijn. Een minderheid valt onder te brengen onder een aantal andere 
kleine etnische groepen. Bijna de helft van de islamitische respondenten 
zijn Javaans en nagenoeg een derde is Ambonees. Christelijke respondenten 
identificeerden zichzelf als Ambonees, Javaans, Chinees, Batak of Toraja. 
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Sommige  van hen kwamen ook van andere, kleinere etnische groepen. 
Meer dan de helft van onze christelijke respondenten identificeerde 
zichzelf als Ambonees. We combineerden etniciteit en religie in etno-
religieuze zelfdefinitie vanwege de aanmerkelijke overlap tussen etniciteit 
en religiositeit. 
Om contactvermijding te meten bevroegen we de studenten op een 
aantal indicatoren van contactvermijding. Dit resulteerde in valide en 
betrouwbare metingen. De meting van contactvermijding maakt gebruik van 
een rangorde van de meest vermeden tot meest geaccepteerd functierollen 
voor leden van de andere religieuze groep. Gebaseerd op de resultaten van 
de enquête vonden we dat moslims het meest geneigd zijn een christelijke 
burgemeester te vermijden. Daarnaast zijn veel islamitische respondenten 
terughoudend om christenen als huisgenoot of goede vriend te hebben. 
Slechts een paar moslims geven aan christelijke buren, politieagenten, 
ambtenaren, en klasgenoten niet te accepteren. Christenen hebben ook 
liever geen moslim als burgemeester. Christelijke respondenten geven 
ook aan terughoudend te zijn om moslims als politieagent of ambtenaar 
te accepteren. Slechts een paar christenen stelden moslims niet te 
accepteren als goede vrienden, huisgenoten, buren of klasgenoten. De 
resultaten van de enquête tonen ook aan dat zowel christenen en moslims 
in beide onderzoekslocaties mensen uit een andere religieuze vermijden als 
toekomstige partner. Bovendien is er relatief veel steun voor residentiële 
segregatie van moslims en christenen.  
Gebaseerd op de bivariate analyses (inzake etno-religieuze 
identificatie) vinden we dat onder moslims dat het hebben van vrienden 
uit de eigen groep positief samenhangt met contactvermijding, terwijl het 
daadwerkelijk hebben van vrienden uit andere etno-religieuze groepen 
negatief correleert met contactvermijding. Deelname aan overgangsrituelen 
en lidmaatschap van religieuze organisaties hangt samen met het 
vermijden van een toekomstige partner uit een andere religieuze groep, 
terwijl het hebben van vrienden uit andere etno-religieuze groepen en 
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deelname in etnische organisaties negatief samenhangt met het vermijden 
om een partner behorend tot een andere religieuze traditie. Bovendien 
correleert het hebben van vrienden uit de eigen groep positief en het 
hebben van vrienden uit andere groepen negatief met de voorkeur voor 
gesegregeerde woongemeenschappen. Bij christelijke respondenten zien 
we dat veel vriendschappen binnen de eigen groep positief samenhangt 
met contactvermijding. Ook correleert participatie in etnische ceremonies 
positief met het vermijden van een partner uit een andere religie. Tot 
slot hangen vriendschappen binnen de eigen groep en frequent etnische 
taalgebruik positief samen met steun voor residentiële segregatie, maar 
correleert het hebben van vrienden uit andere etno-religieuze groepen 
negatief met steun voor gescheiden woongemeenschappen.
De bivariate analyses met individuele determinanten tonen aan 
dat onder moslims een hoger huishoudinkomen en hogere beroepsstatus 
samenhangen met contactvermijding, terwijl het ouderlijk onderwijsniveau 
negatief samenhangt met contactvermijding. Mannen zijn minder geneigd 
levenspartners uit een andere religie te vermijden dan vrouwen. Beroep 
en beroepsstatus hangen positief samen met steun voor gescheiden 
woongemeenschappen. Onder christelijke respondenten vinden we ook dat 
mannen (potentiële) partners uit een andere religie minder vermijden dan 
vrouwen, en is er eveneens een positieve correlatie met  huishoudinkomen 
en ouderlijk onderwijsniveau.
De bivariate analyses met de intermediaire variabelen laten zien 
dat onder moslims religieuze saillantie, gepercipieerde dreiging, kwaliteit 
van contact, positieve in-group attitudes, negatieve out-group attitudes, 
monisme, hermeneutische interpretatie, gepercipieerde discriminatie en 
wantrouwen allemaal samenhangen met meer contactvermijding. Veel 
daadwerkelijk intergroepscontact (‘quantity of contact’) en een pluralistische 
houding ten opzichte van multireligiositeit gaan evenwel met minder 
contactvermijding. Bovendien zijn etnische saillantie, gepercipieerde 
dreiging, positieve in-group attitudes, negatieve out-group attitudes, 
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monisme, fundamentalisme, en wantrouwen positief gecorreleerd met steun 
voor residentiële segregatie. Onder christelijke respondenten vinden we 
een gelijkaardig, zij het minder uitgesproken, beeld. Meer gepercipieerde 
dreiging, meer negatieve out-group attitudes en meer fundamentalisme zijn 
de kenmerken van christenen die meer contact vermijden met moslims. 
De kwaliteit van feitelijk intergroepscontact hangt weinig verassend samen 
met minder contactvermijding. Wordt het contact met moslims positief 
gewaardeerd, dan heeft men ook minder problemen met een mogelijke 
toekomstige partner uit een andere traditie. Ten slotte zijn etnische saillantie, 
gepercipieerde dreiging, positieve in-group attitudes, negatieve out-group 
attitudes, monisme, fundamentalisme, hermeneutische interpretatie en 
wantrouwen positief gecorreleerd aan steun voor residentiële segregatie, 
terwijl een meer contacten (‘quantity of contact’) met andere groepen 
verband houdt met minder steun voor residentiële segregatie. 
Hoofdstuk 5: Contactvermijding op het individuele niveau: resultaten van 
multivariate model testen
Etno-religieuze zelfdefinitie en bepaalde aspecten etno-religieuze 
identificatie blijken significant te zijn in de verklaring van het vermijden 
van intergroepscontact. Afgezien van Sundanese moslims zijn alle andere 
islamitische etnische groepen meer geneigd om contact te vermijden met 
christenen dan de referentiecategorie, Javaanse moslims. Alle christelijke 
etnische groepen scoren evenwel lager op contactvermijding dan de 
Javaanse moslims. Islamitische etnische groepen zijn ook meer geneigd 
om mensen uit een andere religie hebben meer te vermijden als toekomstige 
partner dan referentiecategorie van Javaanse moslims, met uitzondering van 
Sundanese moslims en Madurese moslims. Christelijke etnische groepen 
zijn juist geneigd om mensen uit een andere religie (i.c. moslims) minder 
te vermijden als toekomstige partner. Bovendien zijn de islamitische 
etnische groepen meer de geneigd om gescheiden woongemeenschappen 
(residentiële segregatie) te steunen dan Javaanse moslims. Met uitzondering 
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van de Ambonese christenen vertonen christelijke etnische groepen minder 
voorkeur voor residentiële segregatie dan Javaanse moslims. 
Sommige aspecten van religieuze identificatie en een enkel aspect 
van etnische identificatie hebben aanzienlijke effecten op de vermijding 
van intergroepscontact. We vinden dat mensen die meer regelmatig aan 
religieuze activiteiten deelnemen intergroepscontact vermijden. Mensen 
met meer vrienden uit de ‘in-group’ en minder vrienden uit de ‘out-groups’ 
zijn ook geneigd om contact met mensen van andere etno-religieuze groepen 
te vermijden. Bovendien zijn mensen die vaker in religieuze praktijken 
deelnemen en minder vrienden uit andere religies hebben meer geneigd 
om mensen uit een andere religieuze traditie te vermijden als toekomstige 
partner. Tot slot, mensen die vaker deelnemen aan overgangsrituelen, meer 
vrienden uit dezelfde etno-religieuze groep hebben en minder vrienden uit 
een andere religieuze groep zullen een sterkere voorkeur vertonen voor 
residentiële segregatie. In het algemeen zijn deze bevindingen consistent 
met de sociale identiteitstheorie die stelt dat sociale identificatie gepaard 
gaat met negatieve houdingen ten opzichte van andere groepen en meer 
positieve houdingen ten opzichte van de eigen groep.
Bepaalde individuele determinanten leveren ook een significante 
bijdrage aan de verklaring van de vermijding van intergroepscontact. 
Respondenten met ouders die werken in de handel zijn verrassend genoeg 
meer geneigd tot contactvermijding dan respondenten uit andere families. 
Vrouwen zijn meer geneigd iemand uit een andere religie te vermijden als 
toekomstige partner dan mannen, en respondenten uit huishoudens met een 
modaal inkomen zijn minder geneigd een toekomstige partner uit een andere 
religie te vermijden dan respondenten met een hoog huishoudinkomen. 
Respondenten van families die werken in de handel zijn meer geneigd om 
mensen die een andere religie hebben te vermijden als toekomstige partner 
dan respondenten uit boerenfamilies. Studenten uit arbeidersfamilies 
zijn meer geneigd om residentiële segregatie te steunen dan mensen van 
families die zelfstandig ondernemer zijn. En mensen van families die in 
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de handel werkzaam zijn, zijn vaker geneigd om residentiële segregatie 
te steunen dan mensen van boerenfamilies. Tegen onze verwachtingen in, 
zijn sommige individuele determinanten niet van belang voor de verklaring 
van het vermijden van intergroepscontact, zoals ouderlijke religiositeit en 
onderwijsniveau.
De relatie tussen etno-religieuze identificatie en vermijding van 
intergroepscontact  kan worden uitgelegd aan de hand van verschillende 
intermediaire determinanten: etnische saillantie, gepercipieerde dreiging, 
kwaliteit en kwantiteit van contact, negatieve out-group attitudes, 
monisme, pluraliteit, fundamentalisme, regiocentrisme, en wantrouwen 
tegenover andere religieuze groepen. Consistent met onze verwachtingen 
hangt etnische saillantie samen met steun voor residentiële segregatie. Ook 
gepercipieerde dreiging is van belang: des te groter deze gepercipieerde 
dreiging is, des te meer contactvermijding en steun voor residentiële 
segregatie. Op basis van de multivariate analyses kunnen we het volgende in 
algemene zin zeggen. Ten eerste reduceren meer feitelijk intergroepscontact 
(‘quantity’) en een positieve beoordeling van dit contact (‘quality’) de steun 
voor residentiële segregatie. Sterkere negatieve houdingen ten opzichte van 
religieuze andere groepen leiden tot meer contactvermijding. Een religieus 
pluralistische houding reduceert contactvermijding, terwijl religieus 
monisme de tendens om mensen uit een andere religie hebben te vermijden 
als toekomstige partner vergroot. Religieus fundamentalisme versterkt de 
steun voor residentiële segregatie. Afwijkend van onze hypothese is dat 
een sterkere regiocentrische houding de neiging om mensen die een andere 
religie hebben te vermijden als toekomstige partner verkleint. Als laatste, 
zoals we verwachtten leidt een sterker gevoel van wantrouwen voor mensen 
uit andere religieuze groepen tot meer contactvermijding en meer afkeer 
van mensen uit een andere religie als mogelijke toekomstige partner. 
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Hoofdstuk 6: Conclusie
Dit onderzoek stelt een aantal theoriegestuurde verklaringen voor 
contactvermijding tussen etno-religieuze groepen in Indonesië voor. 
We hebben verschillende sociaal relevante onderzoeksvragen gesteld 
over de relatie tussen etno-religieuze identificatie en het vermijden van 
intergroepscontact. Dit zijn vragen die tot nu toe niet zo grootschalig 
onderzocht zijn in de Indonesische context, daarin begrepen een gebied 
dat veelvuldig door manifest geweld wordt geplaagd. Dit onderzoek levert 
een bijdrage aan de ontwikkeling van empirische onderzoeksmethoden 
door de combinatie van kwantitatieve en kwalitatieve benaderingen. In het 
algemeen was deze triangulatie van gegevens de moeite waard. Bevindingen 
van de enquêtes werden geïllustreerd met en in groter detail uitgewerkt 
door de bevindingen uit de interviews. De respondenten maakten in de 
interviews evenwel geen melding van aanvullende relevante dimensies 
die we nog niet in de enquête in kaart brachten. Onze combinaties van 
methoden zorgde voor meer informatie in termen van representatie van 
respondenten en een gedetailleerde beschrijving van sociale contexten. Dit 
empirische onderzoek probeert een gat in de literatuur van conflictstudies 
te dichten, waar eerdere wetenschappelijke literatuur zich voornamelijk 
richt op economische en politieke strijd. Dit onderzoek heeft daarmee een 
belangrijke dimensie van latent conflict op het individueel niveau in kaart 
gebracht, zowel in conflictgebied als in een gebied dat relatief vredig is. l 
425
SUmmARy In dUtch
CURRICULUM VITAE
Cahyo Pamungkas was born on 11 September 1975 in the village of 
Wareng, Purworejo, Central Java, Indonesia. He graduated from the 
Department of Economics and Development Studies at Gadjah Mada 
University, Yogyakarta (Indonesia) in 1999. Between 2000 and 2002, he 
worked at the Economic and Social Institute for Research, Education, and 
Information (LP3ES) Jakarta. Since 2003, he has worked as a researcher 
of social sciences at the Research Centre of Regional Resources (PSDR), 
the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI). Between 2003 and 2005, he 
conducted research on separatism and the formation of nation states in 
the Philippines and Thailand. In addition, he conducted studies on the 
relationship between ethno-religious groups in Maluku and Papua. From 
2005 to 2006, he received the Asia Public Intellectual (API) fellowship from 
the Nippon Foundation to do a study on “The Effectiveness of Autonomous 
Region for Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) in Coping with the Separatism 
and the Role of National Reconciliation Commission of Thailand in Peace 
Building.” He continued his graduate education and received Master 
of Science in Sociology in 2008 from the Postgraduate programme of 
Sociology, the University of Indonesia. His field work in Jayapura for his 
research thesis entitled “Papua Muslim and special autonomy, contestation 
of identity among the people of Papua,” was funded by the Friedrich Ebert 
Stiftung (FES), Germany. Between 2005 and 2008, together with his 
colleagues in LIPI, he made a study on the separatist conflict of West Papua. 
In 2008, they published a book entitled “Papua Road Map” that became a 
reference to resolve the conflict. Between December 2010 and December 
2014, Cahyo Pamungkas performed his PhD studies at Radboud University 
Nijmegen (the Netherlands), supported by the Netherlands Organisation 
for Scientific Research (NWO).
